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The 9th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
3-6 July 2018
1
The role of reasons in deliberation dialogues
CRISTINA CORREDOR
Department of Philosophy
University of Valladolid
corredor@fyl.uva.es
ABSTRACT: The aim of this contribution is to study the role of argumentation within deliberation. With
that aim in view, I will examine the Deliberation Dialogue Model set forth by McBurney, Hitchcock and
Parsons (2017). Taking as a point of departure an interactional approach to speech acts, I will contend that
the model presents some difficulties in accounting for acts of arguing. I will conclude with some
reflections on the role of argumentation in deliberation dialogues.
KEYWORDS: acts of arguing, Austin, deliberation, Deliberation Dialogue Model, Speech Act Theory,
Toulmin’s model.
1. INTRODUCTION. THE CONCEPT OF DELIBERATION
Within the framework of dialogical approaches to the study of argumentation,
deliberation has been characterized for the following features: (i) it departs from an
initial situation in which there is a need for action; (ii) the relationship among
participants is collaborative; (iii) the goal of any participant is to coordinate goals and
actions; and finally, (iv) the goal of the dialogue is that the participants agree on the best
available course of action for implementation (Walton and Krabbe, 1995). As a result,
practical argumentation is a core form of argument in deliberation. The form of the final
decision can be made explicit by means of an utterance of the form ‘We ought to do A’,
or ‘A is the best course of action for implementation’ (where A is an action to be
performed in response to some problem, issue, etc. of a practical nature) (Walton 2006).
Although it can be said of an individual person that she deliberates, in reference to her
thinking about something and deciding carefully, the notion here considered is
dialogical in that it applies to a group of persons that discuss and consider the reasons
for and against a practical decision. To that extent, it is a dialectical notion as well.
There seems to be a general consensus among scholars in considering that the
speech act of making a proposal must be seen as a defining feature of this type of
dialogue and is necessarily present in deliberation, as a first response to the envisaged
situation (cf. Corredor, 2018). This allows also identifying two main roles among
participants, namely, those of proponent (the speaker who makes a proposal) and
respondent (the addressee whose role is to respond to the proposal in a number of
ways). These roles may shift in the course of the dialogue and, in group deliberation,
can be undertaken by more than one participant in alternate turns.
Two main trends have been identified in the study of deliberation within the
framework of argumentation theory (cf. Walton, 2006), namely, the BDI Model (for
Belief-Desire- Intention), and the Commitment Model. The BDI model (cf. Kauffeld,
1998; Wooldrige, 2000; Paglieri and Castellfranchi, 2005) is an explicitly psychological
model. It assumes the general thesis that types of speech act correspond to and are
defined by the types of attitude being expressed. Although this model will not be
The 9th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
3-6 July 2018
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addressed and discussed here, it seems to me that it is generally prone to a common
objection. In the particular case of deliberation, there seems to be an internal, core
connection between the speech act of making a proposal and the notions of burden of
proof and openness to questioning and refutation, as regulated moves that structure the
dialogue. But these are normative regulations which go beyond, and cannot be fully
explained in terms of the mere expression of an attitude.
The Commitment Model (as represented by Singh, 1999; and McBurney,
Hitchcock, and Parsons, 2001 and 2007) sees speech acts as moves in a dialogue
through which two or more agents interact with each other. Moreover, each agent is
assumed to have a commitment set, where a commitment is a proposition that an agent
has gone on record as accepting (Hamblin 1970). The commitment set of the agents can
change with their moves (speech acts), where these changes concern the insertion of
new commitments or the retraction from previous ones. Interestingly, a possible type of
speech act is the putting forward of an argument. This group of approaches is mainly
driven by the search of a formal model that could be implemented in computational
entities (such as autonomous software agents). Notwithstanding this apparently limited
scope, their analyses of deliberation as a type of dialogue can throw light on the types of
dialectical moves that are characteristic of it.
Here, I will focus my attention on an influential expression of the Commitment
Model, which has been set forth by McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons by means what
they term the Deliberation Dialogue Model (DDM). In particular, when presenting their
DDM, these authors claim,
An important motivation for our work is the development of protocols which enable rational
interaction between participants, where rational is used in the minimal sense of giving and
receiving of reasons for statements. (McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons, 2007, p. 11).
It must be highlighted that both the BDI Model and the Commitment Model,
tacitly or explicitly, assume the idea that deliberative dialogues are a type of
argumentative interaction, in that argumentation is central to the dialogue. In my light,
however, the DDM falls short of capturing this core aspect of deliberation. In the next
sections, my aim is twofold: firstly, to express some doubts with respect to the role that
argumentation plays within the DD Model, and secondly, to suggest a possible line of
development in order to address these difficulties.
2. THE DELIBERATION DIALOGUE MODEL
According to the Deliberation Dialogue Model (DDM), the following are main features
and component elements that characterize deliberation dialogues.
(i) The need for action may initially be expressed in the form of a governing
question, possibly open-ended.
(ii) Proposals for action may arise only late in the dialogue, “after discussion on
the governing question, and discussion of the considerations that are relevant
for its resolution” (McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons, 2007, p. 4)
Commentary. Notice that this last feature strongly suggests that the discussion
takes place through argumentation, by means of giving reasons and
discussing/evaluating those reasons.
The 9th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
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(iii) The formal model of deliberation dialogues comprises eight stages, namely,
Open, Inform, Propose, Consider, Revise, Recommend, Confirm, and Close.
Commentary. Notice that, because proposals are supposed to only appear late in
the dialogue (after discussion of the governing question and the considerations that are
relevant for its resolution), the giving and asking for reasons should mainly take place
within the stages Consider and Revise. This interpretation does not exclude that other
stages, particularly Inform, can afford data which, in a posterior stage, can and will
qualify as reasons worth of consideration. Nevertheless, in my light, a piece of
information does not in itself qualify as a reason, unless other conditions are in place
(this suggestion will be addressed below, section 3). Therefore, the focus here will be on
the stages Consider and Revise. Incidentally, I take my interpretation to be in tune with
the DDM assumption that proposals only arise in the dialogue after some discussions
have taken place.
According to the authors, the stages Consider and Revise consist of the
following actions:
Consider: Commenting on proposals from various perspectives.
Revise: Revising of: (a) goals, (b) constraints, (c) perspectives, and/or (d) action
options in the light of the comments presented; and the undertaking of any
information-gathering or fact-checking required for resolution.
Interestingly, in relation to the Consider stage, the authors note that “other types
of dialogues, such as information seeking or persuasion, may be embedded in the
deliberative dialogue at this stage.” (ibid., p. 6). The fact that persuasion dialogues are
seen as possibly embedded in deliberation, yet as different from the latter, may be seen
also in tune with the DDM assumption that deliberation dialogues are directed at
reaching a joint decision, and not at persuading other participants in order to see one’s
personal interests accommodated. Additionally, the proponents of the DDM also
stipulate that at least an instance of the Consider stage must precede the first instance of
the Revise stage.
(iv) Types of sentences: the eight stages, in particular Consider and Revise, take
place by means of a dialogue in which the following types of sentences may
appear: Actions, Goals, Constraints, Perspectives, Facts, and Evaluations.
When sentences belonging to these types are uttered in the course of the
dialogue, the resulting moves in the interaction are termed locutions. Dialogues are thus
seen as interactions that take place by means of locutions, which are uttered following
certain rules. Uttering a locution in this way constitutes a move in the interaction.
(v) Different types of locutions may take place within the different stages of the
deliberation. In particular, the DDM considers the following:
• making an assertion, assert(.)
• preferring a particular option for action, prefer(.)
• asking the other party to justify an assertion, ask justify(.)
The 9th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
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• pronouncing on whether a proposal for action should be accepted or
rejected, assert(action) and reject(.)
• retracting a previous locution, retract(.)
• withdrawing from the deliberation dialogue, withdraw(.)
(Here, the dots between parentheses indicate the positions to be occupied by the
occurrence of certain symbols of the formal language, standing for: one or more agents,
types of sentences, and sentences.)
In particular,
- the locution assert(Pi, type, t) is an assertion by participant Pi of the sentence
t as a valid instance of type type;
- the locution ask_justify(Pj, Pi, type, t) is a request by participant Pj
addressed to participant Pi, seeking justification for the assertion of sentence
t of type type (where t belongs to Pi’s commitment set)
- the locution prefer(Pi, a, b) expresses that participant Pi prefers action a over
action b.
Commentary. Notice that assert, prefer, and ask_justify (as well as pronounce on
a proposal, retract, and declare one’s withdrawal) are, in the standard approach of
contemporary pragmatics, illocutionary speech acts. Although conceptualizing them as
locutions is in agreement with a semantic approach to the study of dialogues, the fact
that this notion is characterized by the authors as a regulated move in the course of an
interaction gives support to the view that locutions are a semantic representation of
speech acts. Taking locutions to be representations of speech acts is further supported
by the observation that they embed, together with certain sentences (and types of
sentences), a representation of the participants whose interaction is mediated by the
utterance itself.
In what follows, and in order to advance my analysis of the model, I will adopt
the above suggested interpretation and take it that locutions are a semantic
representation of speech acts, i.e. of the actions accomplished in dialogue in virtue of
the words uttered. For brevity, instead of talking about representations of speech acts, I
will just refer to speech acts.
Now, to guarantee the rationality of the process (in the minimal sense seen
above), the authors stipulate the constraint that a preference between actions should
only be expressed for actions already evaluated. Evaluations are presented as a type of
sentence (ibid., p. 8), without further specification. From this, it seems to follow that
evaluations are taken to be a primitive notion, given in the form of a type of sentence.
Notice, however, that asserting an evaluative sentence, the type of move that the DDM
takes into account in an explicit form, does not in itself qualify as giving a reason,
unless some other conditions hold –as pointed out above. This is the issue to be
explored in the next section.
3. SOME DIFFICULTIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SPEECH ACT THEORY
A point of departure for the exploration to be carried out is the ascertainment that,
among the group of speech acts considered in (v), the illocutionary force of several of
them is not in itself argumentative, nor is there a need that the corresponding illocution
The 9th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
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should play a role in argumentation, in the giving and asking for reasons. Among the
types of speech act that are recognized and incorporated within the DD Model, and with
the purpose of focusing on the argumentative stages of the dialogue, I suggest to
distinguish the following, tentative two groups of locutions/speech acts:
a. Speech acts that do not play a (direct, explicit) role in giving and asking for
reasons: prefer(.), assert(action) (in the sense of promoting it), reject(.),
retract(.), withdraw(.)
b. Speech acts that may be used to give and ask for reasons: (1) making an
assertion, assert(.); and (2) asking the other party to justify an assertion,
ask_justify(.)
Some illocutions of the first group would be apt to be put forward as reasons.
For instance, a personal preference may be alleged as a datum that the agent wishes to
see taken into consideration by the other participants. Analogously, also the
locutions/speech acts assert(action) (in the sense of promoting it) and reject(.) may be
adduced as reasons. These moves would presuppose a context in which the participants’
necessities, interests, preferences, etc. were to be seen as relevant data for the final
decision. (Imagine e.g. the members of a family deliberating on whether they should
move to a different country). In my light, when so adduced, these speech acts acquire a
different illocutionary force from the primary one (in the three above considered cases
of prefer, promote an action and reject, this primary force would be that of exercitive
speech acts). In such types of context, the illocution would become that of giving a
reason. In the simplest case, the move could be paraphrased as: ‘This is my reason in
support of action A: that I prefer/promote action A’; and a corresponding paraphrasing
for rejection. My suggestion is that these types of move constitute instances of the
illocution of giving a reason, as part of a more comprehensive speech act of arguing
1
.
My concern is to try and capture the moves that are specific to the actions of
giving and asking for reasons. For that, it seems advisable to pay a closer look to the
types ask_justify(.) and assert(.)
- Asking the other party to justify an assertion, ask_justify(.)
Within Speech Act Theory and in Austin’s original classification, this speech act
is an exercitive. Exercitives are illocutions that consist of the exercise of powers, rights,
or influence (1962, p. 150). They presuppose some degree of authority or
authoritativeness on the part of the speaker and, correspondingly, assign or confer
obligations, powers or rights to the addressee. In Searle’s taxonomy, ask_justify(.) is a
directive speech act, whose illocutionary point consists in “an attempt by the speaker to
get the hearer to do something” (Searle 1975, p. 13). This view, to the extent that it is
stated by appealing to the speaker’s intentions, approaches the BDI Model. For this
1
Acts of arguing have already been dealt with in the literature in terms of speech act complexes. See
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, and Bermejo-Luque, 2011. I think they have pointed out in the right
direction. Yet, in my view, both theoretical models incur in a type of analysis that ultimately explains the
illocution in terms of the speaker’s intentions. This orientation is difficult to conciliate with the Austinian
view of speech actions I am endorsing, according to which the effects of speech acts are to be accounted
for as conventional effects of a social or interpersonal type, impinging on the normative stances of the
participants in the interaction.
The 9th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
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reason, Austin’s seems a better framework for the present analysis. Notwithstanding
this, Austin’s exercitives and Searle’s directives overlap (though Searle’s declaratives
would count for Austin as exercitives as well).
In a deliberation dialogue, a speaker’s asking for justification presupposes that
she is authorized to do so. To the extent that this move is acknowledged by the
participants to be available (and legitimate) in the course of the dialogue, it has the
conventional effect of transferring a corresponding obligation to the addressee –namely,
the obligation to justify. Moreover, one can take it that in an argumentative dialogue,
the obligation to justify will be (normally, usually) redeemed by giving reasons by
means of assertions.
- Making an assertion, assert(.)
In Austin’s classification, an assertion can be a verdictive or an expositive
speech act. In particular, verdictives are typified as the act of giving a verdict or finding
“upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact” (1962, pp. 150, 152). For Searle,
assertives (which overlap with Austin’s verdictives and expositives) are essentially
speech acts whose illocutionary purpose is “to commit the speaker (in varying degrees)
to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition.” (1975, p. 12).
Searle’s view entails that asserting commits the speaker in a certain way, a commitment
that may be seen as entering the speaker’s commitment set. Austin’s view entails the
following. A speaker’s asserting something presupposes that the speaker is availed of
some justification (in varying degrees) and is obliged (and expected) to give it,
whenever another participant asks for it.
My contention is that nothing entails that an assertion is, by itself, a justifying
reason for another assertion (a claim). Being a reason is a relational concept. For this
concept to be applied, not only has the targeted claim to be laid down (in an explicit or
implicit form); additionally, the assertion has to be set forth, and recognized by the
participants, as potentially supportive for the claim. I would add to that, following
Toulmin’s analysis of an argument
2
, that the arguer has to commit to the (possibly tacit)
inference-license that supports the step from the assertion recognized as reason to the
assertion recognized as claim. Inference-licenses, in Toulmin’s words, are what
“authorise the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us.” (1958, p. 91).
Even if the analyst were not to endorse Toulmin’s model of argument as such, acts of
arguing constitutively embed a step from reasons to claim that the act itself presents as
legitimate, appropriate, or correct (possibly modulating the inferential step by means of
some modal qualifier).
Due to this reason, taking into consideration the locution/speech act of making
an assertion does not qualify, in itself, as a component part of an act of arguing. From a
conceptual point of view, until a proposal (qua claim) has been laid down or is
somehow available to the participants, other information or piece of speech cannot be
seen as a reason given in support of it. In my view, it is the participants’ considerations
and revisions what would allow the analyst (and the participants themselves) to
recognize an act of arguing as such.
In order to better assess this point and try to determine the role that making an
assertion performs within the DD Model, it is worth noticing that assertions can be
2
Here I am endorsing Toulmin (1958)’s model, according to which an argument minimally consists of a
claim, together with a reason (that he terms datum or data, and that can be a fact, ground, etc.), and an
inferential license that links both (termed warrant). Cf. ibid., pp. 89-100.
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moves in any of the eight stages. Therefore, I will briefly examine them, before
suggesting some conclusions.
• Open, Propose, Recommend, Confirm, Close:
Although some assertions can be admissible moves in these stages, the main function
accomplished by them would be better expressed by means of other illocutions (e.g.:
exercitives and commissives in Austin’s classification; and directives, commissives and
declarations in Searle’s taxonomy)
• Inform:
Although information is standardly conveyed by means of assertions, these assertions
do not necessarily act as reasons supporting a viewpoint. As I have already contended, a
mere piece of information does not qualify in itself as a reason, unless it is embedded in
an act of arguing where other conditions also hold.
• Consider
According to McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons (2007), this stage consists of the
“Commenting on proposals from various perspectives.” As in the preceding stage,
notice that even if those commentaries are made by means of assertions, no
argumentative connection seems to have been here warranted. Interestingly, when
presenting the DD Model, Walton, Toniolo and Norman (2014) expand the original
definition in the following terms: “The Consider Stage. Comments are made on the
proposals that have been brought forward. At this stage, arguments for and against
proposals are considered.” (ibid., p. 3). Even if this reworking is fair to the DDM
authors’ intentions, it helps make manifest that the original model did not incorporate
this argumentative requirement, either explicitly or in an indirect form. The need to add
the requirement explicitly (to stipulate it, so to say), points out, in my view, to an
important limitation of formal models in general. Moreover, it urges the analyst to
inquiry where is the connection between a justifying reason and a claim captured in the
DD Model.
• Revise
According to McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons (2007), this stage consists of the
“Revising of: (a) goals, (b) constraints, (c) perspectives, and/or (d) action options in the
light of the comments presented; and the undertaking of any information-gathering or
fact-checking required for resolution.” It is the move ask_justify(.) that obliges the
addressee to either retract her claim, or shift into an embedded persuasion dialogue in
which she seeks to persuade her addressee of the validity of her claim
3
. For the above
mentioned authors, however, a persuasion dialogue differs from a deliberative one, in
that in the former the speaker attempts to obtain the addressee’s adherence, whereas in
deliberation the common goal is to reach a mutual decision on the best course of action.
Undoubtedly, this is the reason why they keep apart deliberation from persuasion
dialogues. In my view, the conceptual difference they draw is sound and most relevant
3
Douglas Walton and Alice Toniolo (2016) have noticed that standard approaches to deliberation
dialogue are similar to persuasion dialogues in that the opening issue is set at the opening stage and stays
in place during the argumentation stage. They contend that this characterization falls short of capturing
the kind of revision accomplished in many real deliberations, where the opening issue may be changing as
the deliberation moves forward. As a result, their proposal is to distinguish between two types of
deliberation, namely, problem-solving and the dilemma types. The criticism here developed addresses a
conceptual issue that I take not to be affected by the distinction.
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for a correct characterization of deliberation dialogues. Notwithstanding this, our
question remains unanswered. How is the connection between justifying reasons and
claim captured by the DD Model?
A more comprehensive question would be how is the connection between
justifying reasons and the claims supported by them to be accounted for in deliberation?
My suggestion has been that the act of giving a reason cannot be assimilated to making
an assertion simpliciter, in a straightforward way. A formal model (as the DDM) has to
account for the kind of action that speakers perfom when they bring forward reasons to
justify a claim. Furthermore, not only the adduced reasons, but also the inferential
license that authorizes the step from reason to claim has to be accounted for as a move
in the deliberation dialogue. Correspondingly, the notion of commitment set should be
expanded in order to also integrate these elements. Incidentally, it is worth noticing that
the antecedent considerations point to a direction towards which classical speech act
theory is in need of expansion.
4. CONCLUSION
To sum up,
1. I think the proponents of the DD Model are right in their conceptual characterization
of deliberation dialogues. Yet their formal model does not capture, but presupposes the
kind of argumentative interaction that is essential in deliberation.
2. From a speech act theoretical perspective, their work points at the direction in which
this theory needs to be expanded.
3. Engaging in a deliberation dialogue means performing two speech actions additional
to the ones identified by the DDM framework. Namely, those of bringing forward
reasons to justify a claim, and of committing to the inferential license that authorizes the
step from reasons to claim.
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE ROLE OF ARGUMENTATION IN
DELIBERATION DIALOGUES
What is the role of argumentation in deliberation dialogues? Remember that, in
deliberation, a joint decision is aimed at by the participants on a course of action. It can
be said, moreover, that the final decision is jointly adopted (whenever this is the case)
for the reasons given and taking into account the alternatives dismissed. In practical
terms, deliberation grants that the participants join the decision, that they endorse it –
and not merely acquiescence to it. This consideration is in line with the tenet that,
epistemically, deliberation plays in practical matters a role analogous to ‘tracking the
truth’, where ‘truth’ in practical matters is to be understood as rightness or correctness
(cf. among others Habermas, 2006, and Estlund, 2008)
4
.
A first approximation to this issue, within the framework of deliberative theories
of democracy, is egregiously represented by Rawls’s appeal to the rationality of
political decisions as a source of legitimacy. He says,
4
A relevant distinction here is that between practical and theoretical reasoning and argumentation.
Theoretical reasoning (and argumentation) is directed at setting forth evidence that may count for or
against the truth of a proposition. Practical reasoning (and argumentation) aims at a correct decision
concerning a course of action. (See Walton, 2006, p. 179). As already noticed at the outset, section 2,
practical argumentation is a core form of dialogue in deliberation.
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Since political power is the coercive power of free and equal citizens as a corporate body, this
power should be exercised (...) only in ways that all citizens can reasonably be expected to
endorse in the light of their common human reason. (Rawls, 1993, pp. 139-140)
In this way, Rawls connects a fair procedural rationality, as based on the power
of reason in public political discourse, with democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless,
legitimacy and truth are different concepts, and Rawls’s statement points to a
conceptual problem worth of consideration. As Estlund (2008) criticizes, the position
separates democratic authority (legitimacy) from truth. He contends that “a standard of
democratic approval is not normatively adequate without some appeal to substantive
standards by which democratic decisions ought to be evaluated” (ibid., pp. 23-24; see
also p. 179). He further contends, nevertheless, that deliberation facilitates outcomes
tending to approach some standards of practical truth (justice, or the common good,
e.g.) which should be seen, in themselves, as independent of the deliberative procedure.
A substantive standard is put forward by Bohman (1996), who points out, “The
deliberative process forces citizens to justify their decisions and opinions by appealing
to common interests or by arguing in terms of reasons that ‘all could accept’ in public
debate.” (ibid., p. 5)
This idea is in line with the notion of deliberation here considered, as originally
formulated by Krabbe and Walton (1995). To the extent that the participants in the
deliberation do not pursue their individual goals and interests, but collaboratively try to
contribute to finding the best proposal for action, the rationality of the dialogue is not
instrumental and strategic, but oriented instead to the identification of the best reasons
justifying a decision. The dynamics of the dialogue, if it is carried out on an egalitarian
basis that allows every participant to dissent and raise doubts and objections, obliging
every participant to justify their claims, is the communicative procedure more likely to
enable the epistemic quality of the practical decision at issue.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has been made possible by the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of
Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through research project FFI2016-79317-P.
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