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Correlates of narcissism, self-reported lies, and self-assessed abilities to tell and detect lies, tell truths, and believe others

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This novel research focuses on the relations amongst narcissistic features, self‐assessed communication abilities related to lies and truths, and reports about actual lying. One hundred twenty‐five participants rated their ability to succeed at telling lies, telling the truth convincingly, detecting lies, and believing others. The participants also completed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and reported their weekly lying frequency using designated questions. Results indicated a positive link between narcissism and self‐ratings of the lie‐telling ability. High narcissistic scorers further exhibited confidence in their abilities to detect lies and to convince listeners using truthful communication. Finally, narcissism correlated with reports of telling frequent lies. Different narcissistic subscales correlated with telling different kinds of lies. The theoretical significance of the present results and their importance to the legal system were discussed.
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Correlates of narcissism, selfreported lies, and
selfassessed abilities to tell and detect lies, tell
truths, and believe others
Liza Zvi
|Eitan Elaad
Department of Criminology, Ariel University,
Ariel, Israel
Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ariel
University, Ariel, Israel
Liza Zvi, Department of Criminology, Ariel
University, Ariel, Israel.
This novel research focuses on the relations amongst narcis-
sistic features, selfassessed communication abilities related
to lies and truths, and reports about actual lying. One hun-
dred twentyfive participants rated their ability to succeed
at telling lies, telling the truth convincingly, detecting lies,
and believing others. The participants also completed the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory and reported their weekly
lying frequency using designated questions. Results indi-
cated a positive link between narcissism and selfratings
of the lietelling ability. High narcissistic scorers further
exhibited confidence in their abilities to detect lies and to
convince listeners using truthful communication. Finally,
narcissism correlated with reports of telling frequent lies.
Different narcissistic subscales correlated with telling
different kinds of lies. The theoretical significance of the
present results and their importance to the legal system
were discussed.
deception, lietelling, narcissism, perceived lying ability, trust
The abilities to convince others with veracity, to identify when others are truthful or untruthful, and to successfully
lie to others are important aspects of human social life in general and of the legal process in particular (Elaad, 2015).
These abilities are mainly the product of the subjective way a person perceives oneself and others and may therefore
be biased. Our perception is inherently influenced by various internal and external factors (e.g., Dror & Murrie, 2018;
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© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received: 12 February 2018 Revised: 16 May 2018 Accepted: 21 July 2018
DOI: 10.1002/jip.1511
J Investig Psychol Offender Profil. 2018;116. 1
ShechoryBitton & Zvi, 2015, 2016, 2018; Zapf & Dror, 2017). The perceived ability to deliver the truth convincingly
is especially important in the interrogation situation. Recent admissibility of DNA evidence in court has led to the
exoneration of innocent individuals who were convicted after confessing to a crime they had never committed
(Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner, 2012). In all these cases, suspects failed to convince the interrogators that they told the
truth. It is currently unclear whether overconfidence or lack of confidence in the truthtelling ability is partly respon-
sible for these outcomes. When it comes to guilty suspects, their perceived ability to persuade when telling lies is
important to combat accusations of the legal system and avoid being tried and convicted. The perceived ability to
trust others when trust is justified and the perceived ability to detect lies when they are directed to the suspect dur-
ing the interrogation are equally important. This paves the way to the following questions: Can we identify people
with perceived high and low lietruthrelated abilities? And if so, what drive such people? The present study was
designed to consider these questions.
In a more general sense, studying perceived abilities is important because such perceptions influence thinking,
behaving, and feeling (see Bandura's selfefficacy theory, 1977, 1986). The concept of selfefficacy refers to people's
belief in their ability to accomplish their goals. Drawing from the selfefficacy theory, extreme ratings of the lieand
truthtelling abilities point at how such people may feel, behave, and think.
Earlier research has focused on studying the effects of actual lying and lie detection abilities on social life,
neglecting the impact of subjective lietruth ability assessments (e.g., DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein,
1996; Halevy, Shalvi, & Verschuere, 2014; Serota & Levine, 2015; Serota, Levine, & Boster, 2010).
The few studies that targeted these perceived abilities showed that people tend to rate high their ability to
detect lies (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Elaad, 2018). It was also evident that people tend to rate high their ability
to convince receivers of their truthful communications (Elaad, 2009; Elaad et al., 2012) and their tendency to
believe others (Elaad, 2011). In contrast, the perceived ability to convincingly tell lies was not overestimated (Ekman &
O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij, 2008). A recent metaanalysis conducted on nine studies and 1,169 participants (Elaad, 2018)
clearly demonstrated these perceived lietelling and liedetecting tendencies.
Theoretical explanations of these selfassessed lietruthrelated tendencies are grounded in how people per-
ceive or wish to perceive themselves and others. The above average effectsuggests that people tend to rank their
positive qualities above average and their negative ones below average (e.g., Williams & Gilovich, 2008). Specifically,
lying and dishonesty are considered undesirable attributes, and people are reluctant to think of themselves that way.
By lowly rating their ability to tell lies successfully, they consider themselves honest people and maintain a positive
selfimage (Elaad, 2015).
People further believe that most communications are truthful, and lack of veracity can be unveiled when not
(Kwan, Kuang, & Hui, 2009; Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999). Such thinking sustains (a) the tendency to believe
others; (b) the understanding that the truth should be believed; and (c) the impression that detecting other people's
lies is an easy task. Further, people are disinclined to think that they can be easily deceived (Tyler, Feldman, &
Reichert, 2006), which motivates them to believe that they are above average lie detectors (Elaad, 2003).
These tendencies are further explained by the fact that difficult lies and simple truths are more available than easily
formulated lies or hardtotell truths (DePaulo et al., 2003). Telling a lie is believed to be a difficult task whereas telling
the truth is believed to be a simple matter of telling it like it is(Buller & Burgoon, 1996; G. R. Miller & Stiff, 1993).
Another explanation is related to the illusion of transparency(Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), namely, the
tendency to think or feel that our emotions leak to other people. The illusion of transparency suggests that in com-
munication situations, senders are anchored to their own internal experience. When they realise that recipients are
not exposed to the same information as they are, they make an adjustment. However, the adjustment is insufficient
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and they tend to return to the anchor, believing that receivers can discern their internal
states; specifically, while their truths shine through, their lies are transparent and easily detectable (Vrij, 2008).
As people vary in the way they generally perceive themselves and others, individual differences are anticipated in
the selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities (Elaad & Reizer, 2015). For example, although most individuals believe that
most communications with others are truthful (Kwan et al., 2009), the propensity to trust other people varies
amongst people as a function of different developmental experiences, personality types and cultural backgrounds
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 715). In its extreme form, the tendency to believe others does not apply to
people with paranoid personality disorder, who are characterised by pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
People also differ in how they value lies as good or bad. Some people may categorise lies as dishonest and truths as
honest. In its extreme form, people may view lies as utterly unacceptable and may refrain from lying. Others may see
lies as an acceptable conduct in social interactions and use them frequently. The latter individuals may invest positive
valence to lies and dishonesty (Oliveira & Levine, 2008). It is not surprising that the selfassessed ability to successfully
tell lies is negatively associated with conscientiousness (Elaad & Reizer, 2015) and actual lying is positively associated
with psychopathy and lack of concern for others and merged with violent criminal behaviour (Halevy et al., 2014).
The correlation between personality features and ratings of own lietruthrelated abilities is understudied. Elaad
and Reizer (2015) showed that ratings of different lietruthrelated abilities were associated with some Big Five
personality dimensions. The current study aims to appraise for the first time the correlations between narcissism
and the various lietruth ability assessments.
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and empathy deficits typifies narcissism. Narcissistic
people possess a sense of entitlement. They show unreasonable expectations to receive preferential treatments
and admiration from others. Yet their selfesteem is fragile and vulnerable; when their ego is threatened, they may
respond with fury and hostility (Kohut, 1978; Ostrowsky, 2010; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Sadock, Sadock, & Ruiz, 2015).
Previous research has focused on the association between narcissism and deception of others (Azizli et al., 2016;
Baughman, Jonason, Lyons, & Vernon, 2014; Giammarco, Atkinson, Baughman, Veselka, & Vernon, 2013; Oliveira &
Levine, 2008). Oliveira and Levine (2008) associated narcissism and positive attitudes towards deceptive communi-
cation. Giammarco et al. (2013) found that narcissistic individuals believe themselves to be better liars than the
average person, and some recent studies linked narcissism to lying or unethical behaviour in various everyday life
situations (Azizli et al., 2016; Baughman et al., 2014; Jonason, Lyons, Baughman, & Vernon, 2014). In some of these
studies, narcissism has been assessed as part of the dark triad, a personality cluster composed of Machiavellianism,
psychopathy, and narcissism (Azizli et al., 2016; Baughman et al., 2014; Giammarco et al., 2013).
Like psychopathy, narcissism is considered a predictor of violence and aggression and is, therefore, an important
personality construct to be addressed in forensic contexts (Kohut, 1978; Larson, Vaughn, SalasWright, & Delisi,
2015). Nevertheless, because personality traits are dimensional by nature, the continuum of narcissism includes vary-
ing degrees of manifestations of narcissistic features and, in fact, includes varying degrees of adaptive and maladap-
tive forms of narcissism. Bearing in mind that narcissism can also be adaptive, connections to other aspects of human
communication aside from darkones are also important, specifically narcissists' tendency to trust or mistrust others,
perceived ability to convince others with their veracity, and perceived ability to detect others' lies. Such knowledge
can be useful both in forensic contexts (e.g., police interrogation) and in the context of understanding the mundane
communication style of narcissists.
Although the association between narcissism and deception has been previously established (Azizli et al., 2016;
Baughman et al., 2014; Giammarco et al., 2013; Oliveira & Levine, 2008), the contribution of narcissism to self
assessed lietruthrelated abilities is scarce. The goal of the present study is to investigate for the first time the asso-
ciation between narcissism and various selfreports of lietruthrelated abilities. It is expected that selfassessed
truthtelling, believing other people, and lie detection abilities will be rated as high, whereas the lietelling ability will
be rated around average. Drawing from clinical descriptions of the narcissistic character and studies on self
aggrandising tendencies typical of narcissists (e.g., John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus, 1998), the following predictions
are suggested: (a) More narcissistic participants will rate their lietelling ability higher than less narcissistic
participants; (b) higher narcissism scorers will selfassess their lie detection and truthtelling abilities higher than
lower narcissism scorers; and (c) as for trusting others, trust is positively associated with agreeableness (Elaad &
Reizer, 2015; McCrae & Costa, 1997; Zvi & Elaad, 2016). Agreeable people consider themselves to be nice, friendly,
and trustworthy (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Because narcissism is negatively associated with agreeableness (Costa &
McCrae, 1990; J. D. Miller et al., 2011; Paulhus & Williams, 2002), the prediction is that narcissistic participants will
not exhibit higher levels of trust in others than less narcissistic participants (see also Campbell, Bosson, Goheen,
Lakey, & Kernis, 2007).
The lietruthrelated abilities were recorded using the lietruth ability assessment scale (LTAAS). The LTAAS
(see Appendix A) is a selfreport questionnaire that was recently developed to individually assess each of the four
lietruthrelated abilities.
Relevant research on narcissism and deception has been frequently performed in the context of studying the
dark triad and using the shortD3 measure (e.g., Azizli et al., 2016; Giammarco et al., 2013). No relation of the dark
triad traits with actual ability to detect deception was found (Wissing & Reinhard, 2017; Wright, Berry, Catmur, &
Bird, 2015). However, total dark triad scores were positively associated with confidence in deception detection
ability. Specifically, high dark triad scorers judged their success in detection deception task to be better than their
actual performance (Wissing & Reinhard, 2017).
The shortD3 consists of 27 items, of which only nine items measure narcissism. To isolate narcissistic features,
the present study used the 40item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry,
1988) features. The 40 items represent seven dimensions: Authority, Selfsufficiency, Superiority, Exhibitionism,
Exploitativeness, Vanity, and Entitlement. A recent research indicated that the NPI can be divided into three factors
composed of 25 items from the original questionnaire: Leadership/Authority, capturing feelings of superiority and
desire for power; Grandiose Exhibitionism, capturing vanity and exhibitionism; and Entitlement/Exploitativeness, cap-
turing entitled beliefs and exploitative behaviours (Ackerman et al., 2011). Correlations of the different dimensions of
narcissism with lietruthrelated ability assessments, as well as reports of actual lying, were analysed.
The following is a summary of our predictions:
To establish internal validity of the LTAAS, it is hypothesised that the lie detection, truthtelling, and believing
abilities will be assessed above average. The lietelling ability will show the lowest ratings and the truthtelling ability
the highest.
Significant positive correlations are expected between the assessed abilities to tell lies and truths convincingly,
and to detect lies. The truthtelling ability will correlate positively with believing.
The lietelling, liedetecting, and truthtelling abilities will correlate positively with the overall narcissism score,
the nine narcissistic dimensions, and the three narcissistic factors that Ackerman et al. (2011) suggested. As trust is
not associated with narcissism, narcissistic participants will not exhibit higher levels of believing othersthan less
narcissistic participants.
Both narcissism and lierelated abilities (tell and detect) will correlate positively with the reported total lies, the
number of people lied to, and selfgain lies.
2.1 |Participants and procedure
The present study was approved by the University Ethics Committee. We used the statistical power analysis tool
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), to estimate our sample size. Using a onetailed test, a medium
effect size of 0.3, α= 0.05, and power (1 β) = 0.95, the recommended number of participants is 111. One hundred
twentyfive undergraduate male students (mean age = 25.71, SD = 2.83, years) volunteered to participate in the
study. The participants were promised anonymity and were given the option to end their participation in the study
at any time. Upon completion of the questionnaires, the participants were thanked and debriefed. The questionnaires
were completed individually, in a predetermined order, first the LTAAS and then the NPI.
2.2 |Measures
2.2.1 |Narcissistic personality inventory
The NPI (Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988) was used. The NPI is currently the most widely used measure of
narcissism in the general population (Muris, Merckelbach, Otgaar, & Meijer, 2017). Although it is commonly used in
nonclinical settings, NPI scores are positively correlated with narcissistic personality disorder (e.g., J. D. Miller,
Gaughan, Pryor, Kamen, & Campbell, 2009). The NPI's 40 narcissistic statements (e.g., I like to look at myself in
the mirror;I am an extraordinary person; and I find it easy to manipulate people) were rated by the participants
on a 5point scale ranging from 1 not at all true)to5(very much true). Generally, the NPI has a high internal
consistency, which is also demonstrated in the present sample: α= 0.94.
2.2.2 |Lietruth ability assessment scale
The LTAAS (see Appendix A) is a new scale based on previous single question tests (e.g., Elaad, 2009, 2015). The
purpose was to learn more about perceived lietruthrelated abilities: telling lies successfully, telling the truth con-
vincingly, detecting lies successfully, and believing other people. The LTAAS was developed to widen the scope of
examples to which the four lietruthrelated abilities can be applied and to respond to the requirement for reliability
recording of the various questions. The four original questions were included in the scale, and four other questions
were added. Answers were given on a scale ranging from 0 (much worse than others) to 100 (much better than others),
with 50 (as good as others) serving as the midpoint. In an analysis of the questions, it turned out that one question was
misunderstood by several participants who answered a negatively formulated question as if it was presented
positively. It was therefore decided to omit the four negatively formulated questions. The final LTAAS consisted of
16 questions, four questions for each selfassessed ability (Appendix A).
2.2.3 |Reported lying
The items for lying reports were taken from Jonason et al. (2014). The participants were asked to report the following:
How many lies they had told during the last 7 days; how many different people they had lied to; how many lies they had
told were for selfgain; how many lies they had told were in order not to hurt another person; and how many lies they
had told were just because they felt like it. Internal consistency between the five questions was α= 0.79.
3.1 |Ratings of selfassessed abilities to tell and detect lies, tell truths, and believe others
First, the four questions presenting the selfassessed lietelling ability were correlated. All correlations were signifi-
cant (N= 125, p< 0.001) with a rage of 0.6430.742. Similar significant correlations were computed for liedetecting
a range of 0.6060.769; truthtelling a range of 0.5270.627; and believing a range of 0.3920.634, indicating
that every block of four questions aimed at the same ability.
Next, the means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, and other statistics of the participants' selfassessed
abilities were computed and are displayedinTable 1. Table 1 shows that all lietruthrelated abilities were overestimated
(the lower bound of the 95% CI is larger than the midpoint [50]as good as others). Previous studies (e.g., Elaad, 2011;
Elaad et al., 2012) have shown that people selfassessed their truthtelling, believing, and liedetecting abilities similarly
as high. The perceived ability to tell lies varies (Elaad, 2018) and in some cases is significantly underestimated. The
present results are not in accordance with this latter finding. An examination of the participants' total narcissism scores
may help account for thecurrent results. The prediction of this study was that high narcissism scores would be linked to
an overestimation of the lietelling ability. It appears that the mean narcissism score of the entire sample was 3.17 (out of
5), which is rather high, and suggests that the participants exhibited narcissistic tendencies to a large extent.
A oneway analysis of variance with repeated measures was used to examine the differences amongst all four self
assessed abilities. The analysis of variance showed a significant overall ability effect, F(2.3, 286.2) = 19.6, p< 0.001,
= 0.14, ε= 0.77, indicating substantial differences in the assessments of the various abilities. As the lietelling
ability is usually rated lower than the other abilities (Elaad, 2009, 2015), the lietelling average was compared with
the average of the three other abilities. Towards this end, a planned orthogonal Helmert contrast was performed on
the mean assessments. It turned out that the difference is significant, F(1, 124) = 31.7, p< 0.001, η
= 0.20.
As the truthtelling ability is often assessed higher than the other selfassessed abilities, we proceeded with the
contrast procedure and compared the truthtelling assessment with the mean assessments of the remaining two
abilities (liedetecting and believing). A significant difference emerged, F(1, 124) = 23.8, p< 0.001, η
= 0.16,
indicating that the observed ability difference rests also on the highly assessed truthtelling ability. Finally, the lie
detection and believing abilities were contrasted with no significant differences, F(1, 124) = 0.7, ns.
3.2 |Correlating narcissism and selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities
The correlations between the total narcissism scores and lietruthrelated ability assessments were computed and
are displayed in Table 2, which shows that all the presented abilities correlated positively with narcissism. The four
abilities also correlated with each other, with the exception of telling lies who did not correlate with believing others.
3.3 |Correlating narcissism facets and selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities
Correlates of narcissism should be further examined at the facet level, focusing on narcissistic subscales
(Ackerman et al., 2011). Ackerman's three factorsLeadership/Authority, Grandiose Exhibitionism, and Entitlement/
Exploitativenesscorrelated positively with the lietelling, liedetecting, and truthtelling abilities (Table 3).
Leadership/Authority and Grandiose Exhibitionism were also positively correlated with believing.
Similarly, Raskin and Terry's (1988) original seven subscales of narcissism and participant lietruthrelated
abilities were computed and appear in Table 4. All subscales correlated positively with selfassessed lieand
TABLE 2 Correlations between narcissism and selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities
Narcissism Tell lies Detect lies Tell truths Believe
Narcissism 0.574** 0.539** 0.528** 0.234**
Tell lies 0.575** 0.533** 0.120
Detect lies 0.640** 0.299**
Tell truths 0.389**
Note.N= 125.
**p< 0.01.
TABLE 1 Total means, standard deviations (SD), and other statistics of selfassessed abilities to tell and detect lies
and truths
Tell lies Detect lies Tell truths Believe
Mean 55 63 68 62
SD 21.3 17.0 14.7 15.2
95% CI 51.558.9 60.566.4 65.370.4 59.364.7
Cronbach α0.894 0.896 0.844 0.804
Note.N= 125; CI = confidence interval based on standard error units.
truthtelling abilities and with the lie detection ability. Excluding Sufficiency and Superiority, all other subscales
correlated positively with believing (see Table 4).
3.4 |Correlations between narcissism and frequent lying tendencies
The correlations between narcissistic features and the reported tendency to lie are displayed in Table 5, which
shows that, overall, narcissism is linked to telling frequent lies and lying to more people. Looking at Ackerman
TABLE 4 Correlations between Raskin and Terry's (1988) seven subscales of narcissism and selfassessed lietruth
related abilities
Tell lies Detect lies Tell truths Believe
Authority 0.415** 0.428** 0.455** 0.289**
Sufficiency 0.470** 0.381** 0.322** 0.148
Superiority 0.427** 0.449** 0.431** 0.132
Exhibitionism 0.558** 0.548** 0.534** 0.177*
Exploitativeness 0.480** 0.485** 0.451** 0.197*
Vanity 0.597** 0.415** 0.448** 0.203*
Entitlement 0.492** 0.478** 0.477** 0.234*
Note.N= 125.
*p< 0.05. **p< 0.01.
TABLE 5 Correlations between narcissism and reports of frequent lying
Total lies People lied to Selfgain lies Altruistic lies Lies for no reason
Narcissism 0.296** 0.248** 0.162 0.119 0.167
Leadership/Authority 0.204* 0.126 0.114 0.094 0.184*
Grandiose Exhibitionism 0.318** 0.317** 0.166 0.146 0.116
Entitlement/Exploitativeness 0.294** 0.211* 0.198* 0.121 0.171
Authority 0.216* 0.165 0.112 0.096 0.103
Sufficiency 0.331** 0.327** 0.181* 0.165 0.115
Superiority 0.188* 0.138 0.092 0.059 0.087
Exhibitionism 0.268** 0.226* 0.166 0.056 0.201*
Exploitativeness 0.232** 0.226* 0.111 0.112 0.149
Vanity 0.318** 0.238** 0.205* 0.099 0.160
Entitlement 0.223* 0.168 0.111 0.126 0.169
Note.N= 125.
*p< 0.05. **p< 0.01.
TABLE 3 Correlations between Ackerman et al.'s (2011) three factors of narcissism and selfassessed lietruth
related abilities
Tell lies Detect lies Tell truths Believe
Leadership/Authority 0.483** 0.545** 0.545** 0.169*
Grandiose Exhibitionism 0.502** 0.316** 0.339** 0.181*
Entitlement/Exploitativeness 0.445** 0.466** 0.388** 0.157
Note.N= 125.
*p< 0.05. **p< 0.01.
et al.'s narcissistic scales, it turned out that all three scales are positively correlated with telling frequent lies;
Grandiose Exhibitionism and Entitlement/Exploitativeness are also positively correlated with lying to more
people; Leadership/Authority is positively linked to lying for no reason; Entitlement/Exploitativeness shows a
marginally significant correlation with lying for no reason (p= 0.05); and Entitlement/Exploitativeness is posi-
tively correlated with lying for selfgain. As expected, none of Ackerman et al.'s narcissistic factors are correlated
with altruistic lies.
Looking at the seven subscales of narcissism (Raskin & Terry, 1988), all are positively correlated with telling frequent
lies; Sufficiency, Exhibitionism, Exploitativeness, and Vanity correlated positively with lying to more people; Sufficiency
and Vanity were associated with lying for selfgain. Finally, an association was observed between Exhibitionism and lying
for no reason. In accordance with predictions, none of the seven subscales correlated with altruistic lies.
3.5 |Correlations between selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities and various lying
Correlations of the LTAAS dimensions with participant reports of actual lying are presented in Table 6. Lietelling ability
assessments are positively correlated with actual lying, indicating that participants who assessed themselves as
competent liars reported more lietelling than participants who assessed themselves as less competent liars. Higher
selfassessed lying ability correlated positively with lying to a greater number of people. Selfassessed competent lie
detectors lied more in general and lied more for no reason in particular than less competent lie detectors. Table 6 fur-
ther shows significantly more selfgained lies amongst selfassessed competent lie detectors relative to those who
assessed themselves as less competent lie detectors. Truthrelated abilities were not correlated with the lying scales.
This research focuses on relations between narcissistic features, selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities, and reports
of actual lying. Towards this end, a new selfassessed ability scale, which replaces an earlier singlequestion format
(e.g., Elaad, 2009), was introduced. As with previous accounts, it was observed that the lietelling ability is
assessed significantly lower than the other three abilities. It was explained that people may associate the ability
to lie with dishonesty and underscore their lying ability to maintain a positive selfimage. Still, the results of the
present study show that the lietelling ability was appointed a mean score that is higher than average, which is
indicative of the tendency to consider lying as a positive quality, which may serve a person well in social situations
(Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). It seems that the two opposite tendencies are active in lietelling ability assessments, as
was recently considered by Elaad (2018) who showed that religious females are inclined to rate their lietelling
ability very low whereas secular males tend to rate these abilities much higher. Occupations that require lying
skills (e.g., police interrogators, criminal prosecutors, spies, salespersons, and actors) may force people to raise their
lietelling ability assessments. On the other hand, applying for a job that requires above average lietelling skills
may activate selfselection, and only people who consider themselves good liars will ultimately apply. The two
TABLE 6 Correlations between lietruth ability assessment scale dimensions and actual reported lying
Total lies People lied to Selfgain lies Altruistic lies Lies for no reason
Assessed ability
Tell lies 0.236** 0.224* 0.161 0.081 0.160
Detect lies 0.248** 0.127 0.201* 0.118 0.210*
Tell truths 0.073 0.016 0.061 0.140 0.039
Believe 0.141 0.046 0.101 0.084 0.114
Note.N= 125.
*p< 0.05. **p< 0.01.
opposing lietelling ability assessment tendencies await further clarifications. A first step in this direction was made
in this study by correlating the lietelling ability assessments with the narcissism scale and its facets. The results
show strong relations between selfassessments of the lietelling ability and narcissism. The high positive
correlations were found for the total narcissistic count and for each narcissistic facet. The results suggest that
narcissistic features motivate people to rate high their own lietelling ability assessments. Alternatively, perceiving
the ability to tell lies persuasively leads people to grandiosity and other narcissistic feelings and thoughts. Further,
high lietelling scorers reported having told many more lies in a period of a week than lower lietelling scorers.
They also told lies to many more different people. This replicates earlier results by Schneider and Goffin (2012)
who developed the Perceived Ability to Deceive scale and found an association between the perceived lietelling
ability and selfreported counterproductive workplace behaviour.
The results suggest that there are strong bonds between the perceived lietelling ability, narcissistic features, and
frequent lietelling. In the opposite extreme, we can find people who find it difficult to persuade others to believe
their lies. These people have little or no narcissistic qualities and tend to stick to the truth.
It may be speculated that differences in narcissistic tendencies may account for the inconsistent results found in
previous studies on student and layperson selfassessed lietelling ability (see Elaad, 2018).
Narcissism and the selfassessed lietelling ability are relevant to both everyday social life and the forensic
context. People lie from time to time to maintain the plausibility of their messages. Overconfidence in the lietelling
ability by narcissistic people may lead to frequent lies and increased uncertainty in social interactions.
The perceived lietelling ability was found to be positively correlated with the perceived lie detection ability
(Table 2). Specifically, participants who rated high their lietelling skill rated high their lie detection skill, and vice
versa, those who assessed low their lietelling ability assessed low their lie detection ability as well. Unlike the lietell-
ing ability assessment, the assessed lie detection ability is consistently biased in one directionoverestimation. The
overrated lie detection ability refers to the tendency of people to think positively of themselves. People do not like
to think that others can easily deceive them. By rating high their liedetecting ability, they protect themselves from
feeling gullible. The following question is what distinguishes between people who really believe that they are above
average lie detectors and people who rate high their lie detection ability simply because they are motivated to deny
being easily deceived by others? The question can be partly answered by the correlation between lie detection and
narcissism. On the individual level, one may speculate that people who rate high their lie detection ability and show
narcissistic features really believe that they possess the ability to detect lies. This speculation should be examined in
the future with a welldesigned study.
Results indicated that both the overall narcissistic count and the 10 individual narcissistic components are
positively correlated with the selfassessed liedetecting ability. This may imply that in the present study, most male
participants really believed that they are above average lie detectors. Further support to this conclusion can be found
in a study by Williams and Gilovich (2008), which showed that people truly believe in their selfenhanced ratings and
take their estimates seriously enough to guide their actions.
The assessed lie detection ability correlated positively with the number of lies told, selfgained lies, and lies that
were told without any reason. This is another indication of the firm ties between the perceived lietelling and lie
detecting abilities.
The perceived truthtelling ability emerged as the highest rated ability (Elaad, 2015). It seems that participants
were confident in their ability to convince when telling the truth. This is consistent with the belief that telling the truth
is a simple matter of telling it like it is(e.g., Buller & Burgoon, 1996) and that telling the truth is cognitively simpler
than lying (Gamer, 2011; Verschuere, 2016; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006). The relatively high rating of the truth
telling ability is also explained by the general assumption that we are often telling the truth and we are proud of it.
Therefore, we are anxious to be believed and are certain that there is no reason for other people to doubt our own
In the legal process, admissibility of DNA evidence in court has led to the exonerations of innocent individuals
who were convicted after confessing to a crime they had not committed. The Innocence Project has reported on
more than 300 such DNA exonerations (Kassin, 2015). The present results suggest that innocent suspects may find
themselves trapped by police interrogators with narcissistic features, overestimated ability to detect lies, and
conviction in the suspects' guilt. In such a case, proving innocence is almost impossible.
Is selfassessed ability to be convincing when telling the truth associated with false confessions? Interrogated
innocent suspects believe that truth will prevail and be ultimately validated (Kassin, 2005, 2008; Kassin et al.,
2012; Perillo & Kassin, 2010). The present study shows that overconfidence in the ability to convince when telling
the truth is associated with narcissism. Do innocent narcissistic suspects rely on their perceived ability to win with
their truth and vigorously try to convince their interrogators of their innocence? Alternatively, is narcissistic overcon-
fidence associated with an arrogant stance of making no effort to convince? Perhaps relying on the ability to per-
suade when telling the truth later on in court? Because narcissism is also considered a predictor of violence and
aggression and narcissists are overrepresented amongst criminals (Bushman & Baumeister, 2002; Larson et al.,
2015), the state of mind and behaviour of confident truth tellers with narcissistic features within the criminal justice
system deserve additional research attention.
At the same time, there are few people who rate relatively low their own truthtelling ability. These people
achieve low narcissism scores (Table 2) and exhibit low scores in each of the various narcissistic facets (Tables 3
and 4). In the context of the criminal interrogation, such innocent suspects may feel that they are unable to deliver
their truth convincingly and find themselves trapped in a deadlock. False confessions may seem to be the only
way out. It is necessary to further explore the state of mind of such innocent suspects.
It appears that the selfassessed ability to convince when telling the truth is related to participants' level of
believing others. Previous research showed that the tendency to believe others is overestimated (e.g., Elaad,
2011). It was found that the ability to believe others correlated with the overall narcissism score and with most
narcissism facets, excluding Sufficiency and Superiority, which diverges from the positive association between trust
and agreeableness (Elaad & Reizer, 2015; McCrae & Costa, 1997) and the negative association between agreeable-
ness and narcissism (J. D. Miller et al., 2011; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
Nevertheless, some studies have failed to show negative correlations between narcissism and agreeableness
(Giammarco et al., 2013; Lee & Ashton, 2005) and assumed that this may be indicative of an adaptive and prosocial
elements of narcissism. It was further suggested that different facets of narcissism reflect different levels of adaptiv-
ity. For example, Authority represents an adaptive aspect of narcissism (Ackerman et al., 2011). Indeed, inspection of
the correlations between the selfassessed believing ability and various narcissistic facets shows that most were
positively correlated including the Authority facet.
As to the relations between narcissism and actual lies that are reported by the participants, it turned out that
high narcissism scores are correlated with telling more lies than low narcissism scores. Results are consistent with
recent evidence on the link between narcissism and lying (Azizli et al., 2016; Baughman et al., 2014; Jonason et al.,
2014). Analysis at the facet level showed that all narcissistic subscales correlate positively with reported lying. Yet
different facets are associated with different kinds of lies. Sufficiency and Vanity are associated with lying for self
gain. Leadership/Authority and Exhibitionism are associated with lying for no reason. Entitlement/Exploitativeness
is associated with both kinds of lies. Consistent with narcissistic selfcentredness, none of the narcissistic facets is
correlated with frequent altruistic lies.
The present findings strengthen the need for additional research on selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities
within the context of individual differences. Personality correlates should be further examined as well as other factors
(i.e., research indicates possible effects of religiosity and inservice occupational experience on the lietruthrated
abilities; Elaad, 2018).
The present sample of participants consisted of male students, which does not necessarily represent the general pop-
ulation. Being a student may imply a degree of adaptive personality features, such as the ability to learn. Therefore, it
is suggested to assess the contribution of narcissism to lietruthrelated abilities with different samples of partici-
pants (e.g., lay people from the community). It is also suggested to use female and mixed samples. At present, it
remains unclear whether different samples of participants will show similar results.
The direction of association between narcissism and lietruthrelated ability assessments cannot be inferred with
certainty. Specifically, it is not clear whether narcissism influences the ability assessments or vice versa. Future
research may clarify this point.
Further, narcissism is only one of many possible factors that influence selfassessment of the lietruthrelated
abilities. Future studies may examine whether stress situations, coping strategies, differences in stress appraisal,
different values, or professional expertise in lietelling and lie detection affect how narcissism relates to the
assessments of these abilities.
Finally, this is a selfreport correlational study. As such, it is impossible to present real effects. We already know
that selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities are biased and do not reflect actual abilities to tell and detect lies and
truths. Still, these biased assessments may affect behaviour, thinking, memory, emotional manifestations, and
achievements. The current lying behaviour was also based on selfreports, which should be treated with caution
because estimates of lying may not be valid. Nevertheless, Halevy et al. (2014) demonstrated positive correlations
between actual lying and selfreports about lying. Future research should further correlate actual lying with biased
assessment of lying ability.
The present results show that the new LTAAS is both reliable and valid. The validity can be extracted from
replications of previous results on lietruthrelated abilities and from positive correlations with narcissistic features
and reported lies. Results reemphasise the prominence of the perceived truthtelling ability amongst other perceived
lie/truth abilities. Truthtelling is important in protecting existing relationships, pursuing new relationships, ensuring
product or service quality, and many other social contacts including legal and forensic circumstances. The lietelling
ability was assessed lower than all other recorded abilities. However, strong relations exist between the lietelling
ability assessments and various narcissistic qualities. Previous results emphasised the association between narcissism
and deception. We can now say that narcissism is also associated with the perceived ability to deceive.
Finally, the ability to convincingly lie is associated with frequent lying as reported by the participants.
The present results enrich our understanding of the contribution of the described abilities to deception.
However, research is now being built up, and there is room for many more studies to learn more about biases in
the selfassessed lietruthrelated abilities.
None of the authors has any conflict of interest resulting from this study.
Liza Zvi
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How to cite this article: Zvi L, Elaad E. Correlates of narcissism, selfreported lies, and selfassessed abilities
to tell and detect lies, tell truths, and believe others. J Investig Psychol Offender Profil. 2018;116. https://doi.
Carefully read the following questions and answer all of them. Mark your answer by circling the option that best
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... Common wisdom suggests that people who frequently mislead others are less likely to be misled themselves, a notion often expressed as, "you can't bullshit a bullshitter." This idea finds at least some support in past research showing that people who self-report engaging more frequently in lying (i.e., deliberately convincing someone of a falsehood) also self-report being significantly better than average at detecting lies from others (Zvi & Elaad, 2018). Additionally, some studies have found that those who produce more convincing lies are also actually better at detecting lies (Wright et al., 2012(Wright et al., , 2013, though other more recent studies suggest this may not be the case (e.g., Hudson et al., 2020). ...
... In some ways, this appears to somewhat align with research suggesting that individuals more willing to share fake news (in some instances) are also more likely to fall for it (Pennycook & Rand, 2019), but also appears to somewhat conflict with other research suggesting a positive relation between lying and lie detection (Wright et al., 2012;Zvi & Elaad, 2018). These findings support the idea that being more likely to produce bullshit does not necessarily inoculate a person from being more likely to fall for bullshit (i.e., one can "bullshit a bullshitter"). ...
... I attempted to address this issue in the present study, at least in part, by testing the "bullshit insensitivity" abilities of two types of self-reported prolific bullshitters with empirical measures of various types of bullshit receptivity. One limitation, though, is that I did not ask participants to assess their own "bullshit detection" abilities, as previous deception research has done (e.g., Zvi & Elaad, 2018). Indeed, given that higher frequency persuasive bullshitters were (somewhat ironically) consistently found to be more receptive to various types of bullshit, and were simultaneously overconfident in their own intellectual abilities, it could very well be the case that they are largely unaware of their own inability to sufficiently detect when they are being misled. ...
Full-text available
Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit, which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo‐profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act). Here, I present results from nine studies focusing on: 1) the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in two types of bullshitting (persuasive and evasive) in everyday situations; 2) the associations of both types of bullshitting frequency with other relevant constructs, and; 3) the extent to which those who produce bullshit are also receptive to various types of bullshit. Overall, bullshitting frequency was negatively associated with sincerity, honesty, cognitive ability, open‐minded cognition, and self‐regard. Additionally, the Bullshitting Frequency Scale was found to reliably measure constructs that are (1) distinct from lying and (2) significantly related to performance on overclaiming and social decision tasks. Moreover, the frequency with which individuals engage in persuasive bullshitting (i.e., bullshitting intended to impress or persuade others) was found to positively predict susceptibility to various types of misleading information and this association is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. These results represent an important step forward in the study of the spread of misinformation by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in and are receptive to everyday bullshitting.
... One explanation in this regard may lie in their self-deceptive tendencies (Wright et al., 2015). When Narcissism was investigated as a separate dimension (Zvi & Elaad, 2018), differences were observed for the three subscales, meaning that different aspects of Narcissism related differently with aspects of deception, reinforcing the previous recommendation for using separate measurement tools for each construct, rather than assessing DT traits as a composite. Mating context: -N was unrelated to probability of lying (r = 0.07, n. s.) and correlated with positive emotions when lying (r = 0.25**), increased cognitive effort (r = 0.18**) and belief that the partner will believe their lie (r = 0.11*) -M correlated with probability of lying (r = 0.10*), positive emotions when lying (r = 0.34**), increased cognitive effort (r = 0.15**) and belief that the partner will believe their lie (r = 0.13**) -P correlated to probability of lying (r = 0.13**), positive emotions when lying (r = 0.46**), increased cognitive effort (r = 0.14**) and unrelated to the belief that the partner will believe their lie (r = 0.06, n. s.) Academic context: -N correlated with probability of lying (r = 0.14**), positive emotions when lying (r = 0.28**), belief that the lecturer will believe their lie (r = 0.19**) and unrelated with increased cognitive effort (r = 0.08, n. s.) -M correlated to probability of lying (r = 0.25**), positive emotions when lying (r = 0.33**), increased cognitive effort (r = 0.28**) and belief that the lecturer will believe their lie (r = 0.16**) -P correlated to probability of lying (r = 0.19**), positive emotions when lying (r = 0.42**), increased cognitive effort (r = 0.10*) and the belief that the lecturer will believe their lie (r = 0.17**) Jonason et al. ...
... As observed, individuals scoring high on Narcissism and Psychopathy perceived themselves better at successfully detecting lies, but not those scoring high on Machiavellianism (Wissing & Reinhard, 2019). In case of Narcissism, results replicated when assessed as a separate construct, documenting a positive association between Narcissism, self-rated lie detecting ability, and increased confidence in their lie detection skills (Zvi & Elaad, 2018). ...
People deceive for different reasons, from avoiding interpersonal conflicts to preserving, protecting, and nurturing interpersonal relationships, and to obtaining social status and power. A growing body of research highlights the role of personality in both deception detection and production, with a particular focus on high Dark Triad (DT) traits (Narcissism, Machiavellianism and Psychopathy), for their shared tendency to engage in unethical self-benefitting behaviors, despite negative consequences for others. The main goal of the current scoping review was to bring together the studies investigating self-reported and performance-based deception production and detection performances, as presented in individuals characterized by high DT traits and point out the possible contribution of DT to deception research. To do so, we identified the relevant studies documenting the similarities and discrepancies between the three personality traits and presented their results, based on the procedure used for deception assessment: subjective or objective measurements for production / detection. Then, we discussed possible explanatory mechanisms for inter-individual differences in lie detection / production and argue for the contribution of DT to deception research beyond the typical personality models, particularly for the antisocial character of deception.
... Lying was measured via the SoD (Makowski et al., 2021), and the Lie-Truth Ability Assessment Scale (LTAAS) (Zvi & Elaad, 2018). The former has been described above, and showed to possess good factor structure, validity, and reliability. ...
Full-text available
Past research explored the relationship between personality, moral disengagement, and deception and found a general trend showing that the lower people score on the big five personality factors, but the higher they score on moral disengagement and Machiavellianism, the higher their lying tendency. However, a limitation of past research is that it has usually adopted a variable-centred approach, whereas a person-centred approach might describe people in more detail and provide further insight into the relationship between personality and morality. In the present study, we collected data from 316 participants and asked them to fill an on-line questionnaire which included measures on personality, moral disengagement, and lying tendency (perceived lying ability, frequency, negativity and contextuality). The latter was measured via the newly developed Structure of Deception (SoD) scale (Makowski et al., Current Psychology , 2021). We had to aims. First, to validate an Italian version of the SoD, which showed a good factor structure, gender measurement invariance, and good construct and criterion validity. Second, to explore the association between personal characteristics and lying tendency. Personality and morality scores were combined to obtain subpopulations of participants by a mean of cluster analysis. We obtained four clusters, one of which was marked by high Machiavellianism and moral disengagement but low scores on the personality factors, and one of which showed the opposite trend. The results also showed that cluster membership, and hence personal characteristics, was associated with lying tendency. The person-centred approach can be applied in research on lying. Limitations of the study and future suggestions are also discussed.
... Serota and Levine (2015) replicated the lie distribution finding with 2980 subjects in the U.K., including replications in the culturally variant England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland sub-samples. Stockman (2017) observed the long-tail distribution in Belgium, and a re-examination of data reported by Zvi and Elaad (2018) found the same distribution among Israeli subjects. Most recently, the skewed lie distribution has been replicated in South Korea (Park et al., 2021) and Japan (Diaku et al., 2021). ...
Testing truth-default theory, individual-level variation in lie frequency was parsed from within-individual day-to-day variation (good/bad lie days) by examining 116,366 lies told by 632 participants over 91 days. As predicted and consistent with prior findings, the distribution was positively skewed. Most participants lied infrequently and most lies were told by a few prolific liars. Approximately three-quarters of participants were consistently low-frequency liars. Across participants, lying comprised 7% of total communication and almost 90% of all lies were little white lies. About 58% of the variance was explained by stable individual differences with approximately 42% of the variance attributable to within-person day-to-day variability. The data were consistent with both the existence of a few prolific liars and good/bad lie days.
... It was also observed with a large representative sample from the United Kingdom, (Serota & Levine, 2015), and the general UK finding replicated in each of the geographic/cultural subsets of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Lie frequency measures were also obtained, but not reported, as elements of studies in Belgium (Stockman, 2017) and Israel (Zvi & Elaad, 2018) with subsequent re-analysis providing evidence for the TDT propositions (authors, unpublished). The pattern has further been supported in text messaging (Smith, Hancock, Reynolds, & Birnholtz, 2014) and mobile dating conversations (Markowitz & Hancock, 2018). ...
Truth-default Theory proposes that the frequency of lying is not normally distributed across the population and that most lies are told by a few prolific liars. A survey with a probability sample examined the frequency of lying among of adults in South Korea. Consistent with theoretical predictions and well-documented prior findings from the United States and Western Europe, South Koreans showed the few prolific liar pattern. Although South Koreans reported lying on average once or twice per day (M = 1.48), the distribution was skewed with a mode of zero and a median of one. Half of the reported lies were told by just 12.4% of the respondents. Distributions for women and men show similar results. Estimates of lies received also exhibited a long-tail distribution. The data add to the pan-cultural support for truth-default theory.
This is another municipal case study. The mayor in a Norwegian municipality was charged with fraud by Norwegian police. It was a whistleblower who first notified the legal counsel in the municipality. Assuming that the accusations and charges were correct, convenience themes could be identified. It was individual possibilities in the motive dimension of convenience theory. It might be a matter of climbing the hierarchy of needs for economic success in the position of an important citizen in the municipality. The status of a mayor is difficult to attack, which made the opportunity structure convenient. Status is an individual’s social rank within a formal or informal hierarchy, or the person’s relative standing along a valued social dimension. Status is the extent to which an individual is respected and admired by others, and status is the outcome of a subjective assessment process. High-status individuals enjoy greater respect and deference from, as well as power and influence over, those who are positioned lower in the social hierarchy. Allegations of corruption at the very top of a municipality created reactions among citizens. A revised routine to handle messages from whistleblowers was expected to help regain the social license to operate public.KeywordsHuman motivationHigh statusConflictsTrustSocial licenseNarcissismConvenience theory
Convenience exists in the financial motive, the organizational opportunity, and the personal willingness for deviant behavior. These three themes can result in 14 convenience propositions as presented in this article. In cases where an offender is detected, the offense can be examined by identifying relevant convenience issues in the structural model of crime convenience. Not all of the 14 issues will be relevant to create a narrative of one specific incident. In cases where prevention of offenses is the issue, then vulnerability review is appropriate for all 14 propositions. For example, domination of greed or extensive differential association can signal strong motivation or strong willingness for wrongdoing, while lack of oversight and guardianship can signal an invitation for wrongdoing.
The present study examined how narcissistic features, self-assessed lie- and truth-related abilities, and thinking processing style influence successful lying and convincing truth-telling. To this end, 100 undergraduate students completed the NPI, REI, and LTAAS questionnaires and drew two drawings each. They then presented to a panel of four fellow student judges, 0, 1, or 2 of their drawings together with other pictures, and tried to convince the panel that they had not drawn any of the drawings. Finally, judges reported whether they believed the presenter. Results showed positive correlations between narcissism, self-assessed lying ability, and self-reported rational thinking. Intuitive thinking predicted success in lie detection. The present results enrich our understanding of situational and personal factors involved in intuitive lie detection.
Internal white-collar offenders are individuals who have legitimate access to premises and systems that they use to commit and conceal financial crime harming their own organization online.
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The Dark Triad traits—narcissism, Machiavellianism and psychopathy—have been found to be associated with intra- or interpersonal deception production frequency. This cross-sectional study (N = 207) investigated if the Dark Triad traits are also associated with deception detection accuracy, as implicated by the recent conception of a deception-general ability. To investigate associations between maladaptive personality space and deception, the PID-5 maladaptive personality traits were included to investigate if besides Machiavellianism, Detachment is negatively associated with response bias. Finally, associations between the Dark Triad traits, Antagonism, Negative Affectivity and confidence judgments were investigated. Participants watched videos of lying vs. truth-telling senders and judged the truthfulness of the statements. None of the Dark Triad traits was found to be associated with the ability to detect deception. Detachment was negatively associated with response bias. Psychopathy was associated with global confidence judgments. The results provide additional support that dark and maladaptive personality traits are associated with judgmental biases but not with accuracy in deception detection. The internal consistencies of 4 of the 8 subscales of the used personality short scales were only low and nearly sufficient (αs =0.65–0.69).
In recent years, DNA exoneration cases have shed light on the problem of false confessions and the wrongful convictions that result. Drawing on basic psychological principles and methods, an extensive body of research has focused on the psychology of confessions. This article describes the processes of interrogation by which police assess whether a suspect is lying or telling the truth and the techniques used to elicit confessions from those deemed deceptive. The problem of false confessions emphasizes personal and situational factors that put innocent people at risk in the interrogation room. Turning from the causes of false confessions to their consequences, research shows that confession evidence can bias juries, judges, lay witnesses, and forensic examiners. Finally, empirically based proposals for the reform of policy and practice include a call for the mandatory video recording of interrogations, blind testing in forensic crime labs, and use of confession experts in court.
The chivalry hypothesis and attractiveness bias were evaluated among 323 police officers and 364 students, serving as a control group. The participants were asked to read a description of a swindle, where the offender was either physically attractive or unattractive. They then had to assign a punishment to the offender and judge the blame ascribed to both offender and victim. The findings showed that the offender’s sex, more than his or her external appearance, affects differences in punishment severity. Female offenders were treated more forgivingly than male offenders. Nonetheless, analysis of blame attributions shows that attractive offenders are blamed more than unattractive offenders. Women were also found to dispense severe punishments more than men.
Previous research indicated that people tend to rate low their ability to tell lies convincingly and at the same time believe that they are better lie detectors than the average person. The present chapter highlights correlations of the low self-assessed lie-telling ability and of the relatively high self-assessed lie-detection ability. A mini metaanalysis was performed on observations gathered from 16 experimental groups. The analysis shows demographic differences in these assessments. It was observed that religiosity, gender, age, and on-the-job lie-related experience, are moderators of the lie-telling and lie-detection ability assessments. Personality dimensions such as the Big Five attributes are also associated with people's lie-related ability assessments. It was further observed that high lie-telling ability raters preferred plausible deception over implausible truth. Finally, larger physiological responses to critical items in the Concealed Information Test were found among high lie-telling ability raters. Suggestions for future research are provided.
Experts in forensic psychology must make skilled observations and conclusions, minimally compromised by bias, in order to try and provide reliable and accurate conclusions to the courts. But the field has little data revealing how well forensic psychologists actually perform these tasks, in part because there has been no clear framework for systematic research of their expertise. Therefore, we consider forensic psychological assessments in light of Dror's (2016) Hierarchy of Expert Performance (HEP). HEP addresses reliability and biasability, both within and between experts, at the levels of observations and conclusions. Applying this framework to forensic psychological assessments reveals a few domains in which there are some meaningful data, particularly addressing reliability between experts in certain types of forensic assessments. But applying HEP reveals more domains in which we lack data addressing fundamental aspects of expert performance, such as reliability at the level of observations, and reliability and biasability within experts. Understanding these strengths and gaps in forensic assessment research should guide testimony of forensic psychologists, policies around forensic assessment, and further research in forensic assessment. (PsycINFO Database Record
Presents an integrative theoretical framework to explain and to predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment. This theory states that psychological procedures, whatever their form, alter the level and strength of self-efficacy. It is hypothesized that expectations of personal efficacy determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences. Persistence in activities that are subjectively threatening but in fact relatively safe produces, through experiences of mastery, further enhancement of self-efficacy and corresponding reductions in defensive behavior. In the proposed model, expectations of personal efficacy are derived from 4 principal sources of information: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. Factors influencing the cognitive processing of efficacy information arise from enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotive sources. The differential power of diverse therapeutic procedures is analyzed in terms of the postulated cognitive mechanism of operation. Findings are reported from microanalyses of enactive, vicarious, and emotive modes of treatment that support the hypothesized relationship between perceived self-efficacy and behavioral changes. (21/2 p ref)
Criticism has emerged in the last decade surrounding cognitive bias in forensic examinations. The National Research Council (NRC, 2009 National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community. (2009). Strengthening forensic science in the United States: A path forward. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. [Google Scholar]) issued a report that delineated weaknesses within various forensic science domains. The purpose of this article is to examine and consider the various influences that can bias observations and inferences in forensic evaluation and to apply what we know from forensic science to propose possible solutions to these problems. We use Sir Francis Bacon's doctrine of idols—which underpins modern scientific method—to expand Dror's (2015 Dror, I. E. (2015). Cognitive neuroscience in forensic science: understanding and utilizing the human element. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 370, 20140255. doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0255[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]) five-level taxonomy of the various stages at which bias can originate within forensic science to create a seven-level taxonomy. We describe the ways in which biases can arise and impact work in forensic evaluation at these seven levels, highlighting potential solutions and various means of mitigating the impact of these biases, and conclude with a proposal for using scientific principles to improve forensic evaluation.
The term dark triad refers to the constellation of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Over the past few years, the concept has gained momentum, with many researchers assuming that the dark triad is a prominent antecedent of transgressive and norm-violating behavior. Our purpose in this meta-analytic review was to evaluate (a) interrelations among narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy; (b) gender differences in these traits; (c) how these traits are linked to normal personality factors; and (d) the psychosocial correlates of the dark triad. Our findings show that dark triad traits are substantially intercorrelated, somewhat more prevalent among men than women, predominantly related to the Big Five personality factor of agreeableness and the HEXACO factor of honesty-humility, and generally associated with various types of negative psychosocial outcomes. We question whether dark triad traits are sufficiently distinct and argue that the way they are currently measured is too simple to capture the malevolent sides of personality. Because most research in this domain is cross-sectional and based on self-reports, we recommend using a cross-informant approach and prospective, longitudinal research designs for studying the predictive value of dark triad features.
People are generally poor at detecting deceit when observing someone’s behaviour or listening to their speech. In this chapter I will discuss the major factors (pitfalls) that lead to failures in catching liars: the sixteen reasons I will present are clustered into three categories: (i) a lack of motivation to detect lies; (ii) difficulties associated with lie detection; and (iii) common errors made by lie detectors. Discussing pitfalls provides insight into how lie detectors can improve their performance (for example, by recognising common biases and avoiding common judgment errors). The second section of this chapter discusses 11 ways (opportunities) to improve lie detection skills. Within this section, I first provide five recommendations for avoiding common errors in detecting lies. Next, I discuss recent lie detection research that introduces novel interview styles aimed at eliciting and enhancing verbal and nonverbal differences between liars and truth tellers. The recommendations are relevant in various settings, from the individual level (e.g., “Is my partner really working late?”) to the societal level (e.g., “Can we trust this suspect when he claims that he is not the serial rapist the police are searching for?”).