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Um modelo para a detecção das mudanças de posicionamento dos deputados federais
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In Brazil, there are tools for monitoring the behaviour of legislators in rollcalls, such as O Estado de São Paulo's Basômetro and Radar Parlamentar. These tools are used both by journalists and political scientists for analysis. Although they are great analysis tools, their usefulness for monitoring is limited because they require a manual follow-up, which makes it a lot of work when we consider the volume of data. Only in the Chamber of Deputies, 513 legislators participate on average over than 400 rollcalls by legislature. It is possible to decrease the amount of data analyzing the parties as a whole, but in contrast we lose the ability to detect individuals' drives or intra-party groups such as factions. In order to mitigate this problem, I developed a statistical model that detects when a legislator changes his or her position, joining or leaving the governmental coalition, through ideal points estimates using the W-NOMINATE. It can be used individually or integrated to tools such as Basômetro, providing a filter for researchers find the deputies who changed their behaviour most significantly. The universe of study is composed of legislators from the Chamber of Deputies from the 50th to the 54th legislatures, starting in the first term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1995 until the beginning of the second term of Dilma Rousseff in 2015.
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O dilema institucional brasileiro define-se pela necessidade de se encontrar um ordenamento institucional suficientemente eficiente para agregar e processar as pressões derivadas desse quadro heterogêneo, adquirindo, assim, bases mais sólidas para sua legitimidade, que o capacite a intervir de forma mais eficaz na redução das disparidades e na integração da ordem social.
O objetivo deste artigo é analisar alguns componentes desse dilema, especificamente no que diz respeito ao arranjo constitucional que regula o exercício da autoridade política e define as regras para resolução de conflitos
oriundos da diversidade das bases sociais de sustentação política do governo e dos diferentes processos de representação. Esse contexto torna impossível ao presidente formar maioria parlamentar apenas com seu partido ou governar em minoria. O governo só é viável se for apoiado em uma coalizão multipartidária que controle a maioria das cadeiras nas duas Casas do Congresso Nacional. O conflito entre o Executivo e o Legislativo tem sido elemento historicamente crítico para a estabilidade democrática no Brasil, em grande medida por causa dos efeitos da fragmentação na composição das forças políticas representadas no Congresso e da agenda inflacionada de problemas e demandas imposta ao Executivo. Este é um dos nexos fundamentais do regime político e um dos eixos essenciais da estabilidade institucional.
There is no simplified way of analysing changes in members of parla-ment's behaviour. Consequently, it is difficult to visualize the impact caused by historical events, such as corruption scandals or popular manifestations. In our understanding, such events result in discussions, affecting members' cohesion. We propose a tool to monitor cohesion metrics over time, making it possible to visualize changes in the way members of parlament vote. Resumo. Não há uma forma trivial de analisar as mudanças no comportamento dos parlamentares. Consequentemente e difícil observar o impacto de eventos históricos, como o escândalo popularmente conhecido como mensalão ou as manifesta oes populares de 2013. Entendemos que eventos desse tipo geram discussões, impactando na coesão entre os parlamentares. Dessa forma, pro-pomos uma ferramenta para monitorar métricas de coesão entre parlamentares ao longo do tempo, permitindo a visualiza ao de mudanças na forma como os parlamentares votam.
This study explores the effects of electoral rules on political polarization in
the legislative branch of government. Since in Brazil the districts are also the
states, and senators are chosen according to the plurality-majority rule while
representatives are determined by a proportional rule, the comparison between
legislative chambers enables one to test whether the plurality-majority rule
induces politicians to behave less moderately, and whether the proportional rule
has the opposite effect. To estimate these effects, roll call data from 1988 to
2010 was analyzed and legislators' ideal points were estimated using
WNOMINATE. Evidence in favor of the hypothesis was found,
although not in every circumstance.
According to a widely held view of Brazilian politics, part of the difficulty Presidents experience in governing the country stems from the fact that national legislators respond to pressures from the States rather than from the national government. Based on the argument, governors use their institutional position not only to influence national debates, but also to determine outcomes via the control they exert over their States' legislative delegations. In this paper we examine an extensive data set composed of all roll-call votes taken in the Chamber of Deputies from 1989 to 2006 in order to separate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on the behavior of national legislators. The data span five Presidencies and four different legislatures and show that, although present, the local influence is weaker than that of the national government in the voting decisions of individual legislators We argue that there are institutional resources that allow the central government to counter the centrifugal pressures exerted by federalism and other aspects of Brazil's current institutional system.
In this article, we propose a random walk-based model to predict legislators' votes on a set of bills. In particular, we first convert roll call data, i.e. the recorded votes and the corresponding deliberative bodies, to a heterogeneous graph, where both the legislators and bills are treated as vertices. Three types of weighted edges are then computed accordingly, representing legislators' social and political relations, bills' semantic similarity, and legislator-bill vote relations. Through performing two-stage random walks over this heterogeneous graph, we can estimate legislative votes on past and future bills. We apply this proposed method on real legislative roll call data of the United States Congress and compare to state-of-the-art approaches. The experimental results demonstrate the superior performance and unique prediction power of the proposed model. Copyright
A U. S. Congressional bill is a textual artifact that must pass through a series of hurdles to become a law. In this paper, we focus on one of the most precarious and least understood stages in a bill's life: its consideration, behind closed doors, by a Congressional committee. We construct predictive models of whether a bill will survive committee, starting with a strong, novel baseline that uses features of the bill's sponsor and the committee it is referred to. We augment the model with information from the contents of bills, comparing different hypotheses about how a committee decides a bill's fate. These models give significant reductions in prediction error and highlight the importance of bill substance in explanations of policy-making and agenda-setting.