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Metaphor, Truth, and Representation
Abstract
Do metaphorical sentences express facts or represent states of affairs in the
world? Can a metaphorical statement tell us ‘what there is’? These questions raise the issue
of whether metaphors can be used to make truth-claims; that is, whether metaphors
can be regarded as assertions that can be evaluated as true or false. Some theorists on
metaphor have argued for a negative answer to the above-mentioned questions. They have
claimed, among others, that metaphorical utterances are non-descriptive uses of language
(Blackburn 1998); truth is not the constitutive aim of metaphors (Lamarque and Olsen
1994); metaphorical sentences do not have propositional contents (Davidson 1979; Cooper
1986; Rorty 1987, 1989; Lepore and Stone 2010, 2015); metaphorical utterances are neither
assertions nor expressions of beliefs (Loewenberg 1973, 1975; Davies 1982; Davies 1984;
Blackburn, 1984). I discuss a particular view, Metaphorical Expressivism, which exploits
the relationship between truth, belief and assertion, and argues for the irrelevancy of truth
to metaphors on the premise that metaphorical utterances do not count as assertions and
that they do not count as the expression of beliefs. The denial of the truth-evaluability of
metaphors on this view, I argue, is a product of an unmotivated tendency to see truth and
meaning in terms of the portrayal of facts and a commitment to two untenable principles:
literalism and representationalism.
... However, this dismissal is too quick. Metaphorical assertions are sometimes used to tell 'what is there' and they do describe states of affairs (Kwesi 2018). For metaphorical expressions can count as assertions and they may convey beliefs which invoke notions such as truth, testable content and inferences (Kwesi 2018(Kwesi , 2019a. ...
... Metaphorical assertions are sometimes used to tell 'what is there' and they do describe states of affairs (Kwesi 2018). For metaphorical expressions can count as assertions and they may convey beliefs which invoke notions such as truth, testable content and inferences (Kwesi 2018(Kwesi , 2019a. Indeed, metaphorical assertions are used in argumentation and the making of inferences (Kwesi 2019c). ...
Wiredu uses the term ‘empiricalism’ to characterize a mode of thinking that is essentially empirical in orientation but admits non-transcendental metaphysical categories and existents into its systems of thought. Wiredu finds evidence of this mode of thinking in the Akan language. The central question I engage with in this paper is this: what makes empiricalism a plausible system of thought that has universal validity and intelligibility? I argue that the plausibility and universality of empiricalism is evident in Wiredu’s logical and semantic thinking that underpins the theses of empiricalism. Rather than it being an isolated doctrine of Wiredu, the central theses of empiricalism are rooted in, and cast in terms of, his logical and semantic analysis of distinctions such as signification and reference, concept and object, and of his analysis of terms such as ‘existence’. These analyses show that the attractiveness of empiricalism is dependent on theoretical principles other than, and in addition to, the linguistic evidence that Akan provides.
... This view implies that metaphors do not have propositional contents in addition to their literal contents, and hence, metaphorical sentences qua metaphors cannot be truth-evaluable. This presents a bit of a puzzle: on the one hand, in virtue of being a metaphor, a metaphorical sentence is meaningful and has a non-literal content, and yet the metaphor itself is non-truth-evaluable; and 2 I have pointed out in a previous paper (Kwesi, 2018a) that the theses of literalism and compositionality are often linked with another thesis, representationalism, to support the view that the relevant criterion of truth is the capacity to represent states of affairs as they really are. For instance, Cooper, a defender of Davidson's view, has made these remarks: "The notion of truth, as we normally understand it, is used to appraise utterances in terms of what they achieve. ...
... Another crucial feature of our practices of using metaphors is our capacity to use metaphors in arguments and engage in drawing certain inferences and implications from metaphorical sentences (Kwesi, 2018a;2019a;2019b). Consider these two arguments from Martinich (1996, p. 431, 435): ...
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiii1.07
Davidson argues that metaphorical sentences express no propositional contents other than the explicit literal contents they express. He offers a causal account, on the one hand, as an explanation of the supposed additional content of a metaphor in terms of the effects metaphors have on hearers, and on the other hand, as a reason for the non-propositional nature of the “something more” that a metaphor is alleged to mean. Davidson’s account is meant to restrict the semantic notions of meaning, content, and truth, to literal sentences. I argue that the Davidsonian causal account does not satisfactorily account for metaphor’s figurativeness, speakers’ assertion and hearers’ uptake of metaphor, and our discursive practices of using metaphors in disagreements and argumentation. I offer a non-compositional analysis of a semantic account of metaphor within which one can make sense of the applicability of the notions of meaning and content to metaphor. This analysis shows that metaphorical sentences have meanings other than, and in addition to, their literal meanings and what speakers can use them to mean.
... The other sense, the evaluative sense, is used to appraise a sentence identified as a metaphor whether it is true or false. Kwesi (2018a) explains the difference between the two senses as follows: ...
In this paper, I take a critical look at the Davidsonian argument that metaphorical sentences do not express propositions because of the phenomenological experience—seeing one thing as another thing—involved in understanding them as metaphors. According to Davidson, seeing-as is not seeing-that. This verdict is aimed at dislodging metaphor from the position of being assessed with the semantic notions of propositions, meaning, and truth. I will argue that the phenomenological or perceptual experience associated with metaphors does not determine the propositional contentfulness or truth-evaluability of metaphors. Truth-evaluability is not inconsistent but compatible with a perceptual model for metaphors. I argue for this partly by showing that seeing-as does not constitute understanding of metaphors when understanding is appropriately construed in terms of being able to use an expression.
... As mere invitations to explore comparisons, metaphors are thought not to be in the business of making claims or assertions that can be evaluated for truth. However, metaphors go beyond mere invitations and the experience of comparing two things (Kwesi, 2018). Speakers and hearers of metaphors do more than what invitors and invitees do; the practices they engage in with metaphors go beyond the intention to issue invitations and the undertaking of thinking of one thing as another thing. ...
This paper argues for the view that metaphors are assertions by locating metaphor within our social discursive practices of asserting and inferring. The literal and the metaphorical differ not in the stating of facts nor in the representation of states of affairs but in the kind of inferential involvements they have and the normative score-keeping practices within which the inferential connections are articulated. This inferentialist based account of metaphor is supplemented by insights from accommodation theory. The account is significant for our understanding of both metaphor's figurativeness and cognitive content.
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