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The Catholic Church as a public diplomacy actor: an analysis of the pope’s strategic narrative and international engagement

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Abstract

While religion is often considered a cultural element of soft power, religious institutions are rarely studied as diplomatic actors. The purpose of this study was to better understand the manner in with the Catholic Church attempts to build relationships with foreign audiences, a key function of public diplomacy. Emphasising the role of Pope Francis as an iconic world leader, this study employed a qualitative textual analysis to determine what themes are selected and emphasised in papal speeches in order to construct the strategic narrative of the Catholic Church. Results suggest that Pope Francis’ speeches rely most on narratives of universal identity and values, shared responsibility, and calls to action to present the Catholic Church more favourably in the eyes of both Catholic and non-Catholic audiences around the world. These findings contribute to the study of public diplomacy, the concept of strategic narrative, and the theoretical framework of framing.
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The Journal of International Communication
ISSN: 1321-6597 (Print) 2158-3471 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rico20
The Catholic Church as a public diplomacy actor:
an analysis of the pope’s strategic narrative and
international engagement
Guy J. Golan, Phillip C. Arceneaux & Megan Soule
To cite this article: Guy J. Golan, Phillip C. Arceneaux & Megan Soule (2018): The Catholic
Church as a public diplomacy actor: an analysis of the pope’s strategic narrative and international
engagement, The Journal of International Communication, DOI: 10.1080/13216597.2018.1517657
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2018.1517657
Published online: 05 Sep 2018.
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The Catholic Church as a public diplomacy actor: an
analysis of the popes strategic narrative and international
engagement
Guy J. Golan
a
, Phillip C. Arceneaux
b
and Megan Soule
c
a
Department of Advertising, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA;
b
College of Journalism and
Communications, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA;
c
Department of Public Relations, Syracuse
University, Syracuse, NY, USA
ABSTRACT
While religion is often considered a cultural element of soft
power, religious institutions are rarely studied as diplomatic
actors. The purpose of this study was to better understand
the manner in with the Catholic Church attempts to build
relationships with foreign audiences, a key function of
public diplomacy. Emphasising the role of Pope Francis as
an iconic world leader, this study employed a qualitative
textual analysis to determine what themes are selected and
emphasised in papal speeches in order to construct the
strategic narrative of the Catholic Church. Results suggest
that Pope Francisspeeches rely most on narratives of
universal identity and values, shared responsibility, and calls
to action to present the Catholic Church more favourably in
the eyes of both Catholic and non-Catholic audiences
around the world. These ndings contribute to the study of
public diplomacy, the concept of strategic narrative, and
the theoretical framework of framing.
KEYWORDS
Religious diplomacy; Pope
Francis; Catholic Church;
strategic narrative; framing
Introduction
In March 2013, Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio was elected by a papal conclave
as the new leader of the Catholic Church. Selecting the Argentinian, who chose
to be called Pope Francis, was a strategic move for a church that was losing its
moral authority and lay membership following a series of sex abuse cases
(Lowney 2013). Known for his compassion, authenticity, and his ability to
connect with ordinary people (Vallely 2013), Pope Francis quickly emerged as
the face of a new Catholic Church, widely featured in the global news media.
An Instagram account (@franciscus) was even created to directly convey the
Popes message to mass audiences. The Pope would soon embark on several
high-prole international visits aimed at both engaging foreign publics and
repositioning the Catholic Churchs image.
© 2018 Journal of International Communication
CONTACT Guy J. Golan golanresearch@gmail.com
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2018.1517657
Traditional public relations often examine relationship management as the
central concept of exploration (Ferguson 1984; Ledingham and Bruning 1998;
Ki and Hon 2007). Moving beyond the functional perspective, a growing body
of literature aims to expand public relations scholarship beyond relationship
management by examining the more critical aspects that shape public relations,
including power distribution (Pal and Dutta 2008; Edwards 2012; Dutta 2013),
the interaction between elites, traditional news media, and the public (Davis
2002;LEtang 2004), and sociological aspects that could account for the saliency
of public relations in society (Edwards and Hodges 2011).
The current study analysed the Popes major speeches to foreign audiences.
Recognising the dual function of the Pope as the leader of a sovereign state
(the Holy See) and the leader of the Catholic faith, the Popes global outreach
was considered within the context of its strategic narrative, and the Catholic
Churchs engagement of global audiences as a form of public diplomacy. A
key assumption in public relations research is that organisational values
should be reected not only in mission statements, but also in the organisations
daily practices that incorporate ethical standards into organisational behaviour
(Bowen 2004). Yet, scholars and practitioners alike regularly acknowledge that
such normative standards are often violated (Kent and Taylor 2002).
While institutions and elites in power politics are often held to a higher stan-
dard of behaviour, few are held to a level as high as the Catholic Church. As an
institution founded on the principles of moral and ethical behaviour, the various
church scandals in modern history have seriously violated the Churchs relation-
ship with global audiences and damaged trust in the institution (Admirand
2012). The election of Pope Francis was thus a strategic move on the part of
the Church to reposition itself in a manner through which it could sever ties
with an older, less popular image of the Church and build a newer and more
modern image based on mutual trust with Catholic and non-Catholic audiences.
The election of a non-European member of the Franciscan order, an order noted
for its vows to poverty and community interaction, placed the Pope as a key
actor to rebrand the Church as an institution attempting to live up to the behav-
ioural standards established by Catholic doctrine.
Within Catholic culture, the Pope represents the physical embodiment of the
Churchs values. As the rst non-European pope, Pope Francis had the potential
to reorient and redene perceptions of the Catholic Church away from its long-
standing image as a historic colonial hegemon whose behaviour often fell short
of living up to its rhetoric. This shift is particularly relevant to audiences in the
formerly colonised regions of South America and Africa, where the Popes
speeches were concentrated.
The current study aims to understand the engagement strategy pursued by the
Catholic Church following the election of Pope Francis, who presented a unique
narrative in an attempt to reposition and strengthen the Churchs relationships
with its faithful abroad. Furthermore, the study incorporates emergent literature
2G. J. GOLAN ET AL.
on strategic narrative that provides a useful theoretical framework for under-
standing strategic relationship building between organisations and global
stakeholders.
Literature review
Religious diplomacy
Past decades have produced a growing number of academic studies on public
diplomacy. While denitions vary, public diplomacy is essentially focused on
governmental attempts to build and maintain positive relationships with
foreign citizens for the purpose of securing support for foreign policy objectives
(Nye 2004; Gilboa 2008). Traditional public diplomacy scholarship typically
examines public diplomacy tactics such as educational exchanges (Cull 2008),
cultural exchanges (Nye 2004), and language education programmes (Kerry
2009). More recently, scholarship expanded to address government use of
mass media platforms to promote their soft power and gain support for
foreign policies among global publics (Entman 2008; Sheafer and Gabay 2009;
Golan and Himelboim 2016). There exists a noticeable gap in this research
regarding a public diplomacy tactic often overlooked by public diplomacy scho-
lars: ocial visits from heads of state.
The current literature argues that alternative organisations such as corpor-
ations (Macnamara 2012; White 2015); international organisations, including
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and
the World Bank (Keukeleire, Thiers, and Justaert 2009; Manners and
Whitman 2013); and international NGOs (Betsill and Corell 2008; Zatepilina-
Monacell 2012) also engage in public diplomacy based on the domestic-
foreign relationship management function. While scholarship has expanded
examination of public diplomacy actors beyond governments, literature on
engagement with foreign publics has predominantly focused on corporations
(Kochhar and Molleda 2014) and non-governmental organisations (Cheong
and Yang 2017), while only a limited number of peer reviewed articles
focused attention on the role of religious organisations in public diplomacy.
Indeed, a review of this literature indicates that studies focus on the use of reli-
gion solely as a governmental instrument of soft power (Seib 2013; Zhang 2013;
Gutkowski 2016). At the same time, minimal literature argues that religious
organisations themselves play an important role in international engagement
between nations and foreign publics (Graham 1959; Huntington 1973).
Scholarship states that religious organisations are in fact transnational actors
(Valuer 1971; Ryall 2001,2011). The study at hand provides a unique examin-
ation of the Holy See as a public diplomacy actor. The Vatican provides an inter-
esting case study as both a global religious organisation and an ocial sovereign
state. Like most governments, the Holy See manages multiple relationships with
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 3
a large number of stakeholders for the purpose of gaining support for its global
objectives, spanning beyond church membership and including the participation
and support of international development and mission programmes, volunteer
work, and donations.
The current study focuses on global engagement eorts of the Catholic
Church as manifested by the Popes international travel and his interaction
with both Catholic and non-Catholic foreign citizens. It is important to note
that the Pope serves as the head of the Catholic Church, a global entity
equally comprised of the Catholic faith and the Holy See, the latter being recog-
nised as a sovereign nation. As argued by scholars, trust is a central requirement
for successful engagement between governments and foreign publics (Brewer,
Aday, and Gross 2005; Mogensen 2015). As explored by Kampf (2016), diplo-
matic actors such as the Pope attempt to build relationships with foreign audi-
ences through heartwarming messages intended to build trust between the
messenger and the recipient for strategic purposes, or in the case of the Catholic
Church, to rebuild its trust with a global audience.
Leaders in public diplomacy
As noted by numerous public diplomacy scholars, relationship management
stands as the core concept underlying all public diplomacy eorts (Signitzer
and Coombs 1992; Wang 2006; Fitzpatrick 2007; Golan 2014). Whether an
entity is a government, a corporation, or a religious organisation, building
mutually benecial relationships with foreign publics is key to achieving
global organisational objectives. Yet, such relationship building can be challen-
ging given the abstract nature of organisations, especially those whom foreign
audiences know little about. Some public diplomacy scholarship suggests there
exist two mediators that can help bridge the knowledge or awareness gap by pro-
viding interpretive frames, which link organisations to certain issues and attri-
butes in foreign public awareness.
The rst mediator is the news media, in both traditional and digital contexts.
Indeed, a growing number of studies suggest that international news organis-
ations can be more inuential on foreign public opinion than most exchange
or cultural diplomacy programmes (Entman 2008; Sheafer and Gabay 2009;
Golan 2014).
A second mediator between public diplomacy actors and their various global
publics is organisational leaders. As explained by Van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer
(2012), the process of political personalisation has transformed the nature of
political communication. Specically, the personalising element involves shifting
the predominant focus of media coverage away from the organisation and
toward its leader to oer a more succinct, identiable, and personable presence
to counteract the oft-perceived facelessness of larger organisations or insti-
tutions (Balmas 2017). The personalisation hypothesis has been tested and
4G. J. GOLAN ET AL.
supported by numerous political communication studies (Dalton, McAllister,
and Wattenberg 2000; Balmas and Sheafer 2013; Balmas et al. 2014; Balmas
2017). The growing body of literature on political personalisation gained
momentum following the election of former United States President Barack
Obama in 2008, which followed increased global anti-Americanism during the
George W. Bush presidency. Several empirical studies found support for the
so-called Obama Eect,where positive evaluations of the president were
linked to more positive evaluations of the United States (Dragojlovic 2011;
Golan and Yang 2013; Rinke, Willnat, and Quandt 2015).
In a personality-driven era of global politics, charismatic leaders have the
potential to positively personify the political and cultural values of their
nations. As argued by Burkean identication (Burke 1969), an understanding
of identity, or personal identication between parties, is critical for the extent
that persuasive communication is eective. As such, personal identication
with leaderscharacters increases the persuasiveness of their organisations
rhetoric. Recognising this potential, countries are beginning to strategically
use ocial state visits as a tool for public diplomacy (Wang and Chang 2004).
Such visits serve two key functions: providing an opportunity to gain favourable
media coverage (Manheim 1994; Wang and Chang 2004); and personifying the
visiting statescommitment to an authentic relationship and dialogue between
their nation and the government of the receiving nation, i.e., traditional diplo-
macy (Kunczik 2016) as well as the foreign public of the receiving nation, i.e.,
public diplomacy (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009). Ocial state visits therefore
oer a two-pronged advantage to the art of twenty-rst century statecraft. As
such, state visits by organisational leaders can be tools for public diplomacy in
which both verbal and symbolic narratives are carefully crafted based on the
strategic objectives linked to the relationship between the organisation and the
public (Golan 2014).
Strategic narrative
States are able to craft inuential messages, both in verbal and symbolic contexts,
through strategic narratives. Based on Entmans(1993) theory of framing, state
actors seek to build relationships with foreign audiences through the dissemina-
tion of purposively designed messages, or packages made up of individual frames
(Gamson and Modigliani 1989), that seek to present the sending state in a desir-
able context (Irvin-Erickson 2017; Levinger and Roselle 2017; Miskimmon and
OLoughlin 2017; Roselle 2017; Van Noort 2017). Where traditional scholarship
tends to favour the analysis of public diplomacy from states point of view, i.e.,
what might a state do to make xforeign audience view the state favourably,
strategic narrative oers an empirical means through which to quantify the
eects of public diplomacy from the point of view of the foreign audience
itself, i.e., what was eective about State X that made the audience view it
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 5
favourably (Miskimmon, OLoughlin, and Roselle 2013; Miskimmon and
OLoughlin 2017; Szostek 2017).
Beyond reorienting the scope of public diplomacy scholarship from studying
the messages sent by the state toward understanding the foreign audiences that
receive such messages, strategic narrative also accounts for a practical analysis of
what Borah (2011) referred to as frame competition. The process of disseminat-
ing framed narratives across a foreign audience does not occur in a vacuum. Any
strategic narrative must be able to compete with messages from the audiences
domestic state as well as any other foreign narratives introduced as a function
of power politics. Looking to the Catholic Churchs stance on climate change,
strategic papal narratives must not only present the Catholic Church in a favour-
able light to global audiences, but they must be able to compete with the narra-
tives of United States President Donald Trump arguing that climate change does
not exist (Trump 2012), or the narratives of Russian President Vladimir Putin,
who recognises the existence of climate change, but sees it as a natural phenom-
enon that is unaected by human-based carbon emissions (Russian 2017).
As the charismatic new leader of the Vatican, Pope Francis had the potential
to reposition the longstanding relationship between the Church and its faithful
in Latin America and Africa. Building upon the emergent literature on strategic
narrative, the current study aimed to investigate the rhetorical devices and
message strategy employed by the Catholic Church across Pope Francisstate
visits.
Methods
This current study attempts to further scholarly literature not only through con-
tributing to the relatively new framework of strategic narrative in a public diplo-
macy context (Irvin-Erickson 2017; Levinger and Roselle 2017; Miskimmon and
OLoughlin 2017; Roselle 2017; Szostek 2017; Van Noort 2017), but also through
removing such a framework from a non-secular political context and applying it
more conceptually to the merger of religious outreach and public diplomacy.
Recognising the strategic nature of state visits, the current study analysed
speeches delivered by Pope Francis to global audiences with the aim of under-
standing key engagement strategies.
The study employed textual analysis to understand how Pope Francispublic
addresses around the world are used as religious diplomacy. A qualitative
method was utilised because it allowed for distinguishing and analyzing implicit
patterns and themes (Reese 2007; Fursich 2009), and provided insight into the
respective narratives the Roman Curia, Secretariat of State, and Pope Francis
himself attempt to create in the Popes speeches to international audiences.
Since framing is meant to emphasise only certain aspects and themes while
ignoring others (Lin 2012), utilising a textual analysis method provided
greater insight into which frames are being employed in each speech. Textual
6G. J. GOLAN ET AL.
analysis also allows for a more meaningful cross cultural understanding of the
world.
The analysis sample was sourced from the Vaticans news website, Aleteia,
and Vatican Radio. These sites provided links to all public speeches given by
Pope Francis since his election in 2013. A total of 109 public speeches were
listed from March 2013 to December 2015 on the three websites. These 109
speeches took place in 19 dierent countries where the Pope engaged a variety
of distinct audiences including Catholics, non-Catholics, political elites, and
ordinary citizens. All speeches were separated by the continent where the
speech was given, and an equal number of speeches were taken from each region.
Speech sample
Drawn from Vatican Radio (vaticannews.va) and the Holy Seesocial website
(w2.vatican.va), speeches were chosen to represent a wide variety of audiences
and thematic areas, not solely religious homilies. The speeches chosen rep-
resented a diverse set of audiences in age and education level, from students to
government ocials to religious leaders. Finally, speeches were narrowed by
length, retaining speeches with a word count of 1100 or more words. Through
these multiple stages, the reduced sample consisted of 30 speeches for coding
with an average word count of 2098. All 30 speeches were coded in their entirety.
The sample consisted of speeches delivered in such Latin American nations as
Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and African nations as Kenya, Uganda, and
the Central African Republic. The sample also included speeches delivered in
the United States and Europe during the sampled time period.
Consistent with other textual analysis studies, speeches were analysed for key
themes based on an inductive approach (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira
2008; Fursich 2009). Two researchers coded each speech conjointly and
reached agreement through qualitative inter-subjectivity. Codes were used to
generate reports on consistent themes across the 30 speeches. These codes
and reports were then categorised to better understand the types of frames
each speech contained. Groups of consistent codes were identied as frames
to focus in on a specic theme or attribute that Pope Francis utilised when enga-
ging with a foreign audience (Hsieh and Shannon 2005).
Results
The textual analysis revealed that there were consistent patterns across Pope
Francisvarious addresses. Although variations existed depending on the audi-
ence and purpose of the speech, Pope Francis used similar rhetoric and themes
to engage foreign publics throughout the world. Overall, three dierent themes
were identied: universal identity and values, shared responsibility, and calls to
action.
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 7
Universal identity and values
In many of his addresses to foreign publics, Pope Francisstatements included
rhetoric that attempted to connect the identity of the audience to that of
himself and the Vatican in order to promote the idea of a universal identity.
This was done through his usage of the words ouror usor wein phrases
such as I want to be one with you,(Speech of Pope Francis Charitable
Center of St. Patrick Parish, Washington, D.C., 2015, para 8) and It is our
present and our future, together. It is our identity …’(Address of Pope
Francis to the European Parliament, 2014, para 34). The Popes rhetoric
sought to drive home the idea that despite individual dierences, the audience
was part of some larger whole. For example, in his address to the European
Union and European Council, Pope Francis stated
the motto of the European Union is united in Diversity. Unity, however, does not
mean uniformity Indeed, all authentic unity draws from the rich diversities
which make it up: in this sense it is like a family I consider Europe as a family of
peoples (Address of Pope Francis to the European Parliament, 2014, para 22)
and the history of Europe might lead us to think somewhat naïvely(Address of
Pope Francis to the Council of Europe, 2014, para. 7). Likewise, in his address to
authorities and the diplomatic corps in the Central African Republic, the pope
stated:
First unity. This, we know, is a cardinal value for the harmony of peoples. It is to be
lived and built up on the basis of the marvelous diversity of our environment, avoiding
the temptation of fear of others, of the unfamiliar, of what is not part of our ethnic
group, our political views or our religious confession. Unity, on the contrary, calls
for creating and promoting a synthesis of the richness which each person has to
oer. (Address of His Holiness Pope Francis: Bangui, Central African Republic,
2015, para. 4)
In relation to the idea of a shared identity, the Popes statements also show-
cased the values of the Pope, the Holy See and the global Catholic community.
Many of these statements contain content and rhetoric that suggests an attempt
to decrease the self-other gap between the intended foreign public and the
Catholic Church. These statements often highlighted an intersection between
the values of the Pope and his audience. The Popes statements of shared
values centred on anecdotes about family, public service, or human rights,
and demonstrated an eort to connect the Catholic Churchs values and those
of the foreign public.
In a speech during his visits to Turkey and Paraguay, Pope Francis remarked,
We, Muslims and Christians, are the bearers of spiritual treasures of inestimable
worth. Among these we recognize some shared elements(Visit to the President
of the Diyant, 2014, para. 7);
8G. J. GOLAN ET AL.
The poor person is just like me and, if he or she is going through a dicult time for
many reasons, be the economic political, social or personal, it could be me in their
place, me longing for someone to help me. (Meeting with Representatives of Civil
Society, 2015, para. 11)
Such remarks often exposed shared values among members of various religious
communities:
Our various religious traditions call individuals and communities to worship God,
the source of all life, liberty and happiness. They remind us of the transcendent dimen-
sion of human existence and our irreducible freedom in the face of any claim to absol-
ute power They call to conversion, reconciliation, concern for the future of society,
self-sacrice in the service of the common good, and compassion for those in need.
(Pope at Birthplace of America:Defend Religious Liberty, 2015, para. 6)
By creating a shared identity and unearthing these shared values, the Pope was
able to create a sense of like-mindedness between the Catholic Church and the
audience at hand. Even if the Holy Sees views differ from many of the foreign
publics, highlighting points of commonality may suggest to the audience that
both the Pope and the Catholic Church are similar to themselves in values,
thoughts, and desires. Through these speeches, Pope Francis illustrated his
ability to connect with people from all different backgrounds and cultures.
This helped to give these foreign publics a more favourable view of the Catholic
faith, which has the potential to increase the soft power of the Catholic Church
over time.
Shared responsibility
In illuminating shared identity and values, Pope Francis simultaneously created
a notion of shared responsibility. In many of his remarks to foreign audiences,
Pope Francis addressed impactful issues facing the world today. In each instance,
he noted that the responsibility for addressing these issues does not lie with a
single individual, a single group, or a single nation, but rather it is the respon-
sibility of all humanity, together, as one. These sentiments are revealed
through statements that included words such as together;phrases such as we
mustor we need to,’‘we share a common responsibility;and sentences such
as let us consider society through the social values that we foster at home in
the family: gratuitousness, solidarity and subsidiarity(Ecuador: Meeting with
Political, Economics and Civic Leaders, 2015, para 10).
The idea of shared responsibility was particularly salient in papal addresses to
community and national leaders, including members of the U.S. Congress, civil
society and religious leaders, and country representatives of large international
governing bodies. For example, during his speech before the United Nations,
the Pope referenced the need for a collective eort to address global challenges
three times: If we want true integral human development for all, we must work
tirelessly to avoid war between nations and between peoples;
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 9
we are dealing with real men and women who live, struggle and suer, and are often
forced to live in great poverty, deprived of all rights. To enable these real men and
women to escape from extreme poverty, we must allow them to be dignied agents
of their own destiny (Greetings of Pope Francis to United Nations Organization Per-
sonnel, 2015, para 4)
We need to ensure that our institutions are truly effective in the struggle against
all these scourges we represent the conscience of Europe with regard to those
rights(Visit to the Council of Europe, 2014).
Similarly, during his address before the United States Congress (2015), Pope
Francis noted:
we have all received so much and toward which we share a common responsibility
(para. 1); we pool our resources and talents, and resolve to support one another
(para. 11); We must move forward together, as one, in a renewed spirit of fraternity
and solidarity, cooperating generously for the common good. (para. 10)
This notion of shared responsibility also extends to the popes remarks to
average citizens. In his speech to students in Cuba and civil leaders in
Ecuador, the Pope Francis stated: we must not become enclosed in our little
ideological or religious worlds”’ (Address of Pope Francis to Students, 2015,
para. 5); those who promote selshness, those who serve the god of
mammon, who is at the center of a system that is crushing us all(Ecuador:
Meeting with Political, Economic and Civic Leaders, 2015, para. 4). During
his apostolic journey to Kenya, Uganda, and the Central African Republic,
Pope Francis gave an address at a mosque in Bangui during which he noted
that members of both the Christian and Muslim faiths have a responsibility to
reject violence: Together, we must say no to hatred, no to revenge and no to vio-
lence particularly that violence which is perpetrated in the name of a religion or
of God himself(Meeting with the Muslim Community, 2015, para. 5).
During that same journey, Pope Francis spoke before members of the Kenyan
society about a collective authority to protect the environment: We have a
responsibility to pass on the beauty of nature in its integrity to future generations,
and an obligation to exercise a just stewardship of the gifts we have received
(Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Kenya, Uganda and the
Central African Republic, 2015, para. 3). Many of Pope Francisaddresses dis-
cussed a need to protect human dignity. For instance, during his visit to
Ankara, the Pope stated: we are obliged to denounce all violations against
human dignity and human rights(Pope Francis Condemns Barbaric Violence,
2014, para. 6).
Creating a sense of shared responsibility is another channel for the Pope to
connect with his audience. By emphasising the need for collective ownership,
Pope Francis is telling his target audience that the Holy Sees state policies
toward major global issues are aligned with their personal attitudes, and that
the Catholic faith is invested in solving the worlds social ills. Pope Francis is
10 G. J. GOLAN ET AL.
thus able to help reshape public perception about Catholicism and, more speci-
cally, the Holy See. The speechs objective was for the Catholic Church to no
longer be seen as solely concerned with spreading the gospel, but rather as a
committed partner in making the world better for all, regardless of ones faith.
Although the primary objective of Holy See diplomacy is to spread and preserve
Catholicism, acknowledging a shared responsibility to solve challenges allows
the Catholic Church to engage secular public and policy makers, and to create
a common agenda.
Call to action
The most common theme found throughout Pope Francisvarious orations was
a call to action. These call to actionstatements and phrases were recognised
based on the use of strategic rhetoric (usually imperative verbs) that worked
to engage and incite action within the intended audience in the framework of
the Holy Sees values or policies. This strategy is quite evident in the speeches
made during the Popes visit to the Philippines. During his address at the
Manila Cathedral, Pope Francis stated:
share the joy and enthusiasm of your love for Christ and the Church with everyone, but
especially with your peers. Be present to young people who may be confused and
despondent, yet continue to see the Church as their friend on the journey and a
source of hope. Be present to those who, living in the midst of a society burdened
by poverty and corruption, are broken in spirit, tempted to give up, to leave school
and to live on the streets. Proclaim the beauty and truth of the Christian message to
a society which is tempted by confusing presentations of sexuality, marriage and the
family. (Pope calls on Filipino Church to combat inequality and injustice, 2015,
para. 7)
Since his appointment as head of the Holy See and Catholic faith, Pope
Francis has used many of his visits to speak about global conicts, human
rights, and other challenges, and has attempted to inspire foreign publics to
address the issues facing their nation and the world as a whole (Pamment
2015). For example, while meeting with Filipino leaders, the Pope urged
them and all members of society to reject every form of corruption which
diverts resources from the poor,and to make concerted eorts to ensure
the inclusion of every man and woman and child in the life of the community
(Pope Francis Urges Filipino Leaders to Reject Corruption, 2015, para. 4).
Further, while meeting with civil society in Paraguay, Pope Francis urged
the audience and the world to discuss, think, and discover together a better
solution for everybody(Meeting with Representatives of Civil Society, 2015,
para. 9).
His calls to action are most notable when addressing severe global challenges,
including economic and social injustice: acknowledge and combat the causes of
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 11
the deeply rooted inequality and injustice(Pope calls on Filipino Church to
combat inequality and injustice, 2015, para. 4),
but if you do not dialogue, all is pointless. If there is blackmail, all is pointless. This
great multitude of groups and persons are like a great symphony, each one with his
or her own specicity and richness, yet all working together towards a harmonious
end. That is what counts. And do not fear conict, but speak about matters and
look for paths that lead to solutions. (Meeting with Representatives of Civil Society,
2015, para. 7)
as well as environmental degradation: I call for a courageous and responsible
effort to redirect our stepsand to avert the most serious effects of the environ-
mental deterioration caused by human activity(Pope to Congress, 2015, para.
22). Similarly, Pope Francis made numerous calls to pursue peace: dedicate
these days to peace, to praying for it and deepening our resolve to achieve it
(Pope to Korean Leaders: Honour our ancestors, treasure youth, 2015, para. 6);
nd the courage to be generous and creative in the service of the common good, the
courage to forge a peace which rests on the acknowledgment by all of the right of
two States to exist and to live in peace and security within internationally recognized
borders. (Pope to Palestinian Authorities, 2015, para 3)
refrain from initiatives and actions which contradict the stated desire to reach a
true agreement, and that peace will be pursued with tireless determination and
tenacity(Pope to Palestinian Authorities, 2015, para. 4).
Just as he established collective responsibility, Pope Francis also stressed the
importance of collective action: Let us help others to grow, as we would like to
be helped ourselves(Pope to Congress, 2015, para. 17); let us give security; let
us give life; let us provide opportunities(Pope to Congress, 2015, para. 17); Let
us dialogue(Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Ecuador,
Bolivia, and Paraguay, Meeting with Civil Society members, 2015, para. 6);
enlighten and support one another, and, whenever necessary, to purify one
another from ideological extremes(Address to Council of Europe, 2014, para.
28). This call for collective action is particularly salient when it comes to
papal remarks regarding international responses to the current refugee and
migration crisis. In his address to the European Parliament , Pope Francis
issued a call to action on three occasions: there needs to be a united response
to the question of migration;confront the problems associated with immigra-
tion; and We need to take action against the causes and not only the eects
(para, 32). One of his most powerful calls of action came when he called for a
day of prayer and fasting for peace in Syria:
To this end, brothers and sisters, I have decided to proclaim for the whole Church on 7
September next, the vigil of the birth of Mary, Queen of Peace, a day of fasting and
prayer for peace in Syria, the Middle East, and throughout the world, and I also
invite each person, including our fellow Christians, followers of other religions and
12 G. J. GOLAN ET AL.
all men of good will, to participate, in whatever way they can, in this initiative.
(St. Peters Square, August 2013, para. 8)
Pope Franciseorts towards peace and cooperation were made evident
through his numerous calls to action. His communication with foreign
publics demonstrated his desire to uncover issues receiving limited worldwide
attention, and place these issues on the collective agenda of citizens everywhere.
The creation of universal identity and values and shared responsibility found in
the Popes speeches serves to connect Pope Francis with his audience in order to
initiate action. His rhetoric inspires and has the ability to rally people to take
ownership of their actions.
Discussion
As noted, relationship management and the engagement of foreign audiences
stands at the centre of public diplomacy (Signitzer and Coombs 1992;
Zaharna 2007; Cowan and Arsenault 2008). State visits to foreign nations
provide a unique opportunity for this kind of relationship-building through
direct public exposure to an individual who represents a foreign country. As
suggested by research on political personalisation, leaders provide cognitive,
heuristic cues regarding the traits, values, and personality of nations as exem-
plied by their leaders (Balmas and Sheafer 2013; Golan and Yang 2013;
Balmas et al. 2014; Balmas 2017). The current study aimed to advance the
growing body of literature on political personalisation by analyzing the strategic
narrative of Pope Francis as related to the Churchs attempt to reposition itself
following a longstanding crisis of trust. As argued by Burke (1969), for rhetorical
persuasion to be eective, there must be a level of identication between the
involved parties. As the embodiment of the Churchs core values of universalism,
egalitarianism, and justice, Pope Franciss global speeches to foreign citizens
achieved a level of identication with audiences that previous popes were incap-
able of due to their conformity with Roman Curia hierarchical power dynamics.
As such, state visits have become key opportunities for public diplomacy
tactics, allowing governments to present foreign audiences with strategic narra-
tives in the hope of gaining support for foreign policy objectives. Since state visits
are often covered by domestic and international news media, they serve a dual
purpose, namely as a tool for direct engagement with foreign publics and as a
media agenda building strategy (Wang and Chang 2004; Ojala 2011; Cheng,
Golan, and Kiousis 2015). The results of the current study identify three promi-
nent themes key to the Catholic Churchs global engagement narrative as ident-
ied through papal speeches.
The rst theme focused on universal identity and values, shared between the
Catholic Church and foreign publics regardless of their spiritual identity. A
multi-functional rhetorical device such as papal speeches allowed the Pope to
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 13
build commonality with his own faithful as well as audience members who
belong to other religious denominations. Over the past two decades, the Catholic
Church faced growing competition from other denominations in traditional
Catholic strongholds in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By promoting a narra-
tive of universal identity, Pope Francis is able to establish relationships strategi-
cally with non-Catholics, thereby opening doors for future relationship-building.
This broad engagement strategy is further supported by the second theme
from this studys textual analysis, which is shared responsibility. As with any
other organisation, regardless of sector, the alignment of organisational values
to the values of an organisations primary stakeholders is a fundamental require-
ment for building successful relationships (Ledingham 2003; Grunig 2013). The
Popes speeches allow for a strategic framing of the Catholic Churchs salient
values in the form of global humanism, promotion of peace and cooperation,
and caring for those less fortunate. The results of the textual analysis point to
such alignment between the values of the Catholic Church and that of its
various foreign publics.
The third major theme focused on a global call to action. Here, there was a
strategic alignment between the shared responsibility identied in the second
theme and the shared causes championed by the Catholic Church. These
included social justice, conict resolution, cooperation, and the promotion of
human rights. Pope Franciscall for collective action is consistent with
growing engagement trends between organisations and their various stake-
holders. Recent public relations scholarship specically identies the partake
in our causemessage strategy as a sophisticated engagement tactic that success-
fully builds authentic relationships between organisations and their myriad
publics (Lim, Yang, and Chung 2015).
When understood holistically, the three major themes identied through the
analyses indicate the churchs global engagement eorts stem beyond the Catholic
framework. Rather, the strategic narrative promoted by Pope Francis was targeted
at universal identity, shared responsibility, and a global call for action that would
benet all humankind. Unlike other religious leaders who focus on internal stake-
holders, i.e., members of their own church, Pope Franciss religious diplomacy
strategy aims to expand engagement beyond the Catholic laity. The competitive
nature of a globalised, interconnected world requires religious organisations to
focus their relationship-building and engagement eorts beyond their own
membership. The results of the current study provide salient lessons for public
diplomacy practitioners regardless of the organisational sector.
Beyond practical applications, this study also contributed theoretically to the
growing body of literature on strategic narrative (Levinger and Roselle 2017;
Miskimmon and OLoughlin 2017; Roselle 2017). By investigating the manner
in which global institutions strategically construct message campaigns through
the selection and salience of certain thematic viewpoints, a direct conceptual
bridge was built aligning the theory of framing and the conceptual basis of
14 G. J. GOLAN ET AL.
strategic narratives as a primary tactical behaviour of public diplomacy actors in
the twenty-rst century. Further, it contributed to framing theory by emphasis-
ing the necessity for competitiveness among strategic narratives, as called for by
Borah (2011). Framing rarely functions in a vacuum; thus, understanding not
only how public diplomacy actors seek to inuence a foreign audience, but
how their narratives are built to compete with opposing narratives within that
foreign audience, can provide a more holistic picture of the state of modern
public diplomacy, from the viewpoint of both state and non-state actors.
The results of the current study should be understood in the context of the
prolonged crisis that plagued the Catholic Church in the years preceding Pope
Francistenure. The church received much public scrutiny following its handling
of shocking sexual abuse allegations and subsequent cover-ups. The selection and
election of Pope Francis, the rst non-European Pope who embodied a return to
the inherent values of the Church, was recognised by scholars and experts alike
as a strategic repositioning move aimed at rebuilding trust among a global audi-
ence (Weiss 2013;Mondorf2017). While some may argue that such purposive
organisational strategy is inherently cynical, for others the study of such strategic
narrative can substantially contribute to an understanding of the practical and
rhetorical approach to image development and repair through the lens of inter-
national public relations and public diplomacy.
The ndings of the current study point to the strategic narrative employed by
the Holy See in its attempt to reposition itself abroad and manage its inter-
national reputation. The election of Pope Francis oered the embattled
church with the opportunity to mend relationships with faithful in such
regions as Latin America and Africa where it faces harsh competition and loss
of membership to Protestantism. Unlike previous popes who delivered tradition-
alist public diplomacy messages during state visits, Pope Francis presented
uniquely universal and inclusive narratives aimed at repairing relationship
with Catholics abroad while simultaneously reaching out to non-Catholics.
Future studies can better build upon such ndings through the analysis of stra-
tegic narratives used for foreign engagement by leaders of governments, corpor-
ations, and religious organisations around the globe. While the study adds
knowledge to public diplomacy scholarship, it has several limitations. The quali-
tative nature of the analysis lacks external validity, making results dicult to gen-
eralise. Future studies could address the potential inuence of audience, along with
other in-depth factors, that may lead to the salience and prioritisation of strategic
narrative development. Furthermore, our failure to include quantitative measures
limit the understanding of the results within the broader context of the data.
Conclusion
The world of international relations is continuously evolving. States used to
be the only actors engaged in diplomacy, but statecraft in the twenty-rst
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 15
century can be engaged in by a variety of actors, including governments, inter-
national organisations, and corporations. While public diplomacy literature
often cites religion as a cultural element of soft power, it rarely conceptualises
religious institutions as non-state public diplomacy actors. Catholicism is the
only religion to also be recognised as a state actor, given the international
sovereignty invested in the Holy See. While it is dicult to delineate
between the political and religious elements of the Catholic Churchs behaviour,
it is beyond question that that Catholic Church, as an accumulation of the Holy
See and the worldwide Catholic faith, engages in public diplomacy behaviour
through its eorts to build relationships with foreign audiences. Understanding
how the Catholic Church disseminates its strategic narrative through the
mouthpiece of the church, Pope Francis, helps to conceptualise a framework
through which any religious institution that engages audiences at the inter-
national level can be viewed as a non-state public diplomacy actor.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Janessa White for her contributions to
early drafts of the manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Guy J. Golan is a Visiting Associate Professor at the Zimmerman School of Advertising and
Mass Communications at the University of South Florida. He has published more than 40
peer reviewed manuscripts centered on international public opinion and media eects.
Phillip C. Arceneaux is a PhD student in the College of Journalism and Communications at
the University of Florida. He holds an M.S. from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette and
a B.A. from Louisiana State University. His research investigates both the uses of political
public relations in international contexts as well as media policy and technology policy impli-
cations that arise from such behaviour.
Megan Soule was a student at the S.I. Newhouse School graduate program in public diplo-
macy at Syracuse University.
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THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 21
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... While research on individual popes is not uncommon (Golan et al., 2018), minimal work has analyzed institutional papal rhetoric across time. Pope Francis' creation of @Pontifex and @Franci scus has been the focus of scholarly research (De Franco, 2020), yet such study has been contextually limited to his papacy alone. ...
... This involves analyzing primary data for informational cues conveying either manifest or latent meaning in the textual form. It allows scholars to identify, catalog, and map rhetoric within public diplomacy (Golan et al., 2018;Huang & Wang, 2022;Manfredi-Sánchez & Smith, 2022). Such an approach offers an exploratory look at the storytelling components of the papacy's discursive content strategy. ...
... In every speech delivered, Pope Francis emphasizes the value of the church in line with universal human values. Golan et al. (2019) analysis reinforces this evidence by analyzing several contexts of the Pope's speeches. They found that each speech narrative was constructed by universal identity and values. ...
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