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The Goal Concept: A Helpful Tool for Theory Development and Testing in Motivation Science

September 2018
Motivation Science 4(3):185-205

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New York University

In the present article, I will try to elucidate how relying on the goal concept facilitates the development and testing of theories in the science of motivation. For this purpose, I will focus on those theories whose development I was closely involved with: the self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), the mindset theory of action phases (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer, 1990), and the theory of if-then planning (Gollwitzer, 1999, 2014). So the focus is not on discussing the many different goal theories that have been developed and tested in the psychology of motivation by addressing the consequences of setting, striving for, and attaining goals of a different kind, or the various self-regulation strategies that have been suggested to help people commit to, pursue, and attain these goals. Rather, I’ll try to demonstrate convincingly that the goal concept is a powerful tool when it comes to creating theories that facilitate the understanding of phenomena that are at the center stage in the science of motivation.

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SOCIETY FOR THE SCIENCE OF MOTIVATION

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

The Goal Concept: A Helpful Tool for Theory Development and

Testing in Motivation Science

Peter M. Gollwitzer

New York University and University of Konstanz

In the present article, I will try to elucidate how relying on the goal concept facilitates the

development and testing of theories in the science of motivation. For this purpose, I will

focus on those theories whose development I was closely involved with: the self-

completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), the mindset theory of action phases

(Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987;Gollwitzer, 1990), and the theory of if-then planning

(Gollwitzer, 1999,2014). So the focus is not on discussing the many different goal theories

that have been developed and tested in the psychology of motivation by addressing the

consequences of setting, striving for, and attaining goals of a different kind, or the various

self-regulation strategies that have been suggested to help people commit to, pursue, and

attain these goals. Rather, I’ll try to demonstrate convincingly that the goal concept is a

powerful tool when it comes to creating theories that facilitate the understanding of

phenomena that are at the center stage in the science of motivation.

Keywords: goals, theories in motivation science, self-completion, action-related

mindsets, implementation intentions

In the present article, I will not discuss the

different goal theories that have been developed

and tested in the psychology of motivation fo-

cusing on the various consequences that setting,

striving for, and attaining goals of a different

kind are characterized by. For instance, whether

or not the pursuit of learning versus perfor-

mance goals allows for more effective process-

ing of negative feedback (Dweck & Leggett,

1988), the setting of speciﬁc challenging versus

vague do your best goals leads to better goal

attainment (Locke & Latham, 2013), pursuing

approach versus avoidance goals is associated

with more positive rather than negative affect

(Elliot, Gable, & Mapes, 2006), or whether pro-

motion versus prevention goals are associated

with eagerness rather than vigilance in goal

pursuit (Higgins, 1997). I will also refrain from

discussing whether self-regulation strategies

can enhance the commitment to one’s goals,

pursuing these goals, and attaining them (e.g.,

mental contrasting vs. positively fantasizing

about a desired future outcome, Oettingen,

2012; planning out one’s goal striving in ad-

vance, Gollwitzer, 1993), and whether certain

situational contexts (e.g., being in a position of

power, in a positive/negative mood) will facil-

itate or hamper the setting, striving for, and

attainment of goals. All of this is discussed

extensively in recent handbook chapters by

Gollwitzer and Oettingen (2012,in press)as

well as Oettingen and Gollwitzer (2018).

What I want to achieve in the present article

is different: I want to elucidate how relying on

the goal concept helped the development of

Peter M. Gollwitzer, Department of Psychology, New

York University, and Department of Psychology, University

of Konstanz.

This article is based on a presidential address delivered

by Peter Gollwitzer at the 2017 meeting of the Society for

the Science of Motivation.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-

dressed to Peter M. Gollwitzer, Department of Psychology,

New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY

10003. E-mail: peter.gollwitzer@nyu.edu

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Motivation Science

2333-8113/18/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/mot0000115

185

various theories in the science of motivation.

For this purpose, I will focus on theories whose

development I was closely involved with: the

self-completion theory (SCT; Wicklund &

Gollwitzer, 1982), the mindset theory of action

phases (MAP; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987;

Gollwitzer, 1990), and the theory of if-then

planning (Gollwitzer, 1999). Proceeding this

way will make it easier for me to elucidate how

valuable the goal concept has been for theory

development in different domains relevant to

motivation psychology: self & identity (SCT)

and action control (MAP; the theory of if-then

planning).

Sticking to the listed theories also allows me

to point out that the goal concept may enrich

research on motivation-related phenomena in

two different ways: First, by bringing some-

thing of value to the table that would not have

occurred without it. This is true in particular for

SCT where the goal concept allowed for the

insight that people may not only present them-

selves in line with their self-concepts and eval-

uate themselves in line with their self-esteem;

people may also strive for identity goals (e.g., of

being a great businessman) and thus present

themselves in a way that is not consistent with

their self-concepts or does not afﬁrm their self-

esteem but compensates for identity-goal re-

lated shortcomings. Second, the goal concept

may point research on motivational phenomena

into new directions in which a particular theory

is formed and tested. As will become evident

later in the article, this is true in particular for

the two theories pertaining to action control:

MAP and the theory of if-then planning. Fi-

nally, in closing I’ll suggest that research on

other phenomena studied in the science of mo-

tivation might also beneﬁt from turning to the

goal concept, enriching their theoretical analy-

sis as well as the respective empirical tests.

Self-Completion Theory: Explicating Goal

Compensation at the Identity Level

Traditionally, the psychology of the self or

identity (Suls & Greenwald, 1983;Suls, 1993)

primarily focuses on the following question:

How does a person conceive of his or her self?

Within this approach, the term of self or identity

refers to a cognitive structure that incorporates

all of the ways in which a person might answer

the question, “Who am I?” As William James

had anticipated (James, 1890/1950), people’s

answers were found to relate to physical attri-

butes (“I am tall”), social roles (“I am a father”),

traits (“I am a conscientious person”), to skills

and aptitudes (“I am an IT freak”), or to values

and interests (“I love to read”). Research in this

tradition refers to the self in terms of the self-

concept, and it has observed that people com-

monly are keen to verify their self-concepts

(e.g., by choosing interaction partners that agree

with their self-related beliefs; Swann, 1983).

But why then do we often see people presenting

themselves more positively than it is justiﬁed?

Knowing that imposters are not the most liked

people around (as the term implies, imposters

do thrust themselves offensively upon others),

one wonders: Why do self-aggrandizing self-

presentations exist?

In the late 1970s, Robert Wicklund and I

asked ourselves this very question. Given that

audiences commonly are annoyed by braggers,

what drives presenting oneself positively when

things are actually not looking good? When we

stumbled into Kurt Lewin’s (1926) work and

that of his students (Lissner, 1933;Mahler,

1933;Ovsiankina, 1928;Zeigarnik, 1927)on

compensatory efforts in individuals who fail to

perform an assigned goal (e.g., children who

were given the task of building a house of

wooden blocks), we adopted a goal perspective

on the imposter phenomenon. We asked our-

selves: Couldn’t it be that the individuals who

loudly claim to possess a certain identity (such

as being a great father) do not think of this

identity in terms of a self-concept but rather in

terms of the aspired-to identity goal (of wanting

to be a great father). According to this perspec-

tive, public claims to be a great father might be

nothing more than a compensatory response to

the experience of falling short with respect to an

aspired-to identity (e.g., ﬁnding out that a friend

spends way more time with his children than

oneself does).

Accordingly, we developed self-completion

theory to better understand how people strive

for self-deﬁning goals or identity goals. Such

goals specify the possession of a wanted iden-

tity as a desired end state. Self-completion the-

ory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982;Gollwitzer

& Kirchhof, 1998) proposes that people who

strive for certain identity goals can undertake a

variety of activities to claim identity-goal prog-

ress, because many different actions indicate the

186 GOLLWITZER

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possession of the respective identities. For a

scientist, for example, such self-symbolizing

activities might include engaging in profes-

sional duties (e.g., giving lectures, conducting

research, publishing the obtained ﬁndings),

making positive self-descriptions (e.g., “I dis-

covered the essence of a certain psychological

principle!”), exerting identity-relevant social in-

ﬂuence (e.g., advising students), or acquiring

respective skills, tools, and material symbols

(e.g., programming skills, having fast comput-

ers, a large ofﬁce). Failing to perform an iden-

tity-relevant activity or noticing that one lacks a

certain identity symbol is assumed to produce a

state of incompleteness; to restore complete-

ness, people can engage in self-symbolizing ef-

forts (i.e., compensatory efforts). Such self-

symbolizing can emphasize the possession of

alternative symbols or setting out to acquire new

identity symbols (e.g., describing oneself as hav-

ing the required personality attributes, Gollwitzer

& Wicklund, 1985; displaying relevant status

symbols, Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, & Harmon-

Jones, 2009; engaging in identity-relevant activi-

ties, Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996).

More recently, individuals with the identity

goal of successful businessmen or lawyer have

been found to engage in self-symbolizing ef-

forts even when the offered routes to self-

symbolizing required engaging in antisocial,

corrupt actions that conﬂicted with their general

values (Marquardt, Gantman, Gollwitzer, &

Oettingen, 2016). More speciﬁcally, Marquardt

et al. observed that in the face of bogus negative

feedback on their aptitude for the aspired-to

identity, participants with the identity goal of

becoming a successful businessman or lawyer

compensated by endorsing immoral but effec-

tive solutions to business problems or admitting

to previous immoral but successful actions

shown by lawyers, respectively. Also, when

high school seniors who pursued a STEM pro-

fession received negative feedback on possess-

ing relevant cognitive abilities and thus felt

incomplete, they self-ascribed personality traits

associated with professional success in the

STEM ﬁelds even when these traits were clearly

linked to a heightened readiness to engage in

immoral behavior.

Importantly, our goal perspective on self-

symbolizing also allowed us to recognize that

self-symbolizing should not be equated with

efforts to afﬁrm one’s general self-integrity or

bolstering one’s self-esteem. These latter two

strategies are not sufﬁcient to offset incomplete-

ness regarding an identity goal, as this requires

one to acquire speciﬁc identity symbols and not

just a positive evaluation of the self in general

(e.g., Ledgerwood, Liviatan, & Carnevale,

2007;Gollwitzer, Marquardt, Scherer, & Fujita,

2013). Also, in line with the research on goal

striving conducted by Lewin and his students,

we hypothesized and found that our research

participants experienced a higher level of com-

pleteness when a social audience noticed their

efforts to compensate for an experienced incom-

pleteness. In other words, self-symbolizing that

is noticed by others and thus has become a

social fact is more powerful in restoring expe-

rienced incompleteness (Gollwitzer, 1986). In

addition, we found that incomplete individuals

are more concerned with ﬁnding an audience for

their identity striving than are completed indi-

viduals (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). How-

ever, incomplete individuals see others only in

terms of the potential to notice their compen-

satory efforts; thus, they lack social sensitivity

in the sense of empathetically interacting with

their audience (Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985).

Most interestingly, when people make public

their intention to acquire a certain self-

deﬁnitional indicator (e.g., when a person who

wants to become a great student publicly utters

the behavioral intention of enrolling in an in-

spiring but challenging course) this already pro-

duces an enhanced sense of completion (Goll-

witzer, Sheeran, Michalski, & Seifert, 2009).

However, this enhanced sense of completeness

was found to have negative consequence for

actually acting on one’s intentions. Apparently,

when others take notice of a stated identity-

relevant behavioral intention, the superordinate

goal of claiming the identity feels like being

reached already, and thus actually performing

the intended behavior becomes less necessary.

This ﬁnding is in line with results of prior

self-completion studies; public, positive self-

descriptions claiming the possession of an iden-

tity symbol produced the same sense of self-

deﬁnitional completeness as actually obtaining

this indicator of identity goal completeness

(Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996;Gollwitzer,

Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982).

Finally, self-completion research so far has

primarily focused on the state of incomplete-

ness and its downstream consequences (i.e.,

187THE GOAL CONCEPT

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compensation by self-symbolizing). More re-

cently, the focus has changed toward the state of

completion and its downstream consequences

of resorting to inaction, which is a problem

when one’s identity goal demands sustained

action (e.g., when one’s identity goal is being a

“green person”). For instance, Longoni, Goll-

witzer, and Oettingen (2014) analyzed whether

validating the purchase of green products ham-

pers subsequent green behaviors in people with

the identity goal of being green. They found that

positive feedback on purchasing green products

led to less subsequent recycling compared to

negative feedback, with participants who did

not receive any feedback lying in between.

Moreover, participants who did receive positive

feedback evinced a decreased cognitive acces-

sibility of goal-related constructs in a lexical-

decision task compared to participants who had

received negative feedback, suggesting that

feedback validating one’s green purchasing

choices is associated with heightened goal com-

pleteness. Similarly, participants who had re-

ceived positive feedback recalled a green patch

as less green compared to negative feedback

participants, suggesting that the urge to attain

the identity goal of being green was weakened

by positive as compared to negative feedback.

To conclude, self-completion theory offers an

additional perspective—a goal perspective—to

the psychology of self and identity, which has

so far favored a self-concept perspective (Who

am I?) and a self-evaluation perspective (Do I

have high self-esteem?). The additional per-

spective suggested by self-completion theory

helped to explore how people can strive for their

identity goals by ﬁnding out (a) what kind of

indicators can best symbolize goal complete-

ness, (b) that creating social realities for one’s

self-symbolizing efforts improves its impact on

goal completeness, and (c) that engaging in

self-symbolizing is an impulsive activity that

limits reﬂective thought which is commonly

required when people opt to take the perspec-

tives of others.

Most importantly, SCT by taking a goal per-

spective has brought back the notion of com-

pensation for failing and falling short. As self-

symbolizing is a compensatory act, it is

comforting to know that people who experience

an incompleteness with respect to an aspired-to

identity goal can always point to alternative

indicators of goal completeness that are still in

their possession, and thus easily reinstall a sense

of completeness. This allows them to “stay in

the ﬁeld” (as Lewin referred to persistent goal

pursuit) which is highly import when it comes

to identity goals, as these goals cannot be at-

tained by one single act and can never be at-

tained fully. Think for instance of the identity

goal of being a great father, scientist, or piano

player. There is no exhaustive attainment of

such goals; rather, pursuing such goals is a

life-long endeavor. This requires that people

can easily stay in the ﬁeld in the face of incom-

pleteness experiences, and self-completion the-

ory points to an effective way of doing this:

Incomplete individuals only have to engage in

self-symbolizing that points to those indicators

that are still available, thus reestablishing com-

pleteness on the spot. Theorizing on self and

identity that does not use the concept of “iden-

tity goal” does not provide such an optimistic

outlook. When people fall short, it is assumed

that they have to adjust the respective self-

concept accordingly thus showing consistency

(Swann, 1983); and if the failure is so bad that

it even affects their self-esteem they need to

engage in efforts that afﬁrm their self-esteem in

general (Steele, 1988). Without applying the

goal concept to the theorizing on self and iden-

tity as is done in SCT, the option of compen-

sating on the spot would have never been ex-

plicated and tested as a viable way to cope with

identity-related shortcomings.

Action Phases and Mindsets

In the 1980s, when Heinz Heckhausen and I

set out to analyze how people control their

actions (see Heckhausen, Gollwitzer, & Wein-

ert, 1987), we quickly realized that research on

action control is facilitated when it is broken

down into different phases. But what kinds of

phases does one want to differentiate, and how

can one assure that these phases are actually

distinct? For both questions the goal concept

turned out to be a great tool to ﬁnd convincing

answers.

The Rubicon Model of Action Phases

For Kurt Lewin (e.g., Lewin, Dembo, Fest-

inger, & Sears, 1944), there was never any

doubt that motivational phenomena can only be

properly understood and analyzed from an ac-

188 GOLLWITZER

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tion perspective. In support of this claim, Lewin

argued that processes of goal setting and goal

striving are governed by distinct psychological

principles. This insight however went unheeded

for several decades, probably for the simple

reason that goal setting research based on the

expectancy-value paradigm proved very suc-

cessful (Festinger, 1942;Atkinson, 1957), and

thus captured the full attention of motivation

psychologists. It was not until the reemergence

of the psychology of goals (starting with

Klinger’s current concerns, 1977) that the pro-

cesses and potential strategies of goal striving

began to receive more attention (review by Oet-

tingen & Gollwitzer, 2001). This new action

perspective on human behavior also meant ex-

tending the scope of analysis beyond the ques-

tion of how reliable responding to certain stim-

uli can best be established, the central question

of the behaviorists.

The Rubicon model of action phases under-

stands the course of action to be a temporal,

horizontal path starting with a person’s wishes

and ending with the evaluation of the action

outcomes achieved (Gollwitzer, 1990;Heck-

hausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). It was designed to

raise and help answer the following four ques-

tions: How do people select their goals? How do

they plan the execution of the respective goal

striving? How do they enact these plans? And

how do they evaluate their accomplishments?

According to the Rubicon model, a course of

action involves at the outset a phase of deliber-

ating the desirability and feasibility of one’s

wishes in order to arrive at a binding decision

regarding which of them one wants to pursue

(predecision phase), a phase of planning con-

crete strategies for achieving the goal selected at

the end of the predecision phase (the preaction

phase), a phase of enacting these strategies (ac-

tion phase), and ﬁnally a phase of evaluating the

achieved action outcomes (postaction phase).

The four phases are separated by distinct

boundaries. The ﬁrst boundary (also referred to

as crossing the Rubicon) is located between the

predecision phase and the preaction phase and

stands for turning a wish into a binding goal.

The second boundary sits between the preaction

phase and the action phase, and it stands for

moving from planning on how to act on one’s

goal to actually starting to act. Finally, the third

boundary is placed between the action phase

and the postaction phase and it stands for one’s

acting coming to an end and starting with the

evaluation of the achieved outcomes. The ﬁrst

and the last of the four phases are also referred

to as motivation phases as they are linked to

phenomena that have been addressed in tradi-

tional motivation psychology: making choices

on the basis of perceived feasibility and desir-

ability has been analyzed by expectancy-value

theories (Atkinson, 1957) and evaluating

achieved outcomes has been the focus of atten-

tion in attribution theories (Weiner, 1986). The

second and the third phase are sometimes re-

ferred to as volition phases as they are linked to

phenomena that have been analyzed in the early

days of will psychology (Lewin, 1926;Ach,

1935).

The Rubicon model of action phases has ben-

eﬁtted much from research using the goal con-

cept as it helped to delineate different phases of

the control of action. It is important to note

however that it goes beyond the distinction be-

tween goal setting and goal striving. Although

the model keeps these two problems of goal

pursuit separate, it encompasses both within a

single theoretical model, thus encouraging re-

searchers to analyze their features and the re-

spective underlying processes in relation to each

other.

The Rubicon model has led to a number of

misconceptions that I want to clarify in the

following: First, the model does not imply that

every single initiation of action is directly pre-

ceded by deliberation of the desirability and

feasibility of the underlying goal and the form-

ing of a goal commitment. Many initiations of

action are simply resumptions of activities that

were started some time before; forming the un-

derlying goal anew is therefore unnecessary.

The same is true for action initiations postponed

because of a lack of opportunities to act. Sec-

ond, the model does not imply that forming a

goal commitment is necessarily followed by

intense planning. It is rather assumed that such

concerns originate only when smooth imple-

mentation of the goal is threatened; for instance,

when special circumstances or means are re-

quired that still need to be developed or created,

when the critical opportunity may be missed

because it is difﬁcult to recognize, happens in-

frequently, or presents itself only for a short

moment, and when competing goals continue to

block implementing the critical goal. Third, the

model of action phases does not exclude the

189THE GOAL CONCEPT

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possibility of overlap between these phases. In

the predecision phase, deliberation of wishes

concerning a goal can easily be interrupted so

that actions in the service of other already cho-

sen goals may be planned, initiated, completed,

or evaluated. Also, in the postdecision (preac-

tion) phase, the individual may deliberate vari-

ous wishes and evaluate some completed goal

pursuits while waiting for the opportunity to act

on a newly chosen goal. Similarly, during the

execution of goal-related actions, individuals

may deliberate wishes, ready themselves for

implementing other goals, or evaluate some ter-

minated goal pursuit as long as executing the

critical actions is largely automatized. Fourth,

the model uses the metaphor of crossing the

Rubicon to describe the turning of wishes (po-

tential goals) into binding goals. Here the allu-

sion is not so much to having gone beyond a

point of no return as it is to putting incessant

deliberation to a rest. The model simply as-

sumes that making a goal decision stops the

“babble of competing inner voices” (Jones &

Gerard, 1967).

Deliberative Versus Implemental Mindsets

The goal concept did not only help to delin-

eate the four phases of action in the Rubicon

model. It also allowed us to ﬁnd a way to test

whether these distinctions are valid as research

on goals had in the past been linked to study-

ing people’s mindsets (Külpe, 1904). A mindset

was considered to be the sum total of the acti-

vated cognitive procedures associated with try-

ing to solve a given task. So we thought dem-

onstrating that the phases of the Rubicon model

are characterized by different mindsets sug-

gested that these phases are indeed distinct,

each requiring to solve a unique task.

The Würzburg School of psychology was

particularly interested in studying the cognitive

consequences of assigned task goals (i.e., when

people try to solve an Aufgabe, given to them by

the experimenter). Oskar Külpe (1904),the

founder of the Würzburg School (see Boring,

1950, pp. 401– 406; Humphrey, 1951, pp. 30 –

131), had participants view pictures of four non-

sense syllables, each written in a different color.

The letters composing the syllables, the posi-

tioning of the colors, and syllables themselves

were varied over trials. Most importantly,

Külpe also varied the Aufgabe (the assigned

task goal) prior to each picture presentation.

Subjects had to attend to a particular aspect of

the stimulus display (e.g., the frequency of a

certain letter, the positioning of the colors, the

ﬁgure represented by the positioning of the syl-

lables, or the kind of letters composing the

syllables). Immediately after each stimulus pre-

sentation, lasting 0.125 second, he requested the

subjects to report the solutions to the tasks; in

addition, he asked them to recall the other as-

pects of the stimulus display, of which they had

not been instructed to take notice. The results

showed drastic effects of task instruction:

Whenever the experimenter’s questions were

related to the instructions prior to viewing the

display (e.g., subjects were asked to attend to

the positioning of the colors and then asked to

recall it), subjects were highly accurate in their

answers; however, whenever there was a mis-

match (e.g., subjects were asked to attend to the

positioning of the colors but had to report on the

different letters composing the four different

syllables), subjects were extremely inaccurate.

In a very similar experiment, Chapman (1932)

observed comparatively more accurate reports

when the instructions given prior to stimulus

presentation matched the inquiry posed after

stimulus presentation.

The representatives of the Würzburg School

of Psychology used particular words to talk

about such effects, speaking of the instructions

prior to stimulus presentation as constituting the

Aufgabe (assigned task goal), which creates in

the individual who accepts it a corresponding

Bewusstseinslage (mindset). This mindset in

turn was assumed to “prepare” the individual by

activating the needed cognitive procedures to an-

alyze the presented stimulus material effectively,

resulting in proper task completion. Note that this

original mindset notion (Bewußtseinslage) is dif-

ferent to that used in the growth mindset research

(see Dweck, 2006). When people adhere to the

belief (or naïve theory) that personal attributes are

malleable rather than ﬁxed, they are said to hold a

growth mindset. It is studied what kind of goals

are set by people who belief in malleability (i.e.,

learning goals rather than performance goals), and

whether and how believing in malleability affects

constructive coping with failure.

Based on the research of the Würzburg

School, we felt that the strongest evidence that

the phases delineated in the Rubicon model are

indeed distinct was experimental ﬁndings that

190 GOLLWITZER

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placing people into these phases is associated

with different mindsets (Gollwitzer, 1990,

2012). These mindsets should be characterized

by the activation of exactly those cognitive pro-

cedures that make it easier to solve the respec-

tive task that the Rubicon model sees linked to

each of the four phases. So in a ﬁrst step, we

explicated the nature of the task goals people

are confronted with when entering these phases.

For the predecisional phase, we assumed that

the task the person faces is to make the best

possible choice between potential action goals

(i.e., one’s current wishes). In the postdecision

(preaction) phase the task seems to be one of

promoting the initiation of actions that are in-

strumental for moving toward the chosen goal.

In the action phase, the person obviously faces

the task of efﬁciently executing such actions,

whereas the task in the postaction phase may

best be described as having to determine

whether the intended outcome and its desired

consequences actually accrued and whether or

not further action is needed.

In a second step, we turned to the question of

which activated cognitive procedures could best

help meeting these various task demands. So

far, mindset research regarding the action

phases of the Rubicon model primarily focused

on delineating the cognitive features of the

mindsets of the ﬁrst two action phases, that is,

the predecision and preaction phases with the

respective deliberative versus implemental

mindset. We ﬁgured that before making a deci-

sion, pondering over the desirability and feasi-

bility of potential goals (wishes) requires open-

mindedness (i.e., even peripheral, incidental

information is processed), impartial processing

of desirability-related information (i.e., pros and

cons are given equal weight), and objective

judgments of feasibility (i.e., realistic judg-

ments of difﬁculty and probability of success).

When deliberation is coming to an end and a

decision is made, entering the preaction phase

requires that people start planning the imple-

mentation of their set goal, namely, the when,

where, and how to act to attain the desired

outcome are to be stipulated. Such planning

requires optimistic judgments regarding feasi-

bility (i.e., increased perceived control over out-

comes), partial processing of desirability-

related information (i.e., pros receive more

weight than cons), and relative closed-minded-

ness (i.e., peripheral information is ignored).

Extensive experimental research demonstrated

that placing people into a predecision or a post-

decision (preaction) phase induces mindsets

that are characterized by the cognitive orienta-

tions that help people meet the task demands of

the respective action phase (e.g., Bayer & Goll-

witzer, 2005;Puca, 2001;Gollwitzer, Heck-

hausen, & Steller, 1990;Gollwitzer & Kinney,

1989). There is also evidence that these distinct

cognitive orientations have different down-

stream consequences. Looking at successful

goal striving, for example, individuals in an

implemental mindset evinced heightened per-

sistence exhibited in the face of difﬁculties

(Brandstätter & Frank, 2002). Furthermore, in-

dividuals in an implemental mindset were more

eager to work on their goals, expressed in both

shorter-time predictions with respect to goal

attainment and actual shorter time needed for

task completion (Brandstätter, Giesinger, Job,

& Frank, 2015).

In all of the mindset experiments reported

above, the deliberative mindset is evoked by

asking participants to (a) ﬁrst name an unre-

solved, important personal problem that is caus-

ing rumination but for which they have not

made a decision yet, and then (b) reﬂect on

whether to take action or not. To enhance the

depth of reﬂection, participants are also re-

quested to list a number of positive and nega-

tive, short- and long-term consequences of both

deciding to act and deciding to maintain the

status quo (i.e., deciding not to act); indica-

ting the probability of the occurrence of each

of these consequences is also required. In con-

trast, the implemental mindset is evoked by

asking participants to think of a personal project

for which they have already made the decision

to act but did not initiate any action yet. Sub-

sequently, participants are asked to list the steps

necessary for successful goal attainment and to

plan out in detail when, where, and how they

intend to act on each of these steps.

Importantly, research suggests that pondering

more complex and important unresolved per-

sonal problems or planning out more demand-

ing chosen personal projects leads to stronger

deliberative and implemental mindsets (Taylor

& Gollwitzer, 1995), and this is why partici-

pants are commonly asked to refrain from nam-

ing easily solvable or mundane personal prob-

lems or projects. Moreover, in all of these

studies the theme of the unresolved personal

191THE GOAL CONCEPT

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problem or the chosen personal project that

people had to deliberate or to plan out in order

to induce a deliberative and an implemental

mindset, respectively, were not related to the

theme of the tasks that were used to assess the

predicted activation of certain cognitive proce-

dures; for instance, when the prediction was

open- versus closed mindedness on the depen-

dent variable side the breadth of participants

noun span was assessed by using words that had

nothing to do with the participants’ unresolved

personal problems or chosen personal projects.

There are a number of recent developments in

the research on deliberative and implemental

mindsets further indicating that deliberative and

implemental mindsets are characterized by cog-

nitive consequences geared toward facilitating

the task goals people in the respective action

phases are facing: to turn a desirable but also

feasible wish into a binding goal versus to get

started with the implementation of the chosen

goal. For instance, investigating the conse-

quences of inducing deliberative versus imple-

mental mindsets on visual attention, Büttner and

colleagues (2014) observed that participants in

an implemental mindset do not only exhibit

relative closed-mindedness with respect to pro-

cessing new information (Fujita, Gollwitzer, &

Oettingen, 2007) but also show a narrower

breadth of visual attention compared to partici-

pants in a deliberative mindset. The breadth of

visual attention was determined by tracking eye

movements while participants processed visual

scenes (i.e., nature slides); participants in an

implemental mindset exhibited a narrower

breadth of visual attention by focusing on fore-

ground objects while participants in a delibera-

tive mindset were more likely to process the

whole nature scene more evenly. These results

suggest that implemental as compared to delib-

erative mindsets not only lead to closed-

mindedness when it comes to the processing of

new information but already operate at the level

of visual attention.

In line with mindset effects on illusory feel-

ings of control observed by Gollwitzer and Kin-

ney (1989);Hügelschäfer and Achtziger (2014)

observed that participants in an implemental

mindset were more conﬁdent in having cor-

rectly answered questions in a general knowl-

edge test than did participants in a deliberative

mindset. And Dennehy, Ben-Zeev, and Tani-

gawa (2014) found that an implemental mindset

helps to shield oneself from the detrimental

effects of stereotype threat. The authors com-

pared participants with low versus high socio-

economic status (SES) in a speeded mental

arithmetic task known to elicit performance

anxiety; as expected, participants from a high

SES background outperformed participants

from a low SES background. However, the in-

duction of an implemental mindset helped par-

ticipants from a low SES background to over-

come this difference. So the authors conclude

that asking individuals to plan out when, where,

and how to act on a personal but unrelated

project may in fact help them to shield their

math performance from the effects of stereotype

threat.

Recent research also tested whether deliber-

ative versus implemental mindsets manage to

inﬂuence risk-taking behavior (Keller & Goll-

witzer, 2017). The authors assessed risk taking

by using the Balloon Analogue Risk Task

(BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). In the BART, one

has to decide after each pump whether to go on

pumping a balloon one more time or to save its

current value and opt out. By going on, partic-

ipants increase the balloon’s current value by a

ﬁxed amount but also increasingly risk the

balloon’s popping and thereby the loss of

the balloon’s current value. Using pumping up a

balloon as the risk-taking task, the BART mir-

rors risk taking in the real world quite well (i.e.,

has a high ecological validity) as indicated by

the fact that it can differentiate smokers from

nonsmokers (Lejuez et al., 2002,2003). Indeed,

Keller and Gollwitzer (2017) found that partic-

ipants in a deliberative mindset on average

stopped pumping earlier on each balloon than

participants in an implemental mindset, thus

saving more balloons. The deliberation of tak-

ing action on an unresolved personal problem or

not versus the planning out of when, where, and

how to act on a chosen project apparently im-

pacts the degree to which we take risks in a

risk-taking measure that is ecologically valid.

In the research discussed so far, deliberative

mindsets were induced by asking participants to

consider the question of whether they wanted to

act or not on an unresolved personal problem.

But by adopting a goal perspective, one won-

ders what will happen when people are asked to

deliberate whether an already chosen goal

should be acted on or not? Nenkov and Goll-

witzer (2012) gave participants explicit instruc-

192 GOLLWITZER

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tions to deliberate a set goal (i.e., asking the

participants to deliberate on the positive and

negative, immediate and long-term conse-

quences of making a change or preserving the

status quo). The authors found that participants

were subsequently even more committed to

their goal than before. It turned out that these

participants used deliberation to justify and bol-

ster the commitment to their initial decision,

thus exhibiting what the authors coined postde-

cisional defensiveness. In contrast, participants

who had not yet made a decision to pursue a

certain goal were less inclined to pursue it after

deliberating the pros and cons of pursuing it.

The increase in commitment observed as a con-

sequence of postdecisional defensiveness did

not only translate into a heightened planning

intensity but also into an increased effort to

search for information helping to attain the goal;

participants exhibiting postdecisional defen-

siveness were 3.5 times more likely to visit a

website offering instrumental information.

Renewed deliberation is also focused on by

Brandstätter and Schüler (2013) in their re-

search on so-called action crises. The authors

posit the emergence of an intrapsychic conﬂict

if progress toward reaching a set goal turns out

to be dissatisfying or the chosen means proves

ineffective. This conﬂict, referred to as an ac-

tion crisis, is thought to be characterized by the

renewed deliberation on whether to continue

goal striving or to abandon the goal altogether;

in the words of the Rubicon model, an action

crisis is a motivational phenomenon emerging

in a volitional phase (i.e., the action phase). In a

longitudinal study with dozens of measurement

points over the course of 18 months, Herrmann

and Brandstätter (2015) observed that the sever-

ity of respective action crises at the beginning of

the study predicted disengagement from an ac-

ademic goal as well as two idiosyncratic per-

sonal goals. More speciﬁcally, the more the

students experienced an action crisis with re-

spect to their academic goal at the beginning of

the study, the fewer courses they completed

during their ﬁrst college year and the earlier

they disengaged completely.

While in Nenkov and Gollwitzer’s (2012)

work, participants were explicitly asked to re-

deliberate a chosen goal anew, Herrmann and

Brandstätter (2015;Brandstätter & Schüler,

2013) instead focus on the self-induced redelib-

eration of set goals that turn out to be more

difﬁcult or more frustrating to attain than ex-

pected. Given that these set goals are still highly

valued, an action crisis is experienced. This

crisis sets the stage for a renewed deliberation

over pursuing it or not, which then can ulti-

mately lead to abandoning it.

In sum, the goal concept has stimulated the

Rubicon model’s conceptual distinction be-

tween different phases of action. It has also

brought back the mindset notion thus allowing

to critically test the claim of the Rubicon model

that these phases are distinct. Based on the

mindset notion that different task goals (Aufga-

ben) are associated with the activation of dif-

ferent cognitive procedures it was demonstrated

in many studies that the predicision phase and

the postdecision preactional phase are indeed

unique. Whereas early research focused on the

cognitive features of the deliberative and imple-

mental mindset, recent research has also started

to focus on identifying various downstream

consequences (e.g., the implemental mindset’s

blocking of the detrimental inﬂuence of stereo-

type threat). Importantly, the apparent lack of

research regarding the action and postaction

phases, respectively, asks for more research ad-

dressing these phases. Recent research on de-

liberation during goal striving (i.e., in the pre-

action and the action phase) offering a new

perspective on defensive processing of informa-

tion and disengagement from futile goals does

support this call. Finally, future research might

also want to focus more on the transition points

speciﬁed in the Rubicon model, asking ques-

tions as done early on by Gollwitzer, Heck-

hausen, and Ratajczak (1990): What kind of

deliberation creates a stronger readiness to

move on to making a change decision (i.e.,

crossing the Rubicon)? Or even more basic, are

there certain ways of thinking about the desired

future implied by one’s wishes that ultimately

lead to stronger goal commitments than others

(see the fantasy realization theory by Oettingen,

2012,2014)?

Goal Intentions Versus

Implementation Intentions

The goal concept stimulated a further line of

research distinguishing between different types

of intentions: goal intentions versus implemen-

tation intentions. It all started with the observa-

tion that even though crossing the Rubicon is

193THE GOAL CONCEPT

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associated with turning mere wishes into bind-

ing goals, people still are not very successful in

realizing their goal. More speciﬁcally, the

strength of a person’s intention to reach a cho-

sen goal only correlates around .30 with actual

goal attainment (Sheeran, 2002). So we won-

dered whether there are any easy ways to ame-

liorate this problem such as asking people to

prospectively plan out in advance when, where,

and how they wanted to implement a chosen

goal (e.g., to make a good grade in an upcoming

exam)? They could then link in their mind the

anticipated critical situation (a good opportunity

or a tricky obstacle) with an action that is in-

strumental to realizing the goal by seizing the

opportunity and overcoming the obstacle, re-

spectively. Note that I am not talking here about

encouraging people to make the desired out-

come more speciﬁc by reducing the vagueness

of it (such as moving from wanting to make a

good grade to wanting to make at least an A-;

Locke & Latham, 2013), or about changing the

outcome goal of achieving a certain grade into a

behavioral goal such as studying more (Fish-

bein & Ajzen, 2011). Both of these strategies

are still focused on setting better goals.

What we wanted to turn to instead was suggest-

ing to people to make plans (Gollwitzer, 1993),

actually if-then plans that spell out in their if-part

which situation (opportunity or obstacle) shall

trigger a goal-directed response speciﬁed in the

then-part: “If situation x is encountered (e.g., an

opportunity such as waking up to a quiet Saturday

morning or an obstacle such as an invitation from

your friends to go partying), then I will initiate the

goal-directed response y (e.g., immediately sit

down at my desk at home on Saturday morning

and get started with studying or telling my friends

that this weekend is no good but probably next

weekend, respectively)!” We hypothesized that

adding such plans to one’s goals should heighten

the rate of goal attainment, and thus we used in all

of the research on if-then planning a control con-

dition were participants operated on mere goals

only.

Even though both goals and plans are self-

instructions to achieve certain changes in one’s

future, if-then plans do not have the structure of

goals (such as “I want to reach outcome x!” or

“I want to perform behavior y!”). Accordingly,

top-down controlled discrepancy reduction in

response to goal-frustration (in the sense of

“I’m disappointed that I missed my goal. I need

to do better!”) does not qualify as the mecha-

nism that promotes effective action control by

if-then plans (see Carver & Scheier, 1998).

Rather, as the structure of if-then plans (imple-

mentation intentions) is geared toward linking a

goal-directed response to a critical situation (op-

portunity or obstacle), it should now be bot-

tom-up action control by the speciﬁed critical

situation that does the job. So the insight of

research on the goal concept that goals unfold

their effects via top-down control geared toward

discrepancy reduction forced us to come up

with a novel process hypothesis by which im-

plementation intentions (vs. goal intentions)

might positively affect action control: We hy-

pothesized that adding implementation inten-

tions to one’s goal intentions induces a switch

from top-down control by mere goal intentions

to bottom-up control by the situational cues

speciﬁed in the if-part of the added implemen-

tation intentions; we referred to this switch

hypothesis as the “delegation of control to sit-

uational cues” notion (Gollwitzer, 1993,1999;

Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).

As bottom-up control is known to run off quite

automatically, we then went on to predict that

action control by if-then plans should carry fea-

tures of automaticity. We referred to this type of

automaticity as “strategic automaticity” as it is

based on a simple mental act of linking a critical

situation to a goal-directed response, all in the

service of meeting the respective superordinate

goal. Various lines of research were instigated to

test the claim that implemental intentions (if-then

plans) facilitate goal attainment via automatic pro-

cesses. This body of research can by separated

into three different lines asking the following

questions (Gollwitzer, 2014): (a) Are if-then plans

mentally represented in a way so that bottom-up

control is facilitated?, (b) does action control by

implementation intentions carry features com-

monly associated with automatic action control?,

and (c) do implementation intentions manage to

block unwanted speedy responses based on im-

pulses or habits? In other words, can responses

preprogrammed by if-then planning “outrun” such

responses?

The Mental Representation of

If-Then Plans

Because forming an implementation inten-

tion implies the selection of a critical future

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situation (opportunity or obstacle), the mental

representation of this situation should become

highly activated and hence more accessible.

This heightened accessibility of the if-part of

the plan has been demonstrated in several stud-

ies using different experimental task paradigms

borrowed from cognitive psychology: for exam-

ple, lexical decision tasks (e.g., Webb &

Sheeran, 2004), dichotic-listening as well as

cued recall tasks (Achtziger, Bayer, & Gollwit-

zer, 2012). Further studies indicated that form-

ing implementation intentions not only height-

ens the activation (and thus the accessibility) of

the mental presentation of the situational cues

speciﬁed in the if-part, it also forges a strong

associative link between the mental representa-

tion of the speciﬁed critical situation and the

mental representation of the speciﬁed response

in the then-part (Webb & Sheeran, 2007,2008).

These associative links seem to be quite stable

over time (Papies, Aarts, & de Vries, 2009), and

they allow for priming the mental representa-

tion of the speciﬁed response (the plan’s then-

part) by subliminal presentation of the speciﬁed

critical situational cue (if-part) (Webb &

Sheeran, 2007). Moreover, mediation analyses

suggest that both the cue accessibility and the

strength of the cue-response link qualify as me-

diators of the impact of implementation inten-

tion formation on goal attainment (e.g., Aarts,

Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999;Webb &

Sheeran, 2007,2008). Finally, making if-then

plans seems to also affect the perceptual pro-

cessing of the speciﬁed situational cues. Using a

well-established chronometric method (i.e., the

psychological refractory period paradigm) and

combining it with the locus-of-slack logic, Janc-

zyk, Dambacher, Bieleke, and Gollwitzer

(2015) found that if-then plans facilitate early

perceptual processing and not just attentional

responding to the speciﬁed critical cues.

The Features Associated With Action

Control by If-Then Planning

But will the critical situational cue speciﬁed

in the if-part once encountered elicit the goal-

directed response speciﬁed in the then-part in a

manner that qualiﬁes as automatic— exhibit

features of automaticity including immediacy,

efﬁciency, uncontrollability, and redundancy of

conscious intent. There is extensive evidence

that if-then planners act quickly (e.g., Gollwit-

zer & Brandstätter, 1997, Experiment 3), deal

effectively with cognitive demands (i.e., speed

up effects still evince under high cognitive load;

e.g., Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer,

2001), do not need to consciously intend to act

in the critical moment (i.e., implementation in-

tention effects are observed even when the crit-

ical cue is presented subliminally; e.g., Bayer,

Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Moskowitz, 2009),

and show uncontrolled attention to the speciﬁed

cues (i.e., the situational cue speciﬁed in the

if-part of an implementation intention still re-

ceives attention when it is presented in a task

that requires ignoring it; Wieber & Sassenberg,

2006). In line with this latter ﬁnding, Schweiger

Gallo, Pfau, and Gollwitzer (2012) observed

that hypnotic instructions enriched with respec-

tive implementation intentions produced an in-

crease in hypnotic responsiveness; importantly,

this performance increase was accompanied by

a felt involuntariness of responding. Finally, a

recent line of research by Martiny-Huenger,

Martiny, Parks-Stamm, Pfeiffer, and Gollwitzer

(2017) suggests a further process by which im-

plementation intentions achieve effective action

control. The authors argue that prospectively

planning actions in an if-then format induces

sensorimotor simulations of the anticipated sit-

uation and the intended action (i.e., enacting the

event in the sensory and motor brain areas). Due

to their temporal overlap, these activity patterns

are assumed to become linked. Whenever the

previously simulated situation is encountered,

the previously simulated action is partially re-

activated through spreading activation and thus

more likely to be executed. Empirical support

for this line of theorizing is provided by dem-

onstrating that implementation intentions which

imply a certain movement (e.g., “If I see an

apple, then I will immediately grab it” implies

an elbow ﬂexion) facilitate this very movement

when the critical situation is later encountered

in a different context (e.g., they speed up a pull

response in a classiﬁcation task that requires

differentiating apples and other fruits from veg-

etables by pulling vs. pushing a joy stick).

The most direct test of the hypothesis that

action control by if-then plans promotes bot-

tom-up control has been conducted in an fMRI

study reported by Gilbert, Gollwitzer, Cohen,

Oettingen, and Burgess (2009). In this study,

participants had to perform a prospective mem-

ory task (assessing whether people forget to act

195THE GOAL CONCEPT

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on their intentions or not) on the basis of either

goal intention or implementation intention in-

structions. Acting on the basis of goal intentions

was associated with brain activity in the lateral

rostral prefrontal cortex, whereas acting on

the basis of implementation intentions was

associated with brain activity in the medial

rostral prefrontal cortex. Brain activity in the

latter area is known to be associated with

bottom-up (stimulus) control of action,

whereas brain activity in the former area is

known to be related to top-down (goal) con-

trol of action.

Support for the delegation hypothesis also

comes from studies using critical samples of

individuals with handicapped top-down action

control and demonstrating that they can still

beneﬁt in their action control from forming im-

plementation intentions. The participants in

these studies ranged from people suffering from

schizophrenia or substance abuse (Brandstätter

et al., 2001, Studies 1 & 2), patients with frontal

lobe damage (Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001),

to children with attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity

disorder (ADHD; Gawrilow & Gollwitzer,

2008;Gawrilow, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen,

2011a). For example, response inhibition in the

presence of stop signals was found to be im-

proved in children with ADHD when they had

formed respective implementation intentions,

and this held for other executive functions such

as task shifting and working memory perfor-

mance. Finally, Gawrilow, Gollwitzer, and Oet-

tingen (2011b) analyzed whether delay of grat-

iﬁcation can be facilitated by asking children

with ADHD to from respective implementation

intentions. A computer task was developed in

line with the delay of gratiﬁcation paradigms

used by Walter Mischel (1974) and Sonuga-

Barke (2002)—waiting in the presence of a

suboptimal cue to make money for a delayed

optimal cue allowing for a higher total amount

of money earned. In two studies, it was ob-

served that the goal intention to do well on the

task did not improve performance as compared

to a control group that received mere task in-

structions specifying the reward contingencies.

However, when the goal intention was fur-

nished with an implementation intention that

linked a waiting response to the suboptimal cue,

a signiﬁcantly higher amount of money was

earned, indicating heightened delay gratiﬁca-

tion.

The Control of Habitual and Impulsive

Responses by If-Then Planning

By assuming that action control by imple-

mentation intentions is immediate and efﬁcient,

and adopting a simple horse race model of ac-

tion control (Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave,

2001), research explored whether people might

be in a position to break unwanted impulsive

and habitual responses by forming implementa-

tion intentions that spell out an antagonistic

wanted goal-directed response. The research

question was: Could an implementation inten-

tion that spells out an antagonistic response to a

critical situation outrun an impulsive or habitual

response that is otherwise shown to this very

situation? Research on the control of impulsive

and habitual unwanted responses by the use of

implementation intentions has addressed this

question by targeting cognitive, affective, and

behavioral responses.

With respect to cognitive responses it has

been shown that implicit stereotyping can by

successfully controlled by forming implementa-

tion intentions (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998;

Stewart & Payne, 2008); this even extends to

the behavioral expression of such stereotyping

(Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio, 2010).

Schweiger Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh,

and Gollwitzer (2009, Study 3) analyzed

whether it is also possible to curb impulsive

affective responses by forming implementation

intentions. They found that implementation in-

tentions specifying an ignore response in the

then-component helped reduce fear in response

to pictures of spiders in participants with spider

phobia—to the low level that was experienced

by participants who did not report any spider

phobia. The obtained electro-cortical correlates

(the authors used dense-array EEG) revealed

that those participants who furnished the goal

intention to stay calm with an ignore-implemen-

tation intention showed signiﬁcantly reduced

early activity in the visual cortex in response to

spider pictures, as reﬂected in a smaller P1

(assessed at 120 milliseconds [msec] after a

spider picture was presented). This ﬁnding sug-

gests that the ignore-implementation intention

assigned to individuals with a spider phobia

achieved a strategic automation of the speciﬁed

goal-directed response (i.e., an ignore response)

when the critical cue (i.e., a spider picture) was

encountered, so that—according to the horse

196 GOLLWITZER

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race metaphor—the planned response outran

the habitual response (i.e., the fear response).

Various studies have targeted the control of

habitual and impulsive behavioral responses by

implementation intentions. For instance, Cohen,

Bayer, Jaudas, and Gollwitzer (2008, Study 2;

see also Miles & Proctor, 2008) observed the

suppression of habitual responses using a Si-

mon task paradigm; the Simon task allows to

compare the control of habitual responses (e.g.,

grabbing things presented on the right side of

the person with the right arm) as compared to

nonhabitual responses (e.g., grabbing things

presented on the right side with the left arm).

Expanding this research to a clinical sample,

Marquardt, Cohen, Gollwitzer, Gilbert, and

Dettmers (2017) had stroke patients with a mild

to moderate hand paresis perform the Simon

task before and after they had formed respective

if-then plans. A signiﬁcant Simon effect (i.e.,

comparatively faster responding in correspond-

ing trials where things need to be responded to

with the arm of the side where the stimulus is

presented as compared to noncorresponding tri-

als) was observed in both the affected and the

nonaffected arm; however, there was no longer

a signiﬁcant Simon effect for trials that were

prepared by forming if-then plans. Apparently,

making if-then plans effectively reduced the

Simon effect for both the affected and the non-

affected arm. Importantly, this recent ﬁnding

opens a potential new route to improving stroke

rehabilitation as if-then plans may qualify as a

viable strategy to overcome the commonly ob-

served learned nonuse of the affected arm. Fur-

ther studies on the control of unwanted auto-

matic responses by implementation intentions

analyzed abolishing concept and goal priming

effects on behavior (using different concept and

goal priming methods; Gollwitzer, Sheeran,

Trötschel, & Webb, 2011), and breaking bad

eating habits (using a lexical-decision task pre-

senting the unwanted food item as the critical

word; Adriaanse, Gollwitzer, De Ridder, De

Wit, & Kroese, 2011).

A new line of research on the question of

whether implementation intentions can control

unwanted habitual responding has focused on

social phenomena that are known to run off

automatically. For instance, Wieber, Gollwit-

zer, and Sheeran (2014) demonstrated that mim-

icry effects on social interactions can also be

controlled by forming implementation inten-

tions, even though people are not usually aware

of the inﬂuence of being mimicked on their

judgments and behaviors. Although mimicry

generally facilitates social interactions, some-

times mimicry effects can hamper the pursuit of

focal goals (e.g., when we fall for the persuasive

efforts of a salesperson mimicking our bodily

and facial expressions). In one of the studies

reported by Wieber et al. (2014), participants

formed the goal: “I want to be thrifty with my

money! I will save my money for important

investments!” or an implementation intention

regarding this goal “I want to be thrifty with my

money! And if I am tempted to buy something,

then I will tell myself: I will save my money for

important investments!” They were then mim-

icked by the experimenter who tried to seduce

them to spend the money they had earned for

participating in the experiment on some left-

over coffee vouchers and chocolate bars. As

compared to a control group, forming imple-

mentation intentions reduced participants’ giv-

ing in to the persuasive attempts of the experi-

menter to spend their money, whereas forming

mere goal intentions to be thrifty failed to do so.

Social projection is another quite automatic

social phenomenon, and as is true with social

mimicry it can have both beneﬁts and costs; for

instance, spontaneously thinking that others are

like me increases feelings of closeness and thus

facilitates social interaction but it may induce

costs when I start projecting that the majority of

people smoke cigarettes and thus the needed

behavior change is hindered. Accordingly, A.

Gollwitzer, Schwörer, Stern, Gollwitzer, and

Bargh (2017) explored whether implementation

intentions could be used for both intensifying

and reducing social projection. They found that

implementation intentions managed to success-

fully up-regulate (“If I’m asked to estimate what

percentage of people agree with me, then I will

remember that other people are similar!”) as

well as down-regulated (“If I’m asked to esti-

mate what percentage of other people agree

with me, then I will remember that other people

are different!”) social projection.

Still, one wonders whether forming imple-

mentation intentions always manage to block

impulsive and habitual responses? The answer

by the horse race metaphor is a clear no. If the

impulsive or habitual response is based on

strong urges or strong habits (Webb, Sheeran, &

Luszczynska, 2009) but the if-then guided re-

197THE GOAL CONCEPT

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sponse is based on weak implementation inten-

tions, then the impulsive or habitual response

should win over the if-then planned response;

and the reverse should be true when weak im-

pulses and habits are sent into a race with strong

implementation intentions. Accordingly, con-

trolling behavior that is based on strong im-

pulses or habits requires the formation of strong

implementation intentions. One effective strat-

egy for arriving at strong implementation inten-

tions pertains to creating particularly strong

links between the speciﬁed situational cue (if-

part) and the selected goal-directed response

(then-part). Knäuper, Roseman, Johnson, and

Krantz (2009) found that instructing people to

use mental imagery to make if-then plans in-

creased the rate of initiation of the planned

response by almost 50%, and Chapman, Armit-

age, and Norman (2009) observed that for the

goal to increase one’s fruit and vegetable intake

an if-then plan instruction had greater impact

than the instruction to simply think of the when,

where, and how of acting toward the goal.

What else could strengthen the effects of

implementation intentions? For strong imple-

mentation intention effects to occur people need

to be highly committed to the superordinate

goal (e.g., De Nooijer, De Vet, Brug, & De

Vries, 2006;Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer,

2005), which is facilitated when the goal is

self-concordant (Koestner, Lekes, Powers, &

Chicoine, 2002), the self-efﬁcacy to reach the

goal is high (Wieber, Odenthal, & Gollwitzer,

2010), there are no doubts whether pursuing the

goal is worthwhile or not (Wieber, Sezer, &

Gollwitzer, 2014), and one feels energized to

move forward (e.g., is angry rather than sad;

Maglio, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2014). It was

also found that the commitment to the formed

implementation intention needs to be high to

produce strong effects of if-then planning (e.g.,

Achtziger et al., 2012, Study 2).

This latter ﬁnding has raised the question of

whether action control by implementation in-

tentions shows costs in terms of a heightened

degree of rigidity (Gollwitzer, Parks-Stamm,

Jaudas, & Sheeran, 2008). Research on this

question suggests however that goal striving

guided by implementation intentions shows nei-

ther total rigidity nor total ﬂexibility; instead it

is characterized by ﬂexible tenacity. Indication

of tenacity comes from recent research assess-

ing physiological measures of effort increase

(i.e., cardiac preejection periods, PEPs; Freyde-

font, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2016). The au-

thors observed that when task difﬁculty

increased, only implementation intention partic-

ipants continued to display shorter cardiac PEPs

and thus mobilized additional effort, while mere

goal and control participants failed to mobilize

additional effort. But there is also indication

that this tenacity shows features of ﬂexibility.

Legrand, Bieleke, Gollwitzer, and Mignon

(2017) compared action control by implemen-

tation intentions with that by goal intentions

under different degrees of pleasantness. When

performing the goal-directed behavior was only

somewhat unpleasant, participants with imple-

mentation intentions showed greater persistence

than participants with goal intentions. However,

when performing the goal-directed behavior be-

came highly aversive (i.e., monetary loss) both

goal and implementation intention participants

were less likely to perform the goal-directed

behavior.

There is a further question though when it

comes to the issue of ﬂexibility/rigidity of ac-

tion control by implementation intentions: Do

their effects generalize to similar situations by

still triggering the speciﬁed action? Studies on

promoting physical exercise (Epton & Armit-

age, 2017) and enhancing safe driving (Brew-

ster, Elliott, McCartan, McGregor, & Kelly,

2016) addressed this question and found that

implementation intention effects do generalize

to similar situations. In contrast, with dissimilar

situations it is observed that implementation

intention effects no longer evince (see also

Masicampo & Baumeister, 2012;Parks-Stamm,

Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2007). Finally,

Bieleke, Legrand, Mignon, and Gollwitzer

(2018) studied the ﬂexibililty/rigidity issue with

respect to the question of: What will happen

when a response is required that differs from the

planned one? In a series of experiments, it was

found that behavior was impaired when a sim-

ilar situation required a behavior different from

the planned one, suggesting that participants

could not withhold the planned response (re-

sembling a habit capture error). Moreover, the

results also showed an impaired performance of

the planned behavior when participants encoun-

tered different situations. No such impairments

occurred, however, in different situations that

required different responding.

198 GOLLWITZER

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This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Finally, recent research has addressed a fur-

ther question: When it comes to controlling an

unwanted impulsive or habitual response, are

there any other effective kinds of if-then plans?

Other than those based on the horse-race model

which merely specify an antagonistic response

to the unwanted impulsive or habitual response.

In various studies, it was observed that indeed

another type of if-then plan exists that can also

be used to halt acting on the spur of the mo-

ment. This type of plan speciﬁes a switch to

reﬂective thinking once the critical situation

that triggers unwanted impulsive or habitual

responses is encountered (e.g., Doerﬂinger,

Martiny-Huenger, & Gollwitzer, 2017;Bieleke,

Gollwitzer, Oettingen, & Fischbacher, 2017).

Apparently, people can use such implementa-

tion intentions to automate the initiation of deep

thinking; they thus prevent being guided by

unwanted impulses and habits by planning to

think when thinking is needed.

In conclusion, let’s return to the question of

how the goal concept stimulated research on

if-then planning. It is important to recognize

that research on if-then planning has beneﬁtted

in multiple ways from keeping the goal concept

in mind, but two aspects are most prominent.

First, the beneﬁcial effects of if-then plans on

action control were always considered in com-

parison to action control by mere goals. Pro-

ceeding in this way, it quickly became apparent

that making if-then plans qualiﬁes as a powerful

self-regulation strategy for closing the com-

monly observed gap between committing to

goals and actually achieving them. It is thus not

surprising that forming implementation inten-

tions has become part of many modern-day

behavior change interventions (see Oettingen,

2014;Rothman et al., 2015). Second, when

exploring the mechanisms underlying the ben-

eﬁcial effects of if-then planning on action con-

trol it was quickly recognized that the top-down

mechanisms on which action control by goals is

based on do not qualify. As a consequence, new

mechanisms had to be thought of and bottom-up

processes appeared to qualify as the proper al-

ternative mechanism. This ultimately led to the

novel hypothesis that people can strategically

automate the control of their action by making

if-then plans, and this hypothesis received ex-

tensive empirical support by the many experi-

ments it stimulated.

Conclusion and Outlook

The aim of the present article was trying to

demonstrate that the goal concept can help to

develop and test theories in motivation science.

This is exempliﬁed by discussing self-comple-

tion theory, the Rubicon model of action phases,

and the theory of action control by if-then plan-

ning. It is argued that relying on the goal con-

cept helped to elucidate the phenomenon of

compensation in people who strive for personal

identities (symbolizing the possession of an as-

pired-to identity), to understand what is implied

by moving from undecidedness to feeling de-

termined with respect to realizing one’s wishes

and desires (crossing the Rubicon), to delineate

the distinct cognitive features of the task-

congruent mindsets associated with the various

phases of action (deliberative vs. implemental

mindsets), and to create hypothesis on how im-

plementation intentions differ from goal inten-

tions in how they guide a person’s actions (bot-

tom-up vs. top-down control of action).

What has not been addressed yet is how the

goal concept can be used to elucidate the classic

phenomena studied in motivation science. One

such phenomenon that immediately comes to

mind is making causal attributions for achieved

outcomes (Weiner, 1986). Turning to the goal

concept would allow to raise the question of

what makes people attribute these outcomes to

their goals rather than ability, effort, task difﬁ-

culty, and luck, and whether goal attributions

lead to different downstream consequences than

other attributions (e.g., ability attributions).

That such a goal approach to causal attribu-

tions could provide numerous novel insights

is suggested by the very recent research of

Olcaysoy Okten and Moskowitz (2018), dif-

ferentiating between trait and goal attribu-

tions with respect to explaining the behavior

of others. They discovered that there are dis-

tinctive antecedents to trait versus goal attri-

butions related to whether behaviors are per-

formed toward speciﬁc entities or not, and

whether these behaviors are shown with high

or low consistency over time.

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por José María Cortés Martí, director del XXIV Congreso de Sociología de ACMS (2019) Don Quijote a la mar Galopa Don Quijote a barlovento, mas no quiere aire a favor ni estrella o luna llena (no hay rutas en la mar ni anuncio o canto) A diestra y a siniestra, al sur del norte abre sus lineas. (no hay lugar para Sancho en alta mar: que al faro, al puerto) Oh sí, marcar la mar, hacer la mar, ni muro o límite. Oh sí, vivir contra la mar, contra los astros: gran deseo, que dicen oceánico. Octavio Uña, A la vera del camino Los sociólogos, bien sabemos, que el fenómeno organizativo como herramienta para convertir en realidad los proyectos acordados es una cuestión de voluntad y compromiso. Valores que sustentan estructuras e instituciones, y que expresado crudamente, sin compromiso y sin voluntad no hay proyecto que pueda andar. Nuestro congreso de las supuestas “sociedades inteligentes” no son más inteligentes por poseer únicamente alta tecnología de la comunicación, sino por algo tan humano como es la generosidad resultado del compromiso y la voluntad, como también de la paciencia, madre de la ciencia, tal como versa nuestro saber popular. Caminos de Utopía: las ciencias sociales en las nuevas sociedades inteligentes, celebrado en Valdepeñas, Ciudad Real, del 22 al 24 de noviembre de 2019, se puede afirmar que marcó un antes y un después. Un antes de la pandemia del COVID-19 y un largo después de aproximadamente dos años. La puesta en marcha del congreso de aquel año 2019, la pertinente gestión que conllevó para su realización y visto en perspectiva, se asemejaba más a una utopía que un proyecto realizable dadas las innumerables complicaciones que iban surgiendo, marcándonos a medida que apresaba el tiempo un severo compás para su ejecución. El primer asunto a resolver fue la de formar una nueva comisión ejecutora responsable del congreso por la nonata propuesta primigenia. No cabe decir, la preocupación en que estuvimos inmersos en imprevistas reuniones, un sinnúmero de llamadas e innumerables partidas y llegadas, pero finalmente se constituyó la arquitectura nuclear de la comisión "por vía de urgencia". A pesar de todo ello, superando codo a codo los obstáculos de la travesía, no puedo más que agradecer el apoyo prestado a la dirección del Congreso 2019. Especialmente y me remito por sus nombres: Candelas, Octavio, Joaquín, José Miguel, Mercedes. Candelas sin su minuciosa custodia no hubiese sido posible la supervivencia efectiva del congreso; Octavio desde el puente de mandos divisando el horizonte y atendiendo los procederes de navegación; la inestimable ayuda de Joaquín técnico de la sala de máquinas ya que sin él no hubiese sido posible la travesía congresual; José Miguel que gracias a sus habilidades TIC, su gran generosidad y su benemérita constancia ha sido posible la publicación de las ponencias presentadas. Mi estimada Mercedes supervisando que la temperatura de la sala de máquinas fuese la idónea. A los compañeros participantes que sin su paciente buen hacer el congreso no hubiera sido posible. Y un emotivo agradecimiento al Ayuntamiento, a su alcalde, D. Jesús Martín, y especialmente a su primera teniente de Alcaldía, Dª. Vanessa Irla, que nos brindaron todas las facilidades para su celebración. Sintetizando las ponencias presentadas y debatidas en sus respectivas mesas, no hay duda alguna que por su temática y nivel los “caminos a la utopía” se manifestó una honda preocupación por las aristas que presenta nuestra sociedad y las tendencias que parecen vislumbrase. Cada una de las temáticas, con sus títulos correspondientes, las trece mesas expresaron el profundo sentir de las problemáticas de las sociedades “autodenominadas inteligentes”. En la mesa numero uno “Sociología de la Comunicación y del Lenguaje” tuvo un hilo conductor que denotó la preocupación existente sobre la honestidad y la veracidad de las noticias difundidas por los grandes medios de comunicación. En la segunda mesa “Sociología Política, Gobierno y Administración Pública” abarcó desde las políticas de intervención sobre la discapacidad hasta la calidad del régimen democrático. “Teoría, epistemología y metodología de las ciencias sociales” título de la tercera mesa, profundizó desde una perspectiva socio-histórica los hechos que configuraron nuestra sociedad capitalista y sus consecuentes luchas, dando lugar a una sociedad caracterizada por el consumo de masas. Cuarta mesa “Pobreza y desigualdad y exclusión social” su hilo conductor fue la estigmatización social en el tecnocapitalismo. Seguidamente en la quinta mesa “Inmigración, integración, identidades políticas” observó el impacto de la inmigración en las sociedades avanzadas ante el viraje ideológico a la denominada extrema derecha. “Mayores y envejecimiento. Nuevas alternativas sociales” sexta mesa de trabajo, razonó sobre los retos que nos plantea el envejecimiento en las sociedades occidentales avanzadas. En la séptima “Defensa, conflicto y seguridad. Las relaciones internacionales en el mundo actual” se abordaron aspectos, a veces no analizados por su complejidad, como son la vulnerabilidad de nuestras sociedades ante el escenario de un mundo globalizado. La octava mesa de trabajo “Innovación docente” comprendió las temáticas de inclusividad educativa, hasta el análisis de las motivaciones del acceso a los veinticinco años a la universidad. La mesa novena estudió una problemática acuciante cuyo título suficientemente revelador “El medio y sus riquezas naturales. El agua como fuente de conflictos” profundizó la gestión política de un recurso escaso. La décima mesa “La familia ante los retos sociales. Nuevas formas de convivencia” definió una realidad social, la familia, ante los retos que se presentan en las sociedades inteligentes centrándose especialmente en la infancia y la juventud. No menos fue la mesa decimoprimera “Mujer, Igualdad y violencia” implicando estudios de género empíricos sobre las condiciones laborales de las mujeres en el Magreb, pasando por el estudio del abanico jurídico para alcanzar la igualdad hasta la indagación discursiva de género. Ya en la mesa de trabajo decimosegunda “Transparencia, buen gobierno y educación ciudadana” formuló la preocupación sobre la gobernanza en sus distintos niveles institucionales. Finalmente en la decimotercera mesa “El modelo social de la discapacidad. Atención a la diversidad” puso especial atención en las políticas activas aplicadas en dicho ámbito de la discapacidad y en paralelo la creación del relato de la población afectada por la discapacidad funcional. Desde la memoria sentida de aquellos días plúmbicos del noviembre manchego, compartimos el privilegio de celebrar el vigésimo cuarto congreso de la Asociación de Sociología Castellano-Manchega. La “mise en scene” transcurrió en ese maravilloso escenario del Valle de Peñas, donde gótico isabelino y modernismo industrial transitan por plazas, por calles, por callejuelas y por cerros. En ese rincón de la manchega llanura, en el meandro del Jabalón, surcado por enjutas vides, sazonado por blanqueados molinos, peregrinan utopías de azahar acariciando la dulce marinada de la playa de Barcino, donde nuestro buen amigo de la triste figura extravió, muy a su pesar, la cordura. Barcelona, Septiembre 2022

Effects of Failure on Subsequent Performance: The Importance of Self-Defining Goals

Article

Full-text available

Feb 1996

Extending R. A. Wicklund and P. M. Gollwitzer's (1982) self-completion theory, 2 experiments examined the role of self-defining goals in predicting performance effects of failure among students committed to professional goals such as becoming a physician (Experiment 1) or a computer scientist (Experiment 2) . Results of Experiment 1 revealed that failure on a task characterized as being relevant to students' professional self-definition led to (a) enhanced performance on a subsequent task relevant to the same self-definition and (b) impaired performance on a subsequent task unrelated to the self-definition challenged through prior failure. Experiment 2 replicated these findings. In addition, performance effects due to self-definitional failure were annulled when participants experienced intermittent social recognition for the aspired-to self-definition.

Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets: Cognitive Tuning Toward Congruous Thoughts and Information

Article

Full-text available

Dec 1990

Study 1 established either deliberative mind-set by having Ss contemplate personal change decision or implemental mind-set by having Ss plan execution of intended personal project. Ss were subsequently requested to continue beginnings of 3 fairy tales, each describing a main character with a decisional conflict. Analysis revealed that deliberative mind-set Ss ascribed more deliberative and less implementational efforts to main characters than implemental mind-set Ss. In Study 2, Ss were asked to choose between different test materials. Either before or after making their decision, Ss were given information on deliberative and implementational thoughts unrelated to their task at hand. When asked to recall these thoughts, predecisional Ss recalled more deliberative and less implementational thoughts, whereas for postdecisional Ss the reverse was true. These findings suggest that deliberative and implemental mind-sets tune thought production and information processing.

The Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2019

The Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation, Second Edition, addresses key advances made in the field since the previous edition, offering the latest insights from the top theorists and researchers of human motivation. The volume includes chapters on social learning theory, control theory, self-determination theory, terror management theory, and regulatory focus theory and also presents articles from leading scholars on phenomena such as ego depletion, choice, curiosity, flow, implicit motives, and personal interests. A special section dedicated to goal research highlights achievement goals, goal attainment, goal pursuit and unconscious goals, and the goal orientation process across adulthood. The volume sheds new light on the biological underpinnings of motivation, including chapters on neuropsychology and cardiovascular dynamics. This resource is also packed with practical research and guidance, with sections on relationships and applications in areas such as psychotherapy, education, physical activity, sport, and work. By providing reviews of the most advanced work by the very best scholars in this field, this volume represents an invaluable resource for both researchers and practitioners, as well as any student of human nature.

Attaining Personal Goals: Self-Concordance Plus Implementation Intentions Equals Success

Article

Full-text available

Jul 2002

The present article includes separate meta-analyses showing that self-concordance and implementation intentions are significantly positively associated with goal progress. Study 1 confirmed the positive relations of both self-concordance and implementation intentions to weekend goal progress. Study 2 confirmed the positive relation of self-concordance with monthly progress on New Year's resolutions but failed to find a direct benefit for implementation intentions. Both studies, however, obtained a significant interaction effect indicating that goal self-concordance and implementation intentions combined synergistically to facilitate goal progress. The article also reports a meta-analysis and results from the 2 studies that demonstrated that goal progress was associated with improved affect over time.

Jenseits des Rubikon: Der Wille in den Humanwissenschaften

Book

Full-text available

Jan 1987

Der lange vernachlässigte Willensbegriff wird gegenwärtig in einigen Humanwissenschaften, vor allem in der Psychologie und Hirnphysiologie neu aufgegriffen. Dieser Band soll dazu beitragen, die alltägliche Erfahrungsvielfalt des Wollens wieder als einen Forschungsgegenstand aller Humanwissenschaften zu entdecken. Der erste Abschnitt behandelt das Wollen als einen Gegenstand vielfältiger Erfahrung, sei es in Gestalt geschichtlicher Ereignisse oder literarischer Zeugnisse, im Experiment oder schließlich im Spiegel bildhafter Vorstellungen. Die weiteren Abschnitte beschäftigen sich mit der Vorstellung vom Wollen in der Antike, der Philosophie des Willens sowie der Geschichte der Willenspsychologie. Neuansätze einer psychologischen Willenstheorie betreffen das Bilden von Absichten und ein vornahmegeleitetes Handeln ("Rubikon-Modell"). Abschließend werden pädagogische, psychotherapeutische, strafrechtliche, evolutionsbiologische und hirnphysiologische Forschungsansätze skizziert und diskutiert.

Making if-then plans counteracts learned non-use in stroke patients: A proof-of-principle study

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2017

Background: After stroke, the learned non-use of a paretic arm is a major obstacle to the improvement of hand function. Objective: We examined whether patients with a central paresis could profit from applying the self-regulation strategy of making if-then plans that specify situational triggers to using the paretic arm. Method: Seventeen stroke patients with a mild to moderate hand paresis were asked to perform a Simon task which is commonly used to study the enhanced executive control needed when there is a mismatch between stimulus (e.g., color) and response (e.g., location) features. We examined whether patients with hemiparesis would be able to reduce the Simon effect (i.e., responding slower to mismatched as compared to matched stimulus and response features) by creating new stimulus-response associations via if-then plans. Results: A significant Simon effect was observed in both the affected and the non-affected arm for control trials. However, there was no longer a significant Simon effect for the critical trials prepared by forming if-then plans. This led to a significant stimulus×compatibility interaction effect for the affected arm and a marginally significant interaction effect for the non-affected arm. Making if-then plans was effective for eliminating or at least reducing the Simon effect for the affected and the non-affected arm, respectively. Conclusion: This observation opens a potential new route to improving stroke rehabilitation. If-then plans may qualify as a viable strategy to overcome the learned non-use of the affected arm. Further research is now required to develop and test therapeutic measures based on this proof-of-principle.

From Conscious Thought to Automatic Action: A Simulation Account of Action Planning

Article

Full-text available

Jul 2017

We provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence for how verbally planning an action creates direct perception-action links and behavioral automaticity. We argue that planning actions in an if (situation)–then (action) format induces sensorimotor simulations (i.e., activity patterns reenacting the event in the sensory and motor brain areas) of the anticipated situation and the intended action. Due to their temporal overlap, these activity patterns become linked. Whenever the previously simulated situation is encountered, the previously simulated action is partially reactivated through spreading activation and thus more likely to be executed. In 4 experiments (N = 363), we investigated the relation between specific if–then action plans worded to activate simulations of elbow flexion versus extension movements and actual elbow flexion versus extension movements in a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated categorization task. As expected, linking a critical stimulus to intended actions that implied elbow flexion movements (e.g., grabbing it for consumption) subsequently facilitated elbow flexion movements upon encountering the critical stimulus. However, linking a critical stimulus to actions that implied elbow extension movements (e.g., pointing at it) subsequently facilitated elbow extension movements upon encountering the critical stimulus. Thus, minor differences (i.e., exchanging the words “point at” with “grab”) in verbally formulated action plans (i.e., conscious thought) had systematic consequences on subsequent actions. The question of how conscious thought can induce stimulus-triggered action is illuminated by the provided theoretical framework and the respective empirical evidence, facilitating the understanding of behavioral automaticity and human agency.

On the Self-Regulation of Behavior

Book

Oct 1998

This book presents a thorough overview of a model of human functioning based on the idea that behavior is goal-directed and regulated by feedback control processes. It describes feedback processes and their application to behavior, considers goals and the idea that goals are organized hierarchically, examines affect as deriving from a different kind of feedback process, and analyzes how success expectancies influence whether people keep trying to attain goals or disengage. Later sections consider a series of emerging themes, including dynamic systems as a model for shifting among goals, catastrophe theory as a model for persistence, and the question of whether behavior is controlled or instead 'emerges'. Three chapters consider the implications of these various ideas for understanding maladaptive behavior, and the closing chapter asks whether goals are a necessity of life. Throughout, theory is presented in the context of diverse issues that link the theory to other literatures.

Goal Versus Trait Explanations: Causal Attributions Beyond the Trait-Situation Dichotomy

Article

Nov 2017

In 4 studies, we show that two behavioral dimensions specified in Kelley’s (1967) model of attribution, consistency and distinctiveness of behaviors, determine perceivers’ likelihood to explain others’ behaviors in terms of their goals versus traits. Participants tended to attribute the cause of others’ behaviors to their goals (vs. traits and other characteristics) when behaviors were characterized by high distinctiveness (Study 1A & 1B) or low consistency (Study 2). On the other hand, traits were ascribed as predominant causal explanations when behaviors had low distinctiveness or high consistency. Study 3 investigated the combined effect of those behavioral dimensions on causal attributions and showed that behaviors with high distinctiveness and consistency as well as low distinctiveness and consistency trigger goal attributions. We discuss the implications of the present research in terms of going beyond the dominant approach of trait-situation dichotomy in attribution research.

Does Situation-Specificity Affect the Operation of Implementation Intentions?

Article

Aug 2017
BEHAV THER

Interventions that encourage people to link critical situations with appropriate responses (i.e., "implementation intentions") show promise in increasing physical activity.The study tested whether implementation intentions designed to deal with generic situations are more effective than implementation intentions designed to respond to specific situations.One hundred thirty-three participants either: (a) formed implementation intentions using a volitional help sheet with 10 critical situations (i.e., standard volitional help sheet); (b) formed implementation intentions using a volitional help sheet with one generic situation (i.e., single situation volitional help sheet); or (c) did not form implementation intentions (i.e., control condition).Participants who formed implementation intentions reported more physical activity and greater self-regulation than those in the control condition. There were no differences between participants who were provided with one generic critical situation and those who were provided with 10 specific critical situations.Implementation intentions successfully increased self-reported physical activity irrespective of critical situation specificity. The implication is that implementation intention-based interventions are robust and require minimal tailoring.

The Goal Concept: A Helpful Tool for Theory Development and Testing in Motivation Science

Abstract

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