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The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 1
Contexto Internacional
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0102-8529.2018400200002
Calfat
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy:
Outcomes and Limits of the
Confessional Framework
Natalia Nahas Calfat*
Abstract: Lebanon is frequently referred to as a model of a plural and stable democracy in the Mid-
dle East: a multi-ethnic and pluri-religious society that guarantees political representation through
a power-sharing confessional framework. Numerous authors also see the consociational model as
the best democratic alternative given such a high degree of domestic heterogeneity. However, by em-
phasising Lebanese stability vis-à-vis a troubled regional scenario, these positive perceptions have
neglected some elements of how democracy actually works in Lebanon. In this article, I analyse two
domestic dimensions that hinder the success of the Lebanese democratic experience (the pre-attri-
bution of seats and distortions of representation) and point to the limits, eects and consequences
of consociationalism in this specic confessional reality. e results of this case study indicate that
highly institutionalised consociational arrangements can lead to sectarianism, institutional instabil-
ity, clientelism, and state frailty. I also lay out some lessons and implications that can be derived
from such a framework in terms of harmful sectarian narratives at both the local and regional levels.
Keywords: Consociationalism; Lebanon; Confessional Frameworks; Democratic Limits; Case Study.
Sectarian conict in the Middle East today is the
perpetuation of political rule via identity mobilization.
Nader Hashemi and Danny Poster (2017: 5)
Introduction
Lebanon is frequently referred to by scholars, and by conventional wisdom, as an example
of consociational democracy in the Middle East. It is a multi-ethnic and pluri-religious so-
ciety in which eleven ocially recognised sects (Shia, Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Greek Or-
thodox, Greek Catholic, Alawite, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Evangelical
Protestant, and Jew) are represented in the government’s legislative and executive branch-
* University of São Paulo (USP), São Paulo-SP, Brazil; nnahascalfat@usp.br. ORCID iD 0000-0001-8960-
1598.
2 Calfat
es, with full judicial autonomy for each sect. Lebanon contains one of the last Christian
enclaves in the region, and religions coexist through a very particular confessional insti-
tutional framework (Salamé 1994; Barclay 2007). e country also enjoys levels of free-
dom, pluralism, and civil rights that are well ahead of other Arab countries (Makdisi and
Marktanner 2009: 12). Despite an enduring civil war in neighbouring Syria since 2011 and
increasing regional turmoil, Lebanon has been able to maintain stability, internal security,
and the rule of law. In short, Lebanon is one of the only – if not the only – democracies in
the Arab Middle East.
In spite of the troubled contemporary regional context, Lebanon is one of the few
examples of democratic stability in the Middle East, and its political arrangement is an
archetype of successful multiculturalism. In 2012, Patrice Paoli, the French Ambassador
to Lebanon, hailed Lebanese democracy, freedom, and religious coexistence, stating that
it had become a model to the region that ‘could help resolve violent sectarian conicts in
the Middle East’ (Naharnet 2012).
e Lebanese confessional system is characterised by the proportional distribution
of political power among the dierent religious communities according to their demo-
graphic weight and geographic distribution. Such an arrangement refers directly to Ar-
end Lijphart’s consociational literature for deeply divided societies. In Lebanon, dierent
groups’ representation in the government is guaranteed along confessional lines. is is
achieved by reserving a proportional number of high-level government oces, cabinet
seats, legislative seats, and public employment to representatives of each religious com-
munity (Saliba 2010). is confessional arrangement is called muhasasah ta’iyah.
Several authors (Barclay 2007; Rowell 2016; Somsen 2016) have argued that the sur-
vival of the Lebanese confessional system throughout the 20th century has proved its ef-
ciency and durability and ensured stability in Lebanon. Lebanon has also been able to
accommodate new political elites in the post-civil war period, especially the Shia, which
shows compromise and balance. Hezbollah’s insertion into the system as a political party
– which some originally feared would destroy this arrangement – has provided further
evidence of the system’s co-optation capacity and suitability for domestic reality, as they
have abided by the rules of the confessional game.
However, the country has also witnessed an increase in tensions related to sectarian-
ism and polarisation, and it has required substantial eorts to prevent the system from be-
ing contaminated by regional turmoil and extremist groups. Especially in the last decade,
the country has faced constant institutional disruption and the intensication of sectarian
tensions, even aer the end of the civil war (1975-1990). Examples of these tensions in-
clude the governance crises in 2005 and 2008, the presidential vacuum from May 2014 to
October 2016, and the persistent budget, energy, water, and waste disposal crises of 2015.
e previous parliament postponed national elections three times since 2009, alleging
security concerns regarding political instability and the war in Syria. In addition, Leba-
non is frequently accused of having a fragile nation-state that is decient in terms of its
military defence, the promotion of social services, and the provision of public goods. e
2015 public uprisings – and the 2016 municipal election results, which saw large numbers
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 3
of votes for grassroots anti-sectarian movements – demonstrated the public’s discontent
with Lebanese leaders’ inability to eectively manage the country. How, then, should we
understand Lebanon’s current situation?
is article’s main purpose is to reect on the limits and deciencies of the consocia-
tional system in confessional contexts. My research hypothesis is that the historical crys-
tallisation of political representation on solely religious foundations can lead to adverse
eects once it becomes highly institutionalised. is case study of Lebanon, considered an
example of plural democracy for the Middle East, helps us identify the consequences and
limitations of this highly specic and structured subtype of consociationalism: confes-
sional consociationalism.
is brings us closer to the regional and specialised literature, which already criticises
the confessional system’s functioning in terms of religious representativeness and state
eciency (Krayem 1997; Petallides 2011). ese authors demonstrate, additionally, that
confessional consociationalism has many malaises and disorders, and generates institu-
tional instability and sectarianism. Critics (Barry 1975; Assaf 2004; Makdisi and Marktan-
ner 2009; Kingston 2013; Nelson 2013; Khatib 2015) argue that such systems entrench
sectarian identities, freeze power among traditional elites, and foster clientelism on reli-
gious grounds. e Lebanese duality between a pluri-religious and tolerant model, on the
one hand, and institutional instability and sectarian gridlock, on the other, is a result of its
confessional institutional arrangement.
e rst part of this article shows how the international literature categorises the Leb-
anese case as a consociational democracy and the extent to which this arrangement is still
presented as benecial for the country’s internal stability. e second part analyses two
internal dimensions that threaten the success of the Lebanese democratic experience: the
confessional pre-attribution of seats and the resulting representative distortions. I wrap
up the second part by exploring this system’s specicities, how consociational assump-
tions are manifested in Lebanon, and their eects. Finally, the third part debates the im-
plications of this scenario for state-of-the-art analysis on the Middle East, especially for
analyses centred on sectarian narratives as the solution for allegedly primordial and en-
dogenous conicts and identities; this type of narrative has become more common since
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring.
The conventional wisdom: Lebanon as a consociational democracy
Arend Lijphart’s consociationalism is the political theory most commonly applied to frag-
mented and multi-confessional societies. is model predicts that political elites from
dierent sects or subcultures – despite not sharing similar values – will agree and compro-
mise under a pragmatic institutional arrangement, which will favour democratic stability
and governance (Lijphart 1968). Parliamentary consociational democracy is designed to
avoid sectarian conicts and seeks to faithfully represent society’s demographic composi-
tion – particularly in regard to religious and minority groups – within the state (Lijphart
1995). Such a design would be the most promising and realistic system for conict man-
4 Calfat
agement, capable of creating and maintaining stability in deeply divided societies (Li-
jphart 1977: 236; Andeweg 2000; Assaf 2004), and it is frequently postulated as a solution
for sub-national and religious conicts in the Middle East. Despite criticisms related to
democratic quality and vitality (Lustick 1997), consociationalism has proven to be eec-
tive and robust in several countries.
In Lebanon, the challenge of governing a society composed of 18 confessional com-
munities while protecting minority rights and religious pluralism has taken the form of
consociational confessionalism. It ensures the representation of groups in the government
and state institutions along confessional-religious lines. e framework reserves a pro-
portional number of high-level government oces and ministerial cabinets’ posts for the
respective representatives of the various religious communities, as well as the equitable
distribution of parliamentary seats among them.
For decades, the country was considered a democratic model of peaceful inter-reli-
gious coexistence and co-operation for the Middle East – oen referred to as ‘the Swit-
zerland of the East.’ Between 1943, its year of independence, and the 1970s, Lebanon was
regarded as a post-colonial success story, enjoying economic growth and a society fre-
quently referred to as free and open. Up until 1975 (when civil war broke out, leaving
250 000 dead), the literature was unanimous in stating that the consociational framework
in Lebanon was a success (Lijphart 1977; Ehrlich 2000; Makdisi, Kiwan and Marktanner
2011; Nelson 2013). Lebanon, it is argued, is inherently pluralistic and tolerant, and its
constitution, laws, and policies protect and respect religious freedom. Even as of 2011,
despite occasional social clashes due to spillover from the conict in Syria, there have been
no reports of abuses against religious freedom by the government (Department of State
(USA) 2011).
According to Sara Barclay, ‘the consociational system is the only one that can accom-
modate the social and political needs of a country with such deeply rooted and closed
confessional communities as we nd in Lebanon today’ (2007: 74). Salamé (1994) argues
that confessional democracy in Lebanon has survived for half a century ‘despite the dis-
satisfaction of the Muslim confessional elite, the attempts of the ruling confession to con-
centrate as much power as possible in its own hands,’ as well as the ‘overt rejection of the
system by new radical forces triggered by modernisation, and the constant interference
by regional forces in the country’s domestic aairs’ (Salamé 1994: 102). e confessional
system, argues Somsen (2016), has been protecting Lebanon from a chaotic and unstable
regional setting. Indeed, Lebanon is currently one of the most stable countries in the re-
gion despite the turmoil in Iraq and its proximity to the war in Syria and the Islamic State.
erefore, the consociational arrangement seems, at rst glance, to have fullled its goal
of providing stability to Lebanon.
Historically, the confessional system has been continuously maintained since its Ot-
toman roots in the 19th century (Makdisi 2000; Collelo 2003; Traboulsi 2012). Addition-
ally, there are indications of post-war compromise through the political and economic
rise of a new social group: the Shia. Previously marginalised, they obtained veto power in
2008 through Hezbollah, which is today a bona de party involved in domestic politics
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 5
(Hamzeh 2004; Wiegand 2009), defending Lebanon’s constitution and procedural legiti-
ma c y.1 And, despite ‘occasional crises,’2 the system has for the most part been maintained
since the independence of the country (Salamé 1994; Rowell 2016). Additionally, some
argue the incorporation of new elites represents natural adjustments to the consociational
system, which have led to greater stability (Assaf 2004).
According to Rowell, the Lebanese confessional system is not frail and unstable; in
fact, it has survived throughout the 20th century, thereby proving its eciency and dura-
bility:
e sectarian client-patron networks that form the basis of Leba-
non’s political system, so oen derided as weak and unstable, have
in reality survived a World War (1939-45); three Arab-Israeli wars
(1948, 1967, 1973); the rise of Jamal Abd al-Nasser (with its atten-
dant frenzy of military coups elsewhere in the region); two civil wars
(1958, 1975-90) and subsequent occupations by both Israel and Syr-
ia; three further rounds of ghting with Israel (1993, 1996, 2006);
and now a civil war in neighbouring Syria; and have done so es-
sentially unscathed and unchanged in any fundamental way (Rowell
2016: 3).
Although strongly critical of the consociational system in Lebanon, Makdisi and
Marktanner (2009: 12) argue that ‘the most benecial outcome of Lebanon’s consociation-
al democracy is that it allowed for levels of freedom and civil rights that placed Lebanon
well ahead of other Arab countries.’ Likewise, although without sparing criticism, Ehrlich
(2000: 459) asserts that the post-war system seeks to allow the sects to resolve their own
aairs and maintain their own beliefs while subscribing to a common Lebanese identity.
According to Makdisi, Kiwan and Marktanner (2011: 129), Lebanon has maintained a
generally liberal and pluralist political environment with civil liberties, especially freedom
of expression, even if the practice of consociational democracy, particularly in the post-
civil war period, has been awed. Lebanon’s model has also oered – it is argued – a real
opportunity for dierent religious communities to share power and express their views
freely in debates on public policy, even if there are clear advantages for the three main
religious communities: the Maronites, the Sunni, and the Shia (Makdisi, Kiwan and Mark-
tanner 2011: 132).
Abdel-Kader also asserts that the system has provided a context in which ‘national
consciousness has emerged; inter-community cooperation has increased and political val-
ues have begun to ourish and to converge,’ even though the political system may not have
aggressively promoted national integration in the post-war period. Emphasising mecha-
nisms of close consultation, he argues that the Lebanese political system demands a high
level of co-operation between dierent powers in order to maintain restraint and promote
reconciliation in all matters that could provoke confessional discord or conict (Abdel-
Kader 2010: 12).
6 Calfat
Lebanon, therefore, is still oen referred to as a model of plural and stable democ-
racy in the Middle East. According to conventional wisdom, it guarantees the political
representation of the country’s sects through a confessional arrangement. Many authors
who advocate the consociational model see it as the best alternative given Lebanon’s high
degree of internal heterogeneity. Despite a long civil war in neighbouring Syria, Lebanon
has been able to maintain political stability. And, in a sense, this stability is only assured
by its confessionalism, which prevents the country from descending in yet another civil
war. As a result, Lebanese confessionalism is still seen in considerable segments of the
literature as the most feasible political model, even if one takes into account a consocia-
tional trade-o between this guarantee of institutional order and the resulting decits of
democratic quality.
However, by emphasising, in particular, the general stability of the Lebanese political
system in the face of a troubled regional scenario, positive perceptions of Lebanon have
neglected domestic aspects: how its democracy actually works. From here on out, I will
focus more on the real eects and limits of this confessional consociationalism. It will be
demonstrated that interpretations that focus on the alleged exceptionality of Lebanon’s
continued democratic stability overlook important features of the country’s internal af-
fairs. e Lebanese confessional system’s particularities (presented in Part 2) are precisely
those elements responsible for the defects in Lebanon’s democracy, and they have been
overlooked by most of the scholars mentioned above.
Beyond the conventional wisdom
Specificities of Lebanese confessionalism: outlining the threats to its success
e process that led to Lebanon’s institutionalisation of sectarianism has its origins in
the 19th century. In Lebanon, the division of state power and resources between dierent
sects, as well as the judicial power granted to religious authorities, began with the Otto-
man millet system, and was reinforced during the French Mandate, when privileges were
granted mainly to Maronite Christian groups. From then onwards, confessional identity
continued to be built and incorporated into the judicial and administrative structures of
the Lebanese state (Chaoul 2015), causing constant political tensions. Under the Ottoman
millet system, religious leaders of each community were responsible for the administra-
tion of their community, also performing some civil duties. Reigning over an empire that
was incredibly diverse ethnically and religiously, the Ottomans relied on local feudal elites
and community-entrenched dynasties to rule it. ese political leaders, known as zu’ama,3
used their status to provide protection and patronage (wasta). In fact, some of these same
dynasties constitute the same sectarian elites in present-day Lebanon and are part of the
ruling elite coalition (Nelson 2013: 353). ‘Lebanon indeed witnessed the rst formal in-
stitutionalisation of communalism and sectarianism under Ottoman rule’ (Jamali 2001:
284).
e 1926 constitution consolidated these consociational sectarian arrangements from
the previous century (Assaf 2004: 211). Although the new state comprised a variety of
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 7
confessional communities, the political system between 1920 and 1943 was already re-
inforcing the connection between politics and religion, and the parliamentary structure
gave a position of prominence to the Christian majority (Abukhalil 1989: 53-55). e 1943
National Pact reinforced this stimulus to sectarianisation that had already been promoted
by the French colonial empire during its Mandate for Syria and Lebanon in the 1920s.
When the National Pact was signed, ‘these sectarian elites naturally took up the mantle
of national leadership. Political bosses bargained intensely for resources and positions for
their communities’ (Nelson 2013: 353).
e Taif Agreement, which was signed in 1989 in Saudi Arabia, again reproduced
this sectarian system. e 2008 Doha Agreement, while correcting major sectarian im-
balances and readjusting disproportionalities in representation, has once again ratied
this system and institutionalised political representation based exclusively on a religious-
sectarian basis. Repeatedly, throughout national pacts and agreements in 1926, 1943, 1990
and 2008, ‘the traditional patriarchal and communitarian system was transposed into the
state system of confessionalism, rather than having structured a democratic rule of law’
(Chaoul 2015). Taking into account the role played by sectarianism since the era of Otto-
man dominance, this scenario has constituted, for more than a century, a trajectory that
has reinforced the confessional structures within Lebanon’s institutional design. In this
sense, Johnson (2001) and Makdisi (2000) challenge the view that confessional conict
is a given in Lebanese history, or a mere political extension of endemic conicts; this is
signicant for my analysis of sectarianism in the region below.
e Lebanese government is currently composed of a large national unity coalition
that includes all parties from the March 8 and March 14 Alliances. Since 2005, the country
has been polarised between, on the one side, the March 8 Coalition, which is led by He-
zbollah and contains Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party,
and is supported by Tehran and Damascus, and, on the other side, the March 14 Coalition,
which is led by the son of Rak Hariri, Saad Hariri, composed of the Future Movement,
Lebanese Forces and Kataeb, and supported by Riyadh and Washington.
e Cedar Revolution, which increased polarisation aer 2005, and the December
2006 sit-in protest from allies of March 8 (which requested more balanced political par-
ticipation in the government), were signs of Hezbollah’s demand for veto power. Major
cabinet protests and a violent political crisis in May 2008 were the aermath of what was
considered to be a violation by the government of its strategic infrastructure in the ght
against Israel. Being able to put forward its demands and obtain veto power in Doha 2008,
Hezbollah was strengthened, and confessionalism deeply institutionalised. Iran, interest-
ed in countering Saudi inuence in Lebanon, gave its full-edged support to Hezbollah for
their political and strategic demands.
e opposition, through the March 8 Alliance, sought to expand its share of power
to a signicant extent, especially at the expense of the traditional Maronite Christian elite
and Sunni Muslims. With the threat of a decline in Sunni power in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia
has established itself as a key supporter of the March 14 Alliance (Norton 2007), polarising
Lebanese politics between Iranian and Saudi blocs and their respective regional alliances.
8 Calfat
With the reinforcement of Shia power, the Sunni allies of Saudi Arabia were further
isolated, which partially explains the Saudi involvement in Lebanese aairs in 2017 that
helped lead to Prime Minister Hariri’s short-lived resignation in November. e Saudi
presence and interference in Lebanon is not, however, new. Critics point out that the Saudi
mediation of the Taif Agreement in 1989, although it allowed the seat ratio between Chris-
tians and Muslims to change from 6:5 to 5:5, was able to support its anti-Shia interests by
maintaining 50% of seats for Christians (Izady 2016). In addition, Saudi Arabia, Israel,
and the United States overtly condemn Hezbollah’s weapons and, in the battle of narra-
tives, classify it as a terrorist group and Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
March 8 and March 14 represent opposing political forces on the Lebanese spectrum;
the former tends to concentrate Shia votes and the second Sunni (with both having the
support of dierent Christian sects). Due to the pre-attribution of legislative seats and the
solidication of political-sectarian identities, political actors have a limited ability to win
votes from other religions other than launching multi-religion plural lists. e electoral
system ‘continues to militate against the emergence of cross-cutting political parties with
the ability to challenge the regional power bases of Lebanon’s traditional zu’ama,’ argues
Ochsenwald et al. (2016). However, since its alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement
and its victory against Israel in 2006, Hezbollah has increasingly begun to win political
support beyond its sect and establish a national base. With its oensive against jihadist
groups on the Lebanese border, Hezbollah has been winning more domestic support and
consolidating its role, not only as a local player, but also as a regional power. e increas-
ing cross-sectarian support for Hezbollah and its consolidation of power has diminished
the strength of local Sunni political forces, which is seen as a threat to Saudi Arabia and
its domestic allies. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, sectarian tensions have contributed to
the rise of the Islamic State, which preyed on Sunni marginalisation to present itself as the
restorer of Sunni pride (Khatib 2015).
As the above historical account shows, each of the major politically relevant com-
munities in Lebanon today, Maronite, Sunni and Shia – although the system favours the
Christian-Muslim duality – has veto power, forming a kind of Triumvirate (Johnson 2001),
or Troika (Majed 2010). erefore, all three pillars have bargaining, compromise, and deci-
sion-making powers in the cabinet, and the Shiite ‘minority’ has a veto over vital national
matters. Segmental autonomy is guaranteed through confessions’ jurisprudence, to which
Muhanna (2013) refers, metaphorically, as de facto legislative and legal federalism – or
quasi-religious federations, according to Saliba (2010). Concerning Lijphart’s proportion-
ality principle, it is applied ‘in its eects’ – albeit non-traditionally, through the legislative
pre-attribution of confessional seats – via what Lijphart called the ‘system of proportional
representation predened on a community or religious basis’ (Lijphart 1977: 148).
Although for the most part present in the Lebanese case, Lijphart’s consociational
guidelines seem to have had deleterious eects, or at least limits, in Lebanon. is is be-
cause the domestic and specialised literature has lamented the eects of the consociational
arrangement and denounced Lebanon’s instability and gridlock, as well as the promotion
of clientelism, the predominance of sectarian identities, and the weakness of the Leba-
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 9
nese state. As opposed to the literature that emphasises Lebanon’s stability and its system’s
salutary continuity, a focus on the internal dimensions that threaten the success of this
democratic experience (the pre-attribution of seats and distortions of representation) will
clarify the peculiarities of the confessional system, how it is related to consociationalism,
and what its limits are. Supported by the domestic literature, which already points out the
confessional framework’s disorders, I will dampen the positive perceptions of Lebanon’s
system as an exportable model.
(i) Pre-attribution of seats
Modern Lebanon is a unitary, non-federative, multi-party republic with a parliamentary
system of government. Under the Taif Agreement of 1990, parliamentary seats are cur-
rently shared equally among Christian and Muslim sects, replacing the earlier 1943 Na-
tional Pact, which favoured Christians by a ratio of 6:5. By means of an unwritten conven-
tion, the Lebanese political system divides political and public service jobs (muhassasa)
on a confessional basis. Eectively, it shares political power between a Christian President
(in practice, a Maronite); a Sunni Muslim premier; a legislature led by a Shia Muslim pres-
ident of the parliament; an Eastern Orthodox deputy prime minister and vice-president of
the parliament; and a Druze head of the military (Collelo 2003: 183; Harb 2006).
Article 95 of the constitution states that Christians and Muslims shall be represented
equally in parliament; the cabinet (including ministries up to the level of secretary-general
and general-directors); and in high-level public service positions (Saliba 2010). While not
in the constitution, it is also tradition that key administrative oces also respect the 50:50
proportion (Majed 2010). is distribution of political power operates at both national
and local levels of government, given that seats in parliament are distributed proportion-
ately across all of Lebanon’s regions and all three branches of government (Department of
State (USA) 2011).
e 18 ocially recognised religious groups are Sunnis, Shias, Maronites, Arme-
nians (Catholics and Orthodox), Druze, Copts, Syriacs (Catholics and Orthodox), Alawi-
tes, Greeks (Melkite Catholics and Orthodox Antiochians), Jews, Assyrians, Protestants,
Chaldean Catholics, Isma’ilis and Roman Catholics. ey all have the right to deal with
family law according to their own traditions and religious courts. Every legal, civil, and
personal system is religiously governed, as well as a wide range of institutions and welfare
associations. e government’s resource allocations are also confessionally distributed. In
other words, sects become the means for gaining access to government resources and
public state services, and one’s religious aliation determines the extent of one’s political
rights and privileges (Saliba 2010).
Lebanon’s constitution, enacted in 1926 during the French Mandate and modied by
several subsequent amendments, provides for unicameral legislative power to be exercised
by a 128-member National Assembly that is equally distributed among Christians and
Muslims. e confessional composition of the legislature is 34 Maronites, 27 Sunnis, 27
Shia, 14 Greek Orthodox, 8 Greek Catholics, 8 Druze, 5 Armenian Orthodox, 2 Alawites,
1 Catholic Armenian, 1 Protestant, and 1 Christian minority. is amounts to 64 Muslim
seats and 64 Christian seats, and the following percentages: the Maronites have 26.56%
10 Calfat
of the total seats; the Greek Orthodox 10.94%; the Greek Catholics 6.25%; the Armenian
Orthodox 3.91%; the Armenian Catholics 0.78%; the Protestants 0.78%; other Christians
0.78%; the Sunni 21.09%; the Shia 21.09%; the Alawite 1.56%; and the Druze 6.25%. e
parliament also reserves six seats for non-resident candidates, equally divided between
Christians and Muslims (Article 112, Parliamentary Elections Law No. 44 2017).
Parliamentary seats are divided between een electoral districts or Mohafazahs,
which are in turn further divided into 27 sub-districts. e seats in each district are fur-
ther divided according to sectarian religious representation, and representatives can only
compete against their coreligionists (see Table 1). e 128 deputies represent the political
preferences and religious diversity of their constituencies. Each of the 27 districts has a
given number of parliamentary seats, which is determined by the district’s population and
confessional distribution. e peculiarity of the elaborate consociational calculus in Leba-
non is that each district reserves seats for dierent religious groups, which ensures the
representation of all minorities, regardless of electoral results. In other words, it provides
electoral results that are structured exclusively along denominational lines.
Table 1: Regional distribution of parliamentary seats among the 11 sects
Distribution of
parliamentary seats
among electoral districts
Sunni
Shia
Druze
Alawite
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholic
Armenian Orthodox
Armenian Catholic
Evangelical/Protestant
Christian Minorities
Total seats per district
North
Lebanon 28
Akkar 3 1 1 2 7
Tripoli 5 1 1 1 8
Dinniyeh 2 2
Minnieh 1 1
Batrun 2 2
Bsharreh 2 2
Zgharta 3 3
Koura 3 3
Mount
Lebanon 35
Jbeil 1 2 3
Kisrawan 5 5
Metn 4 2 1 1 8
Baabda 2 1 3 6
Aley 2 2 1 5
Chouf 2 2 3 1 8
Bekaa23
Baalbek +Hermel 2 6 1 1 10
Zahleh 1 1 1 1 2 1 7
West Bekaa + Rashaya 2 1 1 1 1 6
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 11
Distribution of
parliamentary seats
among electoral districts
Sunni
Shia
Druze
Alawite
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholic
Armenian Orthodox
Armenian Catholic
Evangelical/Protestant
Christian Minorities
Total seats per district
Beirut 19 Beirut I 1 1 1 3 1 1 8
Beirut II 6 2 1 1 1 11
South
Lebanon 23
Saida 2 2
Jezzine 2 1 3
Tyre 4 4
Zahrani (Saida Villages) 2 1 3
Nabatiyeh 3 3
Bint Jbeil 3 3
Marjeyoun + Hasbaya 1 2 1 1 5
Total seats per confession 27 27 8 2 34 14 8 5 1 1 1 128
Total Muslims and Christians 64 64
Source: Parliamentary Elections Law No. 44, or Adwan law (2017).
(ii) Distortions of representation
is framework ensures that, even though Christians make up less than 30% of the pop-
ulation, according to unocial estimates,4 exactly half of the parliament is made up of
Christians (further divided into seven sects), while the other half is made up of Mus-
lims (divided into four sects). eoretically, this arrangement was designed to ensure that
Lebanon’s cosmopolitan and multi-religious composition was reected in its political sta-
tus quo. In practice, however, it structures and freezes political representation exclusively
along religious lines and turns the state–citizen relationship into a state–client relation-
ship.
According to Paul Kingston, the Lebanese do not vote in the neighbourhoods where
they live. Instead, they must return to the district where their families were rst regis-
tered in the 1930s. Such movement reies the communal bond and entrenches the elec-
toral power of regionally based family elites, whose support was especially cultivated as a
French Mandate policy, in areas such as the North, the Bekaa Valley and the South (Kings-
ton 2013: 29). In order for the state to capture and empower land-owning elites, the Man-
date created these electoral laws in 1926, which mostly persist to this day as the current
electoral system. rough these laws, ‘constituencies were local […] within which were
multiple seats distributed on a communal basis – that deliberately privileged candidates
of the leading local families’ (Kingston 2013: 29). Voting along sectarian lines means dis-
couraging voting for representatives who will not be responsible for development projects,
Table 1 (continuation)
12 Calfat
zoning, or garbage collection where one lives. In the places where representatives do gov-
ern, they will not be responsive because their constituency lives elsewhere (Baker 2013).
is system leads to additional distortions, such as the under-representation of im-
poverished Shiite communities with weaker channelling of federal resources, which has
contributed to their disproportional rates of poverty. Having undergone rapid demo-
graphic growth since the 1970s, with an estimated population between 40 and 60% of the
country, and concentrated mainly in the periphery of Beirut and suburbs in the south of
Lebanon, the Shias maintain the political representation proportion under the Taif Agree-
ment of 1990,5 which grants 50% of the seats in parliament to all Muslims in the country
in total (including Sunnis and Druze).6
As a result, the number of non-Christian seats in parliament is equal to that of Chris-
tians, even though the Christian population is smaller, not to mention in decline. In the
2011 elections, Christians totalled 38.22% of voters and Muslims 61.62% (Lebanese Infor-
mation Center 2013: 13). e Sunnis have also been granted the same number of seats as
the Shia (27 seats each, or 21.09%), despite the latter being about twice as numerous as the
former (Izady 2016). While the Shia have become the largest segment of the population,
the presidency is still reserved for a Maronite and the oce of Prime Minister for a Sunni.7
Inelasticity and disproportionalities engendered by the confessional system are un-
derscored by specialised literature, but overlooked by conventional wisdom. Petallides,
analysing the results of the 2009 parliamentary election,8 states that Lebanon ‘has a rough-
ly 11% deviation from proportionality; nearly twice our global baseline of 6.65%.’ ese
are interesting gures when considered in ‘a country with a political system that is falling
over itself to ensure proportional representation of dierent groups’ (Petallides 2011: 4).
According to data from the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, the so-
called ‘voting power’ map is not homogeneous throughout the country. By indicating the
percentage of voters registered in each district out of the total number of voters in Leba-
non and comparing it to the percentage of seats actually allocated to that district, the data
indicate that certain electoral constituencies are under-represented (such as Akkar, Dinni-
yeh-Minnieh, Zgharta, Tyre, Nabatiyeh, and Bint Jbeil) while others are over-represented
(such as Kisrawan, Koura, Beirute I, and Jezzine) (LADE 2015).
ese under- and over-representations, when added up throughout the entire coun-
try and combined with a confessional framework, make these disproportionalities highly
problematic, particularly for a country in which sectarian balance is maintained very
tenuously. What appears to be a small distortion in representation becomes aws and
disproportionalities that cannot be ignored, and ultimately holds the country hostage to
a rigid census monitoring (frozen since 1932), as well as making it subject to constant
contestations over minor representation maladjustments. Furthermore, even if propor-
tionality were to be guaranteed throughout all districts, it still would not be truly repre-
sentative because measuring the population of each confessional sect can only be done by
monitoring birthplace registries. In the vast majority of cases, this refers to the ancestral
village of one’s family, not where one lives nowadays. is mechanism completely ignores
the signicant migratory movements registered during the last six decades.9
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 13
Petallides argues that the system also allows for electoral voids, when in spite of the
voting strength of one candidate, he might not be elected due to the pre-attribution of
seats to other sects. ‘ese votes that are lost and sent into the electoral void decrease the
proportionality of the election results and directly undermine voter preferences’ (Petal-
lides 2011: 4). Concerning the district magnitude (the number of legislative seats assigned
to a district) the author argues10 that ‘with 26 districts electing 128 representatives, Leba-
non’s average district magnitude is 4.2 (M=128/26), which is well below Lijphart’s magical
M=7 threshold, where a legislature truly represents a microcosm of society’ (Petallides
2011: 4). Representatives of minority Christian groups – such as Syriac Christians, who
represent 0.9% of the population and are not included in the pre-attribution formula –
despite having served in a few high-ranking public oces, demand ministerial appoint-
ments reserved for their sect. Greater political access is sought, then, through further reli-
gious specication, which perpetuates this sectarian way of thinking.
Limits: a particular and highly institutionalised type of consociationalism
Although the Lebanese experiment with institutionalised pre-war consociationalism last-
ed just over thirty years, it was subjected to several violent ruptures of internal stability be-
fore collapsing completely in 1975. Despite the diculties in measuring the eectiveness
of any institutional design, consociational democracy in Lebanon should not be judged
as to have performed satisfactorily over this time, despite what the literature tends to say.
As Assaf (2004: 204) argues, the ‘new post-war “improved” consociational system does
not seem to have fullled its objective of creating endogenous democratic stability.’ In
addition, the last decade of Lebanese history has been especially troubled. e Lebanese
government, some argue, makes indiscriminate use of vetoes, falling into institutional
paralysis, much more frequently than it uses consensus and co-operation.
It is true, however, that Lebanon’s institutional framework has shown strong resil-
ience. In spite of extensive external inuence in the country during the 20th century, Leba-
non was able to maintain its national identity and sovereign state mainly because of its
confessional framework. e importance of external inuences and their interactions
with the confessional balance cannot be overstated. ey include the French Mandate’s
favouritism of the Maronites, as well as the 1958 US military presence upon President
Chamoun’s request, Chamoun having accused the United Arab Republic of interference.
e Cold War played an important role in the ideological identication and the polarisa-
tion of domestic conicts that had preceded the political crisis of 1958, when Lebanon was
on the verge of a civil war. While Maronite Christians wanted Lebanon to remain allied
with the western foreign powers, leist, Nasserist, and Pan-Arab Muslims pressed the
government to join the newly created UAR, which was aligned with other Arab countries
and the Soviet Union (Ochsenwald et al. 2016).
e further increase in social and political polarisation incited by the entry of Pales-
tinian refugees and guerrillas into Lebanon (aer the expulsion of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organisation from Jordan in the early 1970s), as well as the growth of the Lebanese
Muslim population, meant that there was pressure for changes and for the redistribution
14 Calfat
of the country’s confessional power. e Maronite Christians, however, refused, allying
with the United States, Syria, and Israel (Faour et al. 2007). Syria’s large-scale intervention
in 1976 during the civil war sparked a more active Israeli involvement in Lebanese aairs,
intervening on behalf of the Christians as the Israelis’ main ally against the PLO. e 1982
Israeli siege of West Beirut led to the subsequent emergence of a number of insurgent Shi-
ite groups, who counted on Iranian support, including Hezbollah. Multinational United
Nations forces were also present during the war. e ceasere was brokered in 1989 by a
tripartite committee made up of Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia (Ochsenwald et al.
2016).
Aer the end of the war, the country fell under the reinforced patronage of two main
regional actors: Syria (who only withdrew its troops aer 29 years in 2005) and Saudi
Arabia – represented locally by Hezbollah’s domestic opponents, particularly the Future
Movement, who served Riyadh’s regional objectives in Syria and Lebanon (Salloukh 2014:
104). Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian war started in 2012 and deepened in 2014 and
was also part of a larger ‘geopolitical battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran over regional
supremacy [that was] unleashed in the aermath of the US-led invasion and occupation of
Iraq’ (Salloukh 2014: 104). As had also happened during the Ottoman and French periods,
local elites have allied with regional players and foreign powers to strengthen their own
interests and agendas. Since the Syrian war, the proxy clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran
has become, in Lebanon, an important microcosm of the region as a whole.
Regional tensions and interventions have been closely related to the disruptions in the
Lebanese confessional system. More important than demographic concerns, political and
economic inequalities between Muslims and Christians have been the main reason for the
disruptions in the system. In the words of Yahya (2017: 4), sectarian societies ‘oen invite
inuence from outside countries through the sectarian communities over which those
outside actors oen hold sway, a dynamic facilitated by the political divisions within so-
ciety.’ Moreover, sectarian identities, given how entrenched they are, can be manipulated
and mobilised quite oen, along with fear, in order to create a narrative for the regional
interests at play.
Despite current agreement on the need to maintain the confessional system in place,
the ‘pre-established electoral proportionality,’ or what Lijphart (1977: 148) calls propor-
tionality ‘of eects’, encourages the reinforcement of cleavages, generates clientelism, and
weakens the state by insulating sectarian local elites. In spite of the pre-civil war reality,
the consociationalists who bet on the primacy of current stability and pluralism also fail
insofar as they ignore the shortcomings engendered by the institutional design itself.
Besides political instability and state ineciency, the confessional system has been
strongly criticised for promoting sectarianism and entrenching religious identities (Van
Schendelen 1984; Lustick 1997; Assaf 2004; Makdisi and Marktanner 2009; Nelson 2013;
Khatib 2015). Horowitz (1985) argues that consociationalism can lead to the reication
of ethnic divisions, while Assaf (2004) argues that consociationalism in Lebanon has had
divisive eects, has politicised and manipulated ethnicity, and has the inability to prevent
the emergence of communal conicts. Critics, additionally, underscore a limited concep-
tion of the state’s role, the attribution of legislative functions to non-state institutions,
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 15
and the political dominance of traditional Maronite and Sunni elites (Makdisi 1996; Harb
2006). Consociational democracy has also been criticised for perpetuating a weak state
and institutionalising sectarian dierences (Horowitz 1985; Makdisi and Marktanner
2009; Khatib 2015).
In confessional consociationalism, electoral stimuli are pre-established and calcify
voters’ identication as well as politicians’ aliation on a sectarian basis, which leads to
electoral results that are structured exclusively along denominational lines. Despite the
eorts for pluralistic representation, the distortions and inelasticity of the system ignore
ideological changes and even migratory movements. As a result, they reify communal
bonds and entrench the electoral power of regionally based elites. is type of power-
sharing system reinforces the idea that communal local leaders bargain for power within
state institutions. Sectarian leaders become not only the sole representatives of their com-
munities, but also the main providers of services, jobs, and security, even as they pursue
their personal interests. is has established a long history of clientelistic networks (Majed
2017).
In Lebanon, segmental group autonomy is widely respected, and religious identities
are entrenched and static, without cross-cutting cleavages. Minorities have mutual vetoes
over one another, which leads to stalemate and inoperability more oen than good gover-
nance. e proportionality principle and grand coalition governments, although they are
supposedly broadly representative of all signicant denominational segments, ultimately
multiply such groups and promote the politicisation of religion. e guarantee that 18
dierent confessions and sub-confessions will be represented has become a way to en-
courage new representation demands from demographically insignicant minorities, and
to ensure that voters’ political aliations are based solely on their religion. In practice,
the longing for full representativeness in Lebanon has become a permanent barrier to the
secularisation of politics.
Adjustments and recalibrations to the Lebanese pari passu model of consociational-
ism have indeed been made, such as: absorbing new, demanding elites and widening the
grand coalition (mainly Sunni in the Taif Agreement and Shiite in the Doha Agreement);
segmental autonomy; veto power; and dierent sects’ seats guarantee (in Legislative and
Executive branches). However, Lebanon still experiences constant institutional gridlock.
In addition, the country is unable to manage public assets, clamp down on clientelism, or
attend to generalised complaints of elitism and under-representation by dierent sects.
According to the Arab Barometer II (2013), only 25.8% of the population trust the parlia-
ment, and 22.9% trust political parties. However, 95.5% believe there is corruption within
the state’s institutions and agencies, and 88% think that obtaining employment through
connections is widespread (Atallah 2012: 19).11
is reality shows that the problem has much less to do with consociationalism’s ap-
plicability to Lebanon than to the inexible subtype of consociationalism practised there.
When it was adopted in Lebanon, the institutional design took consociationalism to ex-
tremes. e issue does not lie with the depth of social cleavages in Lebanon, nor with
irresolute individuals who are incapable of any form of pragmatism. Lebanese elites do
not lack the ability to make rational decisions, but the institutional arrangements provide
16 Calfat
political benets from maintaining sectarian practices and patronage mechanisms. e
costs of these practices are low, which ends up maintaining the confessional political sta-
tus quo. In confessional-consociational democracies, electoral stimuli are pre-established
and calcify identication along sectarian lines, which freezes changes in identity patterns
and discourages secularism and ideological change. e Lebanese system, given its highly
rigid institutional characteristics, constrains electoral results, not allowing for large-scale
change in preferences – even if they take place in society.
e second part of this article has exposed the system’s particularities and showed
how, through the pre-attribution of seats and distortions of representation, confession-
alism in Lebanon has resulted in a highly institutionalised type of consociationalism,
threatening the success of this democratic experience. is framework was outlined and
scrutinised so as to demystify the conventional wisdom of Lebanon as a success story. is
eort is important, not only for exposing the limits and deciencies of consociationalism
in its confessional subcategory, but also for laying out the implications of this scenario for
power-sharing sectarian solutions in the region.
Can sectarianism work in the Middle East?
Consociationalism is an institutional framework that is suitable as a transitional (non-
permanent) power-sharing mechanism for conict resolution and mediation. As one can
see through the current case study, however, the rigid pre-attribution of seats can be high-
ly detrimental. Consociational recommendations to tackle Middle Eastern crises reinforce
a view of ethnic and religious identities as immutable, freezing them by promoting what
Ashutosh Varshney (2014) calls a ‘state imprisonment of identities.’ Due to an essentialised
view of religions in the Middle East, one’s confession is seen as the most relevant element
of highly diverse groups of people. Such perceptions of the other frequently ignore how
sectarianism is not only a relatively recent construction, but has also been manipulated
throughout the modern history of the Middle East, a practice that has been present from
the Ottoman millets and the French presence in Lebanon to the civil war and the current
polarisation between Sunnis and Shias, with Lebanon’s March 8 and 14 Alliances serving
as proxies of a Saudi-Iranian hostility.
Conicts over the distribution of political and socio-economic power in the Middle
East, whether domestic or geopolitical, have taken on a sectarian face, and an array of
actors have instrumentalised sectarianism. Examples of geopolitical, institutional, and
ideational drivers of sectarianism in contemporary Middle East include the Shia-centric
state-building in post-2003 Iraq, the Gulf regimes’ exploitation of identity and religious
politics, the Islamic State, and the sectarianisation of the war in Syria (Wehrey 2017).
According to Younis’s analysis of consociational political structures in post-war Iraq,
‘the constitution and electoral framework adopted instituted many of Lijphart’s recom-
mendations, including proportional representation, federalism and a parliamentary sys-
tem with a weak presidency.’ However, this democratic framework has failed (Younis
2011: 1). Sectarian violence in the Middle East is frequently framed in terms of ‘timeless
ethno-sectarian divisions,’ exacerbating the essentialisation of these ‘other’ societies. Far
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 17
from such inelasticity, ‘identities are heightened and politicised in response to social con-
texts’ (Younis 2011: 2):
Many of the ‘divided societies’ that come under scrutiny by scholars
or practitioners are in complex post-conict situations, and there is
a tendency to oversimplify the divisions in these societies by ascrib-
ing them to primordial ethnic or religious divisions. […] Scholars
need to recognize the multitude of factors that contribute towards
civil conict, and avoid the trap of seeing ethno-sectarian divisions
as inevitable features of societies that seem intractably ‘divided’ […]
It is time for the consociational orthodoxy to be challenged (Younis
2011: 15).
Yahya (2017: 1-2) also argues that Lebanon and Iraq have similar sect- and ethnic-
based power-sharing systems, and that these structures have empowered ‘corrupt sectar-
ian and ethnic leaders who have undermined the rights of all citizens.’ Both countries
staged popular protest and civil movements in the summer of 2015 against patronage poli-
tics and corruption, demanding the transcendence of ethno-sectarian politics. Both pro-
tests were triggered by crises in the provision of services, but later morphed into broader
condemnations of the countries’ political systems and underlying power-sharing arrange-
ments (Yahya 2017: 2).
Likewise, Dalacoura states that ‘the American handling of occupied Iraq has under-
mined the prospect of long-term democratisation by strengthening sectarian and ethnic
divisions between Shi’is, Sunnis and Kurds, and indirectly encouraging the re-Islamiza-
tion of Iraqi politics’ (Dalacoura 2005: 971). In Iraq, Yahya argues, ethnicities have become
the new elements around which a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has been organised. ‘e
sectarian power-sharing system put in place went even further than that of Lebanon. Not
only were senior government positions allocated according to sect, but each representative
had two deputies from other ethno-sectarian groups.’ is pattern was repeated through-
out the government at multiple levels in Iraq (Yahya 2017: 4).
By allocating positions in the state according to sect or ethnic group, both the Leb-
anese and Iraqi constitutions encourage communities to resort to so-called primordial
identities. ese identities ‘tend to trump other forms of association, whether ideological
or political.’ As a result, by ‘reducing politics to questions of religion and identity, Iraq and
Lebanon eectively established systems that allow for poor governance, the entrenchment
of undemocratic practices, and patronage politics’ (Yahya 2017: 4).
In the aermath of the Syrian civil war, speculations have abounded over the coun-
try’s future power structure. Syria, suggest policymakers, could nd peace and stability
by adopting a constitutional formula based on a confessional power-sharing system mir-
roring those of Iraq and Lebanon. Similar recommendations can be found in the litera-
ture on the Israeli-Palestinian conict. But, as the Lebanese and Iraqi models have vividly
shown, this ‘method of short-term conict resolution leads to long-term conicts in the
future,’ the unequal distribution of state resources, and the political marginalisation of
many people (Khatib 2015).
18 Calfat
e instrumentalisation of religion is extremely frequent in the region due to the
continuity of the sectarian discourse and, above all, due to de facto sectarian politics. As
Makdisi (2000: 164-166) pointed out, sectarianism in Lebanon – and oen in the entire
Middle East – is more of a modern political construct than it is socially endogenous; aer
all, religious and sectarian identities were only politicised and institutionalised in the 19th
century (Majed 2016). Sectarianism concerns the institutionalisation or reinforcement of
the politicisation of religious identities through historical state institutions. is sectar-
ian narrative – and its political representation – are still strong in national imaginations
and quickly emerge in the presence of overowing regional conicts. Al-Rasheed (2014)
argues we ‘should move away from a historical Sunni-Shi’a divide and focus on the abys-
mal strategies of patron-client dictatorships and economic inequality between and within
various groups. A reconsideration of the so-called eternal confessional model of the Arab
world is overdue.’
Hashemi and Poster (2017) also consider sectarianisation to be a process that informs
all conicts in the region, not a product of anciently rooted sectarian grievances or an old
primordial and immutable force. e term sectarianism:
[...] tends to imply a static given, a trans-historical force – an endur-
ing and immutable characteristic of the Arab Islamic world from the
seventh century until today. […] Authoritarianism, not theology, is
the critical factor that shapes the sectarianisation process. Authori-
tarian regimes in the Middle East have deliberately manipulated
sectarian identities in various ways as a strategy for deecting de-
mands for political change and perpetuating their power. is anti-
democratic political context is essential for understanding sectarian
conict in Muslim societies today, especially in those societies that
contain a mix of Sunni and Shi’a populations (Hashemi and Poster
2017: 4-5).
Final considerations
Despite recognising that confessional consociationalism entrenches ethnic and sectarian
identities over time, much of the international literature on democracy in Lebanon fo-
cuses on its nal positive eects (i.e. the maintenance of a minimal degree of stability and
a tolerable democratic decit, which are together capable of avoiding a new civil war). e
acceptance of the confessional framework as the best possible democratic alternative is
also clear in the many proposals for electoral reform that demand greater proportionality,
decentralisation, and female participation, but rarely address de-confessionalisation. In
the end, despite Lebanese democracy’s weaknesses, it is still the most stable and demo-
cratic country in the Arab Middle East. All things considered, the literature argues that
the system should still be continued, albeit with minimal adjustments. However, this case
analysis demonstrated otherwise. Indeed, Lebanon appears to be protected against a new
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 19
civil war, but the country registers severe inelasticity, disproportionalities of representa-
tion, and institutional paralysis. Moreover, the juxtaposition of economic and sectarian
elites in post-war politics makes political reforms even more dicult (Salloukh 2017: 2).
Out of consociational countries, the Lebanese case study is signicant because it
embodies the particularities of consociational democracies, but also points towards the
limits of consociational theory. When crystallisation reaches its apex, as in Lebanon,
consociational democracy’s mechanisms such as the segmental autonomy, minority veto,
proportionality ‘of eects,’ and grand coalitions, even if present, become insucient for
maintaining democratic stability, actual proportionality, and elite co-operation. e insti-
tutional trajectory experienced by Lebanon, which has gradually laid out and reinforced
the power distribution between dierent confessions, ends up trying to correct any distor-
tions and gridlocks through even more rigid pre-assignments of seats. Lebanon will only
avoid having to constantly respect sectarian proportions, being taken hostage indenitely
by strict census controls, if a light is shone on the limits and eects of consociationalism in
the country and, at the very least, a non-rigid consociational system is adopted.
e results of this study also should instigate debates on the analysis of and prescrip-
tions for sectarian solutions to contemporary conicts in the Middle East – one example
that especially stands out is the Iraqi institutional design aer 2003. Since its inception,
argues Majed (2016), sectarianism has been consciously devised and used by political
leaders and regional powers to either maintain their positions in power or to gain more of
it. Additionally, local and regional leaders in the Middle East have frequently accentuated
historic grievances. Identity politics’ dynamics in the region are highly complex and mul-
tifaceted, so they should not be reduced to xed cultural explanations or self-contained
identities that pre-date sectarianism. As a result, ‘the widespread analyses of sectarianism
in the Arab region are mostly wrong, and are oen resulting in policy prescriptions, such
as consociational democracy, that are based on a wrong diagnosis’ (Majed 2016).
In normative terms, confessional consociationalism robs the Lebanese of the capacity
to be represented as citizens in a representative democracy instead of as believers of a cer-
tain faith. e process of naturalising an exclusively politico-religious form of identica-
tion does not allow for the ourishing or representation of nuance in political institutions.
As a result, the system does not allow for the secularisation of the political and communal
spheres, thereby not allowing citizenship to replace confessional identities. is inaccu-
rate regional diagnosis, so explicit and acute in the Lebanese microcosm, is why noxious
religious narratives and sectarian solutions still abound in the contemporary Middle East.
Notes
1. Much of the specialised literature underscores Hezbollah’s partisan ideological inection, pragmatic
insertion into electoral disputes, and normalised parliamentary dynamics (Harb and Leenders 2005;
Norton 2007; Karam 2010). In 2006, Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement also signed an
understanding encouraging national dialogue and supporting consensual democracy.
2. Examples of the latest crises are: the 2005 Cedar Revolution and political demonstrations in Beirut that
weretriggered by the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rak Hariri; the 17-month political crisis in 2008
sparked by a government move to shut down Hezbollah’s telecommunication and security network that
20 Calfat
spiralled out of control; and, in 2014, the 29-month institutional deadlock and full-edged deciency in
public goods provision.
3. Zaim are dened as ‘feudal political leaders’ who perform services and personal favours, and whose power
is based on the loyalty of their political clientele and the relationship maintained with state authorities
(Karam 2010: 38). AbuKhalil (1989: 56-57) writes that this type of loyalty is traded for services and access
to power brokers, with family status determining one’s access to education and prominence (Abukhalil
1989: 74).
4. Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has preferred not to conduct a population census due to fears
that the results could tarnish its political formula. e last census, conducted in 1932 under the French
Mandate, showed a total population of 785 543, with a Christian majority of 53% (Chamie 1980).
5. By the time when modern Lebanon was founded, Shias had proportionately little inuence on Lebanese
politics. In the government, Shias were heavily under-represented in senior oce appointments (Norton
1998).
6. e (unocial) statistics on the current percentage of the Shia population range from 33% to 59.7% (Jamail
2006) of the country’s population, which is estimated at 5 851 000, excluding refugees. In 2009, out of all
registered voters, Sunnis made up 27.16%, Shias 26.32%, Maronites 21.93%, Greek Orthodox 7.62%, and
Druze 5.73% (Majed 2010: 20).
7. Even though, as of 1990, the President of the Parliament has taken on more power (Johnson 2001).
8. e previous Legislature extended its mandate three times: on 31 May 2013 (for 17 months), on 5 November
2014 (for 31 months), and on 14 June 2017 (until 6 May 2018, when new elections took place).
9. In addition to internal migrations due to civil wars, 450 000 UN-registered (mostly Sunni) Palestinian
refugees and an additional 1 011 366 Syrian refugees (mostly Sunnis, but also Shias) live in Lebanon. ey
make up one-h of the country’s population (UNHCR 2017).
10. Petallides works with the previous electoral law (No. 25 2008), which considers ve provinces and 26
electoral districts.
11. Several non-governmental and transparency groups in Lebanon work towards strengthening accountability
and electoral institutions, and combating nepotism and corruption.
Acknowledgements
e author would like to thank Dr Glauco Peres da Silva, Dr Salem Hikmat Nasser and Dr Paolo
Ricci for their helpful advice and comments on this paper as well as the research project as a whole.
Sincere thanks go to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments, as they
greatly contributed to improving the nal version of the paper. e author is also grateful to the edi-
tors for their generous comments and support during the review process. Finally, thanks are due to
CAPES/PROEX for the research grant that made this research possible. e author, however, bears
full responsibility for the paper.
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About the author
Natalia Nahas Calfat is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of São Paulo
(USP) and holds a Master’s degree in Political Science at the same university. e author is
a member of the Research Group on the Middle East and the Muslim World (GTOMMM/
USP) and Executive-Editor of the Journal Malala (FFLCH/USP). She is a Teaching Fellow
at IPSA USP Summer School in Methods and Concepts in Political Sciences and Inter-
national Relations for Causal Case Studies and Process Tracing. e author is Director of
National Aairs at the Institute of Arab Culture (ICArabe). Her research focuses on In-
ternational Politics and conicts, terrorism, confessionalism and power-sharing designs,
post-colonialism in the Middle East, religious identity, and case studies.
As Fragilidades da Democracia Libanesa:
Resultados e Limites do Arranjo Confessional
Resumo: O Líbano é frequentemente referenciado como um modelo de democracia
plural e estável no Oriente Médio: uma sociedade multiétnica e plurirreligiosa que
garantiria a representação política dos diferentes sectos presentes no país através
de um arranjo confessional de partilha de poder. Inúmeros autores também en-
xergam neste modelo consociativo a melhor alternativa democrática, dado o alto
grau de heterogeneidade interna. Contudo, ao frisarem a estabilidade libanesa ante
o conturbado cenário regional, estas percepções positivas sobre o Líbano têm ne-
gligenciado alguns aspectos domésticos relativos ao real funcionamento desta de-
mocracia. Através da análise de duas dimensões internas que ameaçam o sucesso
da experiência democrática libanesa (pré-atribuições de cargos e distorções repre-
The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy 25
sentativas), este trabalho visa apontar os limites, efeitos e decorrências do consocia-
tivismo nesta especíca realidade confessional. Os resultados obtidos através deste
estudo de caso indicam que arranjos consociativos altamente institucionalizados
podem engendrar sectarismo, instabilidade institucional, clientelismo e debilidade
estatal. Ao cabo, este artigo também aponta as implicações e lições que podem ser
derivadas do arranjo em termos das nocivas narrativas sectárias locais e regionais.
Palavras-chave: consociativismo; Líbano; sistema confessional; limites democráti-
cos; estudo de caso.
Received on 3 August 2017, and approved for publication on 11 April 2018.
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