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Corruption: What everyone needs to know® by Ray Fisman and Miriam A. Golden. (Oxford
University Press, New York 2017), pp. xviii + 316.
It is a bold assertion that any book can be ‘what everyone needs to know’ on any topic,
particularly when discussing a concept as broad as corruption. What Ray Fisman and Miriam
Goldman have done is narrow the topic effectively to an approach from the perspective of
political economy, which seems entirely appropriate as Golden is a political scientist and
Fisman a behavioural economist. I have argued elsewhere (Masters, 2015, 2018; Masters &
Graycar, 2016) that corruption is so broad in scope, it requires a descriptor to allow
analytical utility. The authors only narrow corruption to political corruption occasionally
(e.g. pp. 3-4), then later compare it to bureaucratic corruption (p. 39). Anyone scanning the
book may wonder how police corruption, when confessions are beaten out of a suspect for
no personal gain by the corrupt officer; or sport corruption, when private actors are bribed
by public officials for public gain via host rights to major events like the Olympics or the FIFA
World Cup fit in the volume. When the authors ‘roughly’ categorise four types of actors (p.
4), their categorization suits political corruption, but neglects civil society actors – who
despite best intentions – are as susceptible to corruption as any other social category. This
is my main criticism of the book, it would have been more accurate title the book Political
corruption: What everyone needs to know®. But this is just a quibble directed more at the
publishers than the authors in respect to an otherwise useful volume.
Corruption – as the authors rightly point out – has become a key issue in recent years. Post-
Cold War societal changes have shifted the thinking about corruption – particularly in the
economic, political science and development literature. While the days when scholars
argued that corruption is good for political and economic development are now gone, these
old arguments have a zombie-like character – raising their heads from time-to-time (Fisman
and Golden point to Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967; Scott, 1972). The authors take
the time in this book to outline what these arguments were, the context of the times they
were made, and provide a sustained counterargument throughout the book as to why
corruption has no benefit other than to those directly involved in enriching or empowering
themselves through corrupt means. Their careful dismantling of the ‘corruption as grease in
the wheels’ thesis makes this volume a valuable contribution to the library of any student of
corruption in politics or economics.
The book’s themes are organised in a way to guide the reader through the world of political
corruption toward the tools available for reducing or controlling corruption. Importantly,
while the issue of corruption presents multiple challenges, the book makes no claim to a
final solution, nor does it point toward the lofty, yet unachievable goal of universally
eliminating the problem. Corruption varies markedly from place to place, across time,
government sectors, national boundaries and even within organisations. Solutions thus
need to be tailored toward specific contexts (Graycar & Masters, 2018; Graycar & Prenzler,
2013).
The authors miss their target audience to a certain extent. While eminently readable and
direct, the conception of corruption as an ‘…equilibrium in the specific sense that social
scientists use the term. That is, corruption happens as a result of interactions among
individuals in which, given the choices others make, no one person can make herself better
off by choosing any other course of action…’ (p. 4) could seem a little opaque to the lay
reader, or those otherwise unfamiliar with economics. This seems a long way from
Transparency International and the World Bank whose conceptualisation of corruption
‘abuse of public office for private gain’—while inherently flawed—is far easier to grasp for
those new to the field. Fisman and Golden’s later ‘definition of “corruption” focuses on the
public sector, not the private sphere. (Note, however, that [their] definition extends to
private sector interactions with the public sphere, such as when a corporation pays bribe
money to public officials to gain an economic advantage)’ (p. 25). It is unclear whether this
further extends to private-private corruption in circumstances where management of public
funds has been outsourced to civil society (e.g. health care or education) or business (e.g.
defence production). A generous reading would see their conceptualisation and definition
providing a deeper intellectual approach than the standard definition of ‘abuse of power for
private gain’ (p. 25). Had the authors dealt with the critiques of the World Bank and TI
definition first, their reasoning for a more complex conceptualisation would seem far more
logical.
The qualitative examples used to illustrate the points the authors make do, however,
provide an engaging approach. These examples are strengthened by the choice of
framework used in their selection. Scott’s (1972, cited on page 26) triple standard to define
a corrupt act – the standard of law; the standard of public opinion; and the standard of
public interest – applies to most of the selected cases. Such a standard adequately frames
political and public corruption, yet in other sectors such standards become problematic.
Corruption in sport, for example, may not breach the law, fail the public opinion standard
and be irrelevant to the public interest (Masters, 2015).
Corruption, unlike many crimes remains hidden – particularly at higher levels of society.
Corruptors and the corrupted have a vested interest in keeping their malfeasance under
wraps, and the victims are often unaware. At the other end of the scale, the book addresses
corruption that is all too often the reality of daily life. Bribe payers seeking services they
would, under ideal circumstances, receive from government are forced to pay. Corruption:
What everyone needs to know® provides a useful blend of economic and political analysis,
supported by good data and narrative examples throughout. The examples draw from and
postulate upon significant and recent cases, such as the ‘clean hands’ movement in Italy (p.
26), China’s ongoing crackdown on corruption (p. 182) and financial manoeuvring of
kleptocrats revealed by the Panama Papers (p. 31). Each chapter addresses a fundamental
question regarding corruption – e.g. why does corruption occur; who is corrupt; what does
culture have to do with it – and provides a useful dot-point summation for ease of reference
at the end of each chapter. This provides both a useful quick-reference facility for both the
lay-reader and anticorruption scholars alike.
This book presents a useful and affordable addition to any anticorruption collection or
library. It builds upon existing work of political scientists and economists who have focussed
on the political-economy of corruption.
Reference
Graycar, A., & Masters, A. (2018). Preventing malfeasance in low corruption environments:
Twenty public administration responses. Journal of Financial Crime, 25(1), 170-186.
doi:10.1108/JFC-04-2017-0026
Graycar, A., & Prenzler, T. (2013). Understanding and Preventing Corruption. Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan.
Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Have, CT: Yale University
Press.
Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic orruption. American
Behavioral Scientist, 8(2), 8-14.
Masters, A. (2015). Corruption in sport: From the playing field to the field of policy. Policy
and Society, 34(2), 111-123. doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.002
Masters, A. (2018). How the Transnational Crime of Corruption Impacts Global Security. In P.
Reichel & R. Randa (Eds.), Transnational Crime and Global Security (Vol. 1, pp. 253-
280). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Masters, A., & Graycar, A. (2016). Making Corruption Disappear in Local Government. Public
Integrity, 18(1), 42-58. doi:10.1080/10999922.2015.1093400
Nye, J. S. (1967). Corruption and Political Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis. The
American Political Science Review, 61(2), 417-427.
Scott, J. C. (1972). Comparative political corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
