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Tony Blair’s gamble: The Middle East Peace Process and British participation in the Iraq 2003 campaign

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Tony Blair tried throughout the preparatory phase of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 to influence US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. This article tries to understand how Blair fared in this endeavour. Using newly declassified documents, it examines the circumstances under which the US administration listened and engaged with British ideas and when and why it ignored British requests. The study shows that Blair was able to extract the greatest US concessions on the Middle East Peace Process in moments when Great Britain’s participation in the Iraq campaign was the most uncertain. The findings promote fresh thinking on how, when and why the United Kingdom can influence US decision-making.

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