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A. W. Brian Simpson
76
5
The invention of trials in camera
in security cases
A. W. Brian Simpson
Even in peacetime in Britain it is possible to be tried for very serious criminal
offences in camera, in particular for offences against the Official Secrets Acts
(hereafter OSA). The most remarkable trials in camera have been cases thought
to involve national security. For example, in 1961 George Blake was convicted
of five OSA offences and sentenced to forty-two years’ imprisonment after
proceedings largely conducted in secret, though the sentence itself was pro-
nounced, as the law required, in open court. After Blake had been sentenced,
and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had made a brief statement, a question
was asked by Arthur Holt MP. ‘Is the Prime Minister aware that what is
troubling many people is why, if the Russians know all about this person,
security reasons prevent the House of Commons knowing more about him?’
Macmillan replied, ‘Anyone who has been engaged upon or has knowledge
about these matters knows that is rather too simple a view. It was for that
reason that the Lord Chief Justice decided to hold the trial in camera.’1 Blake
decamped to Russia, but to this day nothing is available in the Public Records.2
In 1983 the so-called Cyprus Eight (or seven) were tried, largely in camera3and
acquitted, and during the twentieth century there were many other examples.
Originally the common law criminal trial on indictment was open. Thus
Sir William Blackstone in the Commentaries does not even trouble to mention
the fact that there were no secret trials on indictment – one does not state the
obvious. The public and theatrical nature of the criminal trial is well illustrated
by the great state trials: even trials of very important people by their peers were
held in public. The trial of Queen Ann Boleyn is said to have been attended by
over two thousand people.4 Indeed the people participated, albeit informally,
in the trial. Thus when Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, was convicted of
high treason in 1571 the account published in the State Trials tells us that,
‘Then the Lord Steward broke his rod and the people cried God Save the Queen.’5
The people might also express approval of an acquittal, as they did at the trial
of Lord Dacre of the North in 1535, when there gave forth, ‘The greatest
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Trials in camera in security cases
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shoute and crye of joy the like no man livying may remember that ever he
heard.’6
The public nature of the criminal trial persisted into the nineteenth cen-
tury. When William Corder was convicted in 1828 for the murder in the Red
Barn, not only were his trial and execution public, the dissection of his body
took place in public in the shire hall and the mangled remains exhibited in
the courtroom. Charles Cottu, a French judge, travelled the northern circuit
in 1819. He was struck by the publicness of English trials.7 David Cairns
comments: ‘Publicness comprised two characteristics. Firstly access, which
enabled spectators to see the law in action. The public’s right of access was
enhanced by conducting the trial as a single and fast event. . . . The second
feature of publicness is orality, by which the audience in court could follow
every step of the trial.’8 And by the 1830s those who could not attend could
read extended newspaper accounts of trials, defendants’ last moments, and
executions.
In the nineteenth century all this began to change. Punishment became
progressively more secret within the new penitentiaries. Press attendance at
executions finally passed out of use in the 1920s. In the end the Home Office
succeeded in suppressing the publication of any information concerning
executions or final hours, with the executioners bonded to reveal no details.
Secret execution always had its critics, including Lord Wensleydale. He argued,
The fundamental principle which governs the administration of the criminal
law in this country was that all proceedings involving life and liberty should be
conducted in public, and it was only in accordance with it that the punishment
should be carried out in public. By that means the public are certain that every-
thing was done fair and right, and that justice had been done.9
But the critics lost.
The trial itself remained open. As late as 1905 the editors of Archbold’s
Pleading, simply do not mention that criminal courts do not sit behind closed
doors. It had never occurred to anyone that they could. Secret trials were
associated with evil institutions such as the Star Chamber, or the Spanish
Inquisition. The 1910 edition of Archbold, however, strikes a different tone.
At common law a trial on indictment or criminal information must be held in a
public court with open doors. . . . In dealing with certain classes of criminal trial
the presiding judge not infrequently asks women and young persons to leave the
court, and there is undoubted power to exclude or eject persons who disturb the
proceedings.10
Later editions vacillate on whether the judge could order the women and
young persons out, or merely request them to leave.
Archbold mentions two statutes which gave express power to hold proceed-
ings in camera, or exclude sections of the public: the Punishment of Incest Act
1908; and the Children Act 1908.11 Section five of the Punishment of Incest
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A. W. Brian Simpson
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Act stated baldly that ‘All proceedings under this Act are to be held in camera.’
It was added as an amendment proposed by Lord Halsbury; he believed that
press publicity would produce ‘a crop of similar offences at other Assizes’.12
The provision was repealed in 1922.13 Thereafter the press in general appar-
ently did not report cases of incest, or cloaked them in euphemism, and this
too provoked judicial criticism. In 1925 Mr Justice Roche lamented that ‘there
was a stratum of society who did not realize that incest was a crime’. He
favoured calling a spade a spade. ‘[T]he Press would be rendering the best
service to the community if it put down perfectly plainly that a prisoner was
convicted of incest.’14 Mr Justice McCardie expressed the same view two years
later at the Warwick Assizes.15 Whether the proletariat amended their ways
one can but wonder. The Children Act provided for the exclusion of everyone
except parties, lawyers and bona fide members of the press when a person
under 16 was giving evidence of an indecent nature, and introduced a gen-
eral exclusion of persons under 14 in such cases.16 The statutory powers were
given ‘in addition to, and without prejudice to any power which a court may
possess to hear proceedings in camera’.
By 1900 it had become a little uncertain whether civil proceedings could
be heard in camera with the consent of the parties. There were situations in
which there was thought to be such a power, but it is not until 1913 that
we get a leading case on the subject – Scott v. Scott.17 In Scott the House of
Lords firmly laid down the general principle that courts were open, and judges
had no general discretion to exclude the public even with the consent of the
litigants. There were, however, some exceptions – cases involving wards of
court and lunatics, and actions concerning the protection of trade secrets.
Also individuals might be excluded to preserve order. Lords Haldane and
Loreburn went a little further: other cases might arise when it was proper to
exclude the public, so long as this was necessary to achieve the paramount
aim of doing justice.
The enunciation of this vague principle opened the way to an extension of
the world of the secret trial. There are two reported divorce cases soon after
Scott v. Scott in which women were permitted to testify in private because the
nature of the evidence might have inhibited them from testifying in public. In
Cleland v. Cleland and McLeod (1913)18 Mr Justice Bargrave Deane, no doubt
from his employment something of a connoisseur, described the case as ‘about
as horrible a case as I ever came across’, and in Moosbrugger v. Moosbrugger
(1913)19 both counsel and Mrs Moosbrugger, agreed that ‘The whole case is
so horrible.’
So far there has been no explicit mention of the possibility of holding
criminal trials in camera, nor of national security, nor the need to control
espionage, as a ground for doing so. Victorians did not bother too much about
spies.20 Attitudes changed with the German spy scare of the early years of the
twentieth century, and the establishment of the Secret Service Bureau in 1909;
‘MI5’, a name it has popularly retained.21 The first OSA of 1889 said nothing
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Trials in camera in security cases
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whatever about secret trials, and was indeed very little used. The first achieve-
ment of the Secret Service Bureau was to secure the passage of the OSA of
1911,22 directed against espionage. It made, however, no provision for hold-
ing trials in camera. A number of supposed spies or agents were tried for OSA
offences shortly before the First World War: Lieutenant Siegfried Helm (1910),
Dr Max Schultz (1911), Heinrich Grosse (1912), Armgaard Graves (1912),
George Parrott with Karl Hentschel (1913), Wilhelm Klauer (1913), and
Frederick Schroeder (1914).23 All these trials were quite public.24
After some uncertainty the military persuaded the government to introduce
what amounted to a form of martial law legitimised by emergency legislation
under the Defence of the Realm Acts (hereafter DORA). The first DORA allowed
regulations to be made ‘for securing the public safety and the defence of the
realm’ and specifically:
(a) to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or obtaining informa-
tion for that purpose or any purpose calculated to jeopardise the success of
the operations of any of H.M. forces or to assist the enemy; or
(b) to secure the safety of means of communication or of railways, docks or
harbours . . .25
The original maximum penalty for DORA offences was penal servitude for life,
but the third DORA of 27 November permitted, but did not require, the death
sentence for offences committed with the intention of assisting the enemy.26
Under this and the consolidated regulations of 28 November 191427 DORA
offences became triable either by court martial, or summarily. DORA offences
tried summarily could attract only six months’ imprisonment.
So spies were normally charged with DORA offences carrying the death
penalty, and not with OSA offences.28 During the war these regulations were
continuously amended and made more stringent. The most extreme example,
and one which is in such blatant conflict with the rule of law as to be barely
credible, is Regulation 18A.29 This required anyone who had been in commun-
ication with a spy, or had attempted to communicate, to prove his innocence.
He must show that he did not know the person was a spy, and had no reason
to believe he was. A spy was very widely defined – it included someone con-
victed under Regulation 18, or reasonably suspected of having infringed it,
with intent to assist, or anyone outside Britain who was suspected of being a
receiver of information. Anyone who had the address of such a spy, or other
information about him in his possession, was deemed to be in communication
unless he could exonerate himself. In effect the regulation, tailored to fit the
meagre evidence which MI5 could offer a court, normally derived from postal
censorship, was designed to ensure that anyone the authorities suspected of
being a spy was more or less bound to be convicted if put on trial. MI5 was
unable to produce proof that suspected spy addresses abroad were spy addresses,
so convictions for attempting to send letters to such addresses had to depend
on suspicion alone. Nevertheless there were supposed spies who were interned
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because it was thought impossible to secure convictions; one can only assume
that the evidence against such persons was very weak indeed.30 Some must
have been wholly innocent. In some cases the problem was that the indi-
vidual had done nothing which could, by any stretch of the imagination,
rank as an offence.31
It might be thought that DORA or its regulations would have introduced
trials in camera. But neither the original DORA of 8 August 1914 nor the
second DORA of 28 August did so.32 The first espionage trial from which the
public was excluded from part of the proceedings, and this in a capital case,
was that of Carl Hans Lody, alias Charles Inglis, which took place on 30 and
31 October and 2 November 1914. He was shot in the Tower on 11 November.
Lody was a naval reserve officer, who certainly had been openly active as a
spy, and he did not really deny this at his trial, much of which was devoted to
demonstrating what a noble fellow he was, and how decently the British had
treated him. His trial was, legally, very curious. He was not charged either
with OSA or DORA offences. Instead, by a decision of the Cabinet on 8 October,
he was charged with commission of a war crime, specifically war treason. The
theory was that engaging in espionage rendered him liable under the inter-
national law of war, after a trial, to the penalty of death, or some more lenient
sentence.33
Spies, unlike other combatants who had become prisoners, were tradition-
ally liable to be executed. The 1894 edition of The Manual of Military Law
states briefly that ‘Spies, when taken, are punishable by death since, as Vattel
observes, there is scarcely any other means of guarding against the mischief
they do.’34 From the citations it is clear that this refers only to persons operat-
ing in disguise, or under false pretences. The edition of February 1914 deals
with the matter in a much more elaborate way. This rewriting was provoked
by the Hague Rules of 1907,35 whose definition of a spy reads: ‘A person can
only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he
obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of operations of a
belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.’ As
the Manual points out, people acting openly outside the zone of operations
(like Lody) were not covered. The Manual therefore recommends that such
persons should be charged with war treason. ‘Indeed in every case where it is
doubtful whether the act consists of espionage, once the fact is established
that an individual has furnished or attempted to furnish information to the
enemy, no time need be wasted in examining whether the case corresponds
exactly to the definition of espionage.’36
The Manual then explains that espionage and war treason are types of the
more general category of war crime, and gives a very wide definition of war
treason, which includes ‘obtaining, supplying and carrying of information to
the enemy’ or attempting to do so; war treason also covered such activities as
sabotage, and aiding prisoners to escape.37 Those accused were entitled, the
Manual points out, to a trial, which would be by a military or civil court. They
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might be punished by death, or suffer a more lenient sentence, not including
corporal punishment. The juridical basis was the law and usages of war.
The 1914 edition of the Manual was relied upon in Lody’s case. The back-
ground to the Cabinet decision was very curious. In August 1914 an unnamed
person, believed to be German, and equipped with a concealed radio transmitter
was, so the War Office thought, captured by the police and lodged in Bodmin
Prison.38 Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, consulted the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Haldane, and ruled that the individual should be tried by court
martial and, if guilty, hanged. Haldane set out his theory of the matter thus:
If an alien belligerent is caught in this country spying or otherwise waging war
he can, in my opinion, be Court Martialled and executed. The mere fact that he
is resident here and has what is popularly called a domicile is not enough. . . .
When war breaks out an alien becomes prima facie an outlaw, . . . if he is a spy
or takes up arms . . . and he becomes a person without legal rights. By interna-
tional law he must have a trial before punishment but the trial may be by Court
Martial. He cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the civil courts.39
The Adjutant General wondered whether Haldane really meant a military
tribunal, not a court martial, and also wondered whether DORA had not
limited the power of punishment to penal servitude for life.40 Haldane’s theory
makes no reference either to the prerogative or to the usages of war.
In reality there was no such person in Bodmin Prison. But the thinking
inspired by this phantom, and by the Manual, led to the form of proceeding
used for the unfortunate Lody. After a discussion in Cabinet the Army Council
on 9 October instructed that Lody be tried under international law, and not
under DORA, so as not to limit the penalty to penal servitude for life. The
military tribunal, though not legally a general court martial, behaved exactly
as if it was one. It was presided over by a retired Major General, Lord
Cheylesmore, sitting with eight other officers; he would preside over all courts
martial for spies held in Britain during the war.
There was no concealment of the name of the accused, nor the fact that he
was on trial, and only part of the trial was held in camera. The request came
from the prosecution, handled by Archibald H. Bodkin.41 The trial was very
fully reported in The Times from 29 October to 11 November, when Lody was
shot. Accounts of his execution read like stories from R. G. Henty’s novels or
the Boy’s Own Paper. He wrote a letter of thanks to those arranging for his
killing, shook hands with the Assistant Provost Marshal, Lord Athlumney,
and he even arranged the romantic gesture of sending a ring to an unidentified
lady in America.42 His native village planted a tree as a permanent memorial,
and a destroyer named after him escorted the doomed battleship Bismarck at
one point during her final voyage.43
Two questions arise out of Lody’s trial. The first is whether his spying did
constitute a war crime, war treason. The 1958 Manual of Military Law argues
that the view that a spy commits a war crime is incompatible with Article 31
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of the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907, which entitles a spy who
rejoins his own side and is later captured to be protected as a prisoner of war.
If spying was a war crime such a person could still be tried and punished. The
Manual diffidently suggests that the idea that persons like Lody were guilty of
war treason was doubtful, without mentioning his case.44 At the time the
Adjutant General, as we have seen, had expressed doubts. It seems fairly plain
that Lody’s execution was unlawful both under domestic and international
law. The second question is whether Lord Cheylesmore’s action in clearing
the court was lawful. There was certainly no statutory basis for it, but then
there was no statutory basis for the trial anyway, and the theory under which
Lody was tried was one that required a trial under international law, but
whose form was unregulated. So if we assume that the trial was lawful then it
was surely lawful to hold it partially or wholly in camera.
No later spy trials in the First World War in Britain followed the precedent
of Lody’s case; from late November 1914 it became possible to impose a death
sentence under DORA. Abroad matters were different. The register of trials
before military tribunals (not courts martial) between October 1916 and
October 1917 records a number of trials of civilians for war treason.45
Under the DORA of 27 November 191446 the military was given the power
to try anyone, including civilian British subjects, by court martial for DORA
offences, even offences involving a possible death penalty. Courts martial were
regulated by the Army Act (1881) and procedural rules made under it.47
These allowed the President to clear the court, but only for deliberation among
its members. A note added that a person who interfered with the proceedings
might nevertheless be excluded, ‘a power incident to every court as necessary
for the proper conduct of the proceedings’. The Manual of Military Law of 1914
said that except for deliberation: ‘the court must be open to the public, military
or otherwise, so far as the room or tent in which the court is held can receive
them. It is not usual to place any restriction on the admission of reporters for
the press.’48 So, unless courts martial possessed some inherent power to exclude
the public in the interests of security, they could not sit in camera in spy trials
or any other trials.
So far as I am aware the issue had never arisen before the First World War.
No doubt it was easy enough to keep the public away from courts martial, if
this was desired. There was, furthermore, no appeal from a decision by court
martial, though its decision had to be confirmed. So if a court martial did
decide to sit in camera the legality of this could not be raised by way of appeal.
In theory it would be possible to apply to the civil courts for habeas corpus.
Indeed Lody could have done this, though if he was simply an outlaw the civil
court would not have heard his application. But neither he nor anyone else,
so far as I know, had ever done this; the pioneer was, as we shall see, one
Doyle in 1917.
The first supposed spy tried by court martial after the DORA of 27 November
1914 was a Swede, Rolf Jonsson, who was tried at Falmouth on 26 February
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Trials in camera in security cases
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1915, and acquitted.49 I have discovered nothing about him. The next was
that of Robert Rosenthal, but his trial took place after an important change in
the law in 1915, which I shall first describe.50 The fact that civilians could be
tried for capital DORA offences by courts martial produced opposition, to which
the government capitulated. So the DORA of 16 March 1915 allowed civil-
ians to claim civil trial by judge and jury.51 This right could be withdrawn in
the event of an invasion, or, by proclamation, for any ‘other special military
emergency arising out of the present war’. This restoration of the right to jury
trial in 1915 had been strongly opposed by the War Office. The Adjutant
General argued that courts martial were better able to judge the gravity of
offences from a military point of view, provided speedier trials, a more effect-
ive deterrent, and were not hampered by technicalities of procedure and rights
of appeal. Sentences were, however, subject to executive review. In Ireland
only trial by court martial provided any hope of securing a conviction. But
the War Office view did not prevail. The War Office rejected a compromise,
which would have been to either drop the death penalty for DORA offences,
or introduce an appeal is such cases.52
It was this DORA which provided the first statutory warrant for holding a
common law criminal trial which might lead to the death penalty in camera.
Section 1 (3) provided:
In addition to and without prejudice to any powers which a court may possess
to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings . . . if . . . application is
made by the prosecution, in the interests of national safety, that all or any
portion of the public should be excluded during any part of the hearing, the
court may make an order to that effect, but the passing of the sentence shall in
any case take place in public.
This was made part of the bill by a Lords amendment.
Somewhat surprisingly the Act made no provision for holding courts mar-
tial, as distinct from regular civil courts, in camera. I have found no material
explaining this; it is unlikely to have been an oversight. Possibly the reason
was that in practice Lord Cheylesmore could be relied upon to clear the court
if deemed necessary, and any challenge would be technically difficult. Given
wartime conditions, and the attitude of the judiciary, a challenge through
habeas corpus would be unlikely to succeed. Had the provision allowing trials
in camera been applied to courts martial there would also have been a difficulty
over announcing the sentence in open court. For the military practice was to
promulgate sentences of death in private, once confirmed. At the conclusion
of a court martial on a capital charge the convicted person knew of the con-
viction, but was not then told whether he was to be killed or not.53 Most
capital sentences were not confirmed.54
After the change in the law a considerable number of espionage or similar
cases arose, and arrangements had to be made to settle which would go to the
civil courts, and which to courts martial. In June 1915 the Director of Public
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Prosecutions, Sir Charles Mathews, obtained a ruling from the Attorney
General, Sir John Simon, approved by the Secretary of State for War, Lord
Kitchener, ‘that trials of all persons accused of espionage (except British
subjects) should be by Court Martial; cases of alleged spies for whom there is
a reasonable ground for believing they are of American nationality to be
reported to DPP for special consideration by the AG’.55 In the whole course
of the war there were twenty-six courts martial of supposed spies under
DORA in Britain, and one trial, Lody’s, under international law.56 Fourteen
death sentences were imposed, four being commuted to penal servitude for
life.57 Nine persons were shot in the Tower,58 and one hanged in Wandsworth
Prison.59 There were two ten-year, three five-year, and one three-year sen-
tences of penal servitude; one two-year, one eighteen-month and one twenty-
eight-day sentences of imprisonment with hard labour; one twenty-eight-day
and one seven-day term of imprisonment; and two acquittals.60
The first spy trial for a DORA offence to take place civilly after the Act of
1915 was never completed; it was that of Anton Kupferle, and it was partly
heard in camera.61 He had been arrested on 19 February, and caught through
the postal censorship. He claimed to be a US citizen. The case predates the
ruling by the Attorney General, but the Army Council, no doubt because of
Kupferle’s citizenship claim, instructed that he should not be tried by court
martial. The trial opened at the Old Bailey on 19 May. To enhance the jollity
of the proceedings the practice of carrying bouquets of flowers was revived.
After some evidence had been given the Attorney General applied for the trial
to continue in camera; the defence did not object. The accused gave evidence
and was cross-examined, but the evidence presented in camera and the hearing
were not reported. Kupferle committed suicide during the trial, on 20 May,
The Times publishing his suicide note, written on a slate. This was the first civil
trial for espionage conducted almost wholly in camera. But the fact that the
trial was taking place, the name of the accused, and details about his death,
were all made public, as was much of the evidence.
The first civil spy trial conducted entirely in camera was that of Karl Friedrich
Muller, tried with Peter Hahn in June 1915.62 They were tried jointly, and
since Peter Hahn was a British subject, though of German extraction, they were
not tried by court martial. The Grand Jury was charged in camera on 20 April.
At the request of the prosecution the entire trial was held in camera, though
the court was opened before sentence. Muller was sentenced to death and
Hahn to seven years’ penal servitude. Muller appealed, and the appeal was
also held in camera, though a reporter from The Times was allowed to attend.
The appeal was dismissed on 22 June.63 Muller engaged in the normal courtes-
ies, shaking hands with the firing squad which then shot him. This was on
23 June. Although the trial had been in camera the fact that Muller and Hahn
were to be tried, the trial itself, the sentence, the appeal, and the execution
were all reported in the press at the time.
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The first spy trial by court martial after the legal change in 1915 was that
of Robert Rosenthal, who was German.64 On 6 July 1915 The Times announced
in advance that the entire trial would be held in camera, so there had been an
executive rather than a judicial decision on this matter. The general court
martial opened on 11 July. The fact that Rosenthal’s trial was to take place
was not concealed; a large crowd gathered outside the Westminster Guildhall,
but members of the public were excluded by armed soldiers. Rosenthal, who
had made two suicide attempts, was hanged in Wandsworth on 15 July, and
not shot. In 1932 MI5 tried to discover the reason for this.65 The files did not
provide any explanation, but the officer who looked into the matter had heard
at the time ‘that the Court considered a bullet too good for him on account of
his extremely cowardly behaviour during the trial’. Being shot, rather than
hanged, was considered to be an honourable way to die. An alternative ex-
planation offered by S. T. Felstead was that some unspecified administrative
problem in the Tower, where executions were carried out in the miniature
rifle range, lay behind the decision.66 Rosenthal’s execution was reported in
the press.
In the world of the secret state matters always seem to get worse, and the
cases of Haicke Marinus Petrus Janssen, and Wilhelm Johannes Roos, in July
1915, introduced a more extreme form of secrecy.67 They were among seven
agents arrested in May and mid-June 1915.68 They were tried by general
court martial on 16 and 17 July 1915 for the DORA offence of espionage
against Regulations 18 and 48. Both were convicted, sentenced to death,
and, after confirmation, shot in the Tower on 30 July 1915. Roos earned
some praise for having asked and received permission to finish his cigarette.
The public was allowed to know little about this at the time. On 15 July The
Times announced, without giving any names, ‘The authorities announce the
arrest of two alleged spies. Their trial will take place by general Court Martial
to-morrow [16 July] at the Middlesex Guildhall. The whole proceedings will
be in camera. They will be charged with collecting and attempting to collect
for communication to the enemy information about his Majesty’s Fleet.’ Then,
on 31 July, ‘It is officially announced that the two persons who were charged
with espionage and found guilty by General Court Martial at the Westminster
Guildhall on July 16 and 17 were found guilty and sentenced to death. The
sentence was duly confirmed and was carried out yesterday morning.’ So it
had come about that persons could both be tried in secret and then executed,
with only the barest public revelation of what they were supposed to have
done, or even who they were.
There were, after this, some cases where there was no secrecy.69 But from
July 1915 the authorities surrounded most espionage trials with enhanced
secrecy. Thus on 11 September 1915 the following appeared in The Times
after the event, that is to say, too late for any person outside the secret state to
influence the outcome:
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Unnamed Spy Executed.
Tried by Court Martial.
It is officially announced that a person who was charged with espionage and
tried by General Court Martial on August 20 and 21 was found guilty and
sentenced to death. The sentence was duly confirmed and carried out yesterday
morning.
This laconic announcement refers, as we now know, to one Ernst Waldemar
Melin. A Swede, Melin had been tried by general court martial on 20 August,
sentenced to death, and shot in the Tower on 10 September after, somewhat
like Muller, shaking hands with his guard, a variant form of socially accept-
able behaviour. He died, it was said, like the gentleman he had once been.70
A similar announcement was made on 18 September about ‘Another Un-
named Spy’, in fact Augusto Alfredo Roggen or Roggin, a Uruguayan, tried
with Melin, and shot on 17 September.71 And on 20 October the Secretary of
the War Office announced that two prisoners, tried by general court martial
on 28, 29, and 30 September had been convicted, and one sentenced to
death, the other to five years’ penal servitude. The execution had taken place
on 19 October, so this announcement too came after the event. The executed
man was Fernando Buschman, a Brazilian.72 Thomson waxes eloquent over
his noble bearing. He played his violin until a late hour the night before his
execution, finally kissing the instrument and saying, ‘Goodbye, I shall not
want you any more.’ As if this were not enough he refused to have his eyes
bandaged, ‘facing the rifles with a courageous smile’.73 The individual sen-
tenced to five years’ penal servitude was Josef Marks, who was eventually
repatriated to Germany after the war, probably in October 1920.74
Why did the authorities arrange to try spies in camera? Most spies were
caught through postal censorship; trials in camera concealed the details. MI5
knew that certain addresses were used by spies, who employed either secret
ink, or codes.75 Thus Buschman was caught because he communicated with
two addresses in Rotterdam which featured in other spy cases. MI5 may have
sent false information to the Germans purporting to emanate from a spy
who had in reality been caught and shot, an anticipation of the double agent
system operated in the Second World War. Secret trials would be essential to
this. According to Thomson this was done in Muller’s case, and payment was
indeed received for the information; Felstead has the same story.76 This seems
very implausible in Muller’s case. Although his trial was held in camera his
arrest, trial, and execution were openly announced in The Times.77
The enhanced level of secrecy soon spread to civil trials. Thus, when George
Breeckhow (alias George Parker, alias Reginald Rowland) was tried with Lizzie
Wertheim in September 1915 before Justices Bray, Sankey, and Low, the
prosecution applied for the whole case to be heard in camera. Mr Justice Bray
asked, ‘Are there any objections? [there were none] Then let it be so.’ The
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judges were told that secrecy was ‘necessary in the interests of the national
safety’ and simply accepted this. Indeed I know of no case in which an applica-
tion by the Crown for a trial in camera has ever been rejected, though there
may have been such cases. On 26 September The Times reported the fact of the
trial and the sentences – death for Breeckhow and ten years for Wertheim –
but gave no names. There was an unsuccessful appeal on 18 October to the
full Court of Criminal Appeal. This too was heard entirely in camera. Breeckhow
was shot on 27 October; The Times announced next day that an unnamed spy
had been executed. He had claimed US citizenship, probably falsely. Wertheim,
who had acquired British citizenship through marriage to a naturalised Ger-
man, died in Aylesbury prison in 1920.
So the position had now been reached when not only aliens, but even
British citizens, could be tried and sentenced for offences involving the risk of
a death penalty behind a veil of almost complete secrecy, for this was no
isolated case. Courtenay (or Kurt) Henslop de Rysbach, a British subject by
birth though of Austrian extraction, was tried civilly in camera, and, the jury
having disagreed, was retried in October 1915.78 He was sentenced to penal
servitude for life, and Thomson records that ‘His name was not made public at
the time; only the fact that a British subject had been found guilty of espionage
was disclosed, and the papers began to wonder why a British spy had been so
leniently treated.’ Felstead confirms this, and quotes a leader from the West-
minster Gazette expressing mild surprise at the sentence.79
Those who did not have British citizenship could hardly expect to be treated
better. A curious example is provided in Eva de Bournonville. She was described
by Thomson as ‘probably the most incompetent woman spy ever recruited by
the Germans’, and in her prison file as refined, of superior education, a bril-
liant linguist, and very neurotic.80 She was a mercenary spy, caught through
postal censorship, sending low-grade information on the result of a Zeppelin
raid of Croydon. Although she was not a British citizen she was tried civilly in
January 1916 before Justices Darling, Scrutton, and Rowlatt. A civil trial was
favoured by the Attorney General and Home Secretary, though opposed by
Bodkin. The context was the Edith Cavell affair, which produced enthusiasm
for demonstrating that the British, unlike their opponents, knew how to treat
women decently.81 Bournonville was sentenced to death, and this was upheld
by a full Court of Criminal Appeal, but following Cavell’s execution her sen-
tence was commuted to penal servitude for life. Had she been male she would
certainly have been executed. The Times announced the charge, trial, failure
of her appeal and outcome, but not her name.82 This information came from
some official, but one file83 indicates that it was not until 20 July 1916 that
the security service itself, through its chief of counter-espionage, Major R. J.
Drake, issued a press notice which was cleared with Matthews, the Director of
Public Prosecutions. This merely said: ‘The letter “M” was attached to a woman
of Danish origin, Swedish by naturalization, who was sentenced to death in
January, 1916, by a Civil Court, the sentence being confirmed on appeal, but
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subsequently commuted to penal servitude for life.’ In 1920 she was still in
prison, and on 17 July 1920 Mr Justice Darling wrote to the Home Office
urging clemency. MI5 recommended that she should serve ten years in prison,
which would have led to her release in 1926 at the age of around 51.84 But
as a result of an initiative taken by Winston Churchill she was released on
licence in 1922 and deported to Sweden.
The legality of trials in camera on security grounds in cases not covered by
the DORA of 1915 came before the civil courts in two reported cases, an
action of detinue in 1916, and a challenge to a court martial by habeas corpus
proceedings in the following year. The story behind Norman v. Matthew and
Another (1916)85 was a curious one. A magistrate, in connection with a prose-
cution under DORA Regulation 27 (prohibition against alarming reports etc.),
had made an order under Regulation 51A86 which authorised the police to
raid premises occupied by the Independent Labour Party. They seized docu-
ments aimed at discouraging recruiting. The magistrate heard the case in
camera and made a destruction order. An unsuccessful attempt was made to
quash the order by certiorari as being ultra vires. The Divisional Court upheld
holding the proceedings, which were said not to constitute a trial at all, in
camera, and this in a case which had nothing whatever to do with espionage.87
Some of the documents belonged to C. H. Norman of the City of London branch
of the ILP, who was the founder of the Stop the War Committee; they were
thought to have been retained by the authorities, in particular by the Director
of Public Prosecutions and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. So he sued
them in the Westminster County Court. The suit was dismissed as frivolous
and vexatious, and here too the proceedings were in camera. The Divisional
Court (Justices Lush and Sankey) affirmed that the County Court had an
inherent power to proceed in camera, and was correct in doing so under the
principles laid down in Scott v. Scott. According to Mr Justice Lush, ‘if there
are materials before the Court for concluding that it is necessary in order to
secure that justice is done, the proceedings should be in camera’.88 Mr Justice
Sankey put it rather differently, thinking the case came within one of the
exceptions mentioned in Scott v. Scott – here ‘secrecy is of the essence of the
cause’.89 Both judges thought the power should be exercised with caution,
but Sankey revealed that the practice of holding proceedings in camera was by
this time becoming common. ‘[N]umerous other cases have been before the
Courts recently where a similar course has been taken.’90 The Court of Appeal
refused leave to appeal. The disease was clearly spreading.
The legality of holding courts martial in camera first came before the civil
courts in R. v. Governor of Lewes Prison ex parte Doyle,91 arising out of the Irish
Easter Rising. Gerald Doyle had been tried in camera by field general court
martial on 5 May 1916, and had been transferred to England to serve his
sentence of three years’ penal servitude. He made an application for habeas
corpus, one ground being ‘The conviction was bad because the field general
court martial heard the case in camera.’ The Attorney General warned that ‘If
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this contention prevailed the consequences would be very serious; at the trial
of a spy, for instance, where the most secret matters were in question, it
would be impossible to exclude the public.’ He further argued that the re-
quirement, under the applicable rules of procedure, that the proceedings should
be held in open court only meant that the accused, his legal representative,
and anyone officially entitled to be there, should be admitted. This rubbish
was too much for the court, but it nevertheless ruled that the trial had not
been invalid. General Maxwell had put in an affidavit that there was unrest
and fighting in Dublin at the time, and the court accepted that there had been
a need to exclude the public. There was no affidavit from the president of the
court martial. The Lord Chief Justice justified the decision by Scott v. Scott –
trial in camera was necessary in the interests of justice: ‘In the existing local
circumstances it was necessary to the public safety and the defence of the
realm that neither the public nor the press should be admitted to the trial. It
must be assumed that the members of the Court-martial took the same view.’
This suggested that the judges would always allow a court martial to sit in
camera if some sort of military necessity was asserted by the general officer
commanding.
This is the only reported decision on the legality of secret trials by court
martial; it was not an espionage case. The seventh edition of the Manual of
Military Law, in reliance on it, states: ‘A court-martial is an open court like
other courts of justice, but it has inherent powers to sit in camera if such
course is necessary for the administration of justice.92 Spies could surely
expect no more sympathy from the judiciary than the rebellious Irish.93
All this was in wartime. But once security services obtain powers in war-
time, they are reluctant to give them up in peacetime. Thus MI5 argued the
powers it had acquired, including the power to try espionage cases in camera,
needed to be retained. The underlying rationale was the Red Menace. Before
the armistice of 1918 the War Office Emergency Legislation Committee, in its
first interim report of 4 April 1918, had pointed out that during the war the
Directorate of Special Intelligence94 had dealt with espionage cases under DORA
regulations, to the practical exclusion of the OSA. There would be serious
inconvenience if DORA came to an end and the only weapon was the OSA.95
It proposed a peacetime National Security Act. The plan was to repeal the
OSA of 1911 and incorporate its provisions in the new act, which would also
widen the range of offences by incorporating a number of DORA and other
offences. MI5 particularly wanted to be able to obtain convictions without
having to prove their case in court, as they had been able to do during the
war. In the name of national security the rule of law was to be abandoned.
This produced an appalling clause 2, based on Regulation 18A of DORA,
which made it an offence to be found in the United Kingdom having commun-
icated or attempted to communicate with a foreign agent or someone reason-
ably suspected of being a foreign agent, unless the accused could prove that
he did not know and had no reasonable grounds for supposing the person to
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be an agent. The National Security Bill also included provisions allowing cases
to be heard in camera, though it retained the requirement that the sentence to
be pronounced in public.
At a meeting in March 1919 the Home Office, in the person of Sir Edward
Troup, the Permanent Under Secretary, with Sir Frederick Liddell, the Chief
Parliamentary draughtsman, strongly resisted the proposed clause 2. What
shocked them was the reversal of the burden of proof. A letter by C. D. Carew
Robinson, expressing Troup’s view, said the clause ‘goes far beyond anything
for which there is a justification in peace time in making an innocent person
guilty of an offence unless he can prove his innocence’. Liddell described MI5’s
view that the offence was committed by simply coming to the United King-
dom as ‘too fantastic to hold in a court of law’. So Walter Moresby, MI5’s legal
officer, went gloomily away to water down the definition of the new offence.
But the Home Office, a department deeply committed to secret government,
did not object to the provision for trials in camera.
The interdepartmental committee finished its work in March 1919.
Sir Vernon Kell, the Director of MI5, was anxious that in some form Regu-
lation 18A should be kept in being after peace officially dawned, as it did on
31 August 1921. ‘It is vital to the national interest that the Regulation should
be continued until it becomes, as may be expected, part of our permanent
legislation.’96 For a while nothing was done. In late 1918 an interdepart-
mental committee had indeed been set up under Sir Reginald Brade, Secretary
to the War Office, to consider which DORA regulations and orders might be
revoked or cancelled without harm to the national interest; it made recom-
mendations which were accepted by a committee of the War Cabinet under
Lord Cave, which thought other regulations might need to be revoked if the
armistice held.97 However by 1920 little had been done to implement the
policy of getting rid of unnecessary DORA regulations.
The imminence of the official ending of the war provoked action at last. On
20 October 1918 the Home Affairs Committee had rejected the idea of a Na-
tional Security Act, fearing political opposition. It recommended simply amend-
ing the OSA, ‘confining such amendments to the most important changes it
was desired to make’.98 An interdepartmental committee was set up to thrash
out the details. The consequence was the OSA of 1920, which implemented
so much of MI5’s scheme as had survived Troup and Liddell.99 Section 2 of the
new OSA was the watered-down version of the old DORA Regulation 18A;
whereas 18A had made the fact of communication with a reputed spy an
offence unless the accused provided his innocence, the OSA version treated
communication as merely evidence that an offence might have been committed.
Section 8(4) made permanent the provision in the DORA of 1915 on trials in
camera, now applied to OSA offences, ‘on the ground that the publication of
any evidence to be given or any statement to be made in the course of the
proceedings would be prejudicial to the national safety . . . but the passing of
sentence shall in any case take place in public.’ So, in a form which could
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have been much worse but for the opposition of the Home Office, MI5 suc-
ceeded in carrying into peacetime, for the first time, statutory authorization
for the holding trials in camera for offences involving security.100
By now, however, the courts had allowed the OSA to be used in cases
which had nothing whatever to do with espionage or national security, thereby
indirectly permitting trials in camera in cases which had no connection with
espionage. The first example seems to be the case of Emile Jules Depuis in
March 1915. He made use of information obtained as a postal censor for a
form of blackmail.101 In 1926 Major F. W. H. Blake was prosecuted under the
OSA for revealing to the Evening News a confession by the convicted murderer
Frederick Bywaters. Blake was a retired prison governor, and this was the first
use of the OSA against a fairly senior official.102 D. Hooper states that in 1919
a War Office clerk, Albert Crisp, and Arthur Homewood, company secretary
of a tailoring firm, were prosecuted, Crisp having passed on information about
clothing contracts.103
In the period between the wars there were a number of trials under the OSA
which took place partially in camera – for example that of Dr Herman Goertz
in March of 1936;104 that of Walter John Butterfield in September of the same
year;105 and that of Percy Glading, Charles Munday, George Whomack, and
Albert Williams in the Woolwich Arsenal case in 1938.106 In at least one case
the defence objected, but without success.107 There seems to have been no
public complaint. Two trials by court martial did, however, give rise to official
anxiety, and led to proposals for general legislation on trials in camera.
One involved an aircraftman, John Donelly. He was convicted by a court
martial held in camera for stealing confidential manuals and blueprints in
1928.108 He was thought to be connected with the IRA, and MI5 was involved.
An application was made to the Judge Advocate General, Sir Felix Cassels, for
a transcript. The trial had taken place under the Air Force Act of 1917, whose
section 124 was based on section 124 of the Army Act of 1881, which long
predated the invention of trials in camera. Under this a person convicted by
court martial was explicitly given a right to obtain, on payment, a copy of
the proceedings, including the transcript of the hearing. Was Sir Felix legally
entitled to refuse to supply a transcript, or to edit it, or to supply it on condi-
tions, where the trial had been held in camera? Of course Donelly had been at
the trial, and he or his lawyer might have made notes. But a transcript might
include details otherwise forgotten, and there was no way of telling what use
might be made of it. Sir Felix had edited out names in transcripts provided to
Irish prisoners tried under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 1920. In
the Donelly case he allowed counsel to inspect the transcript, but he did not
supply a copy. The same solution had been adopted by the director of public
prosecutions in the case of Wilfred R. F. McCartney, who had been tried civilly
in camera for OSA offences in January 1928, where the problem arose under
section 16(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907.109 Sir Felix and the Treasury
Solicitor considered seeking the law officers’ opinion, but decided ignorance
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was bliss. ‘[I]t might be embarrassing to obtain too clear-cut a reply from the
Law Officers, and that it was wise to leave the legal position a little vague,
and, therefore, more open to the interpretation which the public interest
demanded.’ Sir Felix was prepared in any case in which defence interests
might be affected to find ways and means of dealing with a demand for a
transcript of secret evidence. Sir John Salmond, recently appointed to the Air
Council as Air Member for Personnel, was also of opinion that a reference to
the law officers was ‘a gamble which it would be unwise to take’.110 Thus did
officialdom reconcile itself to blatant law breaking in the public interest.
In March 1933 the issue arose again. Norman Baillie-Stewart, a lieutenant
in the Seaforth Highlanders, was tried by general court martial for a number
of OSA offences.111 The names of some witnesses were suppressed, and part
of the hearing was in camera. Baillie-Stewart was convicted, cashiered, and
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. The Judge Advocate General, Sir Henry
F. MacGeagh, anticipated being asked for a copy of the proceedings, which,
on release from prison, Baillie-Stewart would sell to the press. It was felt that
the issue could no longer be ducked. The law officers, Sir Thomas W. Inskip,
and Sir Donald B. Somervell, gave it as their opinion that such a request could
not lawfully be refused.112
This opinion produced consternation in the War Office. It was feared that
Baillie-Stewart might try to compel the release of a transcript by bringing
mandamus proceedings. At a meeting on 11 March 1935, at which neither
the Home Office nor Scottish Office were represented, the favoured solution
was a new OSA, covering both military and civil trials, which would allow the
Secretary of State, ‘if satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of national
safety’ to withhold all or part of the transcript of proceedings heard in camera.
A bill was drafted, and the Lord Chancellor said he was happy, so long as
there was a right to inspect a transcript. But although discussions continued
into 1936 the plan was, by 24 July, dead. The Home Office, in the person of
Sir Alexander Maxwell, strongly opposed the idea as involving ‘a grave de-
parture from the accepted principles of justice’.113 The Scottish Office called it
‘an unwarranted interference with the Courts of Justice’.114 The law officers
emphatically agreed.115 On 4 March 1937 the Army Council formally dropped
the idea. The Judge Advocate General made it clear that he would in future
observe the law, and provide copies of proceedings. With an air of menace he
said that if the Secretary of State directed him not to do so, and legal proceed-
ings were brought to compel him to provide copies, a rule nisi being granted,
‘the Attorney General will have the situation clearly before his mind when he
appears on the hearing of the rule’. But Baillie-Stewart never did demand a
copy of the proceedings, nor, so far as I know, did anyone else. And so the
matter rested until the passing of the Army Act of 1955, which made explicit
provision for the problem.116
Legal preparations for the Second World War started back in the 1920s,117
and when war eventually came an elaborate scheme of Defence Regulations
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(hereafter DRS), authorised by a parent Emergency Powers (Defence) Act,
came into force. Under this new version of DORA the power to hold legal
proceedings in camera was hugely extended.118 Any legal proceedings whatso-
ever, whether commenced before or after the Act, could be heard in camera,
and the court could prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information about the
proceedings if ‘satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of the public safety
or the defence of the realm’.
During the First World War the normal practice had been, as we have
seen, to try alien spies by court martial under DORA. The legal arrangements
in the Second World War were rather different. The DRS did not provide for
courts martial, which Maxwell of the Home Office strongly opposed.119 Nor
did the regulations permit the death penalty.120 It was assumed that spies and
serious saboteurs would be charged with treason. Hence when the war began
there was no specific special provision for the trial and execution of spies and
saboteurs.
Doubts soon arose as to whether a recently landed enemy agent would be
amenable to the law of treason, which applies only to those who owe alle-
giance. Resident enemy agents would owe allegiance, but it was hard to see
how an agent who arrived by parachute in order to blow up some installa-
tion, or whatever, could sensibly be treated as owing allegiance upon touch-
ing down. The whole question came before the Home Policy Committee of the
War Cabinet in 1939.121 At a meeting in the War Office on 1 December, MI5,
represented by Sir Eric B. Holt Wilson and Brigadier O. A. Harker, favoured
trial of all supposed spies by courts martial. The War Office accepted this, and
did not want the army to be left merely with the disagreeable disposal task
of shooting spies convicted by civil courts. Maxwell was informed, and on
6 December he objected, pointing out that trial of British subjects by courts
martial would be unacceptable politically, and arguing that it would be im-
possible to treat aliens differently – for example an American who had lived in
Britain for ten or twenty years. The War Office continued to press for trial of
aliens by courts martial though it did not think that the Lody precedent for
military trial for a war crime would be likely to be followed.122
It was decided to deal with the whole question by drafting a bill which
would permit the death penalty for acts done with intent to assist the enemy.
The mode of trial remained controversial until a compromise was reached at
a conference on 22 February 1940 – enemy aliens were to be tried by courts
martial, but only if the Attorney General gave his consent.123 The bill became
the Treachery Act of 1940. In the event only one spy was tried by the military
during the war, Josef Jakobs, alias Joseph Rymer. He arrived by parachute
on 29 January 1941 and was arrested near Ramsey in Huntingdonshire on
1 February, having broken his ankle on landing. He was tried in camera on
4 August 1941, and shot in the Tower on the fourteenth. His name does not
feature in the Foreign Office list of 1945 nor in the reply, based upon it, of
‘Spies Convicted under the Treachery Act by Civil Courts During the War’.124
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However, the account given by Lt Col. R. W. G. Stephens states that he was
tried under the Treachery Act and this is correct.125 Quite why he was tried by
court martial is unexplained; perhaps the reason was that he had been arrested
by the military, and was thus in their custody.
A story, which has no satisfactory archival basis, has been told that two
SS parachutists were dropped in Britain near Luton Hoo on 28 May 1941 to
assassinate Rudolf Hess, who had arrived in Scotland on 10 May on his strange
peace mission.126 Quite how they were to achieve this feat is wholly obscure.
They were, it is said, captured and summarily executed – conceivably after some
form of trial.127 It is possible that the two parachutists, if they ever existed, were
killed in an attempted arrest by trigger-happy soldiers, or members of the Home
Guard. The 1958 edition of The Manual of Military Law states that ‘In the Second
World War most spies were tried under the now spent Treachery Act 1940 on
the direction of the Attorney General.’128 The odd thing about this passage is
the hint that there might have been more than one exception, but the reference
could be to a trial abroad. It could also refer to the double cross system, under
which some spies were never tried at all. Its meaning is obscure.
All documented trials for spying and similar offences in Britain during the
war, apart from Jakobs’s, were conducted before civil courts, and a consider-
able number of these trials took place entirely in camera. The most remarkable
example is that of Captain John Herbert King.129 King had served in the First
World War in the Artists Rifles, and, according to his own account, suffered a
severe mental illness in 1917 – presumably shell shock. From August 1920
he was employed by the Foreign Office as a cypher officer. This was not a
pensionable job, and cypher officers, whose work was extremely boring and
poorly paid, were treated no doubt as somewhat lowly creatures, about on a
par with a footman, by the socially elevated diplomats. In 1933 or 1934,
according to his confession, he met Henry Pieck, a Dutchman and, it is said,
an artist, at the International Club in Geneva. The man who introduced them
was Raymond C. Oake, another cypher officer. Oake was then courting the
stepdaughter of Captain C. F. B. Harvey, who was Passport Control Officer at
Geneva.130 This was an intelligence job, and Harvey would have been con-
nected with the Foreign Office intelligence service. Pieck was a friend of Harvey,
and he knew others in the Foreign Office: J. P. Russell, R. Kinnaird, Captain H.
B. W. Maling, and H. C. F. Tubb.131 Pieck claimed that money could be made
on the stock exchange by advance knowledge of political developments, and
King gave as this as the reason why he handed over material. He gave, for
example, reports of conversations between Hitler and Sir Neville Henderson,
and claimed that none was of any importance. In 1933 King met one Helen
Wilkie, said to have been American, and started an affair. In 1936 Pieck left
London, and King’s contact then became a Hungarian, Petersen, who pressed
him to provide the cypher itself.132 He strongly denied handing it over. King
was paid substantial sums, £50 – £200 a time by Pieck and £100 – £150 a
time by Petersen. In all he earned, so he claimed, £2,500.
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King was discovered through information provided by Walter Krivitsky,
who defected to the US. After having claimed that the money received from
Pieck and Petersen constituted gambling winnings King confessed on 28 Sep-
tember, apparently in order to exonerate Helen Wilkie; charges against her
were dropped. In his diary Alexander Cadogan refers to the use of the third
degree, and another story, leaked from MI5, is that King was filled with drink
at the Bunch of Grapes public house in Curzon Street until he mournfully
broke down.133 Although others were suspected, only Oake was actually dis-
missed, on 1 January 1940. Other cypher officers, who may well have been
exonerated, were moved to other employment. After a committal for trial in
camera on 10 October at Bow Street King was tried in camera at the Central
Criminal Court on 17 October for OSA offences, to which he presumably
pleaded guilty; he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The fact that a
trial had taken place at all was kept entirely secret; Allason notes that no
press announcement was made at the time. Information leaked out in 1956,
when the Foreign Office issued a statement on the case.134 Whether the judge
simply broke the law by not pronouncing sentence in open court, or whether
some sort of fictitious observance of the law took place, arrangements having
been made to ensure that nobody knew what was going on, is not known. He
could have passed sentence in public and still made an order that no reporting
take place. No other wartime trial, so far as I know, was entirely concealed.
Little short of incredible though it may seem, the position had now been
reached that a British citizen could be sent to prison for ten years (or for that
matter I suppose for some longer period) in conditions of complete secrecy,
the public being unaware that any trial had taken place at all.
Numerous other trials were conducted in camera. One group involved
prosecutions of spies, or associates of spies, on capital charges under the
Treachery Act. With the exception of Jakobs all such persons were tried
civilly, and a list in the Foreign Office papers, which does not include Jakobs,
gives the names of thirteen persons so tried and sentenced to death. Three
were British (George Armstrong, Jose Estella Key and Oswald John Job).135 By
the time the Parliamentary question for which the list had been prepared was
answered three more names had been added, one being that of the British-
born Duncan A. C. Scott-Ford.136 So the total number sentenced to death, if
we include Jakobs, comes to seventeen. One of these persons, Menezes, was
reprieved, and the other sixteen executed. One person, tried on a capital charge
under the Treachery Act, Sjoern Pons, was acquitted, and then interned
under Regulation 18B. Christobel Nicholson was also interned after acquittal
in a trial conducted in camera, but it is probable that she was charged with
a non-capital offence under the OSA.137 Though not viewed as a spy or agent
but as a saboteur, Dorothy P. O’Grady was also tried in camera under the
Treachery Act and sentenced to death, though her sentence was reduced to
fourteen years’ imprisonment on appeal.138 Capital charges, presumably under
the Treachery Act, were also preferred against Nora C. L. Briscoe and Gertrude
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B. Hiscox, but withdrawn in a trial conducted in camera on 16 June 1941.139
Most of those liable to the death penalty had done no harm whatever; the
function of liability was to coerce agents into providing information or joining
the double cross system.
None of these trials, however, was concealed. Whether the legal require-
ment that the sentence be pronounced in open court was actually observed in
a realistic sense seems doubtful. Although the evidence is uncertain, what
may have happened is that the court was ritually opened but, since members
of the public and reporters had no idea that this was going to happen, none
attended. The practice of the Ministry of Home Security and Home Office was,
in collaboration with MI5, to issue a press statement immediately after spies
had been executed, and the Home Office had been informed that they were
dead.140 Why this extraordinary practice was adopted, no announcement hav-
ing been made either before trial or after conviction and before execution, it is
impossible to say; no documentation exists. Thus in the case of Josef Waldberg
and Karl Meier a press release was issued at 9.25 am on 10 December 1940
stating their names, dates of birth and citizenship, a brief account of their
capture, their conviction under the Treachery Act on 22 November, and their
execution at Pentonville. This was accompanied by a ‘Notes to Editors’ stating
‘Editors are asked not to press for additional facts or to institute enquiries.
Editorial comment might profitably take the form of drawing public attention
to loose talk of all kinds, particularly in the presence of strangers.’
That same evening a talk was given by someone from military intelligence
on the BBC; this gave further information and followed the same line. There
were similar releases in the cases of Charles A. van den Kieboom141 and George
Johnson Armstrong. In the case of Karl Theo Drueke and Norman Heinrich
Waelti, executed on 6 August 1941, MI5 seems to have tried to seize the
initiative by presenting a draft to the Home Office; in any event it was MI5
which had the whole story. But in accordance with a procedure which had
been settled on 31 July the Home Office press officer prepared a draft, which
was then vetted by Frank Newsam for the Home Office, and by MI5. The press
was given quite a good story to print, and a communication from the Chief
Press Officer of the Ministry of Information told editors to treat the release as
‘the sole source of information on the subject. Any further details would be
liable to involve breaches of security and will not be passed by the censorship.’
Trouble with the press broke out over the case of Jakobs. The War Office
issued a brief statement on 15 August 1941 which was ill received in Fleet
Street. The censor intended that nothing further be published, but both the
Star and the Evening Standard142 investigated the matter and published fuller
accounts of his capture; that in the Star was passed by a censorship accident.
The outcome of this affair was a meeting of the Home Defence (Security)
Executive on 28 August.
The problem, as the Chairman, Lord Swinton, saw it, was to release suffici-
ent information to dissuade the press from pursuing further enquiries, whilst
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allowing the Security Service to decide what might not be told. The solution
adopted was for MI5 to produce a full statement of the case from which the
Home Office or War Office press officer and an MI5 officer would draft an
appropriate statement. This would then be released and the press told that
this was all the information they could use. Editors who stepped out of line
would be prosecuted. MI5 strongly opposed allowing the press officer access
to the transcript of the trial; however, the other members of the Home Defence
Executive felt that MI5 had no grasp of what would generate a good story and
keep the press happy.
The new procedure was first followed in the case of Karel Richard Richter,
executed on 10 December 1941 after a violent struggle with the executioner.143
There was a formal press release setting out his name, citizenship, place of birth,
trial, and appeal, noting they had been held in camera. This was followed by
unofficial notes giving an account of his capture and providing material for a
story. Francis Williams for the Ministry of Information added a memorandum
telling editors that they must make no further enquiries, and threatening a
total information blackout that if any editor misbehaved. So far as the press
were concerned the new system provoked virtually no further trouble; the
authorities presented it as a sort of bargain with the press.
Unhappily, however, it enraged such judges as had been involved in trials
in camera. Having acceded to prosecution requests to try spies in camera, and
having warned witnesses and jurors that they must reveal nothing whatever
in public, judges now saw chatty accounts of those same trials in the newspa-
pers. Attempts by the Attorney General to soothe the Lord Chief Justice, Lord
Caldecote, and explain the need both to hold the trials in camera, and to secure
the co-operation of the press, were not initially successful. Lord Caldecote
regarded the statements that had been issued as amounting to contempt of
court. By 15 December 1941 peace was restored. It was settled that in future
the procedure would include securing the permission of the trial judge and, if
there had been an appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal. This involvement of
the judges was, however, to be a mere formality; they would not be shown the
statement that was to be issued, which was not based upon what had gone
on in the courts. There is no evidence that they pressed for any undertaking
to release details of trials in camera after some decent interval, much less for
public information that a trial was to take place or had taken place, to be
issued before the individual was dead.
The available file144 contains the statements released in the cases of Duncan
A. C. Scott-Ford (3 November 1942), Johannes M. Dronkers (31 December
1942),145 and the original draft of that for Oswald J. Job (executed 16 March
1944).146 The form of these statements followed that in Richter’s case. That for
Scott-Ford says that he ‘volunteered’ a statement admitting his guilt; he was,
at the request of Helenus (‘Buster’) Milmo, subjected to the rigorous methods
of interrogation employed in Latchmere House.147 In one case, however, there
was no statement; this was the case of Rogerio de Magalhaes Peixto de Menezes,
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an employee at the Portuguese Embassy.148 He was arrested and lodged in
Latchmere House on 22 February 1943,149 and sentenced to death in April
1943 under the Treachery Act. His appeal was dismissed on 13 May, all the
proceedings taking place in camera. The judge had given the jury an assur-
ance that a press statement would be made. A Cabinet decision, not recorded
in the normal minutes, was made on 27 May approving his reprieve and
commuting his sentence to life imprisonment in return for co-operation from
the Portuguese government in clearing up a German spy ring in Lisbon.150
The Home Secretary, Herbert Morison, thought that a statement would have
to reveal why the sentence had been commuted, which was impossible with-
out revealing ‘matter which it was in the public interest should be kept secret’.
Therefore, ‘notwithstanding the obvious objection to not publishing the results
of trials held in secret, he was against making any public statement’.
The Cabinet agreed, comforting itself that a mere life sentence was involved,
and a public statement might be made at some later date. So far as I am aware
this was not done officially until 1990, though information must have been
leaked to Allason for his MI5 (1981).151 The reply to a Parliamentary question
on 18 October 1945 revealed that Menezes had been tried and sentenced to
death, but did not reveal that he had not been executed.152 Presumably the
trial judge and judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal were squared at the
time, but the file, much of which has been destroyed, has nothing on this.153
Presumably at some point he was deported to Portugal.
A number of less serious OSA and DRS violations were tried in camera
during the war; even magistrates were able to exclude the public from hear-
ings of summary offences. Thus George Wace Wall, a radio engineer engaged
on secret experimental work, was publicly sentenced to six years after a trial
in camera for improper recording of information under the OSA in September
1940.154 In July of that year, an engineer who had been working on airfield
construction chatted incautiously with a canon of the Church of England,
who could have been a spy in disguise; the canon reported him and his case
was heard by magistrates partly in camera. He went to prison for three
months.155 Fusilier Michael Hopper collected information with a view to writ-
ing a book after the war; his court martial was held partly in camera.156 But
many cases were tried in open court for offences of one kind or another against
the OSA or DRS, as when a typist in the naval intelligence section of the
admiralty took some documents home with no sinister purpose; she went to
prison for a month.157 The more ridiculous cases mainly occurred in 1940
and 1941.
With the end of the war the emergency legislation went, and the explicit
power to hear cases in camera returned to substantially what it had been in
the interwar years. One legacy of the war, however, was the extended doctrine
of Crown privilege established in the case of Duncan v. Cammell Laird.158 This
was a suit for damages arising out of the loss of the submarine Thetis, which
sank during trials with considerable civilian loss of life. The admiralty wanted
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Trials in camera in security cases
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the hearing to be in camera by judge alone to preserve the secrecy of some of
the features of the submarine, but the plaintiff’s lawyers were not prepared to
consent to this. In the event the case was heard in open court, but the Crown
refused to make available numerous documents which contained sensitive
information. The House of Lords upheld the Crown’s power to withhold docu-
ments in litigation, essentially at its discretion. Had the case been tried in
camera the issue would never have arisen.
Although quite a number of documents connected with trials in camera are
now available in the Public Record Office there is no policy of always releasing
papers, including transcripts, under the thirty-years rule, much less a policy
of early release. Nor, so far as I know, is there any policy of not destroying
records of such trials. The tendency has been for departments, which operate
either under rules which are not made public, or under no rules at all, to place
relevant files under extended closure, or simply retain them. And under the
banner of ‘national security’ numerous trials in camera have taken place since
the Second World War; the ratification and recent incorporation of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights has not affected the practice.159 In gen-
eral the judiciary appear to be perfectly comfortable with this aspect of the
secret state, as with others. In participating in secret trials they have, per-
force, joined it, in dereliction of their fundamental duty to respect and further
the rule of law.
Notes
This is an expanded version of the Atkin Memorial Lecture originally delivered at the
Reform Club on 19 May 1994, which happens to be the day of St Ivo of Kermartin, the
patron saint of lawyers. Since writing this I have come across Leonard Sellers’s Shot
in the Tower (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), which deals with a number of the trials
discussed by me. Sellers provides interesting further information about the individuals
concerned, but does not address the issue of holding trials in camera.
1Hansard, Commons Debs, 5th ser., vol. 639, col. 1618 (4 May 1961).
2See M. Randle and P. Pottle, The Blake Escape (London: Harrap, 1989); and
G. Blake, No Other Choice (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), chs 9 and 10.
3See R. M. Thomas, Espionage and Secrecy: the Official Secrets Acts 1911–1989
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 193– 6.
4E. W. Ives, Anne Boleyn (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 386.
5Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials, 10 vols (London: R. Bagshaw), vol. 1,
p. 1032.
6Ibid., p. 407.
7See, for example, C. Cottu, ‘On the administration of the criminal code in England
and Wales and the spirit of English government’, Pamphleteer, 16: 31 (1820), 21,
51.
8I am indebted for the example and for the passage quoted to David J. A. Cairns,
Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Trial 1800–1865 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1998), p. 16.
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9R. McGower, ‘Civilizing punishment: the end of public executions in England’,
Journal of British Studies, 33 (1994), 257.
10 W. F. Craies and H. D. Roome (eds), Archibold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice
in Criminal Cases, 24th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1910), p. 217 (emphasis
added).
11 8 Edw. VII c. 45 c. 67 (1908).
12 V. Bailey and S. Blackburn, ‘The Punishment of Incest Act 1908: a case study of
law creation’, Criminal Law Review (1979), 708.
13 12 & 13 Geo. V c. 56 (1922), section 5.
14 The Times, (6 June 1925).
15 Ibid., (6 July 1927).
16 8 Edw. VII c. 67 (1908), sections 114 and 115.
17 [1913] A.C. 417.
18 (1913) L.T.R. 744.
19 (1913) 29 T.L.R. 658.
20 See B. Porter, Plots and Paranoia: a History of Political Espionage in Britain 1790–
1988 (London: Routledge, 1992), esp. chs 5 and 6.
21 See C. Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service. The Making of the British Intelligence
Community (London: Heinemann, 1985), ch. 2. The critical report is Public Record
Office, Richmond (hereafter PRO), CAB 16/8.
22 1 & 2 Geo. V c. 28 (1911).
23 The Times (16 September1910), PRO, DPP 1/14 (Helm); The Times (29, 30 August.
1911), PRO, FO 371/1126 file 32404 (Schultz); The Times (10 February1912),
PRO, DPP 1/16 (Grosse, alias Captain Grant); The Times (23, 24 July 1912)
(Graves, or Arngaard Karl); The Times (17 January 1913), R. v. Parrott (1913)
8 CAR 186, PRO, DPP 4/48 and 1/20 (Parrott; the case against Hentschel was
dropped); Hampshire Assizes 7, 14, 21 March 1913 (Klauer, alias William Clare);
PRO, DPP 1/28, PRO, CRIM 1/45/2 (Schroeder, alias Gould, charged with his
wife). See also Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service, pp. 61–2, 64–5, 67–9.
24 There are some books of importance on spy cases. Basil Thomson, who was head
of the CID and Special Branch, gave accounts based on firsthand knowledge,
notably Queer People (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1922), and The Scene Changes
(London: Collins, 1939). S. T. Felstead, a journalist, wrote an officially approved
account, German Spies at Bay (London: Hutchinson, 1922) and edited Steinhauer:
the Kaiser’s Master Spy (London: Bodley Head, 1930). The corresponding work
for later developments is Nigel West [Rupert Allason], MI5: British Security Service
Operations 1909–1945 (London: Bodley Head, 1981). J. Bulloch’s M.I.5. (London:
Arthur Barker Ltd., 1963), is also based on leaked information. On counter-
espionage especially during the Second World War, see J. Curry, The Security
Service 1908–1945 (London: Public Record Office, 1999).
25 4 & 5 Geo. V c. 29 (1914), section 1(a).
26 4 & 5 Geo. V c. 8.(1914), section 4.
27 DORA, Consolidated Regulations (28 November 1914), section 56.
28 Karl Gustav Ernst was convicted on 11 November 1914 for OSA offences com-
mitted before the war. He could not have been tried by court martial for DORA
offences, as DORA was not retrospective. His trial was not held in camera. PRO,
DPP 1/27; Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service, pp. 70–1.
29 Regulation 18A was introduced by Order in Council No. 715 (28 July 1915).
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30 This probably was the case with the spies arrested at the outbreak of the war,
listed by Felstead, German Spies, pp. 8–9. Felstead explains the failure to take
criminal proceedings by the need to conceal the fact of the arrests, which assumes
that they could not have been tried in camera. A later example is Lionel Max
Preiznitser (Thomson, Queer People, pp. 159– 60, name a pseudonym). Felstead,
p. 111, suggests that numerous agents had to be interned for lack of proof.
31 For example, Conrad Leyter was interned in 1915; see Thomson, Queer People,
p. 133, Felstead, German Spies, pp. 85–7. The cases of Meta Brunner and Hilda
Howsin may be similar; see Felstead, p. 197; Thomson, The Scene Changes,
pp. 266–8, 270–2, 278.
32 4 & 5 Geo. V c. 29 and c. 63 (1914).
33 Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service, 182–4; Bulloch, M.I.5., p. 95; Felstead,
German Spies, pp. 23–33, Thomson, Queer People, pp. 122–5. See PRO, DPP 1/29
(transcript); PRO, WO 71/1236, 141/82. See also WO 32/4588, which includes
Haldane’s minute. G. Oram, Death Sentences Passed by Military Courts of the Brit-
ish Army 1914–24 (London: Francis Boutle, 1998), has Lody tried under DORA,
but this is a mistake.
34 G. A. R. Fitzgerald (ed.), Manual of Military Law, 3rd edn (London: H.M.S.O., 1894),
para. 41.
35 Under the International Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, signed 18 October 1907 and ratified by the UK 27 November 1909.
36 H. Godley (ed.), Manual (1914), para. 167.
37 Ibid., para. 445.
38 PRO, WO 105/Gen. No./1829.
39 PRO, WO 32/4588, memorandum of 13 August 1914.
40 PRO, WO 32/4588 minute by the Advocate General.
41 At this time junior treasury counsel and senior counsel at the central criminal
court, later director of public prosecutions.
42 See Thomson, The Scene Changes, pp. 249–51; Queer People, pp. 122–6; and
Felstead (ed.), Steinhauer, p. 45.
43 Felstead (ed.), Steinhauer, p. 38; Burkard Baron von Müllenheim-Rechberg,
Battleship Bismarck: a Survivor’s Story, trans. Jack Sweetman (London: Arms &
Armour Press, 1991), pp. 83, 101.
44 See H. Lauterpacht (ed.), Manual (1958), pp.106 and 108.
45 See PRO, WO 215/12. WO 32/4898 has a list of ‘Spies tried by military courts’
abroad. There are forty-nine names, the trials taking place at Alexandria (1), Doug-
las (1) H.Q. 10th Division (1), Ahmednagar (14), Kiraissi in Macedonia (12), in
the field (1), Salonika (9), Port Sudan (6), Malta (4). Of these persons nine appear
to have been executed. Oram, Death Sentences, has one Egyptian hanged under
martial law in what may have been an espionage case. He also has, at p. 39, one
M. S. Hussein acquitted of war treason; this is a mistake as Hussein was executed.
46 4 & 5 Geo. V c. 8 (1914).
47 44 & 45 Vict. c. 58 (1881).
48 Godley (ed.), Manual (1914), ch. 5, para. 71.
49 PRO, WO 32/4898 with reference to folio 17/1. This has a complete list.
50 In what follows I have used Oram’s valuable Death Sentences, but my account
differs in some respects, and is based on a more extensive archival basis. Oram
does not, of course, deal with civil trials.
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51 5 Geo. V c. 34 (1915).
52 See PRO, WO 32/5526.
53 PRO, WO 32/3989 and 3990; practice changed by Army Council Instruction
570 of 22 March 1918.
54 Oram, Death Sentences, p. 15.
55 PRO, DPP 1/41, case of Robert Rosenthal. He had falsely claimed American
citizenship, and was tried by court martial.
56 PRO, WO 32/4588 and 4898.
57 The four were Rikard Leopold Vieyra (14 December 1916, Dutch); G. V. Bacon
(26 February 1917, American); A. Hagn (27 August 1917, Norwegian); L. Goten
(24 September 1917, Belgian). Dates give the start of each trial.
58 C. H. Lody (30 October 1914, German); H. M. P. Janssen (16 July 1915, Dutch);
W. R. Roos (16 July 1915, Dutch); E. W. Melin (28 October 1915, Swede); A. A.
Roggen (20 August 1915, Uruguayan); F. Buschmann (28 September 1915,
Brazilian); I. G. Ries (4–5 November 1915, American); A. Meyer (5 November
1915, Danish, on whom see PRO, WO 141/83); L. H. J. Zender (20 March 1916,
Peruvian).
59 R. Rosenthal (11 July 1915, German).
60 PRO, WO 32/4898 also lists ten spies tried by court martial and thirty-nine by
military tribunals abroad of whom seven were executed. I have not investigated
whether these trials took place in camera.
61 Alias Copperlee. For accounts, see Thomson, Queer People, pp. 126– 9; Felstead,
German Spies, pp. 33– 40; PRO, WO 141/1/3, CRIM 1/153/3, HO 144/1429/
288639. The Times (19, 20, 21 May 1915).
62 PRO, DPP 1/38, CRIM 1/683, 684, 685, WO 141/2/2; The Times (28 May, 21
April, 5 June, 22 June, 24 June 1915); Felstead, German Spies, pp. 44–52;
Thomson, Queer People, pp. 130–3.
63 Reported as R. v. M., 32 T.L.R. 1 (1915).
64 PRO, DPP 1/41, WO 32/4898, 141/1/5, HO 144/288639; Felstead, German
Spies, pp. 54–7; Thomson, Queer People, p. 148.
65 See PRO, WO 32/4588.
66 Felstead, German Spies, p. 56.
67 PRO, DPP 1/33, WO 71/1312, 92/3, 32/4898; Thomson, Queer People, pp. 135–
7; Felstead, German Spies, pp. 102–9; The Times (15 July 1915).
68 Thomson, Queer People, p. 137; Felstead, German Spies, p. 109; J. Bulloch, M.I.5.,
pp. 116–21. Bulloch indicates they were Janssen, Roos, Wertheim, Breeckow,
Buschmann, and Guerrero. However Felstead, p. 110, indicates that Buschman
was not one, and Oram, Death Sentences, has Buschman executed on 19 October
1915, relying on PRO, WO 92/3 and 71/1313. His text suggests that Auguste
Alfredo Roggen, a Uruguayan, executed 18 September 1915 was, and that an-
other suspect was deported. This may be Raymonde Amondarin, Guerrero’s girl
friend, against whom charges were dropped.
69 For example, the case of Ernst Gustav Waldemann Olson. The Times (13 July
1915); PRO, DPP 1/37, 4/49.
70 PRO, DPP 1/35, WO 71/1237, 141/2/3, 92/3; Felstead, German Spies, p. 134;
Thomson, Queer People, p. 146.
71 PRO, DPP 1/40, WO 141/61, 92/3; Thomson, Queer People, pp. 144– 6; Felstead,
German Spies, p. 125.
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72 PRO, DPP 1/31. Thomson, Queer People, p. 141, has him tried at the Westminster
Guildhall on 20 September but this is incorrect. See also PRO, WO 92/3, 71/
1313.
73 Thomson, Queer People, pp. 141–3.
74 PRO, DPP 1/34, WO 32/4898; Thomson, Queer People, pp. 171–3; Felstead,
German Spies, pp. 181–2.
75 One file in the Public Record Office, CRIM 1/683, contains a wizened lemon
whose juice was, presumably, employed as ink.
76 Thomson, The Scene Changes, p. 357; Felstead, German Spies, p. 52.
77 The Times (21, 28 May, 1, 5, 19, 22, 24 June 1915). Curry, Security Service,
p. 76, states that in one case a German agent was impersonated after his execu-
tion, but does not provide a name.
78 PRO, DPP 1/42, WO 32/4898; Thomson, Queer People, pp. 157–9, The Times
(26 October 1915); Felstead, German Spies, pp. 152– 6.
79 Felstead, German Spies, p. 155.
80 Thomson, Queer People, pp. 187–90; Felstead, German Spies, pp. 187–96; PRO,
DPP 1/32 (case papers), 4/51 and 52 (transcripts), PCOM 8/245 (with photo),
WO 32/4898 (release and list of spies still in prison after the armistice).
81 Lauterpacht (ed.), Manual (1958), part 3, p. 183, states that Edith Cavell was
convicted of what might be called war treason – aiding prisoners to escape.
82 The Times (13 January, 18 February 1916).
83 PRO, DPP 1/32.
84 See PRO, WO 32/4898.
85 (1916) 85 L.J.K.B. 857, 32 T.L.R. 303 (Divisional Court) and 369 (Court of
Appeal). Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service, pp. 192–3; and F. L. Carsten, War
Against War (London: Batsford, 1982), pp. 55– 6, are referring to a different
incident.
86 DORA, Regulation 51A (28 July 1915).
87 See ex parte Norman (1916) 114 L.T.R. 232, and K. D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty,
The Struggle for Civil Liberties. Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain,
1914–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 65–8.
88 (1916) 85 L.J.K.B. 857, 859.
89 Ibid., pp. 860–1.
90 Ibid., p. 861.
91 [1917] 2 K.B. 254, more fully reported at (1917) 33 T.L.R. 222. See Ewing and
Gearty, Civil Liberties, pp. 343–5.
92 Godley (ed.), Manual (1939), ch. 3, para. 37. ch. 8, para. 41, n. 5 mentions a
case in Calcutta (Ricketts v. Walker, 1841) where a reporter whose notes were
seized after he had been ordered not to take notes was awarded nominal damages.
The case is reported in W. Hough, Precedents in Military Law (London: W. H. Allen
& Co., 1855), p. 718.
93 All courts martial held in connection with the Easter Rising were in camera, and
since this chapter was written some material dealing with their legality has been
released in the PRO, which I have not had an opportunity to consult. See in
particular WO 141/21 (shooting of civilians by troops in 1916) and WO 141/27
(supply of copies of courts martial proceedings).
94 The institution which handled counter espionage work in Britain during the First
World War was called MO5g until January 1916, when it was renamed MI5.
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This formed part of MO5, the institution being referred to, rather than the Dir-
ectorate of Intelligence within the Home Office established in 1919 and run by
Thomson. There was also within GHQ a unit concerned with obtaining intelli-
gence related to revolutionary movements and industrial unrest in Britain, set up
in 1919. Thereafter the army wanted wished to have no connection with domestic
secret intelligence, and this unit went early in 1920, but in response to pressure
from Lloyd George and Winston Churchill a small liaison unit continued, called
M04x, but this was disbanded in 1922. See PRO, WO 32/5553, 106/45/525;
Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service, pp. 343–4.
95 See PRO, WO 32/13733.
96 PRO, WO 32/4896.
97 See PRO, CAB 24/109 (CP No. 1604 of 1920. Review of the Defence Regulations,
paper circulated by Churchill 12 July 1920). The report of the Cave Committee is
PRO, GT 6350 and should be in CAB/70.
98 PRO, PRO 32/13733.
99 10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 75 (1920).
100 The history of OSA 1911 and 1920 is discussed in D. Williams, Not in the Public
Interest (London: Hutchinson, 1965), ch. 1; Thomas, Espionage and Secrecy, ch. 1;
and D. Hooper, Official Secrets: the Uses and Abuses of the Act (Sevenoaks: Coronet,
1988), ch. 2.
101 See Williams, Public Interest, p. 33; PRO, DPP 1/25.
102 The Times, (16 November, 8 and 16 December 1926); PRO, HO 144/1982;
Williams, Public Interest, p. 63; PRO, CRIM 1/380; Hooper, Official Secrets,
pp. 38– 40. Another case two years later involved Archibald Taylor, a junior civil
servant engaged in corruption. See Hooper, Official Secrets, p. 40.
103 Hooper, Official Secrets, p. 32.
104 Goertz was convicted on 9 March and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.
See The Times (5, 6, 7, 10 March 1936). See also PRO, CRIM 1/813.
105 The Times (25 September 1936).
106 See West, MI5, p. 81; A. Masters, The Man Who Was M: the Life of Maxwell Knight
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), ch. 4; The Times (4, 8, 12 February 1938).
Williams, Public Interest, p. 104, notes that in the five years up to May 1938 the
Attorney General had consented to OSA prosecutions in twenty-eight cases, and
refused consent in ten. Hooper, Official Secrets Appendix I, lists three of these
cases. For the period between 1920 and 1939 he lists seven cases: Michael
Simington (June 1920, PRO, DPP 4/54); Lionel Ballard Frederick Budgen (June
1932); William Burger (January 1935); Albert Fulton (March 1935); James
Goodrich and Sidney Norris (September 1937); Wilfred Vernon (October 1937);
Edward Edwards (May 1939); Walter Moore (May 1939). He notes that Moore’s
trial was largely in camera. Probably so was that of Burger, who was connected
with the Woolwich Arsenal case.
107 Case of Eric J. C. Camp, see The Times (27 October 1936).
108 See PRO, AIR 2/17425. Donelly’s Air Ministry file was number 893013/28, but
it is not available. I have also relied on AIR 2/718 and WO 141/60 (formerly
PRO, WO 32/60). The case does not seem to have attracted the attention of the
press.
109 The trial resulted from a raid on the Russian trade delegation in London on 12–
14 May 1927. The only file listed in the PRO, CRIM 1/418, was not available
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Trials in camera in security cases
105
when I last ordered it. Accounts of the case are given in West, MI5, pp. 62–75;
and Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service, pp. 467–73.
110 The reference is to his minute on 893013/28. See note 107 above.
111 PRO, KV 2/174–192, WO 71/1033, 209/114; West, MI5, pp. 100–10; The
Times (21–5, 28–9 March 1933) (coverage of the trial itself ). Under section 41 of
the Army Act, if the accused was a serving officer, he could be tried by court
martial.
112 PRO, WO 141/60 (formerly WO 32/60), law officers’ opinion, 1 March 1933.
113 Ibid., letter by Sir Alexander Maxwell, 23 June 1936.
114 Ibid. (Scottish Office memorandum).
115 Ibid. (law officers’ opinion).
116 3 & 4 Eliz. II c. 18 (1955), section 94 (2).
117 See A. W. B. Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), ch. 3.
118 2 & 3 Geo. VI c. 62 (1939), section 6. The provision of OSA was suspended.
119 PRO, WO 32/4588. The Home Office took the same line over the arrangements
for an invasion in 1940–1. See Simpson, Highest Degree, pp. 190–2.
120 PRO, WO 32/4588, including a letter from Maxwell to Sir James Grigg, 31 Octo-
ber 1939.
121 PRO, HPC (39) 86.
122 PRO, WO 32/4588, memorandum by H. D. F. MacGeagh, Judge Advocate
General, 24 November 1940.
123 See PRO, HPC (40) 66, memorandum by the home secretary, 15 March 1940;
HPC (40) 105, 4 May 1940.
124 PRO, FO 371/5084, prepared for a parliamentary question of 18 October 1945
in Hansard, Commons Debs, 5th ser., vol. 414, col. 1513. F. H. Hinsley and C. A.
G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 5 vols, (London: H.M.S.O.,
1990), vol. 4, pp. 92, 97 n. (discussing press releases). PRO, HO 45/25595 has a
note on the aftermath. See also West, MI5, pp. 324– 8.
125 O. Hoare (ed.), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies (Richmond: Public Record
Office, 2000), p. 156. See PRO, WO 32/18144.
126 The story originated with one John McGowan, who was at the time a staff officer
with fighter command; see Luton Herald (10 June 1979). The supposed executions
do not feature in a list of death sentences carried out in PRO, WO 93/40.
127 See J. Douglas-Hamilton, Motive for a Mission (London: Macmillan, 1971),
p. 197; J. Leasor, Rudolf Hess, The Uninvited Envoy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962),
pp. 149–50; L. Picknett, O. Prince, and S. Prior, Double Standards: the Rudolf Hess
Cover-up (London: Little Brown, 2001), p. 309; P. Padfield, Hess: Flight for the
Fuehrer (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), pp. 251–2.
128 Lauterpacht (ed.), Manual, (1958), pt 3, p. 108 (emphasis added).
129 West, MI5, p. 90; Cadogan Diary (Archives of Churchill College Cambridge as
ACAD) September 1939; PRO, CRIM 1/1129, TS 27/1217; W. Cameron Watt,
‘Francis Herbert King: a Soviet source in the Foreign Office’, Intelligence and National
Security, 3 (1988), 62–82; G. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels: the First Soviet
Defectors, 1928–1938 (London: Collins, 1977), pp. 172–80; Curry, Security Ser-
vice, pp. 189–90.
130 Harvey had been appointed a cypher officer in 1919; he was still employed by the
Foreign Office in 1940, and must have been exonerated.
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A. W. Brian Simpson
106
131 Russell, Kinnaird, Maling, and Tubb were all apparently exonerated. Russell
received an MBE in 1939.
132 G. Brook-Shepherd, Storm Petrels, p. 176, has it that King’s controller was
Theodore Maly, who was also known as Paul Hardt.
133 West’s account, MI5, pp. 73– 4, does not tally with the case papers, which indic-
ate that in his first statement King did not confess. See PRO, CRIM 1/1129 and
TS 27/1217.
134 The Times (8 June 1956).
135 PRO, FO 371/5084 (prepared for a Parliamentary question on 18 October 1945).
136 Hansard, Commons Debs, 5th ser., vol. 414, col. 1513 (18 October 1945). See
PRO, CRIM 1/1449, HO 45/25763, KV 2/57–59. The others were Karl Theo
Drueke (Drüke) and Francis Johannes Winter.
137 See Simpson, Highest Degree, pp. 154, 156, 241, 392.
138 See The Times (18 December 1940) and (11 February 1941).
139 PRO, HO 45/25741.
140 All material on press releases is taken from PRO, HO 45/25595. PRO, PCOM 9/
2121 contains an example of the grim form returned to the Home Office after an
execution had been carried out, which, for example, reported on the conduct of
the executioners.
141 PRO, HO 144/21471–2.
142 Star (16 August 1941); Evening Standard (16 August 1941).
143 PRO, CRIM 1/1350, KV 2/30–33.
144 PRO, HO 45/25595.
145 See also PRO, CRIM 1/1454, HO 45/25603, KV 2/43– 46.
146 See also PRO, HO 144/22028.
147 See PRO, HO 45/25763. There is an account by R. W. G. Stephens in Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020, pp. 195– 8, which maintains, however, that Scott-Ford willingly
co-operated.
148 See Hoare (ed.), Camp 020, pp. 47–8, 237–9.
149 See PRO, HO 45/25111, which has lists of those in MI5’s private prisons,
Latchmere House (Camp 020) and Huntercombe Place (Camp 020R).
150 PRO, WM (43) 78th.
151 Accounts are in Hinsley and Simkins, British Intelligence, vol. 4, pp. 110–12,
186, 204; and in West, MI5, pp. 345– 6.
152 Hansard, Commons Debs, 5th ser., vol. 414, col. 1513 (18 October 1945).
153 Judges known to have presided over the trial of spies during the war were Hilbery
(King); Tucker (Kent, Wolkoff, Richter); Wrottesley (Waldberg, Kieboom, Meier,
Pons, Dronkers); Lewis (Armstrong); Asquith (Waelti and Druecke); Humphreys
(Key, Timmerman, Winter); Birkett (Scott-Ford); Stable (Job); Hallett (Vanhove).
154 The Times (19 September 1940); PRO, CRIM 1/1223.
155 Case of Harvey Blessington Young, The Times (17 July 1940).
156 The Times (2 September 1940).
157 Case of Ethel E. Mann, The Times (5 July 1940).
158 [1942] A.C. 642. See PRO, TS 32/101–17.
159 See A. W. B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis
of the European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 399, 465–
6, 694, 732, 1061.
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