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Perfect and Imperfect Bicameralism:
A Misleading Distinction?
by
Giacomo Delledonne
Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 10, issue 2, 2018
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Abstract
The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between
‘perfect’ (or equal) and ‘imperfect’ (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to
contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The
analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The
distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear
prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function
and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable
relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are
incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way
it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role
of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important
evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional
amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of ‘unequal’ bicameral systems,
are put on equal footing with first chambers.
Key-words
bicameralism, parliamentary systems, informal constitutional change, constitutional
rationalisation, constitutional amendment rules
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1. Introduction
The aim of my contribution is to make some points on the distinction between
‘perfect’ (or equal) and ‘imperfect’ (or unequal) bicameralism, its origin and its relevance to
contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. In a
nutshell, I will suggest that this distinction, at least in its traditional wording, may well be
partial and misleading. In focusing predominantly on just some aspects of the division of
tasks between the two chambers of a bicameral legislature – i.e. the ordinary legislative
function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote –, the distinction neglects
some no less important features of their mutual interplay. As such, a multi-dimensional
notion of (im)perfect bicameralism seems better suited to grasp the complexity of the
distribution of powers and tasks in a bicameral system. More importantly, it makes it
possible to re-establish a strong connection between the functional dimension of
bicameralism and other classifications, which, for example, consider the legitimacy of the
second chamber and its overall function within the constitutional order.
The paper is structured as follows. In paragraph 2 I will consider two cases, both drawn
from recent constitutional developments in France and Spain, which show that traditional
understandings of (im)perfect bicameralism do not fully grasp the complex interplay
between the two chambers of a bicameral parliament. Paragraph 3 will look into the
historical genesis of the distinction between equal and unequal bicameralisms in 19th
century constitutional practice and 20th century constitution-making processes. Paragraph 4
will focus on a possible alternative reading, in which the multi-dimensional nature of
(im)perfect bicameralism is considered in order to stress the link between structure and
functions of second chambers. In so doing, I will rely on Palermo and Nicolini’s (2013)
conception of second chambers as institutions for the representation of pluralism.
Paragraph 5 will discuss the results of this study.
As regards methodological aspects, the analysis will be based on comparison of a
number of, mostly, parliamentary constitutional systems. On the whole, bicameralism in
non-parliamentary constitutional systems, like the United States, Switzerland and the Latin
American federations, seems to be less problematic. A comparative study focusing on
federal second chambers pointed out that there seems to be ‘a trend or, to put it more
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simply, a link between having the two chambers put on equal footing with regard to the
legislative function and the autonomy of the executive vis-à-vis the legislative’ (Bifulco
2003: 211). Perfect bicameralism is a recurrent feature in presidential and directorial
federations, like the United States, Switzerland and the Latin American federations. On the
other hand, parliamentary regimes, in which the government of the day is supposed to
enjoy the confidence of the legislature, are marked by extensive discussion about the
appropriate role and tasks of second chambers. A final methodological remark is necessary:
the analysis will not try to identify clearly distinct models of bicameralism; rather, it will
focus on individual cases in order to detect general patterns of evolution. The defining
traits of bicameral legislatures are often highly idiosyncratic: each bicameral legislature is
the product of a specific history, so much so that in this field ‘[d]iversity … has been the
rule over time and among the countries’ (Romaniello 2016: 2).
2. Recent developments from two imperfect bicameral systems
Since the Autumn of 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron has hinted more and
more clearly at his plans for constitutional reform (see Bourmaud 2018 and de Mareschal
2018). In essence, the President’s project – which, for the time being, has not been
converted into a publicly available draft constitutional bill
I
– aims at entrenching the
constitutional position of Corsica, reducing parliamentary involvement in the legislative
process and, simultaneously, strengthening parliamentary control over the executive. Other
measures envisaged, like the reduction of the number of members of Parliament and the
(moderate) injection of some kind of proportional inspiration into the voting system, do
not need to be passed by means of constitutional amendment. On the other hand, those
innovations which impose a modification of constitutional provisions currently in force
have, according to Art. 89 of the Constitution of 1958, to ‘be passed by the two Houses
[i.e. the National Assembly and the Senate] in identical terms’. After that, the President of
the Republic may either convene the Parliament in Congress or submit the constitutional
bill to referendum. What should be kept in mind, however, is that the approval of the
Senate is needed for the constitutional bill to be submitted either to referendum or to the
Congress.
II
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In the last few weeks, headlines in French newspapers have been dominated by
President Macron’s frustration with the explicit opposition of the Senate. For this reason,
the President of the Republic has to strive for some kind of compromise with the upper
house and, more precisely, with its President, Gérard Larcher. Occasionally, an alternative
solution has been suggested by the President’s camp: calling for a referendum on the
organization of public authorities according to Art. 11 of the Constitution, as General de
Gaulle did in 1962.
III
However, the constitutionality of such a move would be, to say the
least, controversial (see Schoettl 2018). From the viewpoint of the Constitution, at least, a
compromise between the President of the Republic and the Senate would clearly be
preferable. According to his supporters, the Senate and its President are endowed with a
specific legitimacy. The presidential party La République En marche! – a centrist coalition of
often unexperienced political freshmen – holds an overwhelming majority of seats in the
National Assembly: conversely, the Senate embodies institutional continuity and is
characterised by tighter institutional and personal ties with the interests of regional and
local governments in ‘deep France’ (la France profonde). According to Art. 24 of the
Constitution, which was amended in 2003, the Senate ensures ‘the representation of the
territorial communities of the Republic’: for this reason, the upper house is supposed to
play a distinctive role in the constitutional architecture of the French State.
IV
The President
of the National Assembly has also displayed his own scepticism towards some of Macron’s
proposals: still, the peculiar composition of the Senate and its somehow eccentric nature
have made it a much stronger voice in an institutional landscape which has been
profoundly shaped by the majoritarian inspiration of the 5th Republic (le fait majoritaire).
What is particularly worth mentioning for the purposes of this paper is that the Senate is
not put on equal footing with the National Assembly when it comes to other functions, e.g.
the ordinary legislative function and the confidence vote. But attempts at constitutional
amendment somehow ‘revive’ the equal bicameralism which had marked the classic age of
French parliamentarism under the 3rd Republic.
Last Autumn, the Senate of Spain, which is routinely described as a very weak second
chamber (Bonfiglio 2005; Castellà Andreu 2006),
V
had to move to the forefront of the
institutional scene when the Catalan crisis was at its peak. After the Parliament of Catalonia
approved the unilateral declaration of independence, the Spanish Government triggered
the special procedure under Article 155 of the Constitution of 1978, according to which
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If an Autonomous Community does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or
other laws, or acts in a way that is seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain, the Government,
after lodging a complaint with the President of the Autonomous Community and failing to receive
satisfaction therefore, may, following approval granted by the overall majority of the Senate, take all
measures necessary to compel the Community to meet said obligations, or to protect the
abovementioned general interest.
In light of this provision, the Senate had to decide alone on the measures envisaged by
the Spanish Government, including the removal of the Catalan executive (Generalitat) and
the dissolution of the autonomous legislature (Parlament). This was, however, to have
important consequences. In comparison with the Congress of Deputies, the partisan
composition of the Senate does overrepresent the right-of-centre Partido Popular (PP),
which holds a majority of seats; even more importantly, none of the 21 senators elected in
the four Catalan provinces or appointed by the Catalan legislature belong to the Partido
Popular. Because of the relative weakness of the Senate
VI
and its perceived anti-Catalan
attitude, the Government felt somehow forced to seek active support from other
parliamentary groups. Thus, the PP engaged in negotiations regarding the application of
the procedure under Art. 155 with the main opposition party, the Partido Socialista Obrero
Español (PSOE). To quote just an example, the Government was persuaded to give up its
plan regarding Catalan public media and to accept that control over them would continue
to rest with the Parlament (Domínguez and Alberola 2017). This example shows another
peculiar situation: even weak second chambers may be entrusted with important specialised
tasks, in the fulfilment of which they act alone. The respective specialisations of the two
chambers of a bicameral legislature are another problematic aspect in the study of
(im)perfect bicameralisms.
3. The origin of the distinction
An unquestionable character of bicameralism is that it is a classic topic for comparative
constitutional studies: in fact, the rise of bicameralism and the frequent complaints about
its alleged crisis or decline have coincided with successive steps in the history of
constitutionalism and political representation (Bon Valsassina 1959: 207; Weber 1972: 577).
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Over the last two centuries, the cyclical salience of these crises has also been a consequence
of the problematic status of many second chambers and the quest for viable alternative
models. In this respect, the legitimacy of second chambers (be it related to aristocratic
representation, territorial representation or considered reflection: see Passaglia 2018) and
the procedures for appointing or electing their members have always been at the heart of
discussions about bicameralism. This has not been the case with the functions of second
chambers. At the very outset these used to be put on equal footing with first chambers and
to be entrusted with the same function: functional differentiation was a subsequent step in
the history of bicameral legislatures, and the distinction between perfect and imperfect
bicameralism is the most recent attempt at classification of bicameral legislatures (Luther
2006: 24-25, Palermo and Nicolini 2013: 73). Put differently, this criterion for classification
has been heavily influenced by other, longer-established criteria: powers and functions of
second chambers ‘depend on the representativeness of the elective body and the way its
members are appointed’ (de Vergottini 2004: 408).
3.1. Bicameralism in the 19th century: formal equality between the two chambers
In the ‘long 19th century’, as it was labelled by Eric Hobsbawm (1962), a basic feature
of bicameralism was that the two chambers, as different as they were, were put on an
entirely equal footing. Basically, this meant, first, that the two chambers had equal power
throughout the legislative process and, second, that the government of the day had to
maintain the confidence of both the lower and the upper house. The constitutional history
of the 3rd Republic in France is quite eloquent in this regard: the indirectly elected Senate
pushed the Government of the day to resign in 1876, 1883, 1890, 1896, 1913, 1930, 1932,
and 1938 (Goyard 1982: 61; Garrigues 2010: 1179).
VII
Generally speaking, constitutions did
not provide for mechanisms for resolving conflicts between the two chambers, either by
ensuring the prevalence of the will of either house or by promoting conciliation between
them. Constitutions did often entrench some kind of pre-eminence of the lower house in
the budgetary process, which, however, did not affect the decision-making powers of the
upper house.
VIII
However, constitutional practice and the development of constitutional conventions
considerably affected the soundness of these assertions. Informal constitutional change is a
fundamental factor when it comes to understanding the evolution of bicameralism over the
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course of the 19th century. Quite soon, upper houses were denied the power to overthrow
governments – but this was not a consequence of formalised constitutional change but of
the development of ad hoc constitutional conventions. In the United Kingdom,
it has never been assumed since 1832 that the House of Lords could, by its vote, overthrow a
Government. ‘The day is gone when a conclave of Dukes could sway a Parliament’, said Sir James
Graham in a completely different connection in 1859. In 1839 the House of Lords voted for a Select
Committee on Ireland. The Government then asked the House of Commons for a vote of confidence.
Sir Robert Peel objected, not because the confidence of the House of Commons could not override the
lack of confidence of the House of Lords, but because ‘the opinions of one branch of the Legislature
ought to be inferred from its general proceedings – from the support or opposition it may give to
measures of the Government – than from abstract declarations’. Again in 1850 the Government was
defeated in the House of Lords, this time in a debate on the Don Pacifico dispute. A resolution of
confidence was moved and passed in the House of Commons. Since then, Governments have often
been defeated in the Upper House, but a resolution of confidence in the Commons is no longer regarded
as necessary.
The explanation is, not that the House of Commons can stop supplies – for the House of Lords could
before 1911 stop supplies as it rejected the Finance Bill in 1909 – but that the power of the Government
rests on the support of the electorate. The electorate chooses the party complexion of the Government
… (Jennings 1969: 490).
In Italy, Prime Minister Agostino Depretis once stated, in face of the opposition of the
Senate, that ‘the Senate cannot trigger ministerial crises (il Senato non fa crisi)’ (Einaudi 2012).
Similar conclusions can be drawn with regard to the legislative function. Second
chambers generally refrained from engaging in open conflict with first chambers because
their own institutional position and legitimacy within the system were often perceived as
weaker. In this respect, it might be said that open conflict was not a plausible option for
second chambers, which often preferred deferring to lower houses. It will suffice to
mention an Italian example: throughout its history, the Senate of the Kingdom of Italy only
engaged in open conflict with the Chamber of Deputies when the left-of-centre
Government tried to introduce a bill providing for the abolition of the tax on grains
(Bonfiglio 2005: 7, Palermo and Nicolini 2013: 56). Open conflict was a risky decision as
the government of the day could resort to its power to nominate party loyalists for the post
of senator (so-called infornate: see Ghisalberti 2002: 177-78). This was also the case in the
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United Kingdom: after altering the balance of power within the House of Lords by creating
new peerages, Herbert Asquith’s Liberal government introduced a bill which later turned
into the Parliament Act 1911
IX
. This piece of (substantially) constitutional legislation also
created pre-conditions for further curtailing the powers of the House of Lords without its
consent, as happened in 1949 (Russell 2006: 71-72). In Canada, the institutional weakness
of the appointed Senate in the legislative process was the result of a deliberate choice of the
Fathers of Confederation. According to the Prime Minister of Canada, Sir John A.
Macdonald, the Senate ‘is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the
legislation initiated by the popular branch and preventing any hasty or ill-considered
legislation which may come from that body, but it will never set itself in opposition against
the deliberate and well understood wishes of the people’ (quoted by Vipond 2017: 95).
X
On the other hand, 19th century constitution drafters did not even perceive the
regulation of mechanisms for solving conflicts between the two chambers as a real issue. In
this regard, the Australian example is telling. Although the 1897-98 Australasian Federal
Convention explicitly addressed that problem, ‘[t]he advocates of the strongest possible
Senate … had precedent on their side when they claimed that no formal mechanism was
necessary and that relations between the houses could be safely left to ordinary political
processes and the good sense of members of parliament’ (Stone 2006: 533).
In his major study of post-war democracy, Lord Bryce aptly epitomised the result of a
century of constitutional development: in his analysis of French bicameralism, he held that
‘[t]he relations of the Senate to the Chamber are determined by its powers, which are
weaker in fact than they seem on paper. … Not venturing to stem the current that runs
strongly towards democracy, it has accepted a position inferior to that for which it was
designed’ (Bryce 1921: 236).
3.2. Imperfect bicameralism: an episode in the rationalisation of parliamentarism
Greater functional differentiation between the two chambers – and, more often than
not, the curtailment of the powers of the second chamber – was a typical component of
the constitutions enacted in the aftermath of World War I. In fact, it might be described as
a ‘moderate’ alternative to the introduction of unicameralism (as constitution makers did in
Finland, Turkey, the three Baltic countries and the 2nd Spanish Republic: see Bon
Valsassina 1959: 208-09).
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In his comparative analysis of the constitutional documents enacted after the end of
World War I, Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch detected an emerging trend which he defined as a
rationalisation of parliamentarism, i.e. entrenching the basic features of a parliamentary
regime, which had developed out of practice and custom in the United Kingdom and
France. He described the diminished role and competences of upper houses as a direct
consequence of rationalised parliamentarism (Mirkine-Guetzévitch 1931: 25-26,
mentioning the examples of Czechoslovakia and Poland; see also Frau 2016: 8). By then,
the evolutionary pattern which Lord Bryce had summarised in Modern Democracies resulted
in the formalising of an unequal distribution of powers and competences between the two
chambers of a bicameral legislature.
This trend was further confirmed in the subsequent waves of constitutionalisation after
the end of World War II,
XI
so much so that according to one scholar ‘the most massive and
important display of the crisis of bicameralism is the trend, which is rapidly circulating in
present-day legal orders, towards humiliating, limiting and reducing the significance of the
bicameral principle in the very text of constitutions’ (Bon Valsassina 1959: 210). The
preservation of equal bicameralism – as has been the case in the Italian Republic since the
Constitution came into force – is not so much the product of deliberate choice as the result
of cross-cutting vetoes and the impossibility of striking a compromise on a plausible
rationale for differentiating the two chambers (Paladin 1984, Macchia 2018: 262).
Furthermore, the Italian model of equal bicameralism was clearly at odds with any
programme of rationalised parliamentarism, to which the Constituent Assembly itself was
committed at the outset (so-called ordine del giorno Perassi, aiming at ensuring governmental
stability and preventing ‘degenerations of the parliamentary system’).
Interestingly, this trend towards the curtailment of the powers of second chambers did
not spare ‘federal’ second chambers. In fact, federations had (and, to a great extent, have)
embraced perfect bicameralism so as to ensure equal participation of their constituent units
in the federal legislative process.
XII
This had happened not only in presidential and
directorial regimes, like the United States and Switzerland, but also in Australia, which is a
parliamentary federation.
XIII
Immediately after the end of World War I and the dissolution
of empires in Central Europe, the weakness of the Austrian Bundesrat reflected the
constitutional compromise underlying the newly established Austrian (federal) Republic
and the prevalence of party concerns during the discussion about the Federal
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Constitutional Law of the Republic (Weber 1980: 132).
XIV
Only in 1984 was the Austrian
Bundesrat granted any powers of ‘absolute’ veto (Gamper 2006: 801). The 2nd Spanish
Republic, which launched a kind of asymmetric regionalisation, even favoured
unicameralism over a combination of regional and corporatist bicameralism (Fernández
Riquelme 2009: 193-195). Indeed, in chronological terms, the rationalisation of
parliamentarism went hand in hand with new constitutional experimentations in the field
of vertical separation of powers: Gaspare Ambrosini’s theory of the ‘regional state’ is the
most powerful attempt at theorising the implications of such a shift (Ambrosini 1944; see
also Mirkine-Guetzévitch 1931: 20-25). As the Austrian example shows, second chambers
were obviously affected by the emergence of those novel forms of state.
As critics have noted, functional differentiation of the chambers of bicameral
legislatures has been marked by the frustrating alternative between the risk of deadlock and
irrelevance.
XV
In federal orders, this concern overlaps, at least in part, with ‘Madison’s
paradox’, according to which federal second chambers, far from ensuring strong
representation of the component units, have gradually turned into fora of national politics
(Dehousse 1990).
Another trend which coincides with the rise of unequal bicameralism is the search for
tools and procedures which seek to find a middle ground between the diverging views of
the two chambers. These had already been resorted to in practice in the United States
Congress, where bicameral conference committees have been used since the first Congress,
thereby following a long-standing British model (Rogers 1922: 301, Oleszek 1974, García
Herrera 1978: 73-75). Still, the use of conference committees has heavily declined in the
last few decades because of the rise of partisanship in a bitterly divided Congress: ‘The
declining use of the conference committee as well as the decline in amendment trading and
post-passage bargaining reflect the lower number of bills passed by recent Congresses and
the inability of the two chambers to resolve their differences on controversial bills’
(Carmines and Fowler 2017: 381). Something similar had also happened in Canada and
Australia in the previous decades with the rise and subsequent decline of, respectively, the
open conference procedure and conferences of members of the two houses. The idea of
amending the Canadian Constitution so as to make it possible to hold mixed meetings of
the two chambers was part of the unsuccessful Charlottetown Accord (Pinard 2006: 490-
91; see also Stone 2006: 551).
XVI
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However, cooperation procedures have been more clearly entrenched in 20th century
constitutions: this is, for example, the case of the German Mediation Committee
(Vermittlungsausschuss: Art. 77 of the Basic Law of 1949), the French Mixed Committee
(Commission mixte paritaire: Art. 45 of the Constitution of 1958), the Spanish Mixed
Committee (Comisión Mixta Congreso-Senado, only available for special purposes: Art. 74(2) of
the Constitution of 1978), the Belgian Conciliation Committee (Commission parlementaire de
concertation for settling conflicts of competence: Art. 82 of the Belgian Constitution,
amended in 2014), and the South African Mediation Committee (Art. 78 of the
Constitution of 1996). It might be argued that conciliation tools are part of the same
rationalising effort which has been described above: still, they combine it with an attempt
at reconciling the different positions of the two chambers, independently of their
respective strengths.
XVII
By the way, revitalising the role of an altogether weak second
chamber in the legislative process is the reason why scholars sometimes suggest that a
mediation committee be established in their constitutional order (see here the Austrian and
Polish discussions as summarised by Gamper 2006: 824 and Granat 2006: 1000). But the
role of conciliation committees in itself is no independent variable: a conciliation body is
necessary ‘insofar as bicameralism reveals an effective potential for opposition’ (Lauvaux
2004: 96), as it is the case with the (intermittently) counter-majoritarian French Senate. A
less convincing option is to provide for joint sessions of two houses whose numerical
strength is clearly different, as it is the case in India (see Shastri 2006: 598).
4. From legislation to constitutional amendment rules: a
multidimensional notion of imperfect bicameralism
As mentioned in paragraph 1, discussions about the classification of bicameral systems
along the perfect-imperfect alternative prove ultimately unable to grasp the full picture. In
fact, among parliamentary regimes perfect bicameralism only characterises the Italian
Parliament – and even survived an attempt at constitutional reform in December 2016.
XVIII
In turn, both Belgium and Romania have abandoned their own models of equal
bicameralism, respectively in 1993 and 2003 (see Lauvaux 1990: 32 and Selejan-Gutan
2016: chapter 2). In the light of this evolution, the heuristic potential of the distinction
does not seem to be particularly strong: imperfect bicameralism is now the rule. On the
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other hand, equal bicameralism is a relatively simple notion, whereas it is possible to think
of a number of different models of unequal bicameralism.
Political scientists suggest that it is more appropriate to (re)conceive the alternative
between perfect and imperfect bicameralism as a continuum ‘from “symmetric” (where the
two houses are coequal, exercising the same powers and functions), on the one end of the
continuum, to “asymmetric” (where one house is subordinate to the other), on the other
end’ (Patterson and Mughan 2001: 41-42). How can this be theorized in constitutional law
terms? Moving back to the starting point of this analysis is a plausible solution. As Palermo
and Nicolini have suggested, it is necessary to establish a stronger link between this
problem, on the one hand, and the main raison d’être of bicameralism i.e. representing
pluralism, on the other hand:
the representation of pluralism provides a justification for the functions and competences which second
chambers exercise in the formation of the state’s will; basically, it characterises ‘non-federal’
bicameralisms – if reference is made to the ‘traditional’ classification – in terms of equality or differentiation
(Palermo and Nicolini 2013: 79).
How crucial is this representation of pluralism in the overall architecture of the
constitutional system? The position of the second chamber vis-à-vis the first chamber
depends on how this question is answered. The developments presented in paragraph 3.1
clearly demonstrate this: the constitutional history of the 19th century, until the wave of
rationalization in the first half of the 20th century, is a story of adaptation of the
constitutional framework to constitutional practice and to the constitutional conventions
which had emerged out of the expectations of the main actors involved. Was it acceptable
for non-elective upper houses to be involved in ordinary legislative processes on equal
footing with elective lower houses? Was it acceptable for the indirectly elective French
Senate to be able to overthrow the government of the day by means of a no confidence
vote? As the legitimising strength of aristocratic or census-related models of bicameralism
declined, second chambers became more and more reluctant to exercise powers of which,
in strictly formal terms, they had not been stripped.
What comparative constitutional studies need right now is a multidimensional notion of
imperfect bicameralism: the two chambers of a bicameral legislature may well be put on
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equal footing with regard to some functions and tasks, with the lower house prevailing in
all the others. Thus, traces of perfect and imperfect bicameralism may well coexist within
the very same constitutional order, thus weakening rigid interpretations of this dialectic
contrast. The subsequent point is to identify those functions and to assess their significance
within a given constitutional order: in order to do this, it is necessary to consider the main
raison d’être of the second chamber.
As of today, the main example of ‘strong’ equality between the two chambers is
provided by constitution-amending processes.
XIX
A great number of comparative
constitutional studies have been devoted to constitutional amendment rules and
constitutional change in the last few years (Albert 2013: 227-28; see, among others, Fusaro
and Oliver 2011, and Albert, Contiades and Fotiadou 2017). For the purposes of this
paper, the most important point is that equality between the two chambers is more
frequently than not the case when it comes to amending the highest source of law (see e.g.
Venice Commission 2009: 9-10). This means that diversity and pluralism – insofar as they
are represented by the second chamber and perceived as crucial in the overall architecture
of the system – should be granted appropriate weight in constitution-amending procedures.
In a way, this confirms the conception of constitutional amendment rules as expressing
constitutional values. Among those values, it should be mentioned that formal amendment
rules may serve a democracy-promoting purpose in two respects: ‘The right to amend a
constitution is, above all, a right to democratic choice. … In addition to promoting the
majoritarian bases of democracy, formal amendment rules may also promote the
substantive dimensions of democracy, namely its counter-majoritarian and minority-
protecting purposes’ (Albert 2013: 235; see also Albert 2014: 913-14 and Rodean 2018: 6-
7). This means that there is a tight connection between one of the functions of
constitutional amendment rules and the very reason for the existence of second chambers.
In empirical terms too, the bicameral structure of a legislature is generally described as a
key issue for assessing the difficulty of amending a constitution. Moreover, legislative
bicameralism has been found out to be one of the most decisive factors in assessing how
easily a constitution can be amended: as one scholar argued, ‘legislative complexity – the
requirement of special majorities or separate majorities in different legislative sessions or
bicamerality – is the key variable to explaining amendment rates’ (Ferejohn 1997: 523; see
also Lutz 1994 and Dixon 2011: 105).
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The French case has already been mentioned in paragraph 2: at this stage, it should be
added that the bicameral structure of the legislature has often been described as a
component of the ‘republican tradition’ in French public law. At the beginning of the 3rd
Republic, conservative republicans placed great importance on the new Senate, as they saw
it as a bulwark for political minorities in the political process (Vimbert 1992: 98-99). Other
cases of equal involvement of the lower and upper houses in amending the Constitution
are Australia (S. 128 of the Commonwealth of Tradition Constitution Act 1900),
XX
Japan
(Art. 96 of the Constitution of 1946), Germany (Art. 79(2) of the Fundamental Law of
1949),
XXI
India (Art. 368(2) of the Constitution of 1950), Spain (Art. 167(1) of the
Constitution of 1978),
XXII
the Netherlands (Articles 137(4) and 138(1)(a) of the
Constitution of 1983), Romania (Art. 151(1) and (2) of the Constitution of 1991), the
Czech Republic (Art. 39(4) of the Constitution of 1992), and Poland (Art. 235(4) of the
Constitution of 1997). In South Africa, the involvement of the National Council of
Provinces is the rule, with minor exceptions provided for at S. 74(3) of the Constitution of
1996: indeed, the approval of six Provinces in the Council is needed for all amendments
affecting the founding provisions, the Bill of Rights, all the Provinces or the Council itself,
altering provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions, or amending a provision
with specifically deals with a provincial matter (see de Vos 2006: 642-46). In some
jurisdictions, like Belgium, the abolition of equal bicameralism and six waves of “State
reform” have had no impact on constitutional amendment rules (Art. 195 of the Belgian
Constitution, unchanged since 1831, if not for the transitional provision added in March
2012: see Behrendt 2003: 280, and Dumont, El Berhoumi and Hachez 2016: 27-30). In
Italy, the unsuccessful Renzi-Boschi constitutional reform also preserved equal
bicameralism with regard, among other issues, to constitutional reform (see Romeo 2017:
37). On the other hand, in some constitutional systems the analysis of the position of the
second chamber with regard to constitutional amendment simply confirms what can be
inferred with regard to ordinary legislation. This is e.g. the case of Austria, where the
weakness of the Bundesrat in the Constitution amending process confirms the problematic
nature of Austrian federalism (Pernthaler 2004: 294-98): according to Article 44(1) of the
Federal Constitutional Law of 1920, ‘[c]onstitutional laws or constitutional provisions
contained in simple laws can be passed by the National Council’. However, constitutional
laws curtailing the competence of the Länder in legislation or execution ‘require
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furthermore the approval of the Bundesrat, in the presence of at least one-half of the
members, by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast’ (Art. 44(2), as amended in December
1984). This limited exception is consistent both with the marginal position of the Bundesrat
in the Austrian constitutional order and the status of the former as the parliamentary organ
in which ‘the Länder are represented’ (Art. 34(1) of the Federal Constitutional Law). The
Canadian case is somehow similar: unless a constitutional amendment bill affects the
executive government of Canada, the Senate itself or the House of Commons, Canada’s
upper house only has a suspensive veto of 180 days (see Pelletier 2017: 259). This
circumstance is telling and illustrates the unfitness of the Senate to represent the Provinces
and Territories of Canada: indeed,
‘[t]he Constitution Act, 1982 creates five formal amendment thresholds, each requiring an escalating
measure of federal or provincial legislative action, sometimes in tandem, with the applicable threshold
rising in difficulty according to the function or symbolic importance of the entrenched provision to be
amended. … This reflects a hierarchy of constitutional importance: The quantum of political agreement
rises according to the importance assigned to the matter to be amended’ (Albert 2016: 411-12).
However, the consent of the Senate is only needed with regard to the federal
institutions; this is not the case with the core of Canadian statehood and Canadian
federalism (including e.g. the office of the Queen, the Governor General and provincial
Lieutenant Governors, the use of the English or French language, the composition of the
Supreme Court, and the principle of proportionate representation of the Provinces in the
House of Commons).
XXIII
5. Specialisation of the second chamber and emergence of the multi-
level dimension
This paper has mainly focused on situations in which the two chambers of a bicameral
legislature co-operate or, possibly, have to deal with conflict. The perfect-imperfect
alternative is shaped by how the two chambers co-operate and conflicts between them are
solved. This reflects the origin of bicameralism in the 19th century: in light of their different
composition and legitimacy, the two chambers were called upon to jointly approve pieces
of legislation (see Palermo and Nicolini 2013: 52). However, the current constitutional
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scene includes a number of situations in which either chamber acts alone. A significant
example has already been cited in paragraph 2: second chambers perform a decisive role in
extreme conflicts between institutional layers in federal and multi-level orders.
Another trend deserves mention, although in practice its impacts have been quite
modest so far: providing second chambers with a privileged position for introducing
legislative proposals related to their main ‘focus’. In 2003, Art. 39(2) of the French
Constitution was amended in order to strengthen the role of the Senate as chamber of
territorial representation: ‘bills primarily dealing with the organisation of territorial
communities [i.e. Communes, Departments, Regions, special status communities and
overseas territorial communities] shall be tabled first in the Senate’. The Conseil constitutionnel
has already struck down a couple of ordinary laws because they had been adopted in
violation of Art. 39(2) of the Constitution.
XXIV
Even more interestingly, it should be mentioned that the multi-level dimension – most
notably, European integration – provides second chambers with a formidable option to
escape the traditional dilemmas between equality and subordination, or between conflict
and cooperation. This relates to both general and specific reasons. In general terms, the
peculiar (and controversial) features of the ‘form of government’ of the Union have
possibly led to a reappraisal of the role of second chambers within the constitutional orders
of the Member States:
bicameralism more than emphasizing the principle of the separation of powers, is an efficient tool to
give voice to territorial entities and social bodies that would be underrepresented, both in the Lower
House and in the European institutions. Particularly in the EU, this role for Upper Chambers should be
considered far from out dated: the ‘European blindness’ makes Upper Houses a pressing need to
reconnect the different layers of the European composite Constitution, through a successful integration
of territorial political representation (Faraguna 2016: 20; see also critical assessment by Fasone 2017: 48-
60).
In a way, this is the same reason why equal bicameralism is preserved when it comes to
constitutional amendment rules (see above in paragraph 4).
In less generic terms, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was marked by an
attempt at strengthening the democratic bases of the Union, with an eye both to
representative and participatory democracy. In this respect, the contribution of national
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parliaments ‘to the good functioning of the Union’ (Art. 12(1) TEU) was seen as a key
issue. Among the ‘European powers’ of national parliaments (as defined by Lupo and
Piccirilli 2017), those related to ensuring compliance of draft legislative acts with the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are clearly crucial. The relevant provisions in
Protocol no. 2 somehow take into account the intimate complexity of many national
parliaments: ‘Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament’ may submit
a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that a draft legislative act does not comply with
the principle of subsidiarity. This means that even very weak upper houses may take
autonomous initiative and ‘participate in the EU decision-making on equal footing with the
lower ones’ (Romaniello 2015: 1). Empirical evidence considering the thirteen bicameral
national legislatures in the European Union even shows that ‘upper houses – in absolute
terms – were much more active than lower houses’ (Romaniello 2015: 9, also pointing at
the considerable impact of the idiosyncrasies of each Member State and ‘the contrast
between the blind and equal approach adopted by the EU and the complexity of national
constitutional settings’). Thus, second chambers may take the initiative in a way which
completely escapes the traditional alternative between perfect and imperfect bicameralism:
both chambers may act – and their action obviously impacts on the domestic setting – but
they can do so independently from one another.
6. Concluding remarks
Comparative analysis in the previous paragraph has pointed to the decline of equal
bicameralism both in institutional practice and in formal constitutional provisions.
Meanwhile, it has shown that the contemporary scene is marked by a number of
phenomena and trends which somehow escape a too rigid dichotomy. For the purposes of
a concluding assessment, the first point which deserves attention is the depth of change
over the last two centuries. The issues underlying the distinction between perfect and
imperfect bicameralism are less stable than those related to the legitimacy and institutional
position of second chambers: ‘The structures and functions of second chambers always
differ but it seems to be the functions and not the structures that are more susceptible to
change’ (Luther 2006: 25). Two examples will suffice. The powers and competences of the
French Senate have considerably evolved since 1875, but its structure, which makes it a
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‘Great Council of the Communes of France’, has not changed considerably since Léon
Gambetta gave his Belleville speech (see Laffaille 2016: 44-45). In Belgium, equal
bicameralism was abandoned two decades before the composition and structure of the
Senate were modified (see discussion by Delpérée 2006: 716-19).
In light of that evolution, the traditional distinction between equal and unequal
bicameralism does not seem to be able to grasp the current complexity of the distribution
of powers and tasks within a bicameral legislature. Indeed, the two chambers of the very
same parliament may well be placed on equal footing in some respects, whereas the will of
the lower house generally prevails on all other occasions. Because of its genetic relationship
with Mirkine-Guetzévitch’s theory of rationalised parliamentarism (see above in paragraph
3.2), the distinction, in its classical meaning, almost exclusively focuses on two decisive
features of parliamentary regimes, i.e. the ordinary legislative process and the confidence
vote. On a different note, equal bicameralism is now an exception, while there are multiple
models of bicameralism, ranging from ‘almost equal’ to the actual subordination of the
second chamber. That is why constitutional law analyses need a multidimensional analysis
of unequal bicameralism, which allows the complexity of the tasks of present-day-
parliaments to be grasped. Furthermore, as has been argued in paragraph 4, a more
complex understanding of unequal bicameralism makes it possible to do justice to the link
between the structure and functions of second chambers. In doing so, the great diversity of
contemporary constitutional arrangements should always be kept in mind: indeed, ‘there is
no one model of bicameralism, neither is there any unique institutional arrangement, but
each model is the outcome of national constitutional designers for maximizing the benefits’
(Romaniello 2016: 2). In sum, like unhappy families in Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, each model
of unequal bicameralism is unequal in its own way.
As mentioned above, 20th century scholars like Mirkine-Guetzévitch and Bon
Valsassina tended to describe imperfect bicameralism as a milder alternative to embracing
unicameralism altogether. As of today, the overall picture seems to be different. The
existence of second chambers is generally subject to controversy in most constitutional
orders, as the Irish and Italian referendums in 2013 and 2016 clearly showed. Meanwhile,
they are often very willing to perform their constitutional role actively (see above in
paragraphs 2 and 5). Even second chambers which are generally seen as weak, like the
British House of Lords, are part of this trend: ‘In total the Parliament Acts have run their
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full course on only seven occasions since 1911. However, these occasions seem to be
becoming more frequent’ (Russell 2006: 79; see also Russell 2013: 81-82 and 134), and the
handling of the Brexit may well add to this list.
In a way, the vitality of second chambers against a very diverse background confirms
that any discussion whatsoever about representation and representativeness (and their
crises) has to consider parliamentary functions in their entirety and, if this is the case, the
impact of the second chamber on those functions (Lupo 2017: 40-41). For constitutional
law scholars to measure up to those intellectual challenges, a multidimensional notion of
imperfect bicameralism is needed.
Postdoctoral Researcher in Comparative Public Law, Scuola superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. Email address:
giacomo.delledonne@santannapisa.it. I would like to thank Anna Gamper and all the organisers of the
Conference ‘Representing Regions, Challenging Bicameralism’, which was held on 22-23 March 2018 at the
University of Innsbruck. Huge thanks are also due to Arthur Benz, Carlo Fusaro, Giuseppe Martinico,
Roberto Toniatti, Matteo Nicolini, Giovanni Boggero and the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and
comments.
I
Nevertheless, the newspaper Le Monde has succeeded in getting access to a preliminary draft, which has been
submitted to the Conseil d’État for advice and is due to be discussed at a meeting of the Council of Ministers
on 9 May 2018: see Roger and Lemarié 2018.
II
Attempts as changing the current balance between the National Assembly and the Senate in Constitution-
amending procedures, e.g. the proposals submitted by the Vedel Committee in 1993, have ultimately been
unsuccessful (see Di Manno 2006: 221-22).
III
On that occasion too, General de Gaulle was also trying to impose his will against the opposition of the
Senate.
IV
French senators are elected by indirect universal suffrage. Its members are elected in each Department
(Département) by an electoral college composed of members of the National Assembly from that Department
and delegates from regional and local government councils. Senatorial elections are held every three years to
renew half of the members of the Senate.
V
These authors, like the overwhelming majority of scholars both in Spain and elsewhere, generally stress the
inability of the Spanish Senate to fulfil its institutional mission as ‘the house of territorial representation’ (Art.
69(1) of the Constitution of 1978). According to Art. 69 of the Constitution of 1978, the Senate is
predominantly composed of directly elected members. Each Province elects four senators, with special
arrangements for the insular Provinces in the Balearic and Canary Islands and the Autonomous Cities of
Ceuta and Melilla. Moreover, the legislatures of the sixteen Autonomous Communities appoint one senator
each and a further Senator for every million inhabitants in their respective territories. To date, the Senate is
composed of 266 members, with 208 senators elected by popular vote and 58 appointed by autonomic
legislatures.
VI
Scholars have generally highlighted the similarities between the procedure under Art. 155 of the Spanish
Constitution and the German ‘federal coercion’ (Bundeszwang) regulated by Art. 38 of the Fundamental Law:
still, a major difference between the Spanish and German procedures ‘is to be found in the considerable
difference between the Spanish Senate and the German Bundesrat with regard to their status as chambers of
territorial representation. … the significance of the Spanish Senate is radically different from that of the
Bundesrat as guarantor of the rights and interests of the Länder in the application of constitutional provisions
regarding federal coercion. The consequence of this is that two virtually identical provisions in terms of their
formal drafting ultimately have in their practical application very different characteristics in the application of
an extraordinary measure such as federal coercion’ (López-Basaguren 2017: 310).
VII
There had been disagreement among 3rd Republic public law scholars with regard to the power of the
Senate to overthrow the Government of the day, with Adhémar Esmein favouring the negative interpretation
and Léon Duguit claiming that the sitting Government should resign after being defeated in the Senate (see
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Esmein 1896: 623-26 and Duguit 1896). As said, Duguit’s interpretation finally prevailed in constitutional
practice (Goyard 1982: 61).
VIII
See, among others, Art. 17 of the French Charte constitutionnelle of 1814; Art. 15 of the French Constitution
of 1830; Art. 27 of the Belgian Constitution of 1831 (later modified); Art. 10 of the Sardinian (and later
Italian) Statuto albertino of 1848; Art. 42 of the Spanish Constitution of 1876.
IX
However, Maitland (1909: 348) also refers that the creation of new peers was discouraged in late 19th
century: ‘The power of creating new peers is obviously an important engine in the hands of a minister.
During the last century peerages were lavishly created for political purposes. … In much more recent times
the power of creating new peers has been used for a great end. In 1832 the House of Lords was practically
coerced into the passing of the Reform Bill by the knowledge that if they again rejected it the king was
prepared to consent to the creation of eighty new peerages. Thus a threat to create new peerages may be a
potent political instrument; but for obvious reasons a minister would shrink from using it save in an extreme
case – he could not see the end of his action; he would be creating heritable rights, and the political opinions
of heirs are not always those of their ancestors’.
X
‘As an appointed body, the Senate was simultaneously enabled and constrained. Which is to say that the
Senate was deliberately designed to allow competing principles – democratic and anti-democratic – to co-exist
over the long term. And, indeed, despite many attempts either to reform or abolish it, the Senate remains
largely intact – sustained by the ambivalence with which it was designed’ (Vipond 2017: 95). Still, some
examples of successful opposition of the Senate can be found even in the second half of the 20th century (see
Brun, Tremblay et Brouillet 2008: 339-40).
XI
It will suffice to mention the British Parliament Act 1949 and the initial text of the Constitution of the 4th
French Republic, which considerably diminished the role of the Senate, by then relabelled ‘Council of the
Republic’.
XII
Still, recent studies have showed that the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution of the United
States was to entrust the Senate with the task of both representing the States and providing second thought
to the law-making process – but this nuance has greatly lost its significance (Beaud 2007: 357-63, Palermo
and Kössler 2017: 75-76).
XIII
The German ‘ambassadorial’ model of representation of the interests of the Länder has always been an
outlier.
XIV
The Catholic and Pan-German parties were successful in supporting the idea of a bicameral parliament
for a federal Austria, but the Social Democrats finally succeeded in weakening the position of the Bundesrat in
the constitutional order.
XV
This reflects the structural alternative – which can ultimately be traced back to the Abbé Sieyès – between
the dubious legitimacy of non-democratic second chambers and the risk of transforming them into mere
duplicates of first chambers (see Mirkine-Guetzévitch 1931: 25).
XVI
In Canada, current parliamentary practice is rather based on the exchange of messages between the House
of Commons and the Senate (Pinard 2006: 491).
XVII
Interesting evidence from the third (and, to date, last) cohabitation in France (1997-2002) suggests that the
activities of the Mixed Committee quite often allowed the Senate and the National Assembly to reach an
agreement on a common text (Bernard 2001: 451).
XVIII
Another example of the conundrum underlying the Italian model of equal bicameralism can be found in
the controversial message which Francesco Cossiga, then President to the Republic, sent to Parliament on 26
June 1991: the President argued that ‘the principle of bicameralism, and perhaps even so-called equal
bicameralism’ amounted to an unamendable principle of the Italian constitutional order. According to critics,
however, the President purposefully overemphasised the width of the area of the untouchable core of the
Italian Constitution in order to hint at the inherent limitations of the constitutional amendment power and to
promote the launch of a fully-fledged constituent process (see Luciani 2010: 592).
XIX
Another plausible example is provided by states of emergence and declarations of war: see e.g. Articles 35
and 36 of the French Constitution and Art. 39(3) of the Czech Constitution.
XX
However, according to scholars, first reading impression is incorrect: ‘A proposed law approved by the
Senate but not by the House, wherein the government controls a majority of votes, will not be permitted by
the prime minister to go to referendum. But in the reverse situation, a Governor-General would be
compelled to act on a prime minister’s advice to submit to the electors a proposed law approved only by the
House’ (Stone 2006: 561-62).
XXI
For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to look into the nature of the German Bundesrat and the
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possibility to classify it as a second chamber or simply as a constitutional organ performing tasks similar to
those of a parliamentary assembly (but see Herzog 2005: 955-56).
XXII
In fact. Art. 167(2) provides for a limited exception: if a constitutional amendment bill has not been
approved by a majority of three-fifths of members of each house, and provided that the text has been passed
by a majority of the members of the Senate, the Congress may pass the amendment by a two-thirds vote (see
also Castellà Andreu 2006: 890).
XXIII
In the Reference re Senate Reform, the Supreme Court interestingly held that ‘[a]mendments to the
Constitution of Canada are subject to review by the Senate. The Senate can veto amendments brought under
s. 44 and can delay the adoption of amendments made pursuant to ss. 38, 41, 42, and 43 by up to 180 days: 2.
47, Constitution Act, 1982. The elimination of bicameralism would render this mechanism of review
inoperative and effectively chance the dynamics of the constitutional amendment process. … The effects of
Senate abolition on Part V [regulating the procedure for amending the Constitution of Canada] are direct and
substantial. While it is true that the Senate’s role in constitutional amendment is not as central as that of the
House of Commons or the provincial legislatures, its ability to delay the adoption of constitutional
amendments nevertheless provides an additional mechanism to ensure that they are carefully considered.
Indeed, the Senate’s refusal to authorize an amendment can give the House of Commons pause and draw
public attention to amendments: Smith, at p. 152’ (Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Senate Reform [2014]
1 S.C.R. 704, 755-56).
XXIV
See Decision no. 2011-632 DC of the Conseil constitutionnel (Loi fixant le nombre des conseillers territoriaux de
chaque département et de chaque région): ‘Considering that the applicant Members of Parliament have referred to
the Conseil constitutionnel the law determining the number of local councillors of each Department and each
Region; that they challenge the procedure by which it was adopted … Considering that the draft bill tabled in
the National Assembly, as the first house to be seized, had the sole objective of determining the number of
local councillors comprising the deliberative assembly of each Department and of each Region; that the rules
governing the organisation of local authorities include the determination of the number of members of their
deliberative assembly; that accordingly, the draft bill that resulted in the law referred was incorrectly tabled
first other than in the Senate; that consequently, the law was adopted according to an unconstitutional
procedure; that, without any requirement to examine any other complaint, it must be ruled unconstitutional’.
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