A Formal Study of Games

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A foundational theory of games may be derived directly from modal logic: thus allows not only to properly assess and define fundamental concept of any games, but also to create meaningful connections between ludology and other field of knowledge.

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This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge—knowledge of one's own mind, knowledge of other people's minds, and knowledge of the external world—by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism–antirealism debate.
Introduction. Origin of the Essays. 1. The Games of Logic and the Games of Inquiry. 2. No Scope for Scope. 3. Informational Independence as a Semantical Phenomenon (with Gabriel Sandu.) 4. 'Is', Semantical Games and Semantical Relativity. 5. Logical Form and Linguistic Theory. 6. On the Any-Thesis and the Methodology of Linguistics. 7. Paradigms for Language Theory. 8. (with Gabriel Sandu.) The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference. 9. Perspectival Identification, Demonstratives and 'Small Worlds'. 10. Game-theoretical Semantics as a Synthesis of Verificationist and Truth-conditional Meaning Theories. 11. (with Gabriel Sandu.) Metaphor and Other Kinds of Nonliteral Meaning.
I hope that some people see some connection between the two topics in the title. If not, anyway, such connections will be developed in the course of these talks. Furthermore, because of the use of tools involving reference and necessity in analytic philosophy today, our views on these topics really have wide-ranging implications for other problems in philosophy that traditionally might be thought far-removed, like arguments over the mind-body problem or the so-called ‘identity thesis’. Materialism, in this form, often now gets involved in very intricate ways in questions about what is necessary or contingent in identity of properties — questions like that. So, it is really very important to philosophers who may want to work in many domains to get clear about these concepts. Maybe I will say something about the mind-body problem in the course of these talks. I want to talk also at some point (I don’t know if I can get it in) about substances and natural kinds.
1. What Is Elementary Logic? Independence-Friendly Logic as the True Core Area of Logic. 2. A Revolution in Logic? 3. A Revolution in the Foundations of Mathematics? 4. Is There Completeness in Mathematics After Godel? 5. Hilbert Vindicated? 6. Standard vs. Nonstandard Logic: A Watershed in the Foundations of Mathematics. 7. Standard vs. Nonstandard Logic: Higher-Order, Modal and First-Order Logics. 8. (with Gabriel Sandu.) The Skeleton in Frege's Cupboard: The Standard vs. Nonstandard Distinction. 9. (with Arto Mutanen.) An Alternative Concept of Computability. 10. (with Gabriel Sandu.) What is the Logic of Parallel Processing? 11. Model Minimization - An Alternative to Circumscription. 12. New Foundations for Mathematical Theories.
Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which aresynthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill-founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism.
This book is an outstanding contribution to the philosophical study of language and mind, by one of the most influential thinkers of our time. In a series of penetrating essays, Chomsky cuts through the confusion and prejudice which has infected the study of language and mind, bringing new solutions to traditional philosophical puzzles and fresh perspectives on issues of general interest, ranging from the mind-body problem to the unification of science. Using a range of imaginative and deceptively simple linguistic analyses, Chomsky defends the view that knowledge of language is internal to the human mind. He argues that a proper study of language must deal with this mental construct. According to Chomsky, therefore, human language is a 'biological object' and should be analyzed using the methodology of the sciences. His examples and analyses come together in this book to give a unique and compelling perspective on language and the mind.
Afurther development of Quine's criticisms of theories of meaning and the related concepts of synonymy, intension, analyticity, and semantic rules. Quine challenges traditional views of reference and puts forth the thesis that translation is theoretically indeterminate. Harvard Book List (edited) 1971 #350 (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
In this paper I will present a puzzle about names and belief.A moral or two will be drawn about some other arguments that have occasionallly been advanced in this area, but my main thesis is a simple one : that the puzzle is a puzzle. And, as a corollary, that any account of belief must ultimately come to grips with it. Any speculation as to solutions can be deferred. The first section of the paper gives the theortical background in previous discussion, and in my own earlier work, that led me to consider the puzzle. The background is by no means necessary to state the puzzle: As a philosophical puzzle, it stands on its own, and I think its fundamental interest for the problem of belief goes beyond the background that engendered it.As I indicate in the third section, the problem really goes beyond beliefs expressed using names, to a far wider class of beliefs. Nevertheless, I think that the background illuminates the genesis of the puzzle, and it will enable me to draw one moral in the concluding section. The second section states some general principles which underlie our general practice of reporting beliefs.These principles are state in much more detail than in needed to comprehend the puzzle; and there are variant formulations of the principles that would do as well.Neither this section nor the first necessary for an intuitive grasp of the central problem, discussed in the third section, though they may help with fine points of the discussion. The reader who wishes rapid access to the central problem could skim the first two sections lightly on a first reading.
The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented 'crisis in the foundations of mathematics', featuring a world-famous paradox (Russell's Paradox), a challenge to 'classical' mathematics from a world-famous mathematician (the 'mathematical intuitionism' of Brouwer), a new foundational school (Hilbert's Formalism), and the profound incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel. In the same period, the cross-fertilization of mathematics and philosophy resulted in a new sort of 'mathematical philosophy', associated most notably (but in different ways) with Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, and Gödel himself, and which remains at the focus of Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion. The present collection brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers. It is a substantially revised version of the edition first published in 1964 and includes a revised bibliography. The volume will be welcomed as a major work of reference at this level in the field.
"This book is valuable as expounding in full a theory of meaning that has its roots in the work of Frege and has been of the widest influence. . . . The chief virtue of the book is its systematic character. From Frege to Quine most philosophical logicians have restricted themselves by piecemeal and local assaults on the problems involved. The book is marked by a genial tolerance. Carnap sees himself as proposing conventions rather than asserting truths. However he provides plenty of matter for argument."—Anthony Quinton, Hibbert Journal
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Lingua Universalis Vs. Calculus Ratiocinator: An Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth-Century Philosophy
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Knowledge and Belief -An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions
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