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Carolina Dutra de Araujo is a PhD candidate in Forest Sciences and Forest Ecology on
Georg-August-Universität-Göttingen, sponsored by CNPq–Brazil.
Max Krott is head of the section Forest and Nature Conservation Policy, Faculty of Forest
Sciences and Forest Ecology of Georg-August-Universität-Göttingen.
Christiane Hubo is an academic counsellor of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy, Fac-
ulty of Forest Sciences and Forest Ecology of Georg-August-Universität-Göttingen.
e authors would like to thank Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientíco e Tec-
nológico do Brasil (CNPq) for the funding that made this research possible and Instituto Chico
Mendes de Conservacao da Biodiversidade (ICMBio) for the research’s authorization on the
Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park.
Please send correspondence to Carolina Dutra de Araujo, dutracarolina@gmail.com.
Special Issue
Executive Summary
Ecotourism is considered an important activity provided by natural ecosystem services
in the Fernando de Noronha archipelago through recreation opportunities. Since 2010,
the Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park has been experiencing a private-public
partnership between the park’s management and a concessionaire, imposing fees to
visitors in order to provide sustainable facilities to some attractions of the protected
area. Payments for ecosystem services schemes are being implemented in many parts
of the world in an eort to promote environmental protection, showing positive
outcomes. erefore, the objective of this study is to analyse the empirical case of
payments for ecosystem services through ecotourism based on economic and political
theory. e economic theory identies the economic processes generated by the
payments, while the political theory identies the political actors and their respective
power strategies that aid in the implementation of a specic scheme of payments for
ecosystem services. Furthermore, the aim of the study is to determine which factors are
successful in utilizing payments for ecosystem services as an instrument to preserve
Journal of Park and Recreation Administration Vol. 36 • pp. 82–100 • 2018
https://doi.org/10.18666/JPRA-2018-V36-I3-7554
Power Strategies for Ecotourism
in the Fernando de Noronha
Archipelago (Brazil) for Implementing
Payments for Ecosystem Services
Carolina Dutra de Araujo
Max Krott
Christiane Hubo
83
Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
ecosystems via ecotourism. Moreover, the paper links an economic approach to power
theories, which is a dynamic perspective on tourism studies. To reach the results,
economic and political factors are identied according to existing theory and are then
compared with empirical evidence from the archipelago. e most powerful actors that
have inuence on the ecotourism activities were interviewed in order to determine
their power elements as well as their level of support for the payments, according to
the power analysis that take into consideration the following power elements: coercion,
incentives, and disincentives and dominant information. e economic analysis
shows that payments for ecosystem services suciently meet the standards of the
economic model and the political analysis explains this success by the inuence of
various powerful actors in Fernando de Noronha. Furthermore, the results support the
hypothesis that only payments for ecosystem services which can gain the support of
powerful actors are eective in practice.
Keywords
Brazil, ecotourism, Fernando de Noronha, payments for ecosystem services, power
elements, powerful actors
Introduction
Ecosystem services are understood to be the benets that humans get from natural
resources. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes have been discussed and
implemented on a global scale in various forms in an eort to support environmental
preservation. Recreation is one such ecosystem service. erefore, the creation of
protected areas combined with recreation services are vital for the preservation of sites
with signicant natural value. Many of these protected areas throughout the world
are visited by tourists (Fedeler & Miles, 1989; Radam et al., 2009; Samdin, 2008). In
this context, payments intended for recreation are frequently discussed and studies
on willingness to pay (identifying whether a visitor would pay for recreational
services) are being carried out in order to gather information related to how a payment
scheme could be eectively implemented (Alam, 2005; Burns & Graefe, 2006; More &
Stevens, 2000). Additionally, payments for recreation have already been successfully
implemented in some Latin American countries (Grima et al., 2016). It is important
to determine what lessons can be learned from these cases with regard to PES. is
paper contributes to existing information through the identication of success factors
by analysing one specic case-based theory: the Fernando de Noronha Archipelago
(north-eastern Brazil). Fees linked with the preservation of this island’s ecosystems
have been established for tourists.
e objective of the present study is to analyse the empirical case of PES based
on existing economic and political theories. Economic theory should help identify
the changes in economic processes as a result of the payments. Political theory should
indicate the relevant political actors, along with their respective power strategies for
implementing a specic scheme of PES. e central research question of this work is:
84
Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
What factors contribute to stablish PES as a successful instrument to sustain ecosystems
via ecotourism?
In November 2014, eld work was carried out on the Brazilian island of Fernando
de Noronha, where the eight most politically inuential state and private actors were
selected for interviews. Additionally, ocial documents (e.g., local laws and local
ordinances) and management plans for the protected areas were analysed (developed
by the management agency) and observations were made directly on the island.
Economic theory was used to analyse the link between PES and policy, while
political theory was employed to analyse the political background of the relevant
economic model’s implementation. Furthermore, the economic model denes the
notion of PES, discusses how it can be economically justied, and how optimal payment
amounts can be calculated. e political theory describes which political actors support
PES, and what means of implementation should be used. e hypothesis of this work
is that only PES that are supported by powerful actors are implemented in practice.
Economic Model of PES
Ecosystem services are dened as “the diverse benets that we derive from the
natural environment” (Smith et al., 2013, p. 10). Such services include environmental
goods (food, fresh water, fuel, and bre); regulating services (climate, ood, and
disease regulation and water purication); supporting services (nutrient cycling and
soil formation) and cultural services (aesthetic, spiritual, education, and recreation)
(Forest Trends, e Katoomba Group & UNEP, 2008). In order to avoid environmental
degradation, many eective alternatives have been developed, such as regulations;
provisions of services by the government; voluntary eorts by businesses, communities,
and individuals; and incentives or market-based mechanisms (through charges,
tradable permits, certication schemes, and PES). Incentives are a common way of
developing market-based mechanisms for ecosystems services. PES is dened as the
wide range of economic activities intended to reward the conservation of ecosystems
and, more specically, schemes in which the beneciaries pay the providers of these
services (Smith et al., 2013).
According to Smith et al. (2013), there are seven key principles to consider with
regard to PES:
1. Stakeholders should submit a PES scheme on a voluntary basis.
2. Beneciaries (individuals, communities, and businesses or governments acting on
behalf of various parties) should pay for ecosystem services.
3. Providers of ecosystem services should directly receive payments, although in
practice usually the payments go through a broker or intermediary.
4. Additionality should be undertaken by resource or land managers, who then pay
for actions above and beyond standard services.
5. Conditionality, in which the payments are dependent on the perceived
environmental benets of an ecosystem service (whereas in practice payments are
based more on management goals to be implemented).
6. Ensuring permanence through management interventions paid for beneciaries
and intended to provide continued service.
7. Avoiding leakage by securing an ecosystem service in one given location and not
permitting the loss of this service elsewhere.
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Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
Such economic principles set a high standard for ecosystem services payments.
For the purpose of this paper, the context of PES is focused on ecotourism
services. e classication system of de Groot, Wilson, and Boumans (2002) divides
information functions and related ecosystem goods and services into ve categories:
(1) aesthetic information, (2) recreation and (eco)tourism, (3) cultural and artistic
inspiration, (4) spiritual and historic information, and (5) scientic and educational
information. Recreation and ecotourism are regarded as a service that is provided by
natural ecosystems where people seek relaxation or opportunities to practice open-air
activities, as well as places with exceptional landscapes to visit.
In order to establish a PES scheme, the economic values of recreation and
ecotourism are key factors. e economic value can be assessed primarily through four
methods: direct market valuation, indirect market valuation, contingent valuation, and
group valuation. Direct market valuation is applicable to the values that ecosystems
have available to exchange, and is related to production, regulation, and information
functions. Indirect market valuation is more complex due to the lack of explicit
markets for services (de Groot et al., (2002). erefore, it is necessary to rely on the
establishment of willingness to pay for these ecosystem services (based on Groot et al.,
2002):
• Avoided cost: payment for services that would help to avoid costs in case of
absence of this service.
• Replacement cost: service costs that can be replaced with articial systems.
• Factor income: ecosystem services can enhance incomes of direct and indirect
users.
• Travel cost: the travel costs for tourism may reect the implied value of the
ecosystem service.
• Hedonic pricing: the prices that one will pay for goods associated with ecosystem
services.
Contingent valuation can be dened as the willingness to pay for ecosystem
services based on social questionnaires; these results are applied to respondents that
use designated areas for recreational purposes (individual preferences), whereas group
valuation is based on group deliberation during open public debates. is approach
stems from political and social theories and is based on the decision-making process
typically utilized in democratic systems (de Groot et al., 2002).
In the case of developing countries, the valuation of ecosystem services is
more important “in that there needs to be a balance between the goals of economic
development and environmental protection or conservation” because rapid economic
growth oen relies on the use of various renewable resources (Alam, 2005, p. 2).
Consequently, non-market benets are more important for economic valuation in
developing countries, ultimately providing support for good policy practices and
improving environmental signicance and protection.
For the purpose of this paper, ecotourism services are dened as non-market
goods, such as leisure activities (e.g., hiking, swimming, diving, canoeing, biking, etc.)
and cultural features that can be consumed by beneciaries in areas with protected
biodiversity and ecosystems, and exceptional landscapes. In this regard, the contingent
valuation method “elicits consumer preferences of goods and services that are not
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Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
traded directly to the consumer in the market. Monetary values of environmental
goods and services are established to the setting up of a ‘hypothetical’ market” (Samdin,
2008, p. 82). us, willingness to pay is a valuable tool that can be used to assess users’
perceptions, as well as to help design PES, specically related to ecotourism and
protected areas. ese areas are of particular interest because there are entrance fees,
ultimately indicating the maximum amount that one is willing to pay for non-market
goods, such as ecotourism services.
Samdin (2008) conducted a survey using the willingness to pay method in Taman
Negara National Park in Malaysia. Results showed that most international visitors were
willing to pay more than the original entrance fee if the additional fee was reverted
into conservation actions (Samdin, 2008). Similarly, Radam et al. (2009) surveyed
visitors in Gunung Gede Pangrango National Park (Indonesia) using the contingent
valuation method. Most respondents were willing to pay a higher entrance fee (Radam
et al., 2009, Fedler and Miles (1989) argued that people tend to pay more in accordance
with the level of development of a site and the type of available facilities. Moreover,
users prefer to pay when they know that the revenues will be returned to the collecting
area to oset the costs of management and maintenance of the ecosystem. On the
other hand, nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents in Buriganga River (Dhaka
City, Bangladesh) were unwilling to pay fees as a result of nancial issues (specically
persons in lower socioeconomic statuses) (Alam, 2005). is result raises the question
of willingness to pay for people with extremely low incomes, mainly in developing
countries (Alam, 2005). Other studies point out that user fees can exclude low-income
people from having recreational experiences in natural areas, although many of these
people agree with charging user fees (Burns & Graefe, 2006; More & Stevens, 2000).
In the context of these studies, it is important to determine what is a “fair fee.” A fair
fee may be based on individual perception, hence the relevant studies referring to
willingness to pay. Burns and Graefe (2006) and More and Stevens (2000) suggest that
having to pay a fee may change the way people experience recreation. In the case of
ecotourism, travel costs should be taken into consideration for a deeper analysis on
willingness to pay.
Entrance fees in protected areas should be applied, since most users (low or high
income) are willing to pay a fee in an eort to keep the site from deteriorating. Most of
them agree that a combination of taxes and fees paid by the public should be put back
into the protected areas and outdoor recreational sites in order to improve ecosystems
and facilities.
Political Implementation of PES
e economic model utilized for PES must be put into practice through political
means. Multiple actors play an essential role in implementation by using their power
either to support or to hinder PES. According to Krott et al. (2013, p. 4), actor-centered
power is a “social relationship in which actor A changes the behavior of actor B
without acknowledging the desires of B.” According to this model, an actor exercising
dominant power is the potentate and an actor receiving power is the subordinate (Krott
et al., 2013). Depending on the actual power resources in the specic conict, the roles
of those in power and those who are subordinate can change quickly. Bramwell and
Meyer (2007) state that power is a result of social relationships and is sustained by
resource distribution and competition. ese authors also posit the relationships of
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Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
power coming from social interactions that reect values, meanings, authority, and
control. Such relationships may occur on various levels, furthermore the theory of
actor-centered power species three dierent power elements: coercion, incentives and
dominant information (Krott et al., 2014).
According to Mariyudi (2011, p. 11) coercion is a way of forcing an actor to behave
in a certain involuntary manner though the “iniction of physical or psychological
harm.” In the case of coercion, potentates use threats or force in order to make the
subordinate act in a desired way to cooperate or obey the potentate who demands
control. e most eective method of coercion is threat, which is the “perception of
potential violence by the subordinate” (Mariyudi, 2011, p. 11).
Mariyudi (2011) states that incentives are dened as nancial or non-nancial
features that can change a subordinate’s behavior through motivation or the expectation
of benets for acting in a way other than in accordance with the subordinate’s own
preferences. e subordinate, even when well informed, is likely to pursue the goals
of the potentate and neglect his interests for perceived additional benets. Incentives
can be material (monetary or luxury goods) or moral (socially acceptable behavior)
(Mariyudi, 2011).
Dominant information refers to a change in the behavior of the subordinate
toward the potentate because the potentate possesses relevant information, leading to
the perception that the subordinate will attain benets for the potentate’s information
(Mariyudi, 2011). e information is dominant because the subordinate is either not
able or is not willing to check whether it is true or false. In this case, the subordinate
will be vulnerable to the potentate’s actions, which controls the situation through
dominant information (Mariyudi, 2011).
e actor-centered power links power to specic actors. erefore, it is important
to identify theory-based actors and to analyze their interests in PES, as well as their
means of power. e hypothesis is that implemented PES are based on the support of
specic actors, through specic means. is hypothesis is tested in the case study on
the Fernando de Noronha archipelago, which includes a National Marine Park and an
Environmental Protected Area.
Material and Methods
e eld work for this study was carried out on the Fernando de Noronha National
Marine Park and the Fernando de Noronha Environmental Protected Area in November
2014, with the aim of understanding the power relationships on the archipelago.
Interviews were conducted with the most powerful actors involved in the tourism
trade. Each interview was recorded wither permission from the interviewee, and notes
were made in the questionnaires in an eort to gather qualitative data. e Marine
Park Management authorized this survey process. Each interview took an average of
one hour, and was undertaken with various sources (e.g., the local government, park
management, NGOs) with a total of eight respondents. ese sources were selected
using a “snowball” process to ensure the inclusion of actors involved in the tourism
trade and facilitate the previous contacts with the island’s community. e rst actor
to be interviewed was the ICMBio manager (Fernando de Noronha National Marine
Park and Fernando de Noronha Environmental Protected Area) and then the snowball
process started with the other actors being mentioned as a supporter of the institution
with some level of inuence on the tourism activity.
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Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
Fernando de Noronha is an archipelago of 21 islands in northeastern Brazil (Figure
1), located 545 km from the mainland coastal capital of Recife, in the Pernambuco State.
Moreover, the archipelago is classied by the United Nations Educational, Scientic
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as part of the Brazilian Atlantic Islands (Reis
& Hayward, 2013). Fernando de Noronha is also the “capital island” and the only
one that is inhabited, with a population of 2,884 (Instituto Brasileiro de Geograa e
Estatística, 2014), although this gure does not take the transient worker population
into consideration, which can double the number on occasion (Estima, Ventura,
Rabinovici, & Martins, 2014).
12
Source: Adapted and retrieved from
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Fernando_de_Noronha-en.svg
Fernando de Noronha had successive occupation attempts by Dutch and French
explorers after the archipelago was found by the Portuguese in the early 16th century
(Ministério do Meio Ambiente, 2005 cited in Reis & Hayward, 2013). In 1737, Portugal took
permanent occupation of the islands due to its strategic position regarding ocean routes
between South America and Europe (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, 2005 cited in Reis &
Hayward, 2013). In the 18th century, a prison was built on Fernando de Noronha that lasted
Figure 1. Location of Fernando de Noronha on the Brazilian coast. Source: Adapted
and retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Fernando_de_
Noronha-en.svg
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Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
Fernando de Noronha had successive occupation attempts by Dutch and French
explorers aer the archipelago was found by the Portuguese in the early 16th century
(Ministério do Meio Ambiente, 2005, cited in Reis & Hayward, 2013). In 1737, Portugal
took permanent occupation of the islands due to its strategic position regarding ocean
routes between South America and Europe (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, 2005, cited
in Reis & Hayward, 2013). In the 18th century, a prison was built on Fernando de
Noronha that lasted for over 200 years, with convicts used as construction workers to
build forts and churches (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, 2005, cited in Reis & Hayward,
2013).
Use of the prison was discontinued in 1972, allowing the rst direct ights to the
island to be established (Andrade, Gomes, & Dias, 2009; Estima et al., 2014; Widmer,
2007). e Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park and the Fernando de Noronha
Protected Area were established in 1988 and 1989, respectively, in an eort to preserve
the island’s ecosystems and cultural heritage, as well as to allow for public visitation and
research activities (Andrade, Gomes, & Dias, 2009; Estima et al., 2014; Widmer, 2007).
e National Marine Park covers 112,7 km² and the Protected Area covers 8 km². Both
areas are managed by the Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservaçao da Biodiversidade
(ICMBio) (Andrade, Gomes, & Dias, 2009; Estima et al., 2014; Widmer, 2007).
e creation of both protected areas on Fernando de Noronha greatly increased
public awareness of the archipelago. Tourism began to emerge as a major activity due to
the island’s beautiful landscapes and beaches (Zanirato & Tomazzoni, 2014), with the
rst lodging facilities adapted from existing residences to meet the demand of tourists
(Estima et al., 2014). e rst restaurants, diving schools, and rental car services
were established in the late 1980s (Estima et al., 2014). e island’s main recreational
opportunities for visitors are hiking, scuba diving, whale, dolphin, and marine turtle
watching, and taking part in activities oered by local NGOs that are intended to raise
awareness for environmental education (Estima et al., 2014). Currently, the economy
of Fernando de Noronha is highly dependent on tourism.
In 2010, a concession agreement was signed between Fernando de Noronha
National Marine Park (ICMBio) and EcoNoronha, a private company, in order to
provide new and improved facilities and infrastructure to some of the park’s attractions
in an eort to enhance ecotourism services and diversify recreational opportunities.
is concession requires visitors to pay an entrance fee to access specied areas of
the Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park. erefore, the PES methods for the
archipelago are further described in the following section.
Results
Currently, two payment methods have been established and implemented on
Fernando de Noronha Island: the environmental preservation fee and the entrance fee.
Annual increases in tourism numbers have impacted the island’s environment,
which has encouraged authorities to establish visitation limits. e ordinance 025/95
(1995) has set a 420-per-day visitor allowance on Fernando de Noronha, according
to a carrying capacity study conducted in 1994 (Widmer, 2007). e island is further
controlled by an admission fee of R$51.40 per day, called an “environmental preservation
fee” (Taxa de Preservaçao Ambiental [TPA]). e TPA is to be paid by tourists upon
their arrival on the island via airport or seaport. is fee can be paid ahead of time
through the island’s website (Estima et al., 2014). Residents and temporary workers are
90
Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
exempted from paying the TPA. e fee is paid to the state government of Pernambuco
and is then returned to the Island Management (Gestao Insular), who decides where
to invest the money.
In order to provide ecotourism services to the public, an entrance fee was established
to allow access to specic areas of the Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park for
up to 10 consecutive days. For Brazilian citizens, this fee is R$81.00, while foreigners
are required to pay R$162.00. Brazilian citizens over 60 or under 11 years of age, legal
inhabitants and their relatives, public servants, and researchers working on Fernando
de Noronha are exempted from payment.
Fee allotment is as follows: EcoNoronha receives 15.3% of each entrance fee,
ICMBio is given 14.7%, and 70% is distributed toward various improvements of the
park’s facilities. In 2013, Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park had 61,580
visitors, of which 54,885 paid the fee. Based on this number, ICMBio is expected to
receive an estimated R$7.884.000,00 over the 15-year concession agreement (Estima et
al., 2014). Both the TPA and the entrance fee are mandatory for visitors to the island.
Economic model. e following model was designed to analyse the current situa-
tion on Fernando de Noronha with regard to actors supporting PES, based on section
1:
1. Voluntary (stakeholders should join a PES scheme on a voluntary basis): On
Fernando de Noronha all fees are mandatory.
2. Beneciary (beneciaries should pay for ecosystem services): Tourists pay for
ecosystem services on Fernando de Noronha via the TPA and the entrance fee.
e beneciaries are not only visitors, but also local residents who pay other types
of taxes, such as the Localization Licence Fee (Taxa de Licença de Localizaçao
[TLL]).
3. Direct payment (providers of ecosystem services should receive payments directly
or through a broker): On Fernando de Noronha the entrance fee is delivered
directly to ICMBio and EcoNoronha. e TPA goes to Gestao Insular through the
government of the state of Pernambuco to be invested in the island.
4. In addition (should be undertaken by resource or land manager who would pay
for actions above and beyond): In the case of Fernando de Noronha, EcoNoronha
invests in new and improved facilities and infrastructure within the National
Marine Park.
5. Conditionality (in which the payments are dependent on the perceived
environmental benets of an ecosystem service): On Fernando de Noronha,
payments are based on the management goals that are to be implemented, for
example, conservation and accessibility. Ecotourism relies on beautiful landscapes
and facilities, which is the ecosystem service that Fernando de Noronha provides.
6. Ensuring permanence (ensuring provision of continued service): On Fernando de
Noronha, it is oen dicult to reverse the implementation of facilities since they
are typically built on remote or limited access areas.
7. Avoiding leakage (no leakage and not permitting the loss elsewhere): On Fernando
de Noronha, the entire archipelago is part of the protected areas, which means that
the islands should be properly monitored in order to prevent leakage and protect
the ecosystems.
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Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
8. Fair fee (PES should be reasonable in order to allow low income tourists to visit
the site): A fair fee should only be put into practice if willingness to pay studies
were carried out prior to the fee implementation. In this context, willingness to
pay studies would be relevant since only a part of Brazil’s population is able to
visit Fernando de Noronha due to existing PES practiced on the island. Hence, the
social costs of the fees are high, since the poor are excluded from participating in
this touristic experience. On the other hand, the current fee method has proven to
be an eective measure with respect to environmental conservation.
e results indicate that the PES method implemented on Fernando de Noronha
is eective for environmental preservation. Accordingly, collected fees can be more
appropriately applied to other protected areas in Brazil that are exhibiting potential
environmental risks or degradation to sustain those local ecosystems. e powerful
actors involved in the tourism trade are oen supportive of the implementation of
fees, as the interviews show, despite the potential for such fees to limit visitors to a
certain extent. is support is primarily driven by the signicant revenues generated
by preserved landscapes, which are ultimately the main attractions of Fernando de
Noronha.
Political conditions related to fees. Economic theory identies and describes
the economic processes generated by the visitor fees. Involved actors follow these
economic processes to dierent extents but are simultaneously a part of the political
system and similarly use their power to inuence economic processes, in both legal
and illegal ways. is section takes a more in-depth look at the political actors and their
power potential.
Relevant actors. Political theory can shed light into the political situation that
surrounds the formulation and implementation of fees for the touristic use of Fernando
de Noronha. e rst step to better understand the political environment is to identify
the most powerful actors, hypothesized to control the touristic activity on the island.
erefore, a theoretical framework can be designed by identifying the types of actors
that have a political inuence on the development of tourism on Fernando de Noronha.
e theoretical framework is shown in Table 1, adapted from Schusser et al. (2016)
with the intent to identify the whole spectrum of actors which may be involved with a
certain economic activity.
Table 1 shows a broad range of relevant actors who are interested in payments for
ecotourism activities. e following section describes in greater details the actors that
are the most powerful, according to the interviewees.
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Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
Table 1
Theory-Based Actor Classifications on Fernando de Noronha
19
Actor
Definition
On Fernando de Noronha
Political entities
Politician
Actor who is elected by the
people to fulfil a public
mandate and who can
legitimise binding decisions
Government, representative
of political parties,
parliament: Conselho
Distrital*
Public administration
Public actor that makes
decisions concerning
specific problems on the
basis of general legal
standards, resolving those
problems by the
implementation of specific
measures (Krott 2005)
Nature conservation
authority, land use
authorities, agriculture
authorities, police, military:
Gestao Insular*, Secretaria
de Ciência e Tecnologia,
ICMBio*
Tourism administration
Public administration
focusing on visitation
management
Department of tourism,
tourism office, directory of
tourism: CONTUR,
Coordenadoria de
Ecoturismo*, EMPETUR,
SETUR
Traditional leader
Actor who is elected to fulfil
a public mandate and who
can legitimise binding
decisions for a community
Village leaders, traditional
healers, traditional authority,
religious leaders
Board
Actor formed by politicians,
traditional leaders or
administrations through
public mandate
Tourism boards, land use
boards, public control
boards, environmental
boards: Conselho Consultivo
do Parque Nacional Marinho
de Fernando de Noronha,
Conselho Consultivo da
Área de Proteção Ambiental
de Fernando de Noronha
Donor organization
Actor that offers funding for
solving problems
National and international
banks and organizations:
Petrobrás, Annenberg
Association, CNPq,
Ministério da Justiça, ABS,
Secretaria de Meio
Ambiente e Sustentabilidade
de Pernambuco, BOVESPA,
CVC, Fundação Boticário
Association
Actor that articulates the
interests of its represented
group and attempts to
implement them by lobbying
politicians and public
administration (Krott 2005)
Tourism association,
residents association,
environmental associations,
hotel associations:
Associação de Pousadas*,
Associação de Moradores,
ACITUR; Centro TAMAR*
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Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
Table 1 (cont.)
20
Support association
Actor that can be
characterized as an
association, but also offers
funds for solving problems
NGOs: Centro Golfinho
Rotador*
Economic entities
Local community group
representative
Actor that articulates the
interests of the local
communities and attempts to
implement them
Local community
management committee
Other group representative
Actor that articulates the
interests of other local
community groups and
attempts to implement them
Village development
committee, conservancy
management committee,
management board
Tourism entrepreneur
Actor using tourism for
profit maximization
Hotels, restaurants, tour
operators, diving schools,
cruise ships, boat renters,
event planners and owners
of related services:
EcoNoronha*, NAVE,
Operadora Atalaia,
Operadora Costa Blue.
Consultant
Actor providing information,
funds and management for
another actor, based on a
contract
Consultants: SEBRAE,
SENAC
Social entities
Research institution
Actor providing science-
based knowledge
Universities, research
centres: Universidade
Federal de Pernambuco
Media
Actors distributing and
generating information
International and national
media, such as newspapers,
journals, radio and TV
stations: TV Golfinho
Religious organization
Actor providing spiritual or
religious support
All kinds of churches,
mosques, religious or
spiritual associations: Igrejas
Católicas, Igrejas
Evangélicas
Visitor
Actor that has influence on
the economic and social
aspects of a local
community with respect to
leisure
Tourists
Source: Adapted from Schusser et al., 2016.
*Interviewed actors.
94
Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
Association: Associacao de Pousadas (Hotel Owners Association):
Interviewee Number 1
e Associaçao de Pousadas is an association that represents all 86 legally operating
hotels on the island, but only a few of these contribute nancially to the association.
e cultural dierences between small hotels (owned mainly by island natives)
and big hotels (owned by non-native Brazilians) make cooperation between both
groups dicult. Larger hotels are dominant in Fernando de Noronha. Furthermore,
infrastructure is considered to be highly decient on the island despite the recent
tourism development. Associacao de Pousadas is part of the advisory council of the
Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park and Fernando de Noronha Protected
Area, but nal decisions come from the governor of the State of Pernambuco.
Associaçao de Pousadas has some legal rights but no nancial means for incentives
nor expertise and knowledge for dominant information, such as reports and research
results.
Politician: Conselho Distrital (District Council): Interviewee Number 2
e Conselho Distrital is a governmental organization acting as an advisory
chamber and monitors all activities on the island. ey can also submit projects to
the legislative assembly, but they have no decision-making power. ere are seven
counselors who are elected by the island’s residents. eir work consists mostly of
reviewing the management plans for the archipelago’s protected areas. Moreover, the
Conselho Distrital has a chair for the advisory council of the Fernando de Noronha
National Marine Park and the Fernando de Environmental Noronha Protected Area.
e Conselho Distrital also desires to develop events during the low season and has
made eorts to decrease the entrance fee by 15% in an attempt to promote tourism
during this time of year. Furthermore, interviewee number 2 believes that large hotel
chains are detrimental for the small businesses on the island.
e carrying capacity study performed by a consultant rm was part of a contract
between a private consulting rm and ICMBio. Since the results of the study, the
authorities no longer approve the creation of hotels on the island. Yet, the unpopular
study resulted in the creation of many illegal hotels.
Conselho Distrital has legal rights for coercion, nancial means for incentives, and
expertise and knowledge for dominant information.
Tourism Administration: Coordenadoria de Ecoturismo (Ecotourism
Coordination): Interviewee Number 3
Coordenadoria de Ecoturismo is a governmental branch of the Gestao Insular and
has four employees. It deals with the planning and monitoring of ecotourism activities
in the Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park and the Fernando de Noronha
Environmental Protected Area and is nanced by the government of Pernambuco State.
Usually, the implementation of actions designed by the Coordenaria de Ecoturismo is
outsourced by other companies.
According to interviewee number 3, “tourism is crucial for human development”
on Fernando de Noronha and the island could not sustain itself without the activity.
Ecotourism promotes environmental awareness and fosters the local economy, directly
beneting the local population. e Coordenadoria de Ecoturismo participates in the
advisory council of the Fernando de Noronha Environmental Protected Area and their
demands are usually accepted.
95
Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
Coordenadoria de Ecoturismo has legal rights, nancial means for incentives, and
high expertise and knowledge for dominant information.
Tourism Entrepreneur: Concessionária EcoNoronha - Cataratas do
Iguaçu SA (Concessionaire EcoNoronha – Cataratas do Iguaçu SA):
Interviewee Number 4
EcoNoronha is responsible for managing, implementing, and maintaining
visitation facilities in the Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park. It employs
65 people on the island and 7 in Recife, all responsible for Marine Park budgets and
logistics. Part of their prots are donated to social projects and they nancially support
and promote cultural and environmental events. eir investment into the park has
been budgeted at 10 million Reais over the course of 15 years. e majority of their
return on investment comes in the form of souvenir sales and from the entrance fee
to specic areas of the park. Moreover, they conduct tourism satisfaction surveys
with a response rate ranging from 10% to 15%. Oen, tourists complain about high
prices of services, but still consider them to be of great quality. EcoNoronha expects
“improvement in the quality of visitation for tourists in Fernando de Noronha” and
actively encourages the development of environmental awareness for all visitors
(Interviewee number 4).
EcoNoronha has legal rights, nancial means for incentives, and high expertise
and knowledge for dominant information.
Public Administration: Gestao Insular (Island Management):
Interviewee Number 5
Gestao Insular is an authority of the State District of Fernando de Noronha that is
linked to the Secretary of Science and Technology. Gestao Insular has 418 employees
and is nanced by the state government, and through its own resources (e.g, the TPA
and the TLL. e TPA goes directly toward investments in infrastructure (e.g., waste
disposal, hospitals, nursing care, etc.) while the TLL goes to the state government,
before being directed back to Gestao Insular. e funds are then invested in some form
that benets the population through activities such as garbage disposal treatment and
road maintenance.
e Gestao Insular has legal rights, nancial means for incentives, and expertise
and knowledge for dominant information.
Support Association: Centro Golfinho Rotador (Rotador Dolphin Centre):
Interviewee Number 6
Centro Golnho Rotador is an NGO that was created to protect the Rotador
Dolphin but has extended its eorts toward environmental conservation as a whole
and has also focused on social welfare. Centro Golnho Rotador has 11 members and
two trainees and is funded by donations from both public and private institutions.
e two interviewed Centro Golnho Rotador members expect that tourism can
be “developed with minimum social and environmental impacts.” Furthermore, the
majority of tourism-directed decisions are made by the hotel owners, ICMBio and
Gestao Insular. Many people outside of these organisations gave up on participating
in the decision-making processes because their requests were never accepted. Many of
96
Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
research opportunities have been outlined for Fernando de Noronha, but the suggested
projects are never implemented.
e Centro Golnho Rotador has some legal rights, nancial means for incentives,
and high expertise and knowledge for dominant information.
Public Administration: ICMBio–Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservacao
da Biodiversidade (Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conserva-
tion): Interviewee Number 7
ICMBio is a government-based organization that is responsible for managing
federal protected areas within Brazil and, thus, manage the Fernando de Noronha
National Marine Park and the Fernando de Noronha Protected Area. ICMBio is
nanced by the federal and state governments and was founded in 2007. ICMBio
currently has 50 employees and eight volunteers on Fernando de Noronha.
e advisory councils of the Fernando de Noronha National Marine Park and
the Fernando de Noronha Environmental Protected Area hold six meetings annually.
Residents tend to be more involved in meetings related to the protected area because
these are focused on the urban area of the island.
While tourism generates environmental impacts and an exceeded carrying
capacity, tourism brings many benets to Fernando de Noronha. According to
interviewee number 7, “90% of the island’s residents work directly or indirectly with
tourism, primarily related to public services.” Since 2002, the creation of new hotels is
prohibited, yet the number of hotels continue to increase due to the lack of monitoring.
As a result, the island should consider expanding its urban infrastructure. e nancial
resources generated by tourism directly benet the community, since the TPA goes to
waste disposal (that is sent to the mainland) and urban infrastructure, while 70% of the
money collected from entrance fees are re-invested in the park in the form of facilities.
ICMBio has made eorts to establish a participative management program
through the advisory councils but the interviewee number 7 points out that most of
the residents leave the decisions to their “leaders.”
ICMBio has legal rights, nancial means for incentives, and high expertise and
knowledge for dominant information.
Association: Centro TAMAR–Centro Tartarugas Marinhas (Marine
Turtles Centre): Interviewee Number 8
Centro TAMAR is a cooperation between a government agency and a non-
government-based institution. With 22 bases throughout Brazil it aims at conserving
endangered marine turtle species. Being nanced by Petrobrás (Oil Company), CELPE
(Electric Company), and revenue from souvenir stores on the island, Centro TAMAR
has 18 employees on Fernando de Noronha. eir main action toward tourism is the
Ecotourism Program, which consists of three initiatives:
1. Assisted intentional capture: tourists can watch turtles being safely captured every
Monday and ursday.
2. Tartarugada: monitoring of Leao Beach to mark nests and female turtles. Only
four people can participate in this initiative due to small living quarters.
3. Nest opening: baby marine turtles release.
97
Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
Centro TAMAR has legal rights, nancial means for incentives, and high expertise
and knowledge for dominant information.
Power element with regard to PES. For this analysis, the following rates regarding
actors’ level of power were dened based on the empirical ndings of this study, as well
as existing data (Krott et al., 2014; Maryudi et al., 2012; Schusser, 2013; Schusser et al.,
2015; Schusser et al., 2016):
• No power–0 (no participation and/or support for the implementation of payments
for ecosystem services).
• Low power–1 (little participation and/or support for the implementation of
payments for ecosystem services).
• Medium power–2 (some participation and/or support for the implementation of
payments for ecosystem services).
• High Power–3 (total participation and/or support for the implementation of
payments for ecosystem services)
ese rates are then applied to the interviewed actors for this research, as follows:
Table 2
Power Elements with Regard to Payments for Ecosystem Services
e power analysis with regard to PES shows that EcoNoronha, ICMBio, and
Gestao Insular are the most powerful actors that are imposing fees on tourists and,
therefore, change their behaviour due to intense monitoring. Coercion is used in
accordance with legal power and technical control since migration control for tourists,
residents, and temporary workers is mandatory in the airport and port. is works
in practice because the aforementioned actors hold the discourse of environmental
conservation and carrying capacity that is supported by research, and are therefore
the actors with dominant information. e redistribution of PES that is invested in
environmental protection is an incentive for people to pay the entrance fee and TPA,
and is supported by all of the interviewed actors, except Conselho Distrital.
ICMBio, EcoNoronha, and Gestao Insular are responsible for imposing these
fees since it is their best interest to obtain the revenues from touristic activity and use
these. Monitoring at the airport and seaport ensures that these fees are collected for all
visitors and that no one has access to the island without paying the TPA. e Fernando
28
Interviewees
Coercion
Incentives
Dominant Information
Associacao de Pousadas
2
1
0
Conselho Distrital
1
2
2
Coordenadoria de
Ecoturismo
1
2
3
EcoNoronha
3
3
3
Gestao Insular
3
3
3
Centro Golfinho Rotador
1
1
3
ICMBio
3
3
3
Centro TAMAR
1
2
3
The power analysis with regards to PES shows that EcoNoronha, ICMBio and Gestao
Insular are the most powerful actors that are imposing fees on tourists and, therefore, change
their behaviour due to intense monitoring. Coercion is used in accordance with legal power
and technical control since migration control for tourists, residents and temporary workers is
mandatory in the airport and port. This works in practice because the aforementioned actors
hold the discourse of environmental conservation and carrying capacity that is supported by
research, and are therefore the actors with dominant information. The redistribution of PES
that is invested in environmental protection is an incentive for people to pay the entrance fee
and TPA, and is supported by all of the interviewed actors, except Conselho Distrital.
ICMBio, EcoNoronha and Gestao Insular are responsible for imposing these fees
since it is their best interest to obtain the revenues from touristic activity and use these.
Monitoring at the airport and seaport ensures that these fees are collected for all visitors and
that no one has access to the island without paying the TPA. The Fernando de Noronha
National Marine Park has fenced-off beaches where visitors must show their previously paid
“visitor card”, valid for ten days, in the PICs (control posts). The visitor card is checked
electronically in order to be granted access to these specific beaches within the park, showing
that coercion is what proves the fees to be effective.
The entrance fee and TPA are therefore viable PES schemes (or fee methods) on
Fernando de Noronha, especially as a result of many unique landscapes within a confined
98
Dutra de Araujo, Krott, and Hubo
de Noronha National Marine Park has fenced-o beaches where visitors must show
their previously paid “visitor card,” valid for 10 days, in the PICs (control posts). e
visitor card is checked electronically in order to be granted access to these specic
beaches within the park, showing that coercion is what proves the fees to be eective.
e entrance fee and TPA are therefore viable PES schemes (or fee methods)
on Fernando de Noronha, especially as a result of many unique landscapes within
a conned geographical area. e interviewed actors believe that the archipelago is
environmentally preserved because of the fees which prevents overcrowding, the factor
which is regarded as the main cause of environmental damage.
e less powerful actors (Associaçao de Pousadas, Conselho Distrital,
Coordenadoria de Ecoturismo, Centro Golnho Rotador and Centro TAMAR)
support the PES scheme on Fernando de Noronha because it is in their best interest to
work in a preserved environment, either by promoting the island as a touristic product
or using it for research purposes.
Conclusions
PES, specically for ecotourism, can be successfully implemented if they are
supported by the most powerful actors in a given area. In the case of Fernando de
Noronha, it is shown that a PES scheme (or fee method) can work in practice, despite
the criticisms of some. e key factor in eective implementation is coercion, since
payment is mandatory and all the possible access areas are monitored. However,
this monitoring allows tourists and residents to enjoy a well-preserved environment
through ecotourism.
In Fernando de Noronha, the prots go to EcoNoronha and ICMBio in the form of
an entrance fee, and the Gestao Insular in the form of the TPA. Some standards of the
economic model are neglected because they go against the interest of powerful actors.
For example, the touristic areas on the island are enhanced, while residential areas
receive low investments because they do not generate prot for these organizations.
e majority of powerful actors are supporters of PES. Even though Conselho
Distrital believes the fees are excessively expensive, there can be no increase in the
number of tourists in the island according to the dened carrying capacity. e capacity
model states that a specic number of tourists can be on Fernando de Noronha at the
same time, as indicated in legal documents and as observed during the interviews.
EcoNoronha and ICMBio are the actors that link PES to ecology, because their
revenues are reinvested in environmental conservation in the form of low impact
facilities and infrastructure, as well as on work force training.
e entrance fee contributes to the island’s environmental conservation since
EcoNoronha has been working on establishing and improving low impact facilities
for ecotourism. e Gestao Insular works towards providing urban infrastructure via
the TPA, although most of the interviewees believe that these eorts are not sucient.
e park management and public administration oces can benet from
the results of this study, provided that they take the powerful actors’ interests into
consideration for tourism planning and the designing of PES. e powerful actors also
are an important driving force behind tourism development and therefore have the
ability to inuence decision-making processes. Residents’ participation in the planning
process is also highly encouraged.
99
Payments for Ecosystem Services through Ecotourism
Finally, results show that PES schemes can be valuable for preserving ecosystem
services through ecotourism in protected areas. is occurs if the revenues are re-
invested into the preservation of the site, which is the case with the Fernando de
Noronha National Marine Park. On the other hand, willingness to pay studies should
be carried out to encourage the park management and public administration oces
to set more fair fees so that tourists of all social classes can partake in this experience.
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