Madagascar is one of the richest countries when it comes to natural and mineral resources. As is the case in many tropi-cal countries, however, this wealth is bluntly coupled with an ever increasing poverty, where more than 92 % of the 21 mil-lion inhabitants are living below $US2 a day. Madagascar has received international aid and conservation interests for years, as part of which, millions of dollars have been donated to the country, but with very little to show for it (Horning 2008). When Madagascar appeared to hit rock bottom in 2009, a political coup d'état took place which led to the international donor community curtailing financial support (Randrianja 2012). During the following years, the transitional government did not receive the international support that the previous government had benefitted from. Here we will analyze the pattern of two cases of natural resource governance, both coinciding with a political event. Case 1 pertains to rosewood: Since 2009, illegal logging and exporting of rosewood has reached unprecedented levels in Madagascar (Schuurman and Lowry 2009, Innes 2010, Randriamalala and Liu 2010) affecting the entire east coast, with highest intensity of pillage in the national parks of Masoala and Marojejy. In 2011, reportedly over 500,000 tons of rosewood were in stocks; discussions among experts at the global table revolved around a solution finding to best deal with these stocks (Randriamalala et al. 2011). However, the issue then went mysteriously silent to a remarkable degree for almost two years. In the meantime, the African Union supported by the interna-tional community pushed the current government to organize presidential elections with a first round on 25 October 2013, and the second and final round scheduled for 20 December 2013. Coincidently, in mid 2013 the World Bank requested a "Study to Assess the Options of Disposal of the Illicit Stocks of Rosewood and Ebony" 1 issued 31 July 2013 with a deadline for the expressions of interest fixed at 13 August 2013. During the last year, a new phenomenon has emerged: inventoried rosewood logs have slowly but regularly been ferreted out of the depots they were stored in. During the early months of 2013, traffickers from Maroantsetra visited the Masoala peninsula and generously offered 1 million MGA per household to turn a blind eye regarding any rosewood. Simul-taneously, large vessels positioned just too far to be seen from any shore, were collecting logs transferred to them at night in smaller boats. Encouraged by the incredulous ineptitude on the part of the local legal authorities, this process has been ongoing, even during daylight hours, with the 'mother ships' eventually even clearly visible from the shores. The timber stocks in the known depots have almost been completely cleared out by now. At the end of September 2013 a petition was suddenly circulated by EIA (Environmental Investigation Agency) bearing the message "Urgent Sign -on To Stop Madagascar Illegal Sale of Massive Stockpiles of Rosewood and Ebony" that many people and international and national NGOs have signed 2 . Interestingly, the concerns revolved around the estimated value of stocks, whether they were worth US$5 billion or only US$600 million. The question which goes begging is, why is the World Bank suddenly trying to find a legal solution for the stocks, when they de facto have already been removed from Madagascar and transported to Asia? We propose the following hypotheses as some food for thought: (i) There is insufficient information to assess the quantity and value of the remaining stocks. If any stock does indeed remain, it does represent a threat to the natural resources, and in principle, conservation NGOs cannot support the legalizing of the sale of such stocks. This implies that in the past, the legalizing and therefore selling of timber held in stocks represented a threat to the remaining precious trees, i.e., it has led to further illegal logging (Randriamalala and Liu 2010). (ii) The stockpiled timber has already steadily and consistently been exported to China: the government, the conservation community, and the public are all cognizant of this. There is a complex financial arrangement proposed by the international funding agencies and promoters of democracy, to appease all the parties involved in the case of dealing in illegally-felled rosewood 3 . Hypothesis 1 appears naïve and almost unrealistic, given that the case is well known by all the parties involved. Hypoth-esis 2 requires a deeper understanding of the financial, legal, and institutional mechanisms involved, since international funding agencies and the World Bank are not allowed to support an illegitimate government (i.e., one which assumed power through a coup d'état). The question which remains alludes to a problem which may be described as "wicked", for lack of a better prescriptive (cf. Rittel and Webber 1973): how can someone make more money from a product which has already been sold? We will try to shed some light by performing a reductio ad absurdum, which entails a step -by -step hypothetical appeas-ing of every party or individual involved in the rosewood traf-ficking process. To begin with, we ask the question: where do the interests of the various actors, really lie? This may be answered as follows: (i) Some, such as international funding agencies and NGOs seek a 'green' image. (ii) Others wish to be seen as promoters of democracy (western countries). (iii) Some are in a position of being in dire need of funding: they include certain NGOs and the Malagasy government. (iv) Some are lenders of money: these are the funding agencies and foreign governments. (v) There are some seeking to launder money, i.e., timber sellers and buyers. To 'green -wash' the illegally -sourced logs, necessitates the issuance of a CITES permit, something which could be lobbied for by NGOs, who would then receive money from the funding agencies, officially to help them protect the wildlife. On the other hand, timber traders and buyers would thereby legalize their business, and push for the supporting of the required democratic process, i.e., the ongoing elections. Therefore, the value of the legalized stocks of wood would lie in its 'greening -up' of the buyers' profiles, and allow some