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Some Buddhist Notions on Time and on Sense of Time

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Abstract

The principle of causality or of dependent origination (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda, Pāli paṭiccasamuppāda) is central in philosophy of Buddhism. The idea that everithing is impermanent, conditioned, that there is nothing permanent or eternal, brings to mind different thoughts about time. In the present article some of the Buddhist ideas concerning time and the sense of time are considered. Psychologically, there are intimate relationships between the sense of time, the structure of human thought, the sense of body, and the sense of self – the loss of the sense of body and time results in collapse of the sense of self. And the collapse of the sense of self is central in Buddhism.
Some Buddhist notions on time and on the sense of time
Gergana Ruseva
Fourth International Scientific Conference "The Silk Road”
June 01-02, 2017, Sofia, Bulgaria
Abstract
The principle of causality or of dependent origination (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda, Pāli
paṭiccasamuppāda) is central in philosophy of Buddhism. The idea that everithing is
impermanent, conditioned, that there is nothing permanent or eternal, brings to mind
different thoughts about time. In the present article some of the Buddhist ideas concerning
time and the sense of time are considered. Psychologically, there are intimate relationships
between the sense of time, the structure of human thought, the sense of body, and the sense
of self – the loss of the sense of body and time results in collapse of the sense of self. And
the collapse of the sense of self is central in Buddhism.
Keywords: sense of time, time, doctrine of momentariness, flow, present moment,
Buddhism, psychology of Buddhism
When we investigate the nature of time and the sense of time we try to isolate the
sense of time from all other senses and feelings, from thoughts, from the sense of body and
from the sense of the self. In fact, there are intimate relationships between the sense of
time, the structure of human thought and sensations, the sense of body, and the sense of self
(Ataria, Neria, 2013, Zhou, Pöppel, Bao, 2014). When we speak about the sense of time in
Buddhism we should have in mind that some of the teachings about time are based on
personal experience during meditation or some other practices leading to altered states of
consciousness (ASC)1 and that these teachings about time and sense of time are internally
connected with the sense of causality, of saṃsāra, of the dharmas, of body, and of self.
1 ASC can occur spontaneously, or can be achieved through meditation, hypnosis, psychedelic drugs, can result from
traumatic experiences such as isolation, hunger, and near-death experience, and can cause varying levels of alertness,
reduced concentration, sharpened senses, generation of unity among senses, hallucinations, etc. See Ataria, Neria,
2013.
We know that during ASC human thought can change dramatically, people can
receive completely new type of knowledge, and the world perception, including time
perception, can be reshaped (see Ataria, Neria, 2013). Time may lose its “pace”, duration,
direction, and its fundamental link to causality system. The ability to estimate time can
disappear and, in certain cases a sense of lack of time and a sense of existence outside time
can develop.2 “Evidence suggests that the loss of the sense of body and the loss of the sense
of time are in fact connected; that is, they collapse together. This breakdown in turn results
in collapse of the sense of self.” (Ataria, Neria, 2013: 159). And the collapse of the sense of
self is central in Buddhism.
One important thing here is that practice of meditation can vary according to the
concepts of the concrete Buddhist teaching and that different practices cause different states
of consciousness with different sense of time. So there is no single teaching about time, but
many teachings, connected with a sense of time in accordance with the sense of saṃsāra,
dharmas, causality or dependent origination, and with the sense of self or no-self, anatta.
For example, the teaching of momentariness is based not on the idea that the time is
discrete, but on the idea that there are no real entities that last more than a moment. So it is
not a teaching of time but of complete change (or more precisely shift) in every moment –
the world (and all its components) is absolutely new in the next moment and the illusion
that it is the same and that the things have some time stretch is conditioned by dependent
origination.
We also will pay some attention to the question do Buddhists have a special sense
of time which is reflexed in their teachings, or do they have the same old sense of time but
conceptualize it in a different manner. Is it possible the structure of human thought to be
like a matrix forming or at least affecting the sense of time? Is it possible, for example, the
doctrine of the lack of eternal, stretched in time entity to bring about the sense of discrete
time?
In the first part of this article we will consider the experience of time according to
Buddhism – the experience is at the heart of various concepts of the world, or at least can
color the concepts, in particular, the concepts of time. Then we will see how this experience
2 See Ataria, Neria, 2013, and their bibliography on the subject.
is mirrored in language – we will consider words signifying “time”, paying special attention
to the word Skt. kṣaṇa, Pāli khaṇa. At last we will look at different Buddhist schools
concerned with time and experience of time, and at the doctrine of momentariness and the
experience of momentariness.
We derive time from events. Linearity and imperativity of time
Now we will focus on the deep laid notion of linearity and imperativity of time, on
the way out of this absolute time, on living in the present moment and on the so called
“flow”.
The Buddha insisted that the beginning of the universe is inconceivable, yet that it is
possible to speak about moments of evolution and dissolution in terms of eons – periods of
immense duration, that can be illustrated by similes.3 From these similes we can see that for
the Buddha (long) time duration is determined by events. In Saṃyutta Nikāya is said:
Sāvatthiyaṃ. Atha kho aññataro bhikkhū yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkami.
Upasaṅkamitvā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinno
kho so bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etadavoca: ''kīvadīgho nu kho bhante, kappo'' ti?
Dīgho kho bhikkhu, kappo. So na sukaro saṅkhātuṃ ettakāni vassāni iti vā,
ettakāni vassasatāni iti vā, ettakāni vassasahassāni iti vā, ettakāni
vassasatasahassāni iti vā'ti. Sakkā pana bhante, upamaṃ kātunti? Sakkā
bhikkhū'ti bhagavā avoca. mahāselo pabbato yojanaṃ āyāmena, yojanaṃ
vitthārena, yojanaṃ ubbedhena, acchiddo asusiro ekaghano, tamenaṃ puriso
vassasatassa vassasatassa accayena kāsikena vatthena sakiṃ sakiṃ parimajjeyya,
khippataraṃ kho so bhikkhu mahāselo pabbato iminā upakkamena parikkhayaṃ
pariyādānaṃ gaccheyya, na tveva kappo. Evaṃ dīgho kho bhikkhu, kappo. Evaṃ
dīghānaṃ kho bhikkhu, kappānaṃ neko kappo saṃsito nekaṃ kappasataṃ
saṃsitaṃ, nekaṃ kappasahassaṃ saṃsitaṃ, nekaṃ kappasatasahassaṃ saṃsitaṃ.
Taṃ kissa hetu? Anamataggoyaṃ bhikkhu, saṃsāro pubbākoṭi na paññāyati
avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhā saṃyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarataṃ.
3 Kalupahana, 1974.
Yāvañcidaṃ bhikkhave, alameva sabbasaṅkhāresu nibbindituṃ, alaṃ virajjituṃ,
alaṃ vimuccitunti. (3.1.5. Pabbatasuttaṃ, Saṃyuttanikāyo, 268)4
At Savatthi. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to
him, sat down to one side, and said to him: "Venerable sir, how long is an aeon?"
"An aeon is long, bhikkhu. It is not easy to count it and say it is so many years, or
so many hundreds of years, or so many thousands of years, or so many hundreds
of thousands of years." "Then is it possible to give a simile, venerable sir?" "It is
possible, bhikkhu," the Blessed One said. "Suppose, bhikkhu, there was a great
stone mountain a yojana5 long, a yojana wide, and a yojana high, without holes or
crevices, one solid mass of rock. At the end of every hundred years a man would
stroke it once with a piece of silk cloth. That great stone mountain might by this
effort be worn away and eliminated but the aeon would still not have come to an
end. So long is an aeon, bhikkhu. And of aeons of such length, we have wandered
through so many aeons, so many hundreds of aeons, so many thousands of aeons,
so many hundreds of thousands of aeons. For what reason? Because, bhikkhu, this
saṃsāra is without discoverable beginning… It is enough to be liberated from
them."6
From this passage emphasizing the immensity of time one can also conclude that according
to the Buddha we derive time from events, we use events to measure time.7
We often assume that abstract, uniform, and objective time is a universal physical
entity. But this kind of evenly flowing time was introduced to us only recently together
with the mechanical clock. Before the introduction of mechanical clock, events were used
to measure time and our natural way of time-keeping depends on the perception, estimation
and coordination of events. Our experience and understanding of time emerges from our
perception of events.8 Even the principle of operation of mechanical clock is based on
4 GRETIL
5 A measure of distance, sometimes regarded as equal to 4 or 5, sometimes to 9, and sometimes to 2,5 English miles.
6 Here is given the Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of Saṃyutta Nikāya, 2000: 654.
7 See Forman, 2015. Buddhism is essentially a practical school which goal is to overcome suffering (Skt. duḥkha,
Pāli dukkha). Early Buddhism is not a system of metaphysics so we don’t expect to find there abstract notions
concerning time. See Koller, 1974.
8 See Forman, 2015.
events: a uniform artificial event is generated and repeated, while keeping an accumulative
count. With the mechanical clock a new sort of uniform, objective, abstract time,
independent of events, emerged (Forman, 2015).
Of course it is obvious that the experience of this linear absolute time is not new at
all. The imperative pace of time is a real factor, for example, for ancient agricultural
societies. The Buddhists have some kind of psychological approach to this imperative,
linear, absolute time – and to the liberation from it. The basic idea of Buddhist teachings is
to eliminate suffering duḥkha or dukkha9 (especially the “third-level” suffering). To do this
one has to see the true nature of the self one has to realize that the reason for this
suffering is the instinctive sense of unchanging, eternal, separate self. This self requires a
particular linear temporal order in which to operate. So time is objectified and is felt like an
external compelling force.10
Our experience then appears to be confined to the realm of linear time, where events
unfold in a predictable sequence, moving forward from the past, to the present, and in to the
future. This is what is called conditioned existence and we act as if this linear time is
absolute.11
Let us for a while leave aside Buddhism and its psychological approach towards
time. Is it possible time to have a more peculiar structure? We often say “the thread of
time”. Can it be “the twisted thread of time”, or can this thread of time possess an
additional structure? Can it be like having primary, secondary and tertiary structure DNA
molecule? We can speak about the DNA structure because it is extended in space, but time
is not extended in space. And since the space is defined by the objects, extended in it, time
is defined by the events the events are extended in time, i.e. time may have a more
peculiar structure, relative to the motion and phenomena, and “thread” gives the sequence
9 According to Ronald Purser (2014), there are three kinds or levels of suffering in Buddhism: the physical and
mental pain; the suffering of change (any phenomenon or being that arises is subject to change and will also pass
away); and suffering of conditioned existence – the basis of the other two levels of suffering. It is the deepest level
existential suffering based on the premise that everything is subject to the laws of karman or karma and dependent
origination and a vague feeling that self may be empty and devoid of separate identity. “This level of suffering is
usually repressed, or covered up, through incessant goal-directed activities that are attempts to make the self feel
more secure, grounded and real. The suffering of conditioning, or “third-level” suffering, requires the deepest level
of investigation of temporality…” Purser, 2014: 1.
10 For more detail see Purser, 2014.
11 Ibid.
of events and cause-and-effect relationship. Moreover, subjective time is also connected
with states of consciousness, structure of thought, and perception, i.e. the secondary and
tertiary structures can arise from quite subjective perspective.
For the way out of the imperativity of time Dōgen (an eminent 13th century Japanese
Zen master, founder of Sōtō school) gives another idea: we are not in time, but we are time.
According to Dōgen (as far as I can understand his teachings) the one is not in time, he/she
is not an observer of the flow of time he/she is the very flow of time. One is not in the
flow looking for a shore one with all his/her experiences, feelings and thoughts is this
very flow, and this flow is time.12
In Anguttara Nikāya, IV.137. is said: “There is no moment, no inkling, no particle
of time that the river stops flowing.”13
The present moment
According to the Pāli scriptures one has to realize enlightenment in the immediate
present.14
Do not chase after the past; do not seek for the future.
The past is already no more; the future is not yet.
And see the elements of present in every place, without attachment,
Without moving – yet clearly see and strive in the present.
Do earnestly the task for today; who knows the nearness of death on the morrow?
Truly who can say he will not meet the great army of death?
Such a man of realization, earnestly striving day and night without indolence,
He, surely, is the sage of time, the peaceful one, the steady one.
(Majjhima Nikāya, 131-134)15
As Sharf (2013) pointed out, early Zen masters recommended intense immersion in
the flow of here-and-now to reach a nonconceptual and nondiscursive awareness, leading to
12 For more detail see Abe, 1992: 77-105; Stambaugh, 1990: 24-71; Purser, 2014; Miyamoto, 1959. Here I would
like to mention also the so called “flow” experience in sport psychology.
13 Citation is according to Kalupahana, 1974: 184.
14 See Miyamoto, 1959.
15 Here I cite the translation given in Miyamoto, 1959: 122.
a state of inner stillness. But Zen reformers Dahui and later Hakuin in Japan thought that
these methods lead to an imbalanced state of “meditation sickness”, in which the meditator
is attached to a dull, peaceful, and blissful stillness and has no concern for the suffering of
the world.16
Cyclic conception of existence
Cyclic events such as the day-night cycle, the cycle of the sun, the cycle of the
moon’s phases are at the basis of calendars since ancient times. The cyclic conception of
existence according to Buddhism is the idea that until one is liberated he/she is bound to be
born, live and die again and again. So there is a cyclic nature of reality, but this does not
mean that the time is cyclic. Only after a very long period a Bodhisattva can become an
enlighten person – a Buddha. “Despite the cyclic nature of the Bodhisattva’s existences and
of the intervening world ages, the vast expanse of time unfolding between the initial
aspiration and the final attainment is conceived of in linear terms. While the wheel
traveling over the road revolves, the road itself does not.”17
Causality
In Majjhima Nikāya, 115, Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta: Sutta 38, i, 262-264, 19 is
said:
Sādhu bhikkhave. Iti kho bhikkhave tumhe pi evaṃ vadetha aham-pi evaṃ vadāmi:
[Iti] imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass' uppādā idaṃ uppajjati…18 (Majjhima Nikāya,
Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta: Sutta 38, i, 263-264)
Good, bhikkhus. So you say thus, and I also say thus: 'When this exists, that comes
to be; with the arising of this, that arises.'19
16 Purser, 2014. Purser (2014) made also some very interesting remarks on the contemporary practices of
mindfulness meditation and especially to the contemporary starving for the present moment. On the present moment
see Montemayor, Wittmann, 2014.
17 Rospatt, 2004.
18 GRETIL.
19 Here is given the Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of Majjhima Nikāya, 1995: 355-356.
Let us consider the causal principle presented here by the Buddha. Because of the
locative absolute construction in the sentence imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti it can be translated
also as a conditional clause “If this exists, that comes to be”20. And this means that
according to the Buddha events cannot be predicted and are not determined with certainty.21
Omniscience and especially knowledge of the future is not claimed by the Buddha
according to causal principal could be made only predictions. And one can perceive only
causality (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda, Pāli paṭiccasamuppāda):
Vuttaṃ kho pan' etaṃ Bhagavatā: Yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ
passati. yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatīti.
Now this has been said by the Blessed One: "One who sees dependent origination
sees the Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination."
(Majjhima Nikāya, Mahāhatthipadopamasuttaṃ Sutta: Sutta 28, i, 284: 190-191)
Here one should have in mind that in Yogasūtra 3.16. of Patañjali the knowledge of
the pariṇāmatraya (the three changes) means also knowledge of the past and knowledge of
the future.22
Sanskrit and Pāli words signifying “time”
Let us now refer to the Sanskrit and Pāli words signifying “time”. There are:
samaya, kāla, kṣaṇa (khaṇa) and adhvan (addhan).23 Samaya means “coming together”,
“meeting”, “contract”, “agreement”, “opportunity”, “appointed time” or “proper time”.
Kāla means time in general, as in kāla-vādatime-doctrine”. Kāla signifies also appointed
or suitable time, meal-time or the time of death. In Sanskrit death is expressed kāla kṛta
(Pāli kāla-kata), meaning literally, "whose time is completed."24 Sanskrit kṣaṇa (Pāli
20 See also Kalupahana, 1974.
21 According to Sarvāstivāda ("the theory of all exists", originated between 3rd century BC and around the turn of the
Christian era), one of the most influential early school of Buddhism, flourishing throughout Northwest India,
Northern India, and Central Asia, all dharmas exist in the past, present and future. From this contemporal existence
of past, present and future it is implicated that the consequence preexists in the cause and that what will be is
completely determined from what is and from what was, so temporality becomes just an illusion.
22 See Yogasutra, 3.16. of Patañjali (pariṇāmatrayasaṃyamādatītānāgatajñānam.) and the commentary of Vyāsa.
See also Ruseva, 2015.
23 According to Miyamoto, 1959.
24 As a compound of the bahuvṛhī type.
khaṇa) can be “a moment”, “an opportunity”, or the moment of fulfillment of a purpose. At
last, adhvan refers to a stretch or length of space or time, a road or journey in space and
time (Miyamoto, 1959). In oldest Buddhist literature the word samaya, according to
Miyamoto (1959), is the most frequent – almost all sūtras begin with the words:
Evaṃ mayā śrutam: ekasmin samaye Bhagavān Rājaghe viharati sma…
Thus have I heard: at one time the Blessed One was staying at Rājagha…25
The word kṣaṇa
The word kṣaṇa means “a moment”, “a very brief unit of time (for example, 1/75th
second)”, in some contexts can mean the momentary entity itself (Rospatt, 1995: 94-110).
In accord with its etymology from akṣan "eye", kṣaṇa refers to the winking of the eye, and
more precisely, to the time taken by the winking. In the Theravada canon khaṇa (=kṣaṇa)
often denotes "opportunity," "auspicious moment".26
In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, however, the word kṣaṇa is used as the smallest unit of
time, according to the Abhidharmic texts, as "time's furthest extreme" (kālaparyanta) the
smallest indivisible unit of time27. The division of time into kṣaṇas is considered in the
same manner as the division of matter into atoms and of speech into syllablesneither of
which is infinitely divisible. This atomistic conception of time probably has been taken for
granted (Rospatt, 1995: 96-98).
In Madhyamaka (RA 1.69-70), however, the conception of the kṣaṇa as the smallest
unit of time is refuted:
yathānto 'sti kṣaṇasyaivam ādimadhyaṃca kalpyatām/ tryātmakatvāt
kṣaṇasyaivaṃ na lokasya kṣaṇaṃ sthitiḥ //69// ādimadhyāvasānāni cintyāni
kṣaṇavat punaḥ. (kā 69-70)
25 The citation is according to Miyamoto, 1959: 118. “In these introductory phrases, the four conditions–time, place,
the master and his audience are posited. The coming together of these four necessarily indicates an auspicious
event which happens once for all in the long eons of sacred history.” (Miyamoto, 1959: 118). The most important
and auspicious time is the moment of Buddha's enlightenment.
26 Rospatt, 1995: 94-95.
27 Rospatt, 1995: 96-98. “bhettum aśakyaḥ; kṣaṇo bhavet”, Pramānaṇavārttikavṛtti, Rospatt, 1995: 96.
As the moment has an end, also its beginning and middle have to be assumed.
Since the moment is thus endowed with these three sections, the duration of the
world is not a moment. Beginning, middle and end [of the moment] should be
considered [to have], in their turn, [beginning, middle and end,] just as the moment
(which leads to an infinite regress).28
On the basis of the Buddhist ideas that there is nothing more transient than mental
events and that each event is a distinct mental entity, kṣaṇa the shortest conceivable
incident, became to represent the duration of mental entities.29
In order to account for the fact that the word kṣaṇa may refer both to an instant of
time and to the entity existing during this instant, E. Steinkellner renders Tibetan variant of
kṣaṇa by "phase."30
Time and of sense of time according to some of the different schools of
Buddhism
Early Buddhism considered both time and causation as parts of our experience, not
as mere inferences based primarily on the succession of momentary ideas. Somehow it
follows the middle path: absolute abstract time is an extreme and unnecessary hypothesis
and time is not an illusion of the intellect.31
The Buddha said in Diggha Nikāya III.134 (or Samyutta Nikāya II: 84-97):
“This physical body made up of the four primary existents is seen to exist for one,
two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, hundred years. That which is
called the mind, thought or consciousness arises as one thing and ceases as another
whether by night or by day.”32
28 The citation is according to Roaspatt, 1995: 98, note 217.
29 Rospatt, 1995: 102.
30 Ibid., 109, note 246.
31 Kalupahana, 1974.
32 Citation is according to Kalupahana, 1974: 184.
This is a description of the two types of experience: the experience of things that
endure for some time, and the experience of momentary things.33 Mental entities are
conceived as being more transient than the physical objects. Gradually, mental entities are
thought to last less and less, i.e. at last they are conceived to be momentary.34
Time is not an object of the five senses, so it could be viewed as an illusion of the
intellect. But when speaking about the idea of Sarvāstivāda that past and future exist in the
present (in the form of dharmas) and that time is not real but mere illusion of the intellect,
we can consider the following linguistic contra-argument of the Buddha:35
Sāvatthi. Tatra voca. Tayo me bhikkhave niruttipathā adhivacanapathā
paññattipathā asaṃkiṇṇā asaṃkiṇṇapubbā na saṃkīyanti na saṃkīyissanti
appaṭikuṭṭhā samaṇehi brāhmaṇehi viññūhi. Katame tayo. Ya hi bhikkhave
rūpam atītaṃ niruddhaṃ vipariṇatam. ahosīti tassa saṅkhā. ahosīti tassa
samaññā. ahosīti tassa paññatti. Na tassa saṅkhā atthīti na tassa saṅkhā
bhavissatīti. vedanā atītā niruddhā vipariṇatā. ahosīti tassā saṅkhā. ahosīti
tassā samaññā. ahosīti tassā paññatti. Na tassā saṅkhā atthīti. na tassā saṅkhā
bhavissatīti. saññā. Ye saṅkhārā atītā niruddhā vipariṇatā. ahesunti tesaṃ
saṅkhā. ahesunti tesam samaññā. ahesunti tesam paññatti. Na tesaṃ saṅkhā
atthīti. na tesaṃ saṅkhā bhavissatīti. Yaṃ viññāṇam atītaṃ niruddhaṃ
vipariṇataṃ. ahosīti tassa saṅkhā. ahosīti tassa samaññā. ahosīti tassa paññatti.
Na tassa saṅkhā atthīti. na tassa saṅkhā bhavissatīti. Yam bhikkhave rūpaṃ
ajātam apātubhūtam. bhavissatīti tassa saṅkhā. bhavissatīti tassa samaññā.
bhavissatīti tassa paññatti. Na tassa saṅkhā atthīti. na tassa saṅkhā ahosīti.
vedanā ajātā apātubhūtā. bhavissatīti tassā saṅkhā. bhavissatīti tassā samaññā.
bhavissatīti tassā paññatti. Na tassā saṅkhā atthīti. na tassā saṅkhā ahosīti.
saññā. pe. Ye saṅkhārā ajātā apātubhūtā. bhavissantīti tesaṃ saṅkhā.
bhavissantīti1 tesaṃ samaññā. bhavissantīti tesam paññatti. Na tesaṃ saṅkhā
atthīti. na tesaṃ saṅkhā ahesun ti. Yaṃ viññāṇam ajātam apātubhūtam.
bhavissatīti tassa saṅkhā. bhavissatīti tassa samaññā. bhavissatīti tassa paññatti.
33 See Kalupahana, 1974, Rospatt, 1995: 113-121.
34 See Rospatt, 1995:113-121.
35 See also Kalupahana, 1974.
Na tassa saṅkhā atthīti. na tassa saṅkhā ahosīti. Yam bhikkhave rūpaṃ jātam
pātubhūtaṃ atthīti tassa saṅkhā. atthīti tassa samaññā. atthīti tassa paññatti. Na
tassa saṅkhā ahosīti. na tassa saṅkhā bhavissatīti. vedanā jātā pātubhūtā.
atthīti tassā saṅkhā. atthīti tassā samaññā. atthīti tassa paññatti. Na tassā saṅkhā
ahosīti. na tassa saṅkhā bhavissatīti. Yā saññā. Ye saṅkhārā jātā pātubhūtā atthīti
tesaṃ saṅkhā. atthīti tesaṃ samaññā. atthīti tesam paññatti. na tesaṃ saṅkhā
ahesun ti. na tesaṃ saṅkhā bhavissantīti. Yaṃ viññāṇaṃ jātam pātubhūtam. atthīti
tassa saṅkhā. atthīti tassa samaññā. atthīti tassa paññatti. na tassa saṅkhā ahosīti.
na tassa saṅkhā bhavissatīti. Ime kho bhikkhave tayo niruttipathā
adhivacanapathā paññattipathā asaṃkiṇṇā asaṃkiṇṇapubbā na saṃkīyant na
saṃkīyissanti appaṭikuṭṭhā samaṇehi brāhmaṇehi viññūhi.36 (SN 3,22(1).62 (10)
Niruttipatha)
62 (10) Pathways of Language
At Savatthi. "Bhikkhus, there are these three pathways of language, pathways of
designation, pathways of description, that are unmixed, that were never mixed,
that are not being mixed, that will not be mixed, that are not rejected by wise
ascetics and brahmins. What three? "Whatever form, bhikkhus, has passed, ceased,
changed: the term, label, and description 'was' applies to it, not the term 'is' or the
term 'will be.' "Whatever feeling… Whatever perception…Whatever volitional
formations... Whatever consciousness has passed, ceased, changed: the term, label,
and description 'was' applies to it, not the term 'is' or the term 'will be.' "Whatever
form, bhikkhus, has not been born, has not become manifest: the term, label, and
description 'will be' applies to it, not the term 'is' or the term 'was.' "Whatever
feeling… Whatever perception… Whatever volitional formations… Whatever
consciousness has not been born has not become manifest: the term, label, and
description 'will be' applies to it, not the term 'is' or the term 'was.' "Whatever
form, bhikkhus, has been born, has become manifest: the term, label, and
description 'is' applies to it, not the term 'was' or the term 'will be.' "Whatever
feeling… Whatever perception…Whatever volitional formations…Whatever
consciousness has been born, has become manifest: the term, label, and description
36 GRETIL.
'is' applies to it, not the term 'was' or the term 'will be.' "These, bhikkhus, are the
three pathways of language, pathways of designation, pathways of description, that
are unmixed, that were never mixed, that are not being mixed, that will not be
mixed, that are not rejected by wise ascetics and brahmins.37
(Saṃyutta Nikāya III. 22. 62 (10) Khandhasamyutta: 905)
In order to eliminate the conception of an eternal self, Buddha developed analytical
method of reducing things to their components – the human personality was analyzed either
into five aggregates (Skt skandha, Pāli khandha), either into six elements (dhātu), which
were the contents of experience, not just of logical analysis. However, the analytical
approach reached the logical conclusion, and together with the emergence of a theory of
atoms (paramāṇu), came out the theory of moments (Skt. kṣaṇa, Pāli khaṇa) and temporal
atomicity.38 There are many difficulties connected with analysis of time in atomic units.
The most difficult problem of this theory of moments is connected with the experienced
continuity of temporal events: a moment is durationless, comparable to the dimensionless
point of space, and so past, present, and future moments are completely distinct from each
other. They are discrete and have no connection between each other. This problem is solved
differently in different schools of Buddhism.
According to the Sarvāstivāda there is unchangeable substance or “own-nature”
(dravya, svabhāva), underlying the succession of momentary events. So, everything
(dharma) has two aspects: temporal (kālika, kṣaṇika) characteristic (lakṣaṇa) and eternal or
timeless substance (dravya). So Sarvāstivādins admit that everything past, present, and
future exist, and are independently real.39
The Buddhist school Sautrāntika rejected Sarvāstivāda idea of svabhāva as being
the same as the idea of eternal self (ātman). But this rejection compelled them to think of
the world as series of fleeting moments.40
37 Here is given the Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of Saṃyutta Nikāya, 2000: 905. It differs from Kalupahana’s
translation (1974: 184).
38 See Kalupahana, 1974.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
In the Mulamadhyamakakārika (“Verses on the Middle”), Nāgārjuna, the most
representative thinker of early Mahāyana Buddhism, devotes one chapter to the
examination of time.41 Nāgārjuna wrote in the nineteenth chapter of his Criticism on Time
(Kālaparīkṣa) as follows:
1. If because of the past
There are future and present,
Then future and present
Must be in the past.
2. If within the past
There were neither future nor present
Then future and present-
How are they caused by the past?
3. Independent of the past
There is no future
Nor any present,
Therefore these two periods are not.
4. Because such is the case,
We know that the two other periods
And above, between, below, unity, difference--
All such states as these have no existence.
5. Time standing still cannot be had,
And time cannot be had.
If time cannot be had
How can one teach time's qualities?
6. Because of things there is time,
of bija or seed, differentiate the present from
Apart from things how can time be?
Even things do not exist,
How much less can time exist?42
41 See Miyamoto, 1959, Kalupahana, 1974.
42 Translation is according to Miyamoto, 1959: 120-121.
Nāgārjuna pointed out that two things cannot be related unless they are coexistent.
Nonenduring and nonstatic time cannot be measured, and an enduring and static time does
not exist. If time exists depending on existential structure, then it cannot be obtained
without such structure and so, according to him, time does not exist.43
So according to Kalupahana (1974: 188): “Early Buddhism presented an empiricist
and relativistic conception of time; the Abhidharma scholasticism produced an absolutistic
conception, and Mādhyamikas denied the reality of time.
The doctrine of momentariness
From the denial of a permanent self comes the idea that mind is a flow of mental
events which have to be entities of their own entities that also have to be momentary.
Probably, the momentariness of material entities was logically deduced from the
momentariness of mental entities, and hence, all forms of conditioned entities are
momentary.44
Buddhist idea is not to atomize time into moments, but to atomize phenomena
temporally as a succession of discrete momentary entities.45 All phenomena, or all
conditioned entities (saṃskṛta, saṃskāra) stop to exist as soon as they have originated and
give rise to new entities of almost the same nature – santāna – a flow of causally connected
momentary entities of the same kind.46 These entities succeed so fast one after the other that
one cannot see them by ordinary perception so one conceives that things are temporally
extended. So, although the world is at every moment distinct from the world in the previous
or next moment, it is linked to the past and future by the law of causality.47
Spiritual experience connected with the doctrine of momentariness
43 See Kalupahana, 1974.
44 Rospatt, 1995: 11-12, 196-218.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. The theory of momentariness cannot be traced back to the beginnings of Buddhism and is a post-canonical
and “sectarian” development. See Rospatt, 1959: 5, note 4.
According to Rospatt (1995: 11-12), the doctrine of momentariness is formed on the
basis of a radical experience of transitoriness of existence, but such experiences are
legitimated and explained by doctrinal considerations. One way of gaining experience of
the impermanence of existence is the observation of death with the awareness that the dead
body is one’s own.48 Another way is to treat impermanence as a constant fluctuation and to
focus on the change of existence, without paying such strong attention to the decay and
death, but to the cyclic notion of existence, saṃsāra, karman, and spiritual development.49
The question is still open “whether the new metaphysical assumption of
momentariness will have prompted a spiritual experience of a new quality, or whether only
the conceptualization of the experience, and not its nature, changed”.50
What means to perceive discrete time? May be to feel the gaps between two
infinitesimally close in time perceptions we perceive and during the time of the
processing of the signals, there is just a moment of loosening the signals from outside. But
is it so? Is our perception discrete and what is the length of these intervals of signal
interruption? Is our brain’s procession of information discrete procession? And are
afterwards the different discrete perceptions sewed into continuous impression?
The processes of perception and procession of information are based on
electromagnetic impulses, and in this sense are discrete, but are bound to chemical
reactions that are not necessarily discrete. And all this discussion of discreteness or
continuity of time is based on the proposition of linear time.
The Buddhist approach is different: the world is discrete not only in space, but also
in time and in every next moment it is quite new, causally connected with the previous one.
As with blinking of an eye in the moment you open your eyes the world is quite new.
Cinematograph is the ideal example however, we should keep in mind that usually tape
mirrors successive (continuous) events, photographed at defined very small intervals, and
the perception of the film is to restore these primordial (continuous) events. So the question
48 See Rospatt, 2004; Rospatt, 1995: 196-218.
49 Ibid.
50 Rospatt, 1995: 209, note 445.
about discreteness or continuity of time, or of the world, is intrinsically connected not only
with events, but also with our perception of these events.51
Is this momentariness connected with the world itselfand is there something like
“the world itself” far beyond the one who perceives it?
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