Compulsion in religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the roots of insurgencies in Iraq
Abstract
Compulsion in Religion relies on extensive research with Ba'thist archives to investigate the roots of the religious insurgencies that erupted in Iraq following the American-led invasion in 2003. The Iraqi archival records demonstrate that by the 1990s, Saddam's regime had developed institutions to control and monitor Iraq's religious landscape. The regime's ability to do so provided it with confidence to launch a national "Faith Campaign" and to inject religion into Iraqi politics in a controlled manner. Islam played a greater role in the regime's symbols and Saddam Hussein's statements in the 1990s than it had in earlier decades. This increase in religious rhetoric did not represent a shift from secular-nationalist ideology to Islamism, however. The regime's official policies toward religious leaders and institutions remained remarkably consistent throughout the Ba'thist period; Saddam spoke derisively about all forms of Islamist politics in Iraq throughout his presidency. He promoted a Ba'thist interpretation of religion that subordinated it to Arab nationalism rather than depicting the religion as an independent or primary political identity. Saddam did so explicitly to undermine Islamists and the revolutionary religious movements that would emerge after 2003. When the American-led invasion of 2003 destroyed the regime's authoritarian structures, it unhinged the forces that these structures were designed to contain, creating an atmosphere infused with politically instrumentalized religion but lacking the checks provided by the former regime. Sadrists, al-Qaida, and eventually the Islamic State emerged out of this context to unleash the insurgencies that have plagued post-2003 Iraq.
... While the Ba'ath party under Saddam Hussein was nominally secular, Shia Muslims experienced significant persecution and were forbidden from participating in the party, which ensured continued dominance of the Sunni minority over the Shia majority (Wainscott 2019, 6). It is important to highlight, though, that the Ba'ath state persecuted both Sunni and Shia religious leaders who did not comply with and support the regime (Helfont 2018). This persecution and suppression of religious leaders and communities under Saddam Hussein pushed many into exile or simply silenced them, fuelling resentment that would contribute to the emergence of inter-religious divisions, conflict, and extremism after the regime's downfall in 2003 (Helfont 2018). ...
... It is important to highlight, though, that the Ba'ath state persecuted both Sunni and Shia religious leaders who did not comply with and support the regime (Helfont 2018). This persecution and suppression of religious leaders and communities under Saddam Hussein pushed many into exile or simply silenced them, fuelling resentment that would contribute to the emergence of inter-religious divisions, conflict, and extremism after the regime's downfall in 2003 (Helfont 2018). At the same time, the Ba'ath party was conscious of the important place of religious institutions, leaders, and practices for the Iraqi population, and so it was careful to allow a degree of freedom for those religious leaders it deemed "trustworthy" and supportive of the regime (Helfont 2018). ...
... This persecution and suppression of religious leaders and communities under Saddam Hussein pushed many into exile or simply silenced them, fuelling resentment that would contribute to the emergence of inter-religious divisions, conflict, and extremism after the regime's downfall in 2003 (Helfont 2018). At the same time, the Ba'ath party was conscious of the important place of religious institutions, leaders, and practices for the Iraqi population, and so it was careful to allow a degree of freedom for those religious leaders it deemed "trustworthy" and supportive of the regime (Helfont 2018). This contributed to the appearance of a relative degree of independence and freedom for religious actors in Iraq, an appearance that was misleading and contributed to errors and miscalculations by Coalition forces as part of the 2003 Iraq war (Gutkowski 2011(Gutkowski , 2014Helfont 2018). ...
... According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Iraqi census of 1987 showed 1,400,000 Christians living in Iraq, but in 2006 it was estimated that there were fewer than 1,000,000 Christians living in Iraq (UN Aug. 2007, 59). However, by 2016, the population was estimated to be less than 250,000 (Helfont, 2018). After a U.S.-led coalition toppled Saddam Hussein, the country has continually been engulfed by sectarian tensions and civil conflicts. ...
... The year 2014 also saw militants belonging to the Islamic State (ISIL) declare a caliphate, having captured Syrian and Iraqi swathes (Hanish, 2015). Some of the notable minorities that have been affected disproportionately include Kaka'i, Christians, Shabak, Turkmen, and Yazidi (Helfont, 2018). In the ancient Mesopotamia, one of the indigenous groups, Yazidis, has been affected adversely whereby most of the followers of Yazidism have been persecuted and killed because of accusations of "devil" worshipping, having predated the Abrahamic religions (Ibrahim, 2018). ...
... Additional research suggests that whereas most of the minority community members who have been displaced would wish to return (five percent), a significant proportion (42 percent) prefer leaving Iraq and securing safe havens abroad (Hanish, 2015). For the majority of those who are against returning, the dominant reason cited involves neighbors' betrayal via collaboration with ISIL (Helfont, 2018). ...
The period after June 2014 has seen forces from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an armed group, spread quickly across Iraq. This process has led to massive displacements in which affected over two million people. Indeed, the primary targets of ISIL have been religious and ethnic minorities. Some of these groups include Yazidis, Shabak, Kaka’i, and Christians. Also, ISIL has abducted or injured many people, with thousands also killed. Examples of adverse actions that the armed group has committed include severe human rights abuses such as the looting of property, the abduction of children, the destruction of places of worship, sexual enslavement, rape, forced conversion, and summary executions. Whereas the period before the insurgency group’s entry still witnessed minorities exist as a vulnerable group, the violence led by ISIL has threatened to eliminate them permanently from regions such as the Nineveh Plains, have lived in these areas for several centuries. The main question purpose of this paper is to examine the future status of minorities in post-ISIL Iraq? ISIL. I will argue that although ISIL had been defeated in Iraq, their impact will be critical on Iraqi Minorities Even after the demise of ISIL. Currently, informal settlements, abandoned buildings, and camps in which the displaced persons live reflect deteriorating humanitarian conditions. With international agencies experiencing limited resources and also the government failing to offer an effective response, most of the international displaced people (IDPs)[1] do not have enough shelter, health care, water, food, and other essential items. Indeed, most vulnerable groups include children and women. At a time when the majority are contemplating emigration out of Iraq, their survival in the immediate and far future rests upon collaboration among four groups that include the international community, the Iraqi government, Kurdish authorities, and minorities themselves. Some of the specific areas that need to be addressed include the asylum dilemma, reconciliation and restoration, preventing future abuses, legislation, and humanitarian issues.
... According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Iraqi census of 1987 showed 1,400,000 Christians living in Iraq, but in 2006 it was estimated that there were fewer than 1,000,000 Christians living in Iraq (UN Aug. 2007, 59). However, by 2016, the population was estimated to be less than 250,000 (Helfont, 2018). After a U.S.-led coalition toppled Saddam Hussein, the country has continually been engulfed by sectarian tensions and civil conflicts. ...
... The year 2014 also saw militants belonging to the Islamic State (ISIL) declare a caliphate, having captured Syrian and Iraqi swathes (Hanish, 2015). Some of the notable minorities that have been affected disproportionately include Kaka'i, Christians, Shabak, Turkmen, and Yazidi (Helfont, 2018). In the ancient Mesopotamia, one of the indigenous groups, Yazidis, has been affected adversely whereby most of the followers of Yazidism have been persecuted and killed because of accusations of "devil" worshipping, having predated the Abrahamic religions (Ibrahim, 2018). ...
... Additional research suggests that whereas most of the minority community members who have been displaced would wish to return (five percent), a significant proportion (42 percent) prefer leaving Iraq and securing safe havens abroad (Hanish, 2015). For the majority of those who are against returning, the dominant reason cited involves neighbors' betrayal via collaboration with ISIL (Helfont, 2018). ...
The period after June 2014 has seen forces from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an armed group, spread quickly across Iraq. This process has led to massive displacements in which affected over two million people. Indeed, the primary targets of ISIL have been religious and ethnic minorities. Some of these groups include Yazidis, Shabak, Kaka’i, and Christians. Also, ISIL has abducted or injured many people, with thousands also killed. Examples of adverse actions that the armed group has committed include severe human rights abuses such as the looting of property, the abduction of children, the destruction of places of worship, sexual enslavement, rape, forced conversion, and summary executions. Whereas the period before the insurgency group’s entry still witnessed minorities exist as a vulnerable group, the violence led by ISIL has threatened to eliminate them permanently from regions such as the Nineveh Plains, have lived in these areas for several centuries. The main question purpose of this paper is to examine the future status of minorities in post-ISIL Iraq?ISIL. I will argue that although ISIL had been defeated in Iraq, their impact will be critical on Iraqi Minorities Even after the demise of ISIL. Currently, informal settlements, abandoned buildings, and camps in which the displaced persons live reflect deteriorating humanitarian conditions. With international agencies experiencing limited resources and also the government failing to offer an effective response, most of the international displaced people (IDPs) do not have enough shelter, health care, water, food, and other essential items. Indeed, most vulnerable groups include children and women. At a time when the majority are contemplating emigration out of Iraq, their survival in the immediate and far future rests upon collaboration among four groups that include the international community, the Iraqi government, Kurdish authorities, and minorities themselves. Some of the specific areas that need to be addressed include the asylum dilemma, reconciliation and restoration, preventing future abuses, legislation, and humanitarian issues.
Keywords: Minority, ISIL, Humanitarian CrISIL, Armed Conflict, International law, KRI, The Federal Government of Iraq.
... In Iraq, violent extremism is the main cause, and consequence, of perceived state collapse and has been attributed to the marginalisation of the Arab Sunni community in the post-2003 political settlement, followed by the institutional penetration of the Iraqi state by religion, be it in the form of sectarian politics, or the official integration of faith-based militias in March 2018 (Alaaldin 2015;Weiss and Hassan 2015). While incredibly complex, the Iraqi context came to be interpreted as a textbook example of violent extremism in the form of religious extremism triggered by the rise of non-state, violent, Islamist actors (Helfont 2018). ...
... In addition to the history of war in Iraq, terrorism is a process that starts with simple steps towards radicalization and evolves into acts of violence (Horgan, 2009). It is possible that the faith campaign (Al-Hamla Al-Imaniyah), invented and enforced by the Saddam Hussein regime in the period between 1990 to his last days of rule in Spring 2003, was a step towards shifting the country as a whole in the direction of Islamist extremism (Helfont, 2014(Helfont, , 2018. ...
... The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood took a leading role in the political opposition in 2011 despite having been crushed and driven into exile by the Assad regime in the early 1980s (Lefèvre 2013;Conduit 2020). Iraqi Islamists took a lead role in Sunni politics after 2003 despite having been repressed and feared by Saddam Hussein's regime (Helfont 2018). ...
Islamist movements today face perhaps their most difficult conditions in decades. After seizing political openings after the Arab uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni political Islamist organizations have suffered from military coups, electoral defeats, social and political polarization, and extreme repression. This is not the first time they have faced such catastrophic conditions, however, and historically Islamist organizations have proven to be resilient and able to return to public life. This article examines the history of Islamist movements in the Middle East recovering from extreme setbacks in order to identify nine key mechanisms that facilitated those rebounds and then considers which of those factors might be operative today. It concludes that many of those factors are less available than in the past, but that the global turn toward populism, the persistent governance failures of Arab states, and the adaptability of Islamists create greater opportunities for recovery than might initially appear plausible.
... Kaftaro, too, was a member of the Naqshbandî tarîqa. Although the Kurdish background of religious leaders like al-Bouti and Kaftaro was neither widely publicized nor systematically papered over, it may be indicative of a wider tendency among Kurds and Arabs to sympathize with, respectively, Naqshbandî and Salafî-38 On the relations between the Iraqi Ba'ath regime and the Muslim Brothers, see al-ʿAzami (2002) and Helfont (2018). Discussion of MB mobilization of among Iraq's Kurds, however, is absent from both analyses. ...
The Cambridge History of the Kurds is an authoritative and comprehensive volume exploring the social, political and economic features, forces and evolution amongst the Kurds, and in the region known as Kurdistan, from the fifteenth to the twenty-first century. Written in a clear and accessible style by leading scholars in the field, the chapters survey key issues and themes vital to any understanding of the Kurds and Kurdistan including Kurdish language; Kurdish art, culture and literature; Kurdistan in the age of empires; political, social and religious movements in Kurdistan; and domestic political developments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Other chapters on gender, diaspora, political economy, tribes, cinema and folklore offer fresh perspectives on the Kurds and Kurdistan as well as neatly meeting an exigent need in Middle Eastern studies. Situating contemporary developments taking place in Kurdish-majority regions within broader histories of the region, it forms a definitive survey of the history of the Kurds and Kurdistan.
... Saddam's efforts to pose as a patron of Islam in the late 1980s and particularly after the revolts of 1991 were aimed at undermining a religious revivalist movement centred on Najaf and establishing new networks that the regime could use to collect information (Helpont 2018). As low-level neotribal leaders helped the regime to suppress revolts (once these individuals perceived the regime to be winning), regime-appointed 'sheiks' provided additional conduits of information (Al-Khafaji 1994). ...
Comparisons of civil wars based on attention to contextual categories do a better job of conceptualising key variables such as ethnic identity, resources, armed group membership, and concepts such as rebellion and negotiation than do studies based on large data sets and methodological individualism. This article shows how important variables and concepts apply in ways that are particular to conflicts that follow the collapse of centralised authority based on personalist networks. Comparisons with civil wars in highly bureaucratised states highlight these differences, and illustrate fallacies of assuming that variables and concepts transcend the broad historical sweep of civil wars.
تحاول هذه الدراسة رصد المراحل التي شهدت تحولات للهوية في أدب الطفل العراقي جنباً الى جنب مع مراحل تحولات السلطة السياسية الحاكمة في الدولة العراقية المعاصرة. حدد الباحث صور وبوسترات الأغلفة لمجلة (المزمار ) العراقية الى جانب بعض المجلات الأخرى، والموجهة للأطفال واليافعين على حدٍ سواء، بصفتها مصدراً للبيانات التي ستعالج بالقراءة النقدية وفقاً لمقاربة (التوسير) الخاصة بشبكة الأجهزة القمعية والايديولوجية التي تحكم الخطاب الرسمي والثقافي للدولة وأثره في تشكيل سمات الهوية المشرعنة كما طرحها (مانويل كاستلز) في مشروعه التصنيفي الخاص بأنواع الهوية إضافة الى توظيف المنهج السيميولوجي في تحليل
صور الأغلفة ورسوماتها.
بوسعنا تتبع أربع مراحل لتحولات الهوية في إصدارات مجلة (المزمار ) العراقية تحديداً وغيرها من مجلات الأطفال منذ سبعينيات القرن المنصرم وحتى أعقاب عام 2003،، وتقترن هذه المراحل التحولية في مرتكزاتها المعرفية والأيديولوجية مع أربع مراحل موازية لتحولات السلطة السياسية في الدولة العراقية المعاصرة. وهذه المراحل هي مرحلة السبعينيات (تحول الهوية نحو القومية العربية بأنحيازات إنسانية طفيفة) ، ومرحلة الثمانينيات (تحول الهوية نحو القومية العربية بانحيازات عسكرية صارمة) ، ومرحلة التسعينيات (تحول الهوية نحو القومية العربية بأنحيازات طائفية سنية) ، وأخيراً مرحلة ما بعد الـ (2003) (تحول الهوية نحو الأسلام السياسي بأنحيازات طائفية شيعية).
ترتكز عملية الرصد لهذه التحولات في سياقها الفلسفي على مقاربة (التوسير): فالسلطة تحاول خلق بيئة ثقافية قمعية وقسرية عبر جهازها الايديولوجي الثقافي الذي يعمل على تطويع أنماط معينة من الهويات القومية والدينية المتلونة بالوان طائفية. وعادةً ما يكون هذا التطويع إنتهازيا في انتقائياته للسمات الثقافية للهوية المدعومة فيعمل على إبراز وتضخيم السمات المميزة لهويات بعض المجاميع والطوائف وطمس وتهميش السمات المميزة للتراث الثقافي لمجاميع أخرى. وتتماهى دور النشر الثقافية بصفتها جزءاً من جهاز الدولة الايديولوجي الثقافي مع توجهات الخطاب الثقافي الرسمي للدولة عبر إصدار منشورات ومجلات تسهم في ترسيخ ملامح الهوية
المشرعِنة لخطاب تلك الدولة الثقافي.
في حين ترتكز قراءة الدلالات الكامنة في صور ورسومات أغلفة مجلات الأطفال على المنهج
السيميولوجي. اذ تعد كل صورة وفقاً لهذا المنهج علامة دالة ناتجة عن تقاطع شبكة ثلاثية من
العلاقات بين مادة التعبير من ألوان وخطوط ومسافات، وأشكال التعبير ( التكوينات
التصويرية للأشياء والأشخاص) ومضمون التعبير ( المحتوى الثقافي للصورة فضلا عن أبنيتها
الدلالية المشكلة للمضمون).
يعتقد الباحث أن المحزن في الأمر أن جميع هذه المراحل التحولية للهوية في الأدبيات البصرية
والرسومات التي تزين أغلفة مجلة (المزمار ) وغيرها من مجلات الأطفال العراقية تصطبغ بارتهانات أيديولوجية تنبثق عن السلطة المواكبة لها مما يجعل تلك التحولات في الهوية مجرد أوهام تنسج خيوطها أنظمة الحكم تلك في محاولة منها لخلق بيئة ثقافية قهرية تجتذب أطياف معينة من المجتمع العراقي وتقصي أطيافاً أخرى. وينجم عن ذلك تجاهل سافر للطبيعة الديناميكية للهوية بوصفها إنموذجاً معرفياً مستقبلياً. اذ تندرج جميع هذه التحولات في الهوية الموجهة نحو الطفل العراقي ضمن سياق خانق من الرؤية السكونية أو الماضوية للهوية. هذا السياق السكوني للهوية عبر مراحلها التحولية الأربعة ما هو الا نتاج لتلك العلائق المعقدة والمتشابكة بين الهوية بوصفها منتجاً لأجهزة الدولة القمعية ثقافياً وبين المتبنيات الأيديولوجية للسلطة الحاكمة. فعلى الرغم من الإختلافات الإيديولوجية المزعومة بين هذه السلطات التي حكمت العراق على مدى خمسة عقود، الا أنها جميعها ترتهن مفهوم الهوية ضمن رؤية سكونية واحدة. وتكرس هذه السلطات جميع طاقاتها المادية والأدبية من أجل السعي للحفاظ على تلك الهوية المُشرعَّنة المزعومة دون التأكيد على الهوية بوصفها شيء ينبغي على المجتمعات والثقافات صياغته باستمرار وصناعته واعادة صناعته مراراً وتكراراً في سياق من التواصل الديناميكي الأصيل والمتفاعل مع المعطيات الثقافية المتغيرة لوضع مجتمعاتنا الراهنة.
According to diverse indices of political performance, the Middle East is the world's least free region. Some believe that it is Islam that hinders liberalization. Others retort that Islam cannot be a factor because the region is no longer governed under Islamic law. This book by Timur Kuran, author of the influential Long Divergence, explores the lasting political effects of the Middle East's lengthy exposure to Islamic law. It identifies several channels through which Islamic institutions, both defunct and still active, have limited the expansion of basic freedoms under political regimes of all stripes: secular dictatorships, electoral democracies, monarchies legitimated through Islam, and theocracies. Kuran suggests that Islam's rich history carries within it the seeds of liberalization on many fronts; and that the Middle East has already established certain prerequisites for a liberal order. But there is no quick fix for the region's prevailing record of human freedoms.
Unlike many other Shiite political factions in Iraq, the Sadrist movement has become increasingly vocal in its criticism of Iranian influence in Iraq. Anti‐Iran chants have become almost ubiquitous in Sadrist demonstrations over the past few years, and prominent Sadrist politicians have unabashedly pointed the finger of blame for Iraq's crises at Iran. The growing Sadrist criticism of Iran has simultaneously come with the gradual ascendance of nationalist narratives in the religious movement. This article aims to study these narratives and their correlation with Iran. It argues that the Sadrist version of Iraqi nationalism encompasses three components that aim to differentiate Iraqi Arab Shiite identity from Iran. It also studies how Sadrist nationalism contributed to the rise of the Iran‐bashing trend among Iraqi Shiites.
The article attempts to analyze the specifics of the position of the Shiiteclergy in Iraq, associated with the traditional Islamic worldview of Shiites, who traditionally occupied a subordinate position in the Sunni political hierarchy. The article focuses on the period of the formation and strengthening of Saddam Hussein’s sole power, when he took the initiative to appease Shiites and Ulama, combining the policy of “carrot and stick”, considering Shiites as a potential threat to his secular power.
The formation of post-colonial states in Africa, and the Middle East gave birth to prolonged separatist wars. Exploring the evolution of these separatist wars, Yaniv Voller examines the strategies that both governments and insurgents employed, how these strategies were shaped by the previous struggle against European colonialism and the practices and roles that emerged in the subsequent period, which moulded the identities, aims and strategies of post-colonial governments and separatist rebels. Based on a wealth of primary sources, Voller focuses on two post-colonial separatist wars; In Iraqi Kurdistan, between Kurdish separatists and the government in Baghdad, and Southern Sudan, between black African insurgents and the government in Khartoum. By providing an account of both conflicts, he offers a new understanding of colonialism, decolonisation and the international politics of the post-colonial world.
After the eruption of civil strife in Syria and Iraq, widespread violence and harassment, mainly by jihadist groups, came to substantiate fears for the extinction of the Christians. Various jihadist groups have perpetrated an ongoing ethnic cleansing of Christians. The paper will examine another alternative to co-optation, a survival strategy that has developed among the Christians in Iraq and Syria, that of armed resistance and the organisation of militias. This militarisation trend reveals serious inner-communal disagreements. Caught among regional antagonisms and suspicious of the ascendent Sunni, Shia and Kurdish political aspirations and nationalisms, the idea of self-determination and self-government in an autonomous zone around Nineveh seems the best alternative to state co-optation. The paper will also look into the evolving relationship of the Christian communities with the state, the Muslim majorities, the other non-Muslim communities and the international community in a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty in the region.
This article examines state‐society relations and inter‐communal dynamics in conflict, focusing on the case study of non‐Muslim minorities in Iraq. It draws on interview data to analyse the lived experiences of Iraq's Yazidis and Christians before, during and after Islamic State (IS) rule. It finds that the attacks by the IS on Iraq's Yazidi and Christian communities not only caused considerable suffering but also led to a renewed crisis of faith in the Iraqi state and a further breakdown in relations with other groups, especially Sunni Arabs. However, Iraq's Yazidis and Christian have also demonstrated remarkable resilience in terms of returning to their ancient homelands and rebuilding their fractured communities. Together, these findings raise further questions about the legitimacy of the Iraqi state in the eyes of its non‐Muslim minorities and the prospects of a peaceful multicultural future for Iraq.
The central meaning of the relation to the Prophet Muḥammad has increasingly manifested itself on various levels in Muslim societies over the course of the early modern and modern periods and becomes even visible among secular and nationalist movements. This chapter investigates the changing representation of the Prophet Muḥammad in the public discourse of the Iraqi Arab Socialist Baʿth Party from 1943 till 2003. The investigation is based on a diachronic analysis of Iraqi daily newspapers, party publications, autobiographies, and qualitative interviews with former leading Baʿth cadres.
Recent scholarship debates as to whether the regime fulfilled with its increasing religious rhetoric an ideological U-turn from a staunch secularism to an Arab Islamism, or whether it did not so much Islamise but expand its ongoing policy to Baʿthise religion and to accelerate the spread of its original Baʿthist interpretation of an Arab Islam. Focussing on the role of the Prophetic figure in Baʿthist ideology and politics throughout this period, this chapter argues, in line with the latter interpretation, that in the core the Baʿth regime stuck to its secular principles till the end but gradually and tactically increased the incorporation of the Prophetic heritage into the official political discourse. This increasing political use of Islamic traditions and motifs can be explained as a tactical reaction to take advantage of and control the general Islamic or religious resurgence that can be observed throughout the Islamic world and beyond since the late 1960s; a political move that fuelled and promoted this resurgence even further.
This article examines the potential for Shiʿa clerics to engage in religious peacebuilding in post-2003 Iraq. By drawing upon theoretical insights from other post-conflict settings and interviews with clerics, I demonstrate that there are two key challenges facing clerics who seek to engage in peacebuilding. First, the association of the Shiʿa religious establishment with political actors has created a crisis of legitimacy for clerics. Secondly, the structure of authority within the religious establishment has made it difficult for activist clerics to introduce theological reforms to aid peacebuilding efforts. I argue that these challenges are neither insurmountable nor unique.
Lustration, as an instrument of transitional justice, determines the extent to which members of the former regime or combatant groups can be reintegrated into a democratizing state. This article examines the effects of de-Ba'athification in the lead up to and following foreign-imposed regime change in Iraq. I demonstrate that exclusive and unconstrained lustration created an institutional mechanism that targeted and excluded key segments of the population as perceived regime collaborators, which subverted peacebuilding during the transitional period of the occupation. I conclude by illuminating the enduring effects of exclusionary lustration on subsequent attempts at state-and peacebuilding in divided, post-colonial societies.
The purpose of this article is to present the situation of atheists and apostates in Iraq, as the tendency to abandon religion is increasing in this country. With the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein and his party, Shiites took power in the country who, guided by religious doctrine, often limit the freedoms and rights of citizens. In addition, the authorities in the country still maintain a policy of ethnic and religious divisions towards citizens, which leads to social conflicts. Another dangerous factor is the emergence of religious terrorist organizations and private militias that persecute dissenters. Although atheism is not punished by state law, many people who deny God’s existence are arrested or killed, The only safe places for them are secret meetings or a virtual space where they can discuss and seek answers to their doubts.
This paper places the fate of the Iraqi marshes within the deeper history of man-made environmental change in the Middle East. Irrigation was crucial to every society inhabiting the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Modern engineering promised to overcome Iraq’s natural hydrological limitations. Environmental manipulation became the lynchpin in wider projects of social engineering. Using a theoretical perspective inspired by James C. Scott’s work on the tensions between societal resistance and state-building processes, the paper argues that the marsh ecology endured as a kind of anti-state space, immune to the surveillance and domination of central governors. Marsh dwellers, in turn, sought refuge from political domination. As the Iraqi states accumulated scientific and economic prowess, the ability to resist or evade declined. Engineers and technocrats deployed a variety of techniques to alter the human ecology of what they saw as wasteland. Saddam adopted and deployed these plans in an even more desperate gambit to augment state control. The final solution to the problem of the marshes came with eviction of the marsh inhabitants and the obliteration of the marsh habitat.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.