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Revisiting the Canadian public policy towards venture capital: Crowding-out or displacement

Authors:
Arash Soleimani Dahaj at University of Waterloo
Arash Soleimani Dahaj
Brian P Cozzarin at University of Waterloo
Brian P Cozzarin
Kambiz Talebi
Kambiz Talebi
Kambiz Talebi
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Corrigendum
Revisiting the Canadian public policy towards
venture capital: Crowding-out or displacement
Arash Soleimani Dahaj,
1,
* Brian P. Cozzarin
2
and Kambiz Talebi
3
1
Department of Management Sciences, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario,
N2L 3G1, Canada and Faculty of Entrepreneurship, University of Tehran, 16th Azar St, Enghelab Sq, Tehran, Iran,
2
Department of Management Sciences, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario,
N2L 3G1, Canada and
3
Faculty of Entrepreneurship, University of Tehran, 16th Azar St, Enghelab Sq, Tehran, Iran
*Corresponding author. Email: arash.soleimanidahaj@uwaterloo.ca
Science and Public Policy, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scy005
This article has been amended to add details not included in the ver-
sion originally published online. The following note has been added:
‘The authors are open to providing the SQL and Stata code that gener-
ated the estimation data. Also, if requested, we can provide the raw
data, however, these data are protected. The researcher would need to
sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement before we could send them the data.’
The following has also been added to the Acknowledgements:
‘We wish to especially thank Professor James Brander from the
Sauder School of Business, the University of British Columbia for
reading the paper and providing helpful comments.’
The article has been updated online to reflect these changes.
V
CThe Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 747
Science and Public Policy, 45(5), 2018, 747
doi: 10.1093/scipol/scy050
Advance Access Publication Date: 27 July 2018
Corrigendum
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/spp/article/45/5/747/5060714 by guest on 20 August 2022
... that is the case in this section. The explanation is not trivial or apparently obvious, in view of the fact that recent work in the Canadian context (Dahaj, Cozzarin, and Talebi 2018) has incorrectly used data that do not predate the policy change. ...
... A more recent paper by Dahaj, Cozzarin, and Talebi (2018) takes a different approach. The authors examine the question of whether or not Canadian government VC crowds out private VC. ...
... As such, there is no econometric model in the work of Dahaj et al. that estimates the extent of private VC that would have existed in the absence of the LSVCC government VC program. Newfoundland and Alberta did not adopt LSVCC legislation, and Ontario phased out its LSVCC legislation over 2005-2011, important issues that are not acknowledged by Dahaj, Cozzarin, and Talebi (2018) that further affect their already flawed estimation procedures and sample period. ...
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