Russia Domination Policy: Implementation of Military Operation in Ukraine

Abstract

Russia Federation as global actor applied its policies towards Ukraine remains assertive. In pursuing state's political objectives from Moscow, the escalation of military operation in 2014 defined as the way on how the state behaves. By means of the combination of military and non-military measures on the conduct of operation, Russia is now slowly regaining its power through the annexation of Crimea. The effectiveness of this method determines to be Russia's strategy on contemporary warfare. Thus, it explains how Russian foreign and defense policy from 2000 to 2013 that depend on surrounding strategic environment of Ukraine to Russia, and the national interests of Russia to Ukraine. The main focus of this research is on the achievement of Russia's political objective in its military operation in Ukraine and analysis on Russia's national security components that are significantly influence the interaction of this asymmetric conflict.

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1 Lecturer of International Department at President University. Email: h_manurung2002@president.ac.id
Russia Domination Policy: Implementation of Military Operation in Ukraine
(2014 – 2015)
Hendra Manurung1
Abstrak
Federasi Rusia merupakan aktor global yang menerapkan kebijakan tegas terhadap Ukraina. Guna mencapai tujuan
politik nasional Rusia yang dikendalikan dari Moskwa, melalui operasi militer di tahun 2014, didefinisikan
bagaimana negara tersebut berperilaku. Melalui kombinasi operasi militer dan non-militer, Rusia secara perlahan
memperoleh kekuasaan melalui aneksasi Krimea. Efektivitas metoda ini dipergunakan untuk menentukan strategi
perang Rusia saat ini. Dengan demikian menjelaskan bagaimana kebijakan luar negeri dan kebijakan pertahanan
Rusia dari tahun 2000 hingga 2013 yang memiliki ketergantungan pada lingkungan strategis Ukraina terhadap Rusia,
dan kepentingan nasional Rusia pada Ukraina. Fokus utama penelitian ini adalah pencapaian tujuan politik Rusia
dalam operasi militer yang dilaksanakan di Ukraina dan menganalisa komponen keamanan nasional Rusia yang
signifikan mempengaruhi interaksi konflik asimetrik.
Kata-kata kunci: keamanan nasional, tujuan politik, operasi militer, perilaku negara Abstract
Russia Federation as global actor applied its policies towards Ukraine remains assertive. In pursuing state’s political
objectives from Moscow, the escalation of military operation in 2014 defined as the way on how the state behaves. By
means of the combination of military and non-military measures on the conduct of operation, Russia is now slowly
regaining its power through the annexation of Crimea. The effectiveness of this method determines to be Russia’s
strategy on contemporary warfare. Thus, it explains how Russian foreign and defense policy from 2000 to 2013 that
depend on surrounding strategic environment of Ukraine to Russia, and the national interests of Russia to Ukraine.
The main focus of this research is on the achievement of Russia’s political objective in its military operation in
Ukraine and analysis on Russia’s national security components that are significantly influence the interaction of this
asymmetric conflict.
Keywords: national security, political objectives, military operations, state’s behavior
Introduction
Major states often exercise their
military operation as the strategy to pursuit
their objectives. The acts systematically
identified as the behavior of states during war
time. The outcome of such action encourages
the international system to formulate an
institution that could maintain the world order,
where it known as the United Nations (UN). In
January 1946, the four major states (Britain,
France, Russia, and the United States) who
were often exercising military operation met
for the first time as the permanent members of
the United Nations Security Council. Despite
as the immediate effects from World War II,
these states power have tendency to implies
victory in war, they need to maintain their
existence in the international system
cooperatively and competitively. Although the
promotion of the ideas of the UN has been
introduce, the military activities are still
continuously conducted by those major states

22 22
in the next decades. Their ability in the
conduct of military operations are adequate
quantity in achieving the objectives(Volt,
2001). Thus, the operations often found as
strategic tools of a state in pursing their
interests because it remains as the capability of
states‟ power in pursuing its objectives on
certain condition.
The world‟s atmosphere was
dramatically changed when the two great
powers, between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) and the United States (U.S.)
came into competition in the second half of the
20th century, known as the Cold War. During
this period, the establishment of mutual
assistance was prominent in international
security architecture. The willingness of states
to be a dominant actor in the international
system is also important. As the result, one of
the major states (the Soviet Union) during this
period established a security alliance known as
the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact was a
formed of political and military alliance under
Soviet Union direction in affirming its control
over military forces in the region as well as to
counterbalance to North AtlantiTreaty
Organization (NATO) on the European
contingent (Curtis, 1992). After inking the
treaty, with the support of Soviet foreign
policy, Brezhnev Doctrine – “Doctrine of
Limited Sovereignty”, declared that when
forces that are hostile to socialism try to revert
the development of some socialist country
towards the restoration of the capitalist order,
it becomes not only a problem of the country
concerned, but also a common problem and
concern of all socialist countries (Brezhnev,
1968). Under this security paradigm, as a
strong actor (the Soviet Union) often did
military operations towards weak actors (post-
Soviet space) in order to keep their influence
towards the opposing state. As such, the
strategic interaction is classified as the study of
asymmetric conflict in international relations
where the strong actor should almost always
win in every conflict based on its victory (Toft,
no year)
The security structure of the Soviet
Union as major state slowly changes. After
expel of Albania in 1962, the organizational
structure of this alliance had been modified.
The reunification of Germany in 1990, the rise
of non-communist government, such as Poland
and Czechoslovakia in 1990 and 1991,
confirmed the demise of the Warsaw Pact and
marked the end of the Cold War as well.
Hence, with the emergence of independence
states of former Soviet Union, it has shown the
decline of state capability to control. At the
moment of Soviet state dissolution, Russia
consistently preserving its national security
and showing its capability as a major state
Hendra Manurung
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23 23
throughout various formulation of her
domestic and foreign policies.
After the dismissal of the Soviet Union
in 1990, the relations between Russia and
former Soviet states remain unstable. Russia
keeps maintaining its dominant within these
countries through various economic, political,
and even military activities until today. Along
with her foreign policy priority, the aims to
establish a Eurasian integration along with
(Commonwealth of Independence States) CIS
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013), space has
restore Russia to has a proactive approach
towards these countries. The basis of Russia
priority in the region is not only base on
sharing generic historical background, but to
build regional integration in various spheres
along with the CIS Member States through
bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2013).
The concept of foreign policy of the
Russian Federation, especially on paragraph 48
(e), it stated that: build up relations with
Ukraine as a priority partner within the CIS,
contribute to its participation in extended
integration processes (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2013). The importance of Ukraine on
Russia‟s border is undeniable. The
aforementioned situation is in line with a
statement from Henry Kissinger statement in
an open editorial in the Washington Post that
“To Russia, Ukraine can never be just a
foreign country” (Kissinger, 2014). Therefore,
the conflict occurring between Russia and
Ukraine within Ukraine‟s territory in 2014 is
reflecting the importance of Ukraine for Russia
domination in the region. Based on Russia‟s
movement towards the country, it illustrated a
new generation of war from Russia‟s approach
today. This pattern of interactions has
demonstrated the concept of asymmetric
warfare which has been exist long time ago.
For instance, as the sage of warfare theory,
Tsun Tzu, on his work The Art of War
determined that all warfare is based on
deception. When confronted with an enemy
one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him;
feign disorder and strike him. When he
concentrates, prepare against him; where he is
strong, avoid him (Griffith, 1971: 66-67). It
identified tactical strategy in facing the
adversaries‟ strength and advocates it into
indirect approach.
Russia respects the universal standards
of human rights and democracy as main
principles that must be non-violently
interpreted by means of different cultural
traditions, which is the case in the Western
democracies which used traditions and cultural
heritages in order to develop domestically
sustainable interpretations of international
agreements and diplomatic relations.
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It creates dilemmatic relations between Russia
and the broader West which strained on
numerous occasions since the collapse of the
USSR. Yet fears of a new Cold War have been
given added impetus have come to perceive as
a game-changing event. It refers to Russia‟s
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014,
and its subsequent thinly disguised assistance
for separatists in the industrialized Donbas
region of Eastern Ukraine. Whereas previous
points of tension between Russia and the West
have given rise to predictions of renewed
rivalry, none of them prior to the crisis in
Ukraine had resulted in the actual
aggrandizement of territory by the Russian
Federation. This was true of Kosovo in 1999,
the two wars in Chechnya, and the brief war
with Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008
(Sussex and Kaneth, 2013: 2).
Indeed Russia expands its territory
since 2014 to 2015. The conflict in Ukraine
had significant repercussions for regional
order, especially in terms of institutional
arrangements, the politics of energy and
resources, as well as great power competition
Russia Geopolitics in Ukraine
The loss of Ukraine in 1991 has also
ultimately marked the decline of Russia
control over this state. With the changing of
security structure after the Cold War, it adjusts
both states interaction. The political instability
in Ukraine on the year of 2014 has sent a
significant challenge for Russia‟s national
security, especially towards Crimea as its naval
base. That matter has jeopardized Russia vital
interest near Black Sea, so it influences the
formulation of strategy towards Ukraine,
where Russia needs to use its military
operation for its interest‟s protection. As a
major state, Russia needs to maintain national
security from possible external hazards to
maintain its control over Ukraine.
It highlights analysis of the current
Russian political discourse monitored by
Moscow which focuses on one aspect of its
normative dimension, namely the ideal of
national sovereignty and anti-colonial
resistance. Kremlin decision makers‟
resistance can be shaped and is actually shaped
in many different ways. As any other vision of
liberation, it is used both by the oppressed and
the oppressors.
Russia is much concerned by the
developments of the United States and the
European Union Foreign Policies that seem to
believe that they have the right to interfere in
other states‟ internal affairs. Lavrov also
indicated that this self-proclaimed right is
often justified by the Western leaders in terms
of political and ideological superiority of the
West. Lavrov stressed that the Russian
position, for example in relation to the so
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called “Arab spring”, is based on the
fundamental Principles of International Law
depends on national sovereignty and non-
interference. Commenting on the situation in
Syria during the spring 2013, Lavrov further
confirms that in most of the cases military
solutions “could only mean radicalization of
the country” (Glasser, 2013).
It is easy to demonstrate how Lavrov‟s
view on international politics presented in the
interview fits very well into the tradition of
just war ethics as well as it includes an
articulated normative vision of how the
international system of human rights should be
sustained (Glasser, 2013). The Russian concept
of foreign policy points out some additional
normative concerns in promoting Russia‟s
approach to Human Rights issues transparently
and pragmatic. It leads to Russia global
competition on a civilizational level, whereby
various values and models of development
based on the universal principles of democracy
and market economy start to clash and
compete against each other in Eastern Europe.
Therefore, with the condition as an
independence state, during Yanukovych
presidency (2010-2014), several tensions have
taken place in the relations between Moscow
and Kyiv. One of the cases is where Kyiv has
built a close relationship with European Union
(EU). The Ukraine and EU work on an
association agreement-aiming at political
association which adhering European values
and principles and economic integration for
last few years. It is challenging the national
security of Russia as a major state in the
region. As the result, before it was due to
signed, Yanukovych rejected the agreement on
November 2013. After several identification
conducted, one of the reason behind this
agenda is that Russia successfully
implemented its political and economic
leverage over Ukraine in order to cancel its
agreement with EU. There has been an
economic instability between Kyiv and
Moscow trade relations. Russia has putted a
sanction over Ukraine in mid-August. Cutting
energy supply to Ukraine and blocking the
flow of imports from the country have
affecting the economic condition of Ukraine.
In accordance to the Wall Street Journal,
“Ukrainian officials say the Russian sanctions
cost them US$15 billion in lost trade and it
could run up to half a trillion by signing the
EU deal” (The Wall Street Journal, 2013). As
the result of rejection of agreement, it caused
big street protests from pro-Western protesters
in Kyiv‟s Independence Square continuously.
On 22 February 2014, a peak demonstration
occurred when protesters took control over
government building in Kyiv. This situation
resulted in Yanukovych fled from Kyiv to
eastern part city of Ukraine, Kharkiv, in asking
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for support (The Wall Street Journal, 2013).
The security instability in Ukraine, on
February 27, 2014, a penetration over Crimea
was executed in the capital of Simferopol, with
approximate number of 120 armed Russian
insurgents armed with automatic weapons
seized the Crimean parliament (Ukrainian
Policy, 2014). The signification of occupation
then marked with Russian flag flies over
Crimea‟s parliament (The Wall Street Journal,
2013). This condition has put a high tension on
the violation of Ukraine territory in regards to
Russian invasion which absolutely occurring.
Moreover, it was also followed by a statement
from the Ukrainian Acting President,
Turchynov stated that:
“Russia has begun wanton aggression
against Ukraine under the guise of training
exercise. The Russian Federation has sent
troops into Crimea, and has not only
captured the Crimean parliament and
Council of Ministers, but also has taken
control of communication facilities [...]
We‟re sure that Ukraine will preserve its
territory, Ukraine will defend its
independence and any attempts of
annexation or intrusion will have very
serious consequences” (Ukrainian
Policy, 2014).
On May 2014, a new president of
Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko is being elected
where at the same time the conflict occurred is
still continuously. This president known has
long supported the country‟s pro-European
movement (BBC News, 2014). Due to this
political challenge, Russia once again is
exercising its military operation into Crimea in
order to protect the Black Sea Fleet on the
ground (Ukrainian Policy, 2014). Therefore, as
the strategic interest of Russia, such military
operations are conducted in Crimea. This
operation has established a strategic interaction
between Russia and Ukraine in achieving their
political objectives. The interaction is being
identified as the asymmetric warfare between
strong actor (Russia) and weak actor (Ukraine)
in winning their survival.
A strategic interaction between the two
countries in Ukraine is reflecting on how a
strong state (Russia) is trying to defeat a weak
state (Ukraine) through military operations
which conducted periodically. It is in line with
how Carl von Clausewitz understanding the
fact about warfare that it must waged the
political objective:
“We see, therefore, that war is not merely
an act of policy but a true political
instrument, a continuation of political
intercourse, carried on with other means.
War in general, and the commander in any
specific instance, is entitled to require that
the trend and designs of policy shall not be
inconsistent with these means. That, of
course is no small demand, but however
much it will affect political aims in a given
case, it will never do more than modify
them. The political object is the goal, war
is the means of reaching it, and means can
never be considered in isolation from their
purpose” (Clausewitz, 1827).
The Cold War remains echoing in the
case of Ukraine as a formerly part of Soviet
Union. In order to protect its national security
and achieving the political objective, Russia
implies its victory as a strong actor by
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conducting military operations in Ukraine. As
the response, Ukraine is also conducting
several operations and tactics based to
overcome the challenge. Therefore, the relative
power occurred within this pattern is
explaining the logic of the asymmetric war
between Russia and Ukraine. With various
operations and tactics executed from both
sides, the relative power owned will later
explains the relative interests of the state on
how they should response. As such, the
strategic interactions that happened during
conflict could determine the outcome of
relative power.
Russia Strategy in Regional Security
Russia has reinvented its national
policy, which is all about economic
cooperation and joint energy projects rather
than territorial disputes. Even further afield,
Vietnam has shown an increasing interest in
Russia, expressing its enthusiasm for being
involved with Russia‟s recently launched
Eurasian Union in Asia Pacific economic
integration.
Despite the legacy of Soviet might, the
degree of trust towards Russia in the Asia
Pacific is symbolically revealed in the reaction
to Russia‟s modernization of its Pacific Fleet.
Whereas China‟s re-fitting of an ancient
aircraft carrier caused a flurry of intensely
negative coverage, there has been little fuss or
outcry in this region about the procuring of
two state of the art Mistral assault ships which
will enter service in 2014 (Manurung, 2013).
Even though this perception of Russia
in the region as non-threatening could be a
great opportunity for the Russian leadership in
Kremlin, to stabilize the region there is a vital
need for a forum whereby geopolitics can be
discussed in the same way in which economics
and globalization are discussed at the annual
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summits. However, Russia has long experience
in great power politics and the complex
security arrangements of the Cold War and its
continuing legacy. It provides Russia with the
necessary prerequisites to promote and help
implement innovative proposals for a multi-
lateral security dialogue across the region.
The writer used realism approach of
International Relations theory define power
implies victory in each interaction during the
conflict. The writer sees the military operations
in Crimean conflict as the strategic interaction
of strong actor to defeat weak actor to increase
their relative power. Also bring strategic
interaction theory in this case to identify the
ideal-types of strategies taken by states in
pursuing their national interest. This strategy
will distinct the approaches direct and indirect
actors in implementing their operations and
tactics on terrain which beneficial for the
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position. It establishes theories which apply in
the framework, determining the level of
analysis is very essential in this research as
analytical tools. In international conflict,
according to Waltz (1959), there are three
levels of analysis: individual level, state level,
and state system level. In association with this
research, the writer uses the state system
analysis in explaining the strategic interaction
between Russia and Ukraine. This is to
accommodate the Realist approach reflecting
the actions taken due to the clash of interests
among states in protecting their national
security.
The strategic interaction theory
explains why some asymmetric conflict could
end quickly and how weak actors can
asymmetric war over strong actors. In this
theory, strategy refers to an actor‟s plan for
using armed forces to achieve military or
political objectives (Marsheimer, 1983: 28-29).
Within this definition, the term strategy should
be differentiated into two affiliated terms:
grand strategy and tactics. Grand strategy is
defined as the consolidation of diplomatic,
economic, military, and political factors used
by leaders to defend their respective nation-
states (Skinner, 2015). While tactics defines as
to the art of fight and along with the use of
various arms of the military-for example,
armor, artillery, and infantry-on terrain and
favorable position. In order to acknowledge the
ideal-type strategies, the typology is explained
as follows (Toft, 2001: 100):
Attack (strong actor) strategies:
(1) direct attack
(2) barbarism
Defense (weak actor) strategies:
(3) direct defense
(4) guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS)
Based on the two distinct strategies, the
approaches that are suitable in the strategic
interaction classified into: direct and indirect.
In direct approach, the focus is on targeting an
adversary‟s armed forces in order to demolish
the adversary‟s capacity to fight. While
indirect approach seeks to demolish the
adversary‟s will to fight: a guerilla warfare
strategy target enemy soldiers, and barbarism
targets enemy noncombatants (Toft, 2001:
105). If the same approach (direct-direct or
indirect-indirect) occurs in the conflict, the
weak actor will be defeated because there is no
deflection of strong actor‟s power advantage.
While in contrast, if opposite approach apply
in the interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-
direct), the victory for weak will indicate
because the strong actor‟s power advantage is
diverted or avoided (Toft, 2001: 105). There
are 4 (four) premises are as follows:
First, in the context of direct attack versus
direct defense, when strong actors attack
using a direct strategy and weak actors
defend using a direct strategy, all other
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29 29
things being equal, strong actors should
win quickly and decisively;
Second, in the context of direct attack
versus indirect defense, when strong actors
attack with a direct strategy and weak
actors defend using an indirect strategy, all
other things being equal, weak actors
should win;
Third, in the context of indirect attack
versus direct defense, when strong actors
attack with an indirect strategy and weak
actors defend using a direct strategy, all
other things being equal, strong actors
should lose;
Fourth, in the context of indirect attack
versus indirect defense, when strong actors
employ barbarism to attack weak actors
defending with a guerilla warfare strategy
(GWS), all other things being equal, strong
actor should win.
It concludes these premises describe an
interaction based on the same-approach or
opposite-approach. With strong actors are
more likely to win same-approach interactions
and lose opposite-approach interactions.
Russia is a regional strong actor versus
Ukraine which perceived as a weak actor
which conflicting interests in the protection of
their national security. The clash of interest is
affecting them to use its military power to
pursuit their national interest. The writer
identified that throughout strategic interaction
occurring within the asymmetric conflict could
be utilized in analyzing conditions of war that
generate an outcome of states‟ actions in
achieving their objectives.
Conclusion
The relative power of Russia as a
strong actor in international system has
determined its position to act assertively
towards Ukraine. In regards to state behavior
play a significance role in international system
which reflected of Soviet Union era, Russia
attempted to regain its sphere of influence over
Ukraine-as. As result, a state implies power in
victory. The behavior of Russia on this
asymmetric warfare demonstrated Realist logic
towards the protection of national security of
the state. Realist logic becomes an integral part
on Russia‟s military operation in Ukraine.
It remains as center of gravity for
Russia in building a Eurasian integration
ambition. EU enlargement policy on Ukraine
illustrates a small shift taken by Ukraine to
increase its power from Western part of the
contingent. Political and economic provisions
are recognized to be the elements of both
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Figure 1 Russia-Ukraine Strategic Interaction
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entities‟ relations. Russia also still has several
political measures to maintain. The importance
of economic flow of energy transfer and
natural resources, historic and symbolic
(Crimea and Black Sea), military (defense
industry and infrastructure of Russia Black Sea
Fleet), and strategic geopolitical location are
classified as the national interests of Russia
over Ukraine.
From national perspective, Russia
reformulates country‟s foreign and defense
policy in order to maintain its survival.
Particularly under the timeframe on 2000 until
2013, the revitalization process was become
clearer on the stage. The willingness of Russia
in return to change the world polarity
architecture never is ignored. Russia renewed
its foreign policy concept to maximizing
presence on international system. Due to
contemporary development, network
diplomacy seems to be one of an effective
solutions under these circumstances, including
humanitarian and information technology. In
addition, the reconstruction of Russian defense
policy has strengthened state‟s capacity and
capability in achieving the objectives.
Additional consideration on Russia‟s military
capability, the recognition of the advancement
of cyber power, which begun since 2001 has
signed a new dynamics of Russia‟s military
operation. In the sense of combination between
military and non-military forces, this new
element is ready to be measured.
In the interaction between the two
countries, Russia confirms its status as strong
actor. Russia determines its national security
components based on national goals, national
balance of power, and degree of national
security. On national goals, Ukraine perceived
as a zone of Russian interest. Ukraine is not
allowed to have a direct align with the EU
because geopolitically it might hamper
Russia‟s Eurasian interests; Protection of
Russian compatriots in Ukraine has become a
legitimate instrument for Russia in expanding
its influence; Russia‟s energy transfer to
Europe must be secured; and the existence of
Russia Black Sea Fleet have to be maintained.
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