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Modus Vivendi and Political Legitimacy
Abstract
In this paper I seek to explore how the idea of modus vivendi might help us to understand political legitimacy. A suitable conception of modus vivendi, I suggest, can represent a way of underpinning a viable and attractive account of political legitimacy. On my account a modus vivendi is basically a set of arrangements that are accepted as basis for conducting affairs by those who are party to them. Political legitimacy, I argue, is ultimately rooted in the judgements of those subject to it, but is mediated through a language in which claims to it are argued and assessed. The thought is that the web of operative beliefs and values in any given society, which constitute the grounds of judgements about political legitimacy, are what sustains a modus vivendi around the basic political institutions and practices. On this view, legitimate political institutions and practices incline towards a modus vivendi in that they are the outcome of an historical and ongoing conglomeration of settlements reflecting shifting and conflicting values and interests, as well relative balances of power, both currently and in the past. The marriage of modus vivendi and political legitimacy, therefore, seeks to reflect the contingent and ‘negotiated’ character of basic political institutions and practices and an understanding of political legitimacy that sees it as mediated through an ongoing and emergent discourse of argument and judgement, which remains nonetheless always vulnerable to challenge and change.
... Any realist acceptability theory, I argue, will struggle to hold 'acceptability to all' as a necessary condition for legitimacy, because of the notion of acceptability they use. 31 Other accounts which fit into this category, as I have defined it, include Horton's (2012Horton's ( , 2018) and Sleat's (2014) accounts of legitimacy. Beetham's (2013) account also stresses the justifiability of rule in terms of subjects' beliefs and hence appears to fit well into this category -but his account is multifaceted and includes, over and above this kind of 'acceptability', conditions on legality and evidence of consent. ...
... What 'makes sense', in turn, can only be understood by a process of interpretation. Horton (2012Horton ( , 2018 and Sleat (2014) also advance versions of realist acceptability theories which seem to require a degree of interpretation in order to yield judgements of legitimacy. According to Horton, legitimacy depends on the congruence between rule and what he calls the "salient criteria of legitimacy that are practically operative" in the given historical and political circumstances (2012, p. 142). ...
This thesis is an investigation of realist theories of political legitimacy, with a particular focus on two realist accounts of legitimacy – those of Amanda Greene (2019) and Bernard Williams (2005). Many theorists have taken the view that realist accounts of legitimacy clearly provide an insufficient normative standard of legitimacy. This thesis provides a challenge to such critics by offering a partial defence of (some kinds of) realist accounts of legitimacy as providing a viable normative standard of legitimacy. The thesis argues, first, that realist theories of legitimacy have more impressive normative implications than might be thought, and second, that there are good reasons to reject forms of critique of realist legitimacy based on ‘external’ moral standards. This latter argument is based on an understanding of realist legitimacy as offering an ‘internalist’ standard for the moral evaluation of states’ rule.
Realist political theory is often confronted with the objection that it is biased towards the status quo. Although this criticism overlooks the fact that realist political theories contain various resources for critique, a realist approach that is strong in status quo critique and contributes, constructively, to the theorising of alternatives to the status quo is a desideratum. The article argues that contextual realism, which sources its normativity from particular contexts, harbours an underexploited potential to establish such a form of political theorising. By drawing on ideas and principles that have guided critical engagements with social and political forms in a particular context, and on widely shared views of need for reform, realists can identify deficits of the status quo and contribute to a debate on how these deficits might be addressed. This article describes and illustrates the idea of a transformative contextual realism, and defends it against some potential objections.
THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF TOLERATION aims to provide a comprehensive presentation of toleration as the foundational idea associated with engagement with diversity. This handbook is intended to provide an authoritative exposition of contemporary accounts of toleration, the central justifications used to advance it, a presentation of the different concepts most commonly associated with it (e.g. respect, recognition) as well as the discussion of the many problems dominating the controversies on toleration at both the theoretical or practical level. The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration is aimed as a resource for a global scholarly audience looking for either a detailed presentation of major accounts of toleration, the most important conceptual issues associated with toleration and the many problems dividing either scholars, policy-makers or practitione
This paper seeks to explore some connections between the ideas of toleration and modus vivendi, principally through a critical engagement with the work of John Gray. In particular, it argues that while Gray is right to see a connection between modus vivendi and a particular conception of toleration (here referred to as the ‘traditional conception’) it is both problematic and potentially confusing to tie either of these ideas, as he does, to a theory of value-pluralism. Instead, they should be viewed as distinct but partially overlapping and often mutually supportive ideas, the relevance of which are best explained in terms of the need or desire of people to live together under conditions of conflict about the worth of different ways of life, and motivated by a variety of pragmatic and principled concerns. The paper also offers a modest defence of the traditional conception of toleration against some of its critics, arguing that such a practice of toleration, if supported by a modus vivendi, can provide a peaceable means of accommodating differences in a way that is broadly accepted, although neither ideal nor necessarily uncontested, by both tolerators and the tolerated.
Toleration is typically defined as follows: an agent (A), for some reason, objects to certain actions or practices of someone else (B), but has outweighing other reasons to accept these actions or practices nonetheless and, thus, refrains from interfering with or preventing B from acting accordingly, although A has the power to interfere. So understood, (mutual) toleration is taken to allow for peaceful coexistence and ideally even cooperation amongst people who disagree with each other on crucial questions on how to live and what to value, which is why it has traditionally been regarded as an important part of political liberalism. An explicitly value-neutral liberal state then avoids taking sides when it comes to different and competing ways of life. However, following this idea of liberal neutrality, it has been questioned whether a value-neutral liberal state still needs toleration or is even compatible with it, for apparently neutrality leaves no more room for the objection component of toleration to take hold. In this paper, I take up this question and argue that there is, indeed, conceptual and practical room left for a value-neutral liberal state to be tolerant. Drawing on the interplay between four kinds of reasons (pragmatic, ethical, moral, and political), pragmatic and political reasons may still provide the needed evaluative and normative ground upon which the combination of objection and outweighing acceptance can be made sense of. However, the possible scope of toleration for a value-neutral liberal state is considerably limited.
Modus vivendi theories are caught in an uneasy relationship with a substantive, normative pluralism of toleration and a conceptual and structural awareness of the unavoidability of sociopolitical diversity and contestation. The chapter explores the semantic space occupied by modus vivendi and the kind of political thinking it represents, in particular as a variant of the quest for order and the inevitability of ranking priorities. The implicit boundary drawn by ‘modus vivendi’ theorists between solid blocs of ideas and practices is questioned. When larger magnification orders are employed, points of contact and intertwining may reveal a messiness with which conventional modus vivendi approaches cannot engage. Modus vivendi would consequently benefit from a micro-analysis of its various components instead of being subject to broad-brush treatment, particularly in view of a morphological approach to political concepts. Modus vivendi is also examined in contrast to consensus theories, compromise theories, and agonism, and some of its different forms—fragmentation, segmentation, and asymmetry—are discussed. Finally, modus vivendi is interrogated as an interpretative rather than a prescriptive thought-practice, relating it to a realism based on the ascertainable core characteristics of the political.
John Horton has recently (The political theory of modus vivendi. Springer, 2018) combined the theory of modus vivendi with a hybrid conception of legitimacy. This chapter explores the relation between the two, places the proposal in the wider context of legitimacy theory, and assesses whether modus vivendi legitimacy could be an alternative to liberal notions of legitimacy. The combination of descriptive and normative elements brings about an understanding of legitimacy that incurs problems in some cases, especially as it relates to Horton’s theory of political obligation. It will be argued that modus vivendi theory may be, contrary to what Horton suggests, better off without the specific theory of legitimacy that he offers—instead, an even more limited notion of legitimacy might suffice and steer clear of the challenges developed in the chapter. However, it seems as if modus vivendi theory is necessary for the defense of Horton’s theory of legitimacy and political obligation. Depending on one’s theoretical interests and commitments, then, one may choose to separate or reinforce the link between modus vivendi and the hybrid conception of legitimacy.
In this chapter, I tackle a deficit of current modus vivendi theory, namely its neglect of institutions. Modus vivendi theorists have good reason to get beyond this position and show how the notion of modus vivendi politics can be made use of for considerations about institutional design. First, I argue that two features of modus vivendi enable critical assessments of institutional design: modus vivendi arrangements are supposed to reflect the plurality of views on disputed issues and find the acceptance of those who are subject to the arrangement in question. Second, I apply these criteria of modus vivendi to recent institutional innovations that have been implemented in order to strengthen the capacity of pluralist democracies to deal with deep disagreements: (a) the release of parliamentarians’ duty to vote in line with their parliamentary groups and the establishment of (b) ethics councils and (c) mini-publics. The requirements of modus vivendi politics enable both a critique of these institutions and the development of alternative designs. I make an exemplar case for this claim by sketching a fourth possible institutional innovation: flexible negotiating forums.
There have been four main motives to introduce the notion of modus vivendi in the political-philosophical literature. One is to use it as a negative contrast to what one regards as the ideal goal in politics. The second is to use it within a distinctively realist political theory that refrains from advocating utopian ideals. The third is to defend liberal institutions as a modus vivendi. The fourth is to have a concept for the institutional tools for peace. Depending on the motive to introduce the notion of modus vivendi, the notion is conceptualized slightly differently. One aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of the different motives that have led theorists to think about modus vivendi and the different conceptualizations of modus vivendi they have offered. But the chapter also makes a more substantial point: it argues that we should conceptualize the notion of modus vivendi in line with the fourth motive, because this seems the most promising way to get a conception of modus vivendi that is both “deeply motivated” and “open” for all kinds of approaches in political theory.
The double thesis sketched in broad strokes in this essay will be that modus vivendi conceptions do not qualify as viable alternatives to political liberalism. In order to be normatively plausible, modus vivendi conceptions depend on a (politically) liberal framework and on the normative reasoning justifying it. Within such a liberal framework, however, modus vivendi theory and modus vivendi institutions are necessary. Modus vivendi theory is analysed to be a normatively inconsistent approach that cannot be successful in its attempt to undermine liberalism’s aspiration to occupy a privileged normative position vis-à-vis other kinds of regimes. Pluralist theories of the modus vivendi kind, dissociating themselves from normative individualism which takes individuals as the core elements of the political and legal processes, are in danger of destroying the very base of a sound political idea of pluralism. The essay especially questions how much realism is found in the “realist turn” in recent political theory, of which the modus vivendi approach is part, given systematic underestimation of the legal system in modus vivendi theorizing.
This chapter presents an overview on the current debate on modus vivendi theorising and makes selective use of the arguments developed in the subsequent chapters to show how this book contributes to it. First, modus vivendi is defined as an arrangement that enables political cooperation in the face of conflict, which can be supported for moral and non-moral reasons and is shaped by the specific context from which it emerges. Second, it is shown that those who make modus vivendi a central concept of their political theorising include both liberal and realist theorists: while liberals use it to reinterpret the liberal project, realists aim to make it the basis of a distinctive form of political theorising that avoids the “moralising” tendencies of much of current liberal political theorising. This chapter discusses in more detail the latter project and shows, third, how realists have worked towards a political theory of modus vivendi by defining standards of legitimacy that are less idealised. However, there are two important criticisms. Some question whether realist accounts of legitimacy differ significantly from “liberal moralism”. Others argue that these accounts express an uncritical view towards domination. Finally, the chapter sketches some proposals for the further developments of modus vivendi theorising that are discussed in this book. One is to focus more explicitly on the circumstances and practices of modus vivendi politics. Another is to make sense of the normative implications of modus vivendi in novel ways.
This paper explores two different versions of ‘the realist turn’ in recent political theory. It begins by setting out two principal realist criticisms of liberal moralism: that it is both descriptively and normatively inadequate. It then pursues the second criticism by arguing that there are two fundamentally different responses among realists to the alleged normative inadequacy of ideal theory. First, prescriptive realists argue that the aim of realism is to make political theory more normatively adequate by making it more realistic. Interpretative realists, on the other hand, argue that realist theorising should detach itself from such an aspiration, and instead aim at theoretical understanding rather than normative prescription. After some further elaboration of what interpretative realism might look like, it is acknowledged that both approaches still need to address the question of political normativity.
According to what has recently been labeled ‘political realism’ in political theory, ‘political moralists’ such as Rawls and Dworkin misconstrue the political domain by presuming that morality has priority over politics, thus overlooking that the political is an autonomous domain with its own distinctive conditions and normative sources. Political realists argue that this presumption, commonly referred to as the ‘ethics first premise’, has to be abandoned in order to properly theorize a normative conception of political legitimacy. This article critically examines two features of political realism, which so far have received too little systematic philosophical analysis: the political realist critique of political moralism and the challenges facing political realism in its attempt to offer an alternative account of political legitimacy. Two theses are defended. First, to the extent that proponents of political realism wish to hold onto a normative conception of political legitimacy, refuting wholesale the ethics first premise leads to a deadlock, since it throws the baby out with the bathwater by closing the normative space upon which their account of political legitimacy relies. This is called the ‘necessity thesis’: all coherent and plausible conceptions of political legitimacy must hold onto the ethics first premise. Secondly, accepting this premise – and thus defending an ethics first view – does not entail that the political domain must be seen as a subordinate arena for the application of moral principles, that political normativity is reduced to morality or that morality trumps other reasons in political decision making, as claimed by political realists. Rather, the ethics first view is compatible with an autonomous political domain that makes room for an account of political legitimacy that is defined by and substantiated from sources of normativity specifically within the political. This is called the ‘compatibility thesis’.
This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice and from the nature of political judgement. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought.
This article sets out some of the key features of a realist critique of liberal moralism, identifying descriptive inadequacy and normative irrelevance as the two fundamental lines of criticism. It then sketches an outline of a political theory of modus vivendi as an alternative, realist approach to political theory. On this account a modus vivendi should be understood as any political settlement that involves the preservation of peace and security and is generally acceptable to those who are party to it. In conclusion, some problems with this conception of modus vivendi and with a realist political theory more generally are discussed. In particular, the question is raised of whether a realist political theory should be understood as an alternative to liberal moralism or only a better way of doing basically the same kind of thing.
What is it for a state, constitution or set of governmental institutions to have political legitimacy? This paper raises some doubts about two broadly liberal answers to this question, which can be labelled ‘Kantian’ and ‘libertarian’. The argument focuses in particular on the relationship between legitimacy and principles of justice and on the place of consent. By contrast with these views, I suggest that, without endorsing the kind of voluntarist theory, according to which political legitimacy is simply created by individual consent, an adequate understanding of political legitimacy should take much more account than most philosophical theories tend to do of the attitudes and beliefs of citizens and the social and political context in which they have saliency. This also involves acknowledging the limits of theory in determining criteria of political legitimacy.
John Gray's advocacy of a political theory of modus vivendi is closely linked by him with his commitment to value‐pluralism. In this essay I raise some problems about value‐pluralism, suggesting that it is too controversial and beset by theoretical difficulties of its own to serve as a secure basis for modus vivendi. I go on to argue that modus vivendi can be better defended against its critics by making it less dependent on value‐pluralism. The idea of modus vivendi is then defended against four specific charges: that it is unstable; that it is indeterminate; that it is unjust or immoral; and that it privileges a narrow and contestable conception of value.
This article explores a neglected aspect of Peter Winch's work: his writings on political authority. It seeks to show that this neglect is undeserved. Three themes are interweaved in the discussion. First, the major developments in Winch's thinking between his first published article on political authority (in a symposium with Richard Peters) and his later writings on the subject are identified and assessed. Criticism is focused mainly on his tendency to be insufficiently attentive to the distinction between being in authority and being an authority, and the implications this has for the distinctiveness of political authority. Secondly, particular attention is given to some of the key strands in Winch's analysis. These include his distinction between the nature and the grounds of political authority, how the role of consent is to be understood in the light of this distinction, how an adequate understanding political authority does not undermine our ideas of autonomy, and what it might mean to reject the whole idea of political authority. Finally, the article concludes by briefly defending the value of Winch's approach to political philosophy. Earlier it is shown that Winch's analysis does not foreclose on a range of political responses to authority, and this point is generalised to argue for a philosophical approach (like Winch’s) that aims at understanding, rather than at advancing any particular set of moral or political principles.
A polity is grounded in a modus vivendi (MV) when its main features can be presented as the outcome of a virtually unrestricted bargaining process. Is MV compatible with the consensus-based account of liberal legitimacy, i.e. the view that political authority is well grounded only if the citizenry have in some sense freely consented to its exercise? I show that the attraction of MV for consensus theorists lies mainly in the thought that a MV can be presented as legitimated through a realist account of public justification. Yet I argue that, because of persistent ethical diversity, that realism problematically conflicts with the liberal commitments that underpin the very ideas of consensus and public justification. Thus, despite the interest it has recently attracted from critics of political liberalism and deliberative democracy, MV is not an option for those wishing to ground liberal political authority in some form of consensus. So if realist and agonistic critiques are on target, then the fact that modus vivendi is not an option casts some serious doubt on the viability of the consensus view of liberal legitimacy.
In this chapter, I tackle a deficit of current modus vivendi theory, namely its neglect of institutions. Modus vivendi theorists have good reason to get beyond this position and show how the notion of modus vivendi politics can be made use of for considerations about institutional design. First, I argue that two features of modus vivendi enable critical assessments of institutional design: modus vivendi arrangements are supposed to reflect the plurality of views on disputed issues and find the acceptance of those who are subject to the arrangement in question. Second, I apply these criteria of modus vivendi to recent institutional innovations that have been implemented in order to strengthen the capacity of pluralist democracies to deal with deep disagreements: (a) the release of parliamentarians’ duty to vote in line with their parliamentary groups and the establishment of (b) ethics councils and (c) mini-publics. The requirements of modus vivendi politics enable both a critique of these institutions and the development of alternative designs. I make an exemplar case for this claim by sketching a fourth possible institutional innovation: flexible negotiating forums.
This essay examines the promise of the notion of modus vivendi for realist political theory. I interpret recent theories of modus vivendi as affirming the priority of peace over justice and explore several ways of making sense of this idea. I proceed to identify two key problems for modus vivendi theory, so conceived. Normatively speaking, it remains unclear how this approach can sustain a realist critique of Rawlsian theorizing about justice while avoiding a Hobbesian endorsement of absolutism. And conceptually, the theory remains wedded to a key feature of social contract theory: political order is conceived as based on agreement. This construes the horizontal tensions among individual or group agents in society as prior to the vertical, authoritative relations between authorities and their subjects. Political authority thereby appears from the start as a solution to societal conflict rather than a problem in itself. I argue that this way of framing the issue abstracts from political experience. Instead I attempt to rethink the notion of modus vivendi from within the lived experience of political conflict, as oriented not primarily toward peace, but political survival. With this shift of perspective, the idea of modus vivendi shows us, pace Bernard Williams, that the “first political question” is not how to achieve order and stability, but rather: what can I live with?
Much of the recent work on modus vivendi politics has come from writers who are broadly sympathetic to the realist critique of liberal moralism. They present modus vivendi politics as an alternative to the political moralism that is associated with liberal Anglo-American philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. This chapter argues that the opposition between these two sets of views—liberal moralism and modus vivendi politics—has been misconceived. On the one hand, it argues that liberal moralists have failed both to accurately characterize and to adequately appreciate the importance of modus vivendi arrangements for political order. On the other hand, it argues that realist critics of liberal moralism have generally failed to appreciate the extent to which an adequate defense of a modus vivendi arrangement presupposes commitment to moral principles of the sort defended by liberal moralists. After advancing these two lines of criticism, the chapter takes a more constructive turn and discusses the notion of a moralized modus vivendi, explaining how this notion draws on ideas from both liberal moralism and modus vivendi political theory. The possibility of a moralized modus vivendi, the chapter concludes, illustrates not only the compatibility but also the integration of liberal moralism and modus vivendi politics.
David Beetham's book explores the legitimation of power both as an issue in political and social science theory and in relation to the legitimacy of contemporary political systems including its breakdown in revolution. 'An admirable text which is far reaching in its scope and extraordinary in the clarity with which it covers a wide range of material... One can have nothing but the highest regard for this volume.' - David Held, Times Higher Education Supplement ;'Beetham has produced a study bound to revolutionize sociological thinking and teaching... Seminal and profoundly original... Beetham's book should become the obligitory reading for every teacher and practitioner of social science.' - Zygmunt Bauman, Sociology
Acknowledgements - PART 1: NEUTRALITY AND THE GOOD IN LIBERAL THEORY - Introduction - Liberalism and Neutrality - A Liberal Theory of the Good? - PART 2: RAWLS AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM - In the Shadow of the General Will: Rawls, Kant and Rousseau on the Problem of Political Right - Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical? - Does He Mean What He Says? (Mis)Understanding Rawls' Practical Turn - PART 3: ALTERNATIVE LIBERALISMS - Perfectionism With A Liberal Face? Nervous Liberals and Raz's Political Theory - Dworkin on the Foundations of Liberal Equality - Vulgar Liberalism - Index
This book explores the morality of compromising. The author argues that peace and public justification are values that provide moral reasons to make compromises in politics, including compromises that establish unjust laws or institutions. He explains how it is possible to have moral reasons to agree to moral compromises and he debates our moral duties and obligations in making such compromises. The book also contains discussions of the sources of the value of public justification, the relation between peace and justice, the nature of modus vivendi arrangements and the connections between compromise, liberal institutions and legitimacy. In exploring the morality of compromising, the book thus provides some outlines for a map of political morality beyond justice.
Many contemporary political thinkers are gripped by the belief that their task is to develop an ideal theory of rights or justice for guiding and judging political actions. But inPhilosophy and Real Politics, Raymond Geuss argues that philosophers should first try to understand why real political actors behave as they actually do. Far from being applied ethics, politics is a skill that allows people to survive and pursue their goals. To understand politics is to understand the powers, motives, and concepts that people have and that shape how they deal with the problems they face in their particular historical situations. Philosophy and Real Politicsboth outlines a historically oriented, realistic political philosophy and criticizes liberal political philosophies based on abstract conceptions of rights and justice. The book is a trenchant critique of established ways of thought and a provocative call for change.
‘The author has provided us with a masterful overview and critique of liberal theorizing of the past quarter-century. While dealing exhaustively and fairly with each of a variety of broadly liberal approaches, Gaus also presents a compelling argument for his own preferred "justificatory" approach. His analyses range across familiar territory - Berlin, Gauthier, Baier, Habermas, social choice theory, Rawls, and so on - and are always illuminating and, taken together, provide both the newcomer and the old-hand much to ponder’ - Fred D’Agostino, University of New England, Armidale ‘[A]ll that man is and all that raises him above animals he owes to his reason’ - Ludwig von Mises Contemporary Theories of Liberalism provides students with a comprehensive overview of the key tenets of liberalism developed through Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Rawls to present day theories and debates. Central to recent debate has been the idea of public reason. The text introduces and explores seven dominant theories of public reason, namely, pluralism, Neo-Hobbesianism, pragmatism, deliberative democracy, political democracy, Rawlsian political liberalism and justificatory liberalism. As a proponent of justificatory liberalism, Gaus presents an accessible and critical analysis of all contempoary liberal political theory and powerfully illustrates the distinct and importsant contribution of justificatory liberalism. Contemporary Theories of Liberalism is essential reading for students and academics seeking a deeper understanding of liberal political theory today.
A central task in contemporary political philosophy is to identify principles governing political life where citizens disagree deeply on important questions of value and, more generally, about the proper ends of life. The distinctively liberal response to this challenge insists that the state should as far as possible avoid relying on such contested issues in its basic structure and deliberations. David McCabe critically surveys influential defenses of the liberal solution and advocates modus vivendi liberalism as an alternative defense of the liberal state. Acknowledging that the modus vivendi approach does not provide the deep moral consensus that many liberals demand, he defends the liberal state as an acceptable compromise among citizens who will continue to see it as less than ideal. His book will interest a wide range of readers in political philosophy and political theory.
What, if anything, can realism say about the normative conditions of political legitimacy? Must a realist political theory accept that the ability to successfully employ coercive power is equivalent to the right to rule, or can it incorporate normative criteria for legitimacy but without collapsing into a form of moralism? While several critics argue that realism fails to adequately differentiate itself from moralism or that it cannot coherently appeal to normative values so as to distinguish might from right, this article seeks to help develop a realist account of legitimacy by demonstrating how it can successfully and stably occupy this position between moralism and Realpolitik. Through this discussion, however, the article also argues that political rule necessitates the use of coercive power which is (at best) imperfectly legitimated, and that this blurs the distinction between politics and successful domination which lies at the heart of many recent accounts of political realism. In at least this sense, realism retains important and under-acknowledged affinities to Realpolitik.
In this article I discuss Bernard Williams' realist conception of legitimacy. According to his critics Williams tacitly incorporates various moral claims, endorses a philosophically suspect ‘consensus’ view of politics, and employs an unrealistic and moralised conception of political rule. I argue that these criticisms mischaracterise the nature of the basic legitimation demand and the judgements about the acceptability of the state at its core and conclude that political theorists who object to the direction and style of much contemporary political theory should take seriously the possibility of developing an appropriately ‘political’ political theory on Williamsian lines.
The business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and person.
John Locke
In recent decades, a ‘realist’ alternative to ideal theories of politics has slowly taken shape. Bringing together philosophers, political theorists, and political scientists, this countermovement seeks to reframe inquiry into politics and political norms. Among the hallmarks of this endeavor are a moral psychology that includes the passions and emotions; a robust conception of political possibility and rejection of utopian thinking; the belief that political conflict — of values as well as interests — is both fundamental and ineradicable; a focus on institutions as the arenas within which conflict is mediated and contained; and a conception of politics as a sphere of activity that is distinct, autonomous, and subject to norms that cannot be derived from individual morality. For political realists, a ‘well-ordered society’ is rarely attainable; a modus vivendi without agreement on first principles is often the only practical possibility. Not only will ‘full compliance’ never be achieved, but also it is an assumption that yields misleading accounts of political norms. While realists offer a number of compelling criticisms of ideal theory, there are some lacunae in their stance. It is not yet clear whether realism constitutes a coherent affirmative alternative to idealism. Nor have realists clarified the extent of conflict that is consistent with political order as such. And because both sides accept ‘ought implies can’ as a constraint on the validity of political norms, much of the debate between realists and idealists revolves around deep empirical disagreements that are yet to be clarified.
This paper explains and advocates a political theory of modus vivendi, and specifically explores how it might work in the context of problems arising from religious conflicts. The account of modus vivendi that is defended is distinguished both from that of John Rawls and that of John Gray, and is conceived primarily as a matter of bargaining, negotiation and compromise. It is not merely to be understood as a simple reflection of the balance of political forces but a 'pragmatic' approach that mobilises whatever resources are available to effect a workable political settlement that is broadly acceptable to the contending parties. In the final part of the paper the merits of this conception are considered in the context of religious conflicts, with the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland taken as one exemplar of a political theory of modus vivendi in action.
So is this it: I must recognize certain authorities in order to make judgments at all? (OC, 493)
I want in this paper to consider Wittgenstein's great posthumous work On Certainty in a different perspective from the usual: from the point of view of certain deep questions in political philosophy. These questions concern the nature of the state's authority and the citizen/s obligation to it; the notion of legitimacy and the role of consent in this context. Such issues have many dimensions; but they arise in part out of difficulties in reconciling the application of such concepts with our understanding of human rationality, especially practical rationality. I think it has been, and remains, characteristic of the main tradition of discussion of such issues to leave certain important questions about the nature of practical rationality unasked. I believe that these questions are asked, though in a different context, in Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
Of the original contract
- D Hume