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Migration and Markets
inAgadez
Economic alternatives to the migration industry
Anette Hoffmann
Jos Meester
Hamidou Manou Nabara
Supported by:
CRU Report
Migration and Markets in Agadez:
Economic alternatives to the
migration industry
Anette Hoffmann
Jos Meester
Hamidou Manou Nabara
CRU Report
October 2017
October 2017
© Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’.
Cover photo: Men sitting on their motorcycles by the Agadez market. © Boris Kester /
traveladventures.org
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About the authors
Anette Hoffmann is a senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute’s Conflict Research Unit.
Jos Meester is a research fellow at the Clingendael Institute’s Conflict Research Unit.
Hamidou Manou Nabara is a PhD student at the University of Ouaga.
The Clingendael Institute
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Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industry
1
Acknowledgements
This repor t would not have been possible without the financial support received from
NWO-WOTRO – commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and
developed in close collaboration with the Knowledge Platform Securit y & Rule of Law
(SRoL-ARF5) . We are especially grateful to our research partner, the Nigerien think tank
Economie Politique & Gouvernance Autonome (EPGA), to its director, Rahmane Idrissa
and to EPGA’s survey enumerators for their incessant efforts to support the design and
distribution of our survey, as well as their comments on the reports. The authors would
also like to thank the staff of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Niger
for their suppor t throughout the realisation of the research project. In particular we
would like to thank Livia Manente, Maria Veger and Lucia Anna Speh for their generous
insights during the review process of these reports. The design of the survey was fur ther
informed by the expertise of Jannine van der Maat and Kars de Bruijne who ensured
scientific quality. A special thanks goes to Francesco Mascini and Steffen Mueller (GIZ
Niger) who have invested time in providing comments and suggestions. Finally, we are
especially grateful to all the respondents who answered our sur vey, participated in focus
group discussions, and generally demonstrated a willingness to share insights on such
complex topics.
2
Contents
Abstract 3
Executive summary 4
List of abbreviations 6
1 Introduction 7
2 Agadez’s economy in brief 10
3 Historical overview of the migration value chain 17
4 Impact of the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants 23
4.1 Economic sector most affected: transport 25
4.2 Facilitation payments on the rise 27
4.3 Effects on the wider local economy 28
4.4 Income losses and economic decline causing greater insecurity 28
4.5 Social tensions on the rise 29
5 Opportunities for development and stability 31
5.1 Promote the creation of income-generating activities and businesses
today 31
5.2 Invest in an enabling business environment 42
5.3 Ensure conflict sensitivity 46
Conclusion 48
Appendix: Methodology 49
References 51
3
Abstract
This repor t situates the migration industry of Agadez in the broader context of the town’s
political economy. After providing a brief economic overview, the report maps out the
value chain of migration in Agadez and shows its multiple linkages with other sectors in
the economy. It subsequently explores how the implementation of the 2015 Law Against
Illicit Smuggling of Migrants in late 2016 — supported by European Union funding and
capacity building programs — affected the economy in general and people’s livelihoods
in particular. Given the migration industry’s deep entanglement with people’s livelihoods,
the criminalisation of northbound migration robbed large parts of the population of an
important source of income. Evidence suggests that the crackdown on migration also
exacerbated feelings of marginalisation, tensions between groups and mistrust vis-à-
vis state authorities. Any reduction in outbound migration flows through Agadez can
be sustained only if alternative income-generating oppor tunities will materialise in the
immediate future. The repor t offers three sets of recommendations showing concrete
ways to leverage the region’s existing potential: to create economic opportunities in the
short term, to work towards an enabling business environment and to design support
measures in a conflict-sensitive manner.
towards Sebha
Madama
Djado
towards Djanet and Ghat
towards Tamanrasset
Arlit
Imouraren
Ingal
Tchintabaraden
Tahoua
Tillabéri
Niamey
Azelik
Zinder
Diffa
Tesker
Bilma
Dirkou
Séguédine
Dabaga
Agadez
Tchibarakaten
Tabelot
Legend
State Capital
City
Village
Mining locality
Traditional route of migration
Current route of migration
Agadez Region
Active mine
Inactive mine
Uranium mine
Cassiterite and copper mine
Gold mine
Salt mine
France
Germany
United States
Foreign military
presence
Figure 1 Map of Niger
4
Executive summary
At the intersection of transit routes, the region of Agadez has historically benefited
from migration as a source of income. In recent years, and profiting from the fall of
the Libyan regime, which eased coastal access, Agadez grew into a major hub for
traders facilitating the passage of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. Facing
persistently high numbers of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea, the
European Union (EU) has joined a strategic partnership with Niger to stem the flow of
northbound migrants. This report investigates the impact of clamping down on a major
source of income on the economy and population of an already volatile region.
Because agriculture, a traditional and still important source of income for the region,
is subject to production fluctuations, and the region’s other economic sectors (tourism,
artisan handicrafts and uranium mining) declined over the past few years, a boom
in the migration and gold industry provided an important windfall. The migration
industry offered direct jobs for more than 6,000 people (in jobs such as passeurs,
coxeurs, ghetto owners and drivers) and the combination of migrant consumption and
increased trade with Libya indirectly supported incomes of reportedly more than half
of all the households in Agadez. Since late 2016, however, migration flows have begun
to circumvent the city of Agadez in the wake of the implementation of the 2015 Law
Against Illicit Smuggling of Migrants, which is supported by EU funding and capacity-
building programs. Because surface gold deposits are also running low and gold mining
sites have been closed, economic opportunities in the region have become increasingly
scarce.
The adverse economic effects of irregular migration-mitigating measures are not
just limited to those directly employed in the migration sector and migrants (who pay
additional for their passage and face the risk of being abandoned in the desert as
smugglers try to cope with the increased risk of arrest). Another economic fallout is
evident among businesses that previously thrived on demand driven by both migrants’
and smugglers’ consumption, for instance food and water sales, as well as the demand
for motorcycle taxis, bus transport and money transfers. Unemployment is on the rise,
especially given that young people working at the lower tiers of the migration value
chain are leaving the business due to the increased risk associated to the facilitation
of migration.
Commerce and other value chains relying on imports are also suffering from reduced
traffic because less return traffic has decreased the supply and raised prices. Among
the significantly affected, for instance, are workshop owners from the industrial area
in Agadez, who also report that checkpoints at the entrance of Agadez have become
more burdensome for their suppliers in that both waiting time and facilitation fees are on
5
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
the rise. Faced with lower local purchasing power, craftsmen have little room to reflect
the increased transaction costs in their product pricing. Increasing facilitation fees are
likewise extracting funds from the productive economy. In addition, and due to growing
insecurity across Niger’s northern border, business and technology transfer from Libyan
businesses has also slowed. Farther down the route, in waypoints like Dirkou and
Séguédine, economic effects are likely to be even more pronounced, considering the
route now circumvents checkpoints and hence places that were previously on the route.
This is not to say that no growth sectors are visible. The market for private security
is seeing increasing demand and benefits from the availability of skilled labour and
equipment, such as drivers who used to work in the migration industry. Another sector
facing an uptake in revenues is the hospitality sector, which is increasingly catering
to NGO personnel and journalists visiting the area on migration-related assignments.
The repor t also identifies potential for short- and long-term economic development in
the sectors of agriculture and pastoralism, artisanal handicrafts and jeweller y, gold and
uranium mining, infrastructure, private security and small trade, as well as a number of
opportunities for women entrepreneurs.
The repor t offers three recommendations to leverage the region’s existing potential.
First, promoting income-generating activities and businesses in the short term is key.
Concrete measures could include conducting a participatory market assessment,
supporting the ongoing business plan competition, deploying road construction and
maintenance, or ensuring that international actors commit to sourcing locally. Second,
working towards an enabling business environment in the longer term is also necessary.
Key elements in this area are developing entrepreneurial thinking in the region,
removing obstacles preventing access to markets, promoting greater transparency and
accountability among the larger companies, investing in infrastructure, and potentially
exempting Agadez city from the zone rouge travel warning. Third, designing support
measures in a conflict-sensitive manner is essential. This means any engagements in
the area should avoid exclusively targeting actors involved in the migration economy.
More generally, local perceptions and processes, not just the actual outcomes of
an intervention, need to be carefully monitored in fragile societies, where perceived
injustice can easily trigger violent reactions. Finally, no matter how weak and informal
markets are in Agadez today, they are still part of a broader settlement; interfering in
them can have wider destabilising effects.
6
List of abbreviations
AFD Agence française de développement
[French Development Agency]
AFNCG Association of Nigerien Women against the War
COMINAK Compagnie Minière d’Akouta
[Minerary Company of Akouta]
CIPMEN Centre Incubateur des PME au Niger
[Incubation Center for SMEs in Niger]
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EPGA Economie Politique et Gouvernance Autonome
EU European Union
EUR Euro
KfW KfW Development Bank
LASDEL Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherche sur les Dynamiques Sociales et le
Développement Local
MAE Minister des Affaires Etrangères
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
NGO Nongovernmental organisation
IOM International Organization for Migration
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise
SOMAIR Société des Mines de l’Aïr
[Mining Company of the Aïr]
SOMINA Société des Mines d’Azelik SA
[Mining Company of Azelik SA]
UNESCO United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture
WB World Bank Group
XOF International Organization for Standardization denomination for XOF
currency
7
1 Introduction
One of the last significant outposts on the border of the Sahara Desert, the Nigerien
city of Agadez has a rich history of trade and commerce. Situated at the bisection of the
Trans-Sahara Highway (connecting Algiers to Lagos) and the West Africa–Libya route,
a wide variety of goods and people have passed through the city over the ages, ranging
from salt to slaves, from livestock to uranium and gold.1 As trade patterns changed, so
did the value proposition of the Saharan trade corridor. Port infrastructure developed
in the countries surrounding Niger, making the Saharan route increasingly marginal.
The route once served as a gateway for African exports to North Africa, the Middle East
and Europe, as well as for European impor ts to affluent Hausaland cities.2 Over time,
however, the costs associated with transport along the route became prohibitively
expensive as sea- and air-based transport developed in other hubs in the region
(facilitated by the development of railways). As licit trade through the region faced
a sharp decline, informal and illicit trade, taking advantage of weak governance and
security along the route, began to flourish. Benefitting from the fall of the Libyan regime
to ease coastal access, Agadez became known as a major hub for traders facilitating the
passage of migrants through Africa and to Europe.3
Facing persistently high numbers of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean
Sea, as well as numerous drownings, the European Union (EU) is attempting to stem the
1 K emper, S. 2012. A Labyrinth of Kingdoms: 10,0 00 Miles T hrough Isl amic Africa, New York: W.W. Nor ton;
Pellerin, M. 2017. ‘Beyond the “ Wild West”: The Gold Rush in Nor thern Niger,’ Small Arms Sur vey.
2 Ibid.
3 M olenaar, F. and El Kamouni-Jansen, F. 2017. ‘Turning the tide. The politics of irregular migr ation in the
Sahel and Libya,’ CRU Report, T he Hague, Clingendael. Ir regular migration is de fined here as migration
undertaken by per sons ‘who, owing to unau thorized entry, bre ach of a condition of entr y, or the expir y
of his or her visa, lacks l egal status in a transit or host country’ ( Malakooti, A. 2015. Mig ration Trends
Across the Mediterranean, Paris, Altai Consulting and IOM, 3) . Irregular migra tion flows ar e integrated by
‘temporary and reversible movements’ [circular migration], ‘long-term migration,’ and ‘forced migration’
[refugees] (Guilmoto, C. Z. and Sandr on, F. 2003. Migration et développement, Par is, La Documentation
Française). Although the majority of migrants in A gadez are re gular West African migrants trave lling freel y
under the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African S tates) pr otocol, (the debates surrounding
the) implementation of the 2015 law has framed these migrants as ir regular migrants. Le gally speaking,
migration become s irregular o nly when ECO WAS citizens cross the border wi th Libya and Algeria wit hout
valid travel documents.
8
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
flow of migrants.4 Efforts addressing migrant departures from Libya have had limited
effect and are subject to concerns regarding the conditions of those stranded in Libya,
prompting the EU to explore mitigation strategies in other hubs on the route, namely
Agadez.5 Although criticised for numerous reasons,6 measures in Agadez region seem
— according to the official IOM numbers — to be considerably more effective at reducing
the number of northbound migrants leaving (though traffic may have shifted to other
routes) .7 At the centre of what appears to be a successful EU intervention is the Loi
2015-36 relative au trafic illicite de migrants (the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling
of Migrants) passed in May 2015 and enacted as of late 2016, making Niger the first
country in the region to criminalise the smuggling of migrants.8 Policy measures appear
to have been relatively effective at limiting migrant outflows from Niger, but questions
regarding the effects of closing down a major source of income on the economy and
population of an already volatile region remain largely unanswered.
4 International Organization for Migration. 2017. ‘Mediterranean Update: Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals
and Fatalities,’ July; see also the UNHCR Operational Portal on Refugee Si tuations ,
http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterr anean (access ed Septemb er 2017). Mo st visible of the
drownin gs is that of the S yrian boy Ay land Kurdi in 2 015. Smith, H. 2015. ‘ Shocking images of drow ned
Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees’, The Guardian, 2 September, https: //www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/sep/ 02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees (accessed
September 2017); Re uters. 2 015. ‘Troubling image of drowned boy captiv ates, hor rifies’,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey/troubling-image-of-drowned-boy-captivates-
horrifies-idUSKCN0R20IJ20150902 (accessed September 2017).
5 A l Jazeera. 2017. ‘EU leaders ink de al to stem re fugee flow fr om Libya,’ http://ww w.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/02/eu-leaders-ink-deal-stem-migrant-flow-libya-170203151643286.html (accessed A ugust
2017); De arden, L. 2 017. ‘ EU Malta summit: Leaders warned against str anding thous ands of refug ees
in ‘conce ntration camps’ in Libya deal’, Independent, http://w ww.independent.co.uk/news /world/
europe/eu-malta-summit-leaders-warn-strand-thousands-migrants-libya-deal-concentr ation-camps-
crisis-a7560956.html (accessed August 2017) ; Molenaar and El Kamouni-Jansen, op. cit.
6 S ee, for instance, Tinti, P. 2017. ‘The EU ’s Hollow Success over Migrant Smuggling in Niger,’
Refugees Deeply, 17 January, https://w ww.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/01/17/the-e-
u-s-hollow-success-over-migrant-smuggling-in-niger (accesse d August 2017) ; minutes of migration
stakeholder meeting held in Oct ober 2016, obtained from deputy mayor of Agadez durin g field work in early
Ju ly 2017.
7 IOM, June-July 2017, Displa cement Tracking Matrix ( DTM) . Migration through A gadez is down significantly
since aut umn 2016. However, only 10 to 20 percent of these migrants are d estined for Europe, he nce a
reduction at Agade z does not tr anslate one on one in a reduction at the Libyan coast . Molenaar and E l
Kamouni-Jansen, op. cit.; Samuel Hall. 2016. ‘S elling Sand in t he Deser t, The Economic Impact of Migration
in Agadez ,’ IOM Niger.
8 A frica at LSE. 2017. ‘What incentives doe s Niger have for c racking down on
migrant smuggling? Not many,’ http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse /2016/01/13 /
whatincentivesdoesnigerhaveforcrackingdownonmigrantsmugglingnotmany/ (accessed Augus t 2017).
9
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
February August March July
0
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
Outflow of Migrants
Implementation of the 2015 Law against Illicit Smuggling
of Migrants
2016 2017
Figure 2 Evolution of northbound migration from Niger
Building on survey data, focus group discussions and key informant interviews (see
appendix 1 for an over view of the research methodology), this report explores the
implications of Niger’s EU-supported migration policies on the economy of Agadez.9 First
it describes the city’s main economic drivers to better understand the significance of the
migration industry to livelihoods of the city’s inhabitants. It then analyses the economic
potential of the migration market and assesses the impact of EU policy on the migration
market to size the impact for the region. The report concludes by indicating realistic
opportunities for private-sector development, which may be employed to mitigate the
economic impact of the clampdown. Further implications of migration policies on local
governance dynamics and security in the region are described in a companion report
Local governance opportunities for sustainable migration management in Agadez.
9 We invite the reader to fur ther explore the data using this study’s inter active data dashboard.
10
2 Agadez’s economy in brief
Although the city is known as a hub for migration, the economy of Agadez is relatively
diversified, and some of the major economic drivers are in fact based on local
production rather than transport and commerce. To understand the significance of the
migration industry, familiarity with its position in the wider economic context is essential.
Most impor tant are the agricultural and livestock sectors, which provide livelihoods
for the majority of Agadez’s inhabitants.10 Livestock production (camels, goats, sheep
and cattle) generates a significant share of Niger’s gross domestic product (GDP),
and although difficult to measure because of the large herds crossing the border into
Nigeria informally, it is ranked as the country’s second most important foreign exchange
earner.11 Agricultural production in turn largely remains subsistence oriented, boasting
only a few vegetable crops, namely, cowpea, groundnut and onion, contributing to
export earnings that can therefore be considered cash crops.12 Citrus fruits and potatoes
are grown for the southern Nigerien market, supplementing farmers’ livelihoods
but not generating earnings from export taxes for the central government. Because
crops are not diversified, external shocks such as slumps in crop prices or droughts,
most recently in 2014, can have a heavy and adverse impact on household incomes.13
Production is mainly geared to local consumption and is not taxed; and is hampered
by inadequate agricultural equipment and irrigation, the silting of water sources and
underdeveloped livestock infrastructure (such as veterinary services and food storage) .14
Professionalisation among producers is limited, and considerations regarding generating
surplus production or expor t opportunities are not major drivers of the sector.
Many young people have been abandoning the profession.15
10 Personal interview wi th a representative government authorities and private-se ctor organisations in Niger.
2017. Agadez, Niger, Jun e; Commune Urbaine D’Agadez. 2012. ‘Projet de plan de développement communal
(PD C) 2012–2016.’
11 Zonon, A . 2007. ‘A preliminary assessment of the economic value of the goods and services provided b y
dryland ecosys tems of the Aïr and Ténéré,’ IUC N The World Conservation Union.
12 According to t he chamber of c ommerce in Niamey, in 2013 annual tur nover of onion production in Agadez
amounted to XOF 50,000,000 ( EUR 76,2 25), exceeding the local earnings on uranium . Interv iew with
chamber of commerce r epresentative. 2017. Niamey, Nige r, June.
13 Pellerin, op. cit .; Bagnet to, L. 2012. ‘Agadez O nion Crisis Adds to Niger ’s Food Pro blems –Africa,’ RFI,
http://en.r fi.fr/africa/20120906-agadez-onion-crisis-adds-niger-s-food-issues (accessed 24 August 2017) .
14 Commune Urbaine D’Agadez, op. cit.
15 Focus group discussion with youth represent atives. 2017. Agadez , Niger, June.
11
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
Home to an UNESCO world heritage site, the region also has a proven potential for
tourism.16 Especially in the period between 1985 and 1991 and then from about 1998 to
about 2007 the sector attracted considerable revenues, servicing approximately 5,000
(predominantly European) tourists annually and at times serving as a waypoint for the
Paris-Dakar race. By 2007, it was composed of some 62 travel agencies employing
approximately 500 staff, mainly those of higher caste Tuareg origin (for an overview of
Niger’s main northern ethnic groups, see box 1).17 For a number of years, the sector
provided an alternative livelihood in agricultural low seasons and periods of drought.
The sectors’ success drove investments in off-road vehicles for guided tours. However,
the sector suffered heavily under the 2007–2009 Tuareg rebellion and the general
insecurity in the area. The remaining companies in the sector now rely predominantly on
NGO personnel visiting the region.18
Box 1 Northern ethnic groups with transnational ties19
The Tuareg make up 10 percent of the Nigerien population and are concentrated
in the sparsely populated and impoverished northern region of the country
surrounding Arlit and Agadez. Their ties extend to neighbouring countries such
as Libya, Algeria and Mali. The Toubou make up a mere 0.4 percent and live
primarily in desert areas in northeastern Niger. Their ethnic ties extend to Libya,
Chad and Sudan. The Arab population, mostly of Libyan descent, makes up
0.3 percent of the population. In the city of Agadez, they gravitate towards the
neighbourhood of Dagamanet.
The ethnic groups have reached an informal understanding over the division of
territory and spoils in the Agadez region. The Toubou control the Libyan axis
of the migration trade and the transportation routes to the Djado gold mines.
The Tuareg control the Algerian axis and routes to the Tchinchaden gold mines.
When conflict ensues on these routes, it is usually between individual smugglers.
The Arabs are well known for cross-border trade of agro-food products from
Libya and Algeria as well as for their involvement in drug trafficking. Given their
16 United Nations E ducational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 2017. ‘Historic Centr e of Agadez,’
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list /1268 (accessed September 2017).
17 Debarbieux , B., et al. , eds. 2014. Tourism in Mountain Regions: Hopes, Fears and Realities, Geneva, UNIGE,
CDE, SDC.
18 Personal interview with a representati ve of an implementing agency. 2017. Agadez, Nige r, June.
19 The main et hnicities in Niger are Hau sa (53. 0 percent) , Zarma-Sonrai (21.2 percent), Tuareg (10.4 percent) ,
Fula (9. 9 percent), Kanuri Manga (4.4 percent) , Tubu (0.4 percent), A rab (0.3 percent) , Gourma
(0.3 percent) , other (0.2 percent). Inst itut Natio nal de la Statistique . 2012. ‘Struc ture de la pop ulation,’
Niamey.
12
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
increasing economic power, the Arabs have expanded their commercial
operations by investing in transportation, hydrocarbons, construction and public
works.
The 2007-2009 rebellion resulted in the incorporation of many Tuareg leaders
in the state. At the national level, the current prime minister is a Tuareg.
At the local level, both the President of the Regional Council and the mayor of
Agadez are Tuaregs as well. Several wealthy Arabs have established important
political connections through financial contributions and high-level political
appointments. The Toubou are less politically connected.
More interestingly, the remaining former employees and entrepreneurs of the once
thriving tourism industry have mostly found refuge in the migration business, the two
sectors requiring similar skill sets. Experienced former tourist guides with unique
knowledge of the desert reinvented themselves as passeurs; drivers shifted their
clientele from tourists to migrants and the local food industr y began to adjust their
menus to the needs and budgets of transiting visitors from neighbouring countries.20
The networks of local tour guides, drivers and young fixers largely remained in place.
Copying the all-inclusive packages for tourists, passeurs would aptly offer arrangements
to migrants that included the pick up from the local bus station, the accompaniment
to a ghetto for lodging (typically the walled compound of a private residence),
the connection to a motorcyclist for errands as well as to a private or formal money
transfer agent to finance the next leg of their trip.
As tourism dropped significantly in the 1990s and effectively came to an end in 2007
because of Tuareg rebellion, the market for artisanal handicrafts and jewellery lost an
important customer segment. After the entire Agadez region was labelled a red zone
in 2010, tourists no longer visited the Tuareg capital. In response, Tuareg artisans,
traditionally a separate endogamous status group, began bringing their products
closer to their potential customers, establishing sales points in Niamey: currently half
of production is sold in Niamey. This coping strategy has not fully negated the loss of
revenue, however.21 In recent years, production has declined fur ther as visas for artisans
20 Interestin gly, the recipe of the typ ical travelling fare tha t women in Agadez prepare fo r the migrant s dates
from ancient times. It is still the same nutritious snack — l ocally known as tokoud i — made of cheese, dates ,
millet and flavours that nomads would c arry with them on their long journeys through t he deser t long
before Fr ench occupation. Today, migrants depend on the same dry mix: a mouthful of tokoudi dissol ved
in a zip of water makes for a migr ant’s meal in th e desert , provided the cros sing does not outlasts the
standard ration . Personal intervi ew with former mayor of Agadez. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
21 Tiekoura , O. 2012. ‘Tourism and g ender ident ities in Agadez, Niger,’ Via@ — International interdisciplinary
review of tourism, 6 2(2), 1-8.
13
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
selling in Europe have become increasingly difficult to obtain, further jeopardising the
livelihoods of the mainly lower caste Tuareg households in the sector.22
Losses in tourism were to a certain extent offset by developments in the mining sector.
Niger is one of the world’s primary producers of uranium and uranium exports are the
country’s most important foreign currency earner, generating 72 percent of its export
revenue. Production is centred around the city of Arlit and the country’s two main mines,
Aïr and Akouta, are currently exploited by the SOMAIR and COMINAK , two companies
owned by a French-led consortium. Though the sector has growth potential (currently
three new concessions are in various stages of development) the sector faced a
slowdown in 2013 and 2014 after significant price drops in uranium.23 Both the SOMAIR
and COMINAK mines closed temporarily following protracted negotiations on tax
rates, and the SOMINA mine closed permanently, due to losses caused by delays and
budget overruns. More than 3,000 jobs were lost in the SOMINA mine closure alone.24
Development of the Imouraren concession was similarly postponed pending a rise in
uranium prices.25 According to interviews with local government officials in Agadez,
no uranium-related tax revenues have reached Agadez’s local government coffers in
recent years.26
When uranium went into decline in 2014, gold mining took off. The main sites of Djado
and Tchibarakaten provided livelihoods for approximately 1,000 and 500 Nigeriens
respectively, as well as tens of thousands of foreign workers, mainly from Chad, Sudan
and Libya.27 Mining was largely informal, ar tisanal mining of surface deposits. Indirectly,
profits earned in the gold sector pushed a boom in various sectors. Amongst others,
new houses were constructed in Agadez, increased demand for private security
providers facilitating transport between Agadez and the gold sites, and demand rose
for consumption goods such as vegetables, fuel and water (supplied through Agadez).28
Though highly lucrative, employment in the gold sector has declined sharply. In 2017,
22 Personal inte rviews with several jewellery artisans. 2017. Niamey, Niger, June.
23 World Nuclear Association. 2017. ‘Uranium in Niger,’ http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/
country-profiles /countries-g-n/niger.aspx (accessed Au gust 2017).
24 Pellerin, op. cit .; pers onal inter view with a represe ntative of the mechanis m for resour ces and response for
migrants. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
25 World Nuclear Association, op. cit.
26 Personal interview s with representatives of the R egional Council and the regional chamber of commer ce.
2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
27 Pellerin, op. cit .; Pers onal inter view with a gold miner. 2017. Agadez, Nig er, June.
28 Personal interview w ith a hotel employee. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
14
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
the government closed the Djado gold mining site. At the same time, the quality of
discovered surface gold dropped significantly, from 24 to 17 karat, and gold prices fell.29
A last significant sector is obviously trade and commerce. Trade in the region relies
on the smuggling of both licit and illicit goods. Licit goods consist of subsidised food
staples (such as couscous, milk, tomato sauce), cement and subsidised fuel, mainly
brought in from Tuareg areas from Algeria.30 Additionally, cars, electronics (refrigerators
and televisions) and mining equipment come through Toubou areas from across the
border with Libya.31 These items are mainly sold in Agadez itself because the route from
Agadez to Niamey is tightly controlled. Consumers may come from various locations in
the region, however, including the capital. Illicit items consist mainly of drugs (cocaine
arriving from Guinea, Niger and Ghana) and include the arms trade as a side business.32
Small arms are mainly smuggled from Libya; other arms are available through Chadian
gold miners.33
Box 2 Agadez’s trade and commerce, embedded in the system
of sultanate34
That most of the trade in Agadez is informal does not mean that it is not being
taxed. A system of semi-informal tax collection system has in fact long prevailed.
The system enables merchants to sell imported goods at ver y attractive prices:
a sack of rice would cost nearly the same amount in Cotounou (a Benin port city)
as it does, after being impor ted, in Niamey or even Agadez, despite the lengthy
29 Pellerin, op. cit .; pers onal inter view with a gold miner. 2017. Agadez, Nig er, June. The Nig erien government
authorities explained the nee d to close the Djado mining si te by referr ing to the complex security situa tion
in the region and the uncontrollable presenc e of informal Sudanese and Chadian gold miners who enter the
countr y withou t permission and extr act most of t he gold to be channelled. Many interv iewees, including
a gold miner active in the r egion, claimed that the Nigerien military, some Toubous in collaboration w ith
Arabs , Sudanese and Chadians, c ontinue to mine in Djado. One in terviewee depicted the current scene at
the site by referring to the Nigerien armed for ces walking around in Djado ‘holding the ir Kalashnikov in one
hand; a me tal detec tor in the other.’ Personal intervie w with miner, previously in Djado, at the time of the
field research in Tchibarakaten. 2 017. Agadez, Niger, June.
30 Much of these mer chandise ar e transported via Ingall or Tchintbar aden to Tahoua, past Agadez. Agadez
region likely benefits from these imports through taxation. Personal communication from migration expert.
2017. Niamey, Niger, September.
31 Personal interv iew with re present ative of the C entre for t he Promotion of Investments (CPI) of the chamber
of commer ce and industry of Nige r. 2017. Agadez, Nige r, June.
32 Africa Frontex Intelligence Community. 2017. ‘Africa-Frontex Intelligence Communit y Joint Report 2016,’
Frontex.
33 Pellerin, op. cit .
34 Personal inter view wi th representative of regional c hamber of commerce. 2017. Niamey, Nige r, June.
15
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
bus transport linking these towns. This is only possible because significantly
lower volumes are declared than actually transported: a common practice
referred to as pont basculé, the manipulation of the weighting of the truck. To
ensure declaration specificities are not being checked at one of the many police
checkpoints, each merchant would pay around XOF 2,000 (EUR 3) to the police
to ensure smooth passage. In 2015, a bus with 70 passengers travelling from
Cotonou to Niamey would generate extra revenue of XOF 140,000 (EUR 213)
for the police. A personal anecdote related by a representative of the regional
chamber of commerce in Agadez illustrates the level of institutionalisation of
this practice. Travelling by bus from Cotonou to Niamey, he once refused to
pay his share of the facilitation payment, stressing that he had nothing to hide.
When the bus was waved through the next police checkpoint without much ado,
he realised that his fellow passengers had collectively made up for his missing
share. The bus driver had handed over the total amount to the police. Locally
known as the system of sultanate, this facilitation network has traditionally eased
the import of goods; it also came to accommodate the transport of migrants into
Agadez.
Commerce
Transportation
Craftsmanship
Housekeeping
Livestock farming
Education
Tailoring
Electromechanics
Security
City administration/
Marabout
Masonry
Agricultural farming
Taxi-moto driver
Chieftain
Stay-at-home
Healthcare
Retired
Blacksmith
Other
Share of employment
36%
8% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
10%
Ethnicity
OthersToubouHausaTuareg
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Figure 3 Employment across occupations by ethnicity
16
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
0%
10%
20%
Share of respondents employed in
occupations reporting change
Commerce
Transportation
Craftsmanship
Housekeeping
Livestock farming
Education
Tailoring
Electromechanics
Security
City administration/
Marabout
Masonry
Agricultural farming
Taxi-moto driver
Chieftain
Stay-at-home
Healthcare
Retired
Blacksmith
Other
Variation in income
No variationIncrease of incomeDecrease of income
36%
8%
6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
10%
30%
40%
Figure 4 Changes in income by occupation over the last 5 years
17
3 Historical overview of the
migration value chain
The migration business developed as a logical complement to existing trade in the
region. Routes had considerable overlap, and transporting outbound migrants avoided
empty rides on the way to pick up goods from Libya and or Algeria. Although (circular)
migration was well established, the migration industry started professionalising
following the Tuareg rebellion of 1990 to 1995. As a reintegration effort, Tuareg ex-rebels
— namely, their leaders — were granted papiers de courtage by the Agadez municipality,
granting them the right to legally transport people from Agadez via Arlit to Algeria.35
Growth was facilitated by the availability of off-road vehicles from the declining tourist
industry, as well facilitation and navigation skills learnt in that same business. Journeys
were facilitated for approximately XOF 3,000 (EUR 5). Inclusive arrangements were
developed in which one person could be paid to facilitate all legs of the journey for
about XOF 15,000 (EUR 23) to Dirkou and XOF 35,000 (EUR 53) to Sebha (Libya), taking
up to 20 days.36
In contrast with tourism, the migration business recovered quickly following the rebellion
of 2007 to 2009, and boomed after the fall of the Libyan regime in 2011. With the closure
of the till then widely used Western route (Senegal — Mauritania — Morocco) , the route
shifted from Algeria to Libya, passing by Dirkou and Séguédine, until the handoff point
at Madama. Here migrants were transferred onto Libyan vehicles, which in turn supplied
fuel for the Nigerien vehicles for the return trip. The Libyan route passed through
Toubou-controlled territory and relied on support from Nigerien Arabs.
With the rule of law in Libya in decline and the Toubou entering the business, the
migration industry underwent a modernisation process: Toubou smugglers brought in
new and larger vehicles from Libya, thereby shortening the trip to three days.37 Prices for
an inclusive trip reached up to XOF 150,000 (EUR 229), putting earnings per truckload
(approximately 25 migrants) to about XOF 4,000,000 (EUR 6,100). The trip could be paid
in advance or on credit with a mark-up. From 2011 onwards the smugglers’ or passeurs’
profit margins grew and their wealth became more visible in Agadez: larger houses
35 Personal interview with a journali st from Radio Sahara. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
36 Personal inte rview with repre sentati ves of the Urban Commune of Agadez. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
37 Personal interview w ith representative of chamber of commerce. 2017. Niamey, Niger, June. The Tuareg
used Toyota Hilux, which would carry 25 persons, wher eas the Toubou introduced the Tundra model , which
accommodates up to 3 0 migrants .
18
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
emerged and an influx of new cars started to roam the streets.38 Another indication
of the migration boom was the growing number of jobs it provided, mostly for family
members of local smugglers: brothers of the passeurs became drivers, cousins were
hired as ghetto-managers, and young nephews started to work as coxeurs.39
Pa ss eur Cox eu r
Ghe tto
lodging
d
t
Fu el
2014
2016
2017
XOF 2,400,000,000
3,680,000 EUR
XOF 7,350,000,000
11,200,000 EUR
XOF 1,864,000,000
2,841,000 EUR
2014
2016
2017
XOF 17,25 0,000,000
26,292,000 EUR
XOF 52,500,000,000
80,000,000 EUR
XOF 44,375,000,000
67,000,000 EUR
XOF 230,000,000
350,000 EUR
XOF 700,000,000
1,000,000 EUR
XOF 177,500,000
270,000 EUR
XOF 230,000,000
350,000 EUR
XOF 700,000,000
1,000,000 EUR
XOF 1,775,000,000
2,700,000 EUR
XOF 460,000,000
700,000 EUR
XOF 1,400,000,000
2,100,000 EUR
XOF 355,000,000
500,000 EUR
d
t
XOF 273,000,000
416,000 EUR
XOF 831,600,000
21,260,000 EUR
XOF 211,000,000
320,000 EUR
r
Inbound
transport
by bus
Outbound
transport
by 4x4
2014 2016 2017
Figure 5 Migration value chain, with estimated revenues40
Initially, migrants arrived in Agadez by bus. In response to a consistently high demand
for transpor t from migrants, bus companies used to run separate buses for migrants
38 Personal interviews w ith a journalist from Radio Sahara and with a repr esentat ive of an implementing
agency. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
39 Personal inter view wi th a journalist from Radio Sahara. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
40 Figures are estimated bas ed on number of migrants passing throu gh, unit pric es and consumption per
migrant ( assuming full transpor t loads of 70 per bus and 25 per truck). Migrants passing through were
estima ted at 115,000 (2014) , 350,00 0 (2016) and 88,750 (2017, assuming a 70 % decline over 2016), based on
IOM Displacement Tracking Matri x figures and t he authors’ estimates of migrati on flows over 2 017 based
on develo pments in figures throu ghout the fir st 8 months of 2017. Prices use d were as follo ws: Bus rides
at XOF 21,000 ; inclusive trips at XOF 150 ,000 in 2014-2016 and XOF 5 00,000 in 2017; bus station pick up at
XOF 2,00 0 in 2014-2016 and XOF 20,000 in 2017; ghetto lo dging at XOF 1,00 0 per night, assuming 2 night s
per refugee; outbound trans port fee s at XOF 100,000; fuel at XOF 4 50 per litr e, assuming consumpti on
of 11 litre per 100 kilometre over a 1,200 kilo metre trip. Unit pric es are based on personal interviews with
journali sts of Radio Sahara, t wo large bus c ompanies, the chamber of commerce and industr y of Niger,
the Urban Commune of Agadez. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June. Prices for fuel and ghetto lodging are based
on online int erviews with a jour nalist, a r epresentative from the NGO Tamakr ast and a public official
responsible for Regional Development. 2017. September.
19
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
to spare regular passengers the extended security check-ups migrants are subject
to. Tickets sold for approximately XOF 21,000 (EUR 32), totalling approximately XOF
2,400,000,000 (EUR 3,700,000) over 2014.41 Two of the seven main bus companies
currently operating in and around Agadez, STM and Rimbo, confirmed that the influx
of West African foreigners into Agadez boomed between 2011 and 2014, leading to the
purchase of new vehicles and additional employment.42
Following the (legal) entry into Agadez, a passeur facilitated the irregular section from
arrival in Agadez until the passing the Libyan border. Coxeurs awaited the migrants
at Agadez’s bus station, ensuring the migrants find their way to lodging at one of the
city’s ghettos. Based on estimates from several experts on the ground in Agadez,43
coxeurs earned about XOF 2,000 (EUR 3) per migrant from the chef de ghetto, totalling
approximately XOF 230,000,000 (EUR 350,000) over 2014. The chef de ghetto was usually
employed by a passeur, netting approximately XOF 1,000 (EUR 1.5) per night per migrant,
totalling approximately XOF 230,000,000 (EUR 350,000) over 2014.44 The approximately
200 ghettos in Agadez generally had a capacity of over 30 people, and employed
about five motorcyclists to run errands for the migrants in town, sparing them the
need to leave the relative safety of the ghetto (charging about XOF 400 / EUR 0.60 per
errand) . The passeurs earned about XOF 150,000 (EUR 229) per inclusive trip (XOF
17,250,000,000 / EUR 26,300,000 over 2014), and hired drivers for at least the last leg
of the journey at XOF 100,000 (EUR 152) per ride (XOF 460,000,000 / EUR 700,000 over
2014).45
The presence of migrants in the community also led to demand for other goods
and services in Agadez, such as water, jerry cans, sunglasses, turbans, food, fuel,
transpor tation, communications and money transfers services. On average, migrants
spent about XOF 19,000 (EUR 29) as they passed through Agadez (totalling XOF
2,185,000,000 / EUR 3,300,000 over 2014),46 contributing to the Houssa-dominated
41 Approximately 115,00 0 to 150,000 migrants passed through Agadez in 2014; p ersonal intervie ws with a
journali st from Radio Sahara, mayor’s office. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
42 Personal intervie ws with CEO s of two large bus companie s. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
43 Earning s along the migr ation value chain have fluc tuated significantly in recent years. The estimates
presented in this se ction represent mo dest estimates, based on information about prices charged before
the application of the 2015 Law Against th e Illicit Smug gling of Migrants. Ex perts c oncur that prices acr oss
the chain have significantly incre ased ever since.
44 Assuming migrants stay two nights in Agade z. Becaus e costs in A gadez are high, migrants are incentivised
to minimise the duration of their stay in the city, generally ar riving over the weekend in order to depart
on Monday s. As pric es of passag e have increa sed over the years, increasing numb ers of migrants have
extended their time in Agadez to work and pay for pas sage. Inte rview s with repr esentatives of the mayor’s
office , regional c hamber of commerce, Re gional Council. Agadez , Niger. June 2017.
45 Assuming 25 passengers per ride.
46 Samuel H all, op. cit .
20
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
commerce in town. Migrants frequently transferred additional funds into town to cover
expenses of the trip and possibly beyond, giving rise to a growing market for formal
and informal money transfer operators. Currently, about 50 such agents are in town,
facilitating transfers of around XOF 5,000,000 (EUR 7,600) a piece at a 10 percent margin
(XOF 1,200,000,000 / EUR 1,800,000 over 2014).47
Overall, in 2014 when migration through Agadez town was approaching its height,
reportedly more than half of all households in Agadez benefitted from the industr y to the
point of intensifying the existing circular migration of Nigeriens from the South moving
to Agadez in search of employment.48 Most motorcyclists operating taxis in Agadez are
from Maradi, men from Zinder typically come to do masonry and women from the same
region come to Agadez as cleaners, all testimonies of a relatively thriving economy.49
Purchasing power went up, as prices of consumption goods did not rise significantly
(only selectively for cer tain groups of foreigners), and the imports business from Libya
flourished, offering a wide range of household goods and Japanese and Korean cars:
electronic appliances such as refrigerators and televisions, but also mattresses were and
still are high in demand. The price difference with Niamey is such that it attracts till this
day customers from the capital to come buy those products in Agadez. Knowledge, skills
and machinery also improved, as many entrepreneurs who went to work in Libya have
returned to Agadez due to the deteriorating security situation in the country. Drawing
on their experience and freshly imported machinery many of them have established
flourishing workshops in Agadez.50 Migrants generally did not take part of the labour
market in Agadez, as few intended to stay long enough to warrant searching for work.51
The pressure on salaries frequently associated with migration was thus limited.
The migration economy also generated significant local tax revenue at the commune
level. Up to the implementation of the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants
(late 2016), the authorities of Dirkou earned an estimated XOF 155,000,000 (EUR
47 Personal interview with a jo urnalist fr om Radio Sahara. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June. Assuming four transfers
per operator per month.
48 Due to higher population growt h, southern Nigeriens have traditionally co me to Agadez to work in mining,
horticulture or as household help, part icularly between October and A pril during t he dry season. Pers onal
communic ation from migration e xpert . 2017. Niamey, Niger, Septembe r. Nearly all interview ees confir med
the estimation of migration beneficiaries.
49 Benattia, T., Armitano, F. and Robinson, H. 2015. ‘Ir regular Migration between Wes t Africa, N orth Afr ica and
the Meditereanean,’ IOM Nigeria, 21, http://www.rodakar.iom.int/oimsenegal/sites/default/files/Altai%20
Consulting-Free%20Movement%20and%20Migration%20in% 20West%20Africa-Final%20Report..._0.pdf
(acce ssed Augus t 2017).
50 Pers onal inter views with local ent repreneurs. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
51 S amuel Hall, op. cit.
21
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
236,000) in visitor taxes on the migrants, while the authorities also levied road taxes.52
In a context of decentralised governance, where transfers of funds from the centre to
the regions remain the exception rather than the rule, these direct local revenues were
critical for local development of the region.53
Tuareg Toubou Hausa > 35 years < 35 years Men Women
A lot
Somewhat
Not at all
A lot
Somewhat
Not at all
A lot
Somewhat
Not at all
A lot
Somewhat
Not at all
A lot
Somewhat
Not at all
A lot
Somewhat
Not at all
A lot
Somewhat
Not at all
0%
25%
50%
75%
Share of respondents
Figure 6 Perceived economic benefits from migration by demography
The modernisation of the migration has undoubtedly generated increased direct and
indirect incomes for a majority of households in Agadez. Evidence gathered for this
research shows that the migration value chain has boosted economic activity in multiple
sectors, ranging from transport to hospitality, from the financial sector to the ser vice
industries. Overall, according to estimates gathered from experts during fieldwork in
Agadez approximately 6,000 to 7,000 people were employed directly in the business,
52 Per sonal inter view with repres entative of the Regional Council. 2 017. A gadez, Niger, June. According to
a smuggler quoted in a news article in The Guardian in November 2015, thr ee checkpoints wer e present
betwe en Agadez and t he border and at each of them the driver wo uld be reque sted to pay XOF 10,000
(EUR 15) per passenger to pass (Kingsley, P. 2015. ‘On the r oad in Agadez: desper ation and death along a
Saharan smuggling route,’ 9 November, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/on-the-road-in-
agadez-desperation-and-death-along-a-saharan-smuggling-route (accessed September 2017) .
53 Perso nal inter view with r epresentative of the Regional C ouncil. 2017. Agadez, N iger, June; Bensaad, A.
2003. ‘Agadez, carrefour migratoire sahélo-maghrébin,’ Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales,
19(1), 7–2 8, https: //remi.revues.org/336 (accessed September 2017).
22
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
many more in other industries benefitting from the migrants passing by. These positive
economic effects came at a critical moment, offering an alternative to two of the regions’
former economic lifelines: tourism and mining. Earnings from the migration business did
however not appear to equal the rise in consumption deriving from the gold industry,
which brought more than 20,000 people to the region.54
The migration economy has thus made a critical contribution to people’s livelihoods and,
by extension, to the region’s stability.55 Nonetheless, most of these economic activities
take place in the informal sector, which makes their further upscaling and state revenue
generation a far-off scenario. Of even greater concern is that the professionalisation
of the migration business has gone hand in hand with deteriorating travel and lodging
conditions, which migrants have had little choice but to accept: because of greater
organisation between the chain actors ( passeur, coxeur, chef de ghetto, moto-taxi-men,
and so on), the room for migrants to negotiate prices or conditions has dwindled to
nearly nothing.
Besides aiming to drastically lower the migration flow towards Europe, the new human-
smuggling measures undertaken by the Nigerien government with support from the EU
seek to address this latter point. Indeed, the goal of the European Agenda on Migration
is to address the fact that ‘migration needs to be better managed in all its aspects
and to take ‘immediate action to prevent further losses of migrants’ lives.’56 In reality,
criminalising the migration industry in Agadez has failed to fully recognise the industry’s
embeddedness in the town’s broader political economy and has therefore had the
opposite and rather harmful effect on both the migrants and the local population.
54 Pellerin, op. cit .; pers onal inter view with a journalist from Radio Sahara. 2017. Agadez, Ni ger, June.
55 For a mor e detailed discussion of the impact of the migration sector o n the region’s stability, see the
companion report Local governance o pportunities for sustainable migration management in Agadez.
56 European Commission: Migr ation and Home affairs . 2017. ‘European Agen da on Migration,’
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs /what-we-do/policies /european-agenda-migration_en (accessed
September 2017).
23
4 Impact of the 2015 Law
Against the Illicit Smuggling
of Migrants
Despite the benefits that the migration industry brought to the region, the situation
quickly changed after the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants
was adopted and subsequently implemented in Agadez starting in the autumn of
2016 .57 The arrests of 282 drivers and ghetto operators and at least nine gendarmes
(on migration-linked corruption charges) , combined with the confiscation of at least
169 trucks used to transpor t migrants through the deser t, have had a strong deterrent
effect on the irregular migration industry.58 EU support was critical in making this
happen through its ‘hands-on support on the ground to support the design and
implementation of the short term actions to tackle smuggling and trafficking in human
beings.’59
Although activities facilitating migrants’ journeys from Agadez onto Libya became illegal
in 2015, the effects of the new policy became increasingly pronounced. Increasing
securitisation of the routes has substantially increased the risks along the route for
both smugglers as well as migrants. Northbound migration through the town of Agadez
is down significantly compared to 2016, but this reduction does not take into account
the number of migrants who attempt to cross the desert by less-tested routes to
circumvent the one through Agadez and its surrounding checkpoints.60 The number of
attempted desert crossings from alternative towns in the hope of avoiding the numerous
57 The ado ption of the 2015 Law followed br iefly after the Valletta Summit on migration, which gather ed
ministers of foreign affairs and government r epresentatives of EU and African states to negotiate a new
partnership to address root causes of migration.
58 Data is available for the period from July to mid- October 2016 and for January to August 2017. Actual
numbers may therefore be higher be cause no dat a is available fo r the period from mid-O ctober to
Decemb er 2016. See: European Co mmission. 2016. ‘Second Progres s Report: First D eliverables on the
Partnership Fr amework wi th third co untries under the Europ ean Agenda on M igration ,’
https://eeas .europa.eu/sites /eeas/files/second-progress-repor t-1_en_act _part1_v11.pdf (accessed
September 2017); Eur opean Commission. 2017. ‘Fifth Pr ogress Report on the Partne rship Framework wit h
third co untries under the Europ ean Agenda on M igration ,’
https://eeas .europa.eu/sites /eeas/files/20170906_fif th_progress_report_on_the_partnership_framework_
with_third_countries_under_the_eam_en_0.pdf (accessed September 2017).
59 European Commission, 2016, op. cit.
60 IOM, op. cit.
24
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
checkpoints in and around Agadez risks to remain rather high. The apparent statistical
success also comes at a significant human cost because migrants are increasingly
abandoned in the desert by smugglers attempting to evade arrest.61 Furthermore, since
the industr y has gone into hiding, migrants’ mobility in Agadez has decreased and
thus their dependency on local smuggling networks is stronger today. As one of the
motorbike drivers pointed out, ‘Since migrants can’t leave their ghettos anymore, they
cannot check the exact prices in the local market themselves. So we can charge them
double or even three times the price and keep the difference ourselves. Particularly non-
French speakers have little choice but to pay the amounts we charge them.’62
Immigrants Transit migrants Anti-smuggling operations
A lot Somewhat Not at all A lot Somewhat Not at all A lot Somewhat Not at all
0%
Share of respondents
20%
30%
40%
50%
10%
Figure 7 Extent to which respondents’ community benefits fr om immigrants, tr ansitor y
migrants and antismuggling operations
61 In February, local media reporte d 38 migrant bodies found in t he deser t; during the week of field r esearch
for this re port, a t elevisio n crew accompanied a Nigerien milit ary mission to rescue the survivors of a
truck t hat had broken down in the desert, w ith 20 passengers mis sing. See, for example, N ieuwsuur.
2017. ‘Migranten verdwalen en drogen uit in de w oestijn van Niger,’ 8 July, https ://nos.nl /nieuwsuur/
artikel/2182188-migranten-verdwalen-en-drogen-uit-in-de-woestijn-van-niger.html (accessed
September 2017). A former mayor of Agadez reported that a women commi ttee had be en set up to organise
searches of dead bodies in the desert: ‘ We know that t here is many more dead in the desert than what we
hear in the local media. We cannot bring them back to li fe, but shoul d find these bodies and give t hem a
proper b urial. That’s the least w e can do and it’s important in our Islamic culture.’ Personal interview. 2017.
Agadez, Niger, June.
62 Focus group discussion with motorcyclists. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
25
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
4.1 Economic sector most affected: transport
Typically presented by local authorities as the most obvious effect and perhaps proof of
law enforcement is the number of confiscated cars and arrested smugglers. Inter views
with entrepreneurs and private households quickly revealed that these measures often
leave households without their main source of income. Interviewees concurred that
arrests are primarily targeted at the many young Nigerien motorcyclists, the so-called
moto-taxis from Maradi or at Toubou or Arab drivers: ‘everyone who looks like an Arab
or Toubou and drives a four-wheel-drive is highly suspect.’63 However, no arrests of
high-ranking smugglers could be confirmed during fieldwork.
Box 3 Toubou’s response to car confiscations under 2015 law64
In late 2016, the Toubou took to the streets and threatened to attack the police
commissariat where about 100 confiscated cars were parked. Their aim was to
reclaim ownership of the vehicles and to use force if necessary. The authorities
reacted promptly, relocating the cars to the military camp outside of town. As a
former Toubou chauffeur explained, the incident needs to be understood in the
context of long-standing pastoralist traditions, according to which one basic
rule holds that ‘If you attack my camel, I’m entitled to kill you,’ Unsurprisingly,
authorities took the threat very seriously.
The Toubou, many of them double nationality individuals, were marginalised
under Gadhafi and largely neglected by the government authorities in Niamey.
In fact, many Toubou argued that they have effectively functioned autonomously
through necessity for a long time, cross-border smuggling activities being their
lifeline. With the confiscation of their cars, which are critical to their livelihoods,
the Toubou feel ‘not only threatened by the hostility of their territory, but also by
the hostility of their government,’ as a former Toubou chauffeur put it.
Two interviewees suggested that the next rebellion in northern Niger was
imminent and that this time the Toubou would be in the lead. Rumours have
it that rather than closed, the Djado mines had been given to the Toubou to
63 At least 169 vehicles were confisc ated and 291 arrests migration-linked arrests made. A public prose cutor
with the Agadez high court was quo ted by an inter viewee in February 2017 confirming that 100 people had
been arr ested and 3 00 vehicle s confisca ted (Diallo, I. 2017. ‘EU strategy stems migrant flow from Niger, but
at what co st?’ Special report, Irin news, 2 Februar y, https://www.irinnews.org/special-report/2017/02/02/
eu-strategy-stems-migrant-flow-niger-what-cost).
64 Perso nal interviews wit h a former mayor of Agadez and a represent ative of the chamber of commerce in
Agadez. 2017. Agadez , Niger, June; M olenaar and El K amouni-Janse n, op. cit.
26
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
compensate the heavy losses they had suffered from the migration-mitigation
measures. Although these allegations could not be verified, they indicate the
frustration levels among the Toubou.
Though not criminalised by the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants, the
formal supply side of the migration value chain has also suffered heavy losses. Bus
companies connecting Agadez to the capital and other neighbouring towns have either
closed down or ceased operations.65 Rimbo Transport Voyageurs, one of the largest bus
companies, used to operate five buses between Niamey and Agadez every day, but today
schedules only one. This bus reaches Tahoua at full capacity yet arrives in Agadez nearly
empty. Nigerien passengers complain that the company no longer operates separate
buses for migrants — as it used to do to spare nonmigrants the lengthy police checks
migrants had to endure — and that, because of the decline in number of passengers,
buses now accommodate both migrants and nonmigrants. Adjusting to the shrinking
demand, the company released 75 percent of its staff operating the Niamey-Agadez
route and increased its fares to cover operating costs.66 Meanwhile, banditry on the
roads has increased significantly, particularly along the Tahoua-Agadez–Arlit,
Ingall–Agadez and Dirkou-Tabelot-Agadez routes, a development many interviewees
linked to the numerous job losses in the migration and mining industries.67
The migration sector had adapted to the new policies, largely by going into hiding.
Migrator y movements continue accommodating large volumes, but routes have
been altered to circumvent cities and other area’s presenting high risks of arrest.
The alternative routes are generally harder to traverse and hence put a higher strain
on vehicles, increasing the chance of vehicle breakdowns in inaccessible places.
Additionally, the costs of the route along the desert have gone up significantly to cover
the increased risk to which the smugglers are exposed. During 2017, prices of a trip rose
from XOF 150,000 (EUR 229) to XOF 500,000 (EUR 762), the latter equalling the price
of a new car when filled to capacity, prompting drivers more easily to abandon their
passengers to their fate. The relatively visible coxeurs, in turn increased their tariffs from
XOF 2,000 (EUR 3) to XOF 20,000 (EUR 30) , reflecting their particularly high exposure to
the risk of being caught.68
65 Examples are Air Transport, Nigma Transpor t, Pass enger Transport.
66 Pers onal inter view with represe ntative s of Rimbo Transport Voyageurs and STM Transport. 2017. Agadez,
Niger, June.
67 Ibid. Personal int erview with staf f member GIZ. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
68 Falschi, V. 2016. ‘AGAMI – Agadez Migration Project: Final Evaluation,’ 5,
http://ww w.nigermigrationresponse.org/sites/default/files/AGAMI %20final%20evaluation%20report.pdf
(accessed September 2017) .
27
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
The increasing risks with smuggling work have also led to the entry of new actors in
the chain. Where previously most work was handled by Nigeriens, migrants are now
competing in the business. Through their networks in countries of origin, they are better
able to plan migrants’ arrivals, thereby shor tening the time to departure and reducing
the risk. Migrants have also made inroads as drivers because the risks of arrest are
lower: if caught, they can hide as a migrant among the passengers. Overall, although
criminalising migration from Agadez onwards has increased both risk and profit margins
for all facilitators in the chain, migrants themselves face both higher risks and higher
costs. It is unknown how many migrants cross the desert by different routes, which
makes estimating the effectiveness of recent migration policies difficult.
4.2 Facilitation payments on the rise
With the additional competences and resources of police and security forces, the
ability of security actors to levy informal taxes or bribes along the migration value chain
has increased. The threat of a five-year prison sentence and car loss has reportedly
proven effective in skyrocketing extortion rates. Again, both the formal legal side of
the value chain is affected before Agadez, as well as the now illegal side of the chain
when crossing and leaving Agadez. For example, since the law is being enforced, the
number of police checkpoints on the road between Niamey and Agadez has increased
to 10. At every checkpoint, migrants are requested to pay at least XOF 10,000 (EUR 15)
to continue their journey, amounting to a total amount of XOF 130,000 (EUR 198) per
person.69 As to departures from Agadez, police are reportedly charging XOF 50,000
(EUR 76) per truck leaving Agadez for Libya.70 As the 2015 Law Against the Illicit
Smuggling of Migrants has enabled security forces to charge higher facilitation fees,
competition between the police/gendarmerie and the army has stiffened. The armed
forces that used to accompany migrant trucks with military convoys now accuse the
police for turning a blind eye on smugglers’ trucks when passing their checkpoints.
In response, a new practice has quickly emerged: instead of charging chauffeurs
of migrant transports on the spot, police officials make prior arrangements with the
smugglers, ensuring that payments are received before depar ture and that the trucks
know how to circumvent the police checkpoints.
69 Perso nal interview with fo rmer member of the Association of Nigerien Women against the War ( AFNCG) .
2017. Agadez, Niger, Jun e. These ac counts pr ompted one interviewee who had recently t ravelled by
bus from t he capital to Agadez to pr oclaim, ‘ The only cr iminals in the migration bu siness, i t’s the polic e!
They deliberatel y increase t heir margins without pr oviding any service s! ’
70 Per sonal inter view with a journalist from Radio Sahara. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
28
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
In effect, the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants is being used as
pretence to levy higher taxes from the smugglers and, by extension, from the migrants
themselves. Yet, evidence also suggests that it is the wider local economy that bears the
brunt of the crackdown on migration.
4.3 Effects on the wider local economy
Because the numbers of northbound migrants arriving in Agadez are down and routes
increasingly circumvent major cities, demand — driven by both irregular migrants’ and
smugglers’ consumption — has been tailing off. Women entrepreneurs have lost a good
share of their customers to sell food to, water vendors are left waiting in vain with their
jerry cans, and groups of motorcycle taxi men populate street corners complaining
about police harassments increasingly outweighing the number of customers per
day.71 Unemployment is increasing, and young people working in the lower tiers of
the migration value chain are leaving the business because of the increased risk.
Additionally, many people employed in the informal economy who previously benefitted
from the consumption of irregular migrants have seen losses in income. Commerce
and other value chains relying on impor ted inputs from neighbouring countries, namely
Nigeria (such as cement, steel and wood) are also seeing increasing difficulty because
transaction costs and, by extension, prices have gone up. Workshop owners from the
industrial area in Agadez reported that checkpoints at the entrance of Agadez have
become more burdensome for their suppliers in recent months because both waiting
time and facilitation fees are on the rise. Faced with less local purchasing power,
craftsmen have little room to reflect the increased transaction costs in their product
pricing; their profit margins have reached a low point. In addition, business and
technology transfer with Libyan businesses has also slowed. Fur ther down the route,
at waypoints like Dirkou and Séguédine, economic effects are likely to be substantial as
well given that the route now circumvents checkpoints and hence places that previously
were on the route.72
4.4 Income losses and economic decline causing greater insecurity
Risks and costs are further heightened by an increase in banditry along the transport
routes, leading to additional payments, confiscation of goods and equipment or
71 Fo cus group dis cussions with women entrepren eurs, mot orcyclists and yout h. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
72 Personal inter view wit h a journalis t from Radio S ahara. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
29
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
kidnapping.73 Given the skilled labour (frequently ex-combatants) and equipment
(vehicles) becoming available from the decline in the migration industry, combined
with the availability of arms, further increases in banditr y are a considerable risk.
Combined with increased corruption, this means that cash is increasingly extracted
from the productive economy. Following a similar logic, the market for private protection
is seeing increasing demand and benefits from the same availability of skilled labour
and equipment. Nonetheless, many new employees in the business view this work
as a stepping stone to other, better paying jobs, such as goldmining or returning to
migration-related work.74 Another sector facing an uptake in revenues is the hospitality
sector, which is increasingly catering to EUCAP expats, their logistic suppor t companies
as well as US military staff. In addition, NGO personnel and journalists have also become
regular visitors to the city of Agadez on migration-related assignments. Many young
men now work as fixers, connecting journalists with smugglers.
4.5 Social tensions on the rise
Because smuggling is embedded in the broader political economy of Agadez, the
economic effects of smuggling measures have wider social repercussions and risk
eroding the town’s social fabric. Known for its diversity and multi-ethnic tolerance,
the town is now seeing growing tensions between groups. Neighbours from the
ECOWAS region, for example, are experiencing a wind of change. Anyone interacting
with a potential transit migrant, the general perception is, risks being arrested. As a
result, ECOWAS migrants are no longer as openly welcomed in Agadez as they used to
be. No differentiation is made between ECOWAS migrants who look for more permanent
work in Agadez and those who seek to earn money to finance the continuation of their
journey. The counterproductive effect of the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of
Migrants becomes obvious: the same law that discourages migrants from transiting
onto Libya, inhibits their settlement in the Agadez region, as host communities would
risk to be jailed for receiving them. An interviewee related the struggle of a Ghanaian
secondar y school teacher who decided to stay in Agadez permanently as the route
to Libya became too risky and also because he identified some demand for English
teaching. However, as an ECOWAS foreigner he could not find a room to rent because
locals would be afraid to facilitate his settlement.75
73 Unite d Nations Of fice for the Coordinat ion of Humanit arian Affairs. 2016. ‘Shattered dreams: Returning
migrant s in Agadez tell their stories,’ http ://ww w.unocha.org/story/shattered-dreams-returning-migrants-
agadez-tell-their-stories (accessed September 2017).
74 Personal inter view wit h private s ecurit y company. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
75 Per sonal inter view ent repreneur. 2017. A gadez, Niger, June. Even though it has always been ver y
cumber some to obtain a work permit, ECOWA S migrants could actually find work in the informal sector and
interacting with them was not feared as a criminal act. This situation has changed .
30
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
In addition, resentments among the population towards local authorities ‘that do
not dare to stand up against Niamey’s deal with the EU’ are on the rise, primarily
against the police and its requests for facilitation payments.76 The discontent among
Agadez residents this creates is discussed in greater detail in a companion report
‘Local governance opportunities for sustainable migration management in Agadez’.
Enough to say here that, although residents perceive the law to be implemented
impartially, implementation hits the Toubou community especially hard given their
overrepresentation in the business. Conflict potential is thus rising because of
grievances associated with the migration policy, though their salience among the wider
population is currently still limited.
76 Focus group discussion wi th youth re present atives, personal interview with women entrepr eneurs. 2 017.
Agadez, Niger, June.
31
5 Opportunities for
development and stability
Although in economic decline, the region does not lack potential or ambition. In light
of the destabilising effects of the migration mitigation measures so far, it is high time
to harness this potential to create alternative economic opportunities. Rather than
completely breaking up the migration sector, the ecosystem that has developed around
and along the migration value chain, the networks, skill sets, services and experiences
should be used wherever possible as entry points for developing the region. Because
both short-term impact and longer-term structural economic change are needed, three
development pathways — to be tackled simultaneously — suggest themselves: create
income oppor tunities immediately, work towards an enabling environment and large
investments for structural change and consistently avoid doing harm.
5.1 Promote the creation of income-generating activities and
businesses today
Because half of Agadez households are reportedly facing the risk of losing an important
source of livelihoods, alternative income-generating activities are urgently needed.
Nearly all the respondents interviewed for this report were keenly aware of the amount
of funds the EU committed to improve migration management and provide alternative
income streams in Agadez. Many have high expectations about the share they expect
to receive. Immediate benefits need to materialise and be visible to reinforce livelihoods
and curb frustration. The following recommendations are concrete measures to support
livelihoods in the short term by producing quick wins. Although some of them will also
advance the mid- to long-term agenda of structural change for sustainable economic
growth, not all will do so. Nonetheless, the urgency and scope of the economic
downturn demands immediate results.
1) Participatory market assessment
In developing support measures geared to viable economic activity, a critical first step
is a sound assessment of the market. This information can be generated through a
participatory market assessment in which the target group itself is involved in gathering
the data and learns on the job how to collect data effectively. The objective of this
intervention, ideally co-managed by the migration committee of the mayor’s office
and the chamber of commerce of Agadez, would be twofold: to generate urgently
needed information on the demand and supply sides of the (formal and informal) labour
32
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
market, and short-term employment and on-the-job training for a dozen people in each
neighbourhood in Agadez. The group of data collectors should be diverse, composed of
former migration actors and others, women and men, Tuareg, Toubou and Haussa. Skills
and locations of the migration industry could be harnessed to conduct the assessment:
moto-taxis could ensure the mobility required to cover all blocks or markets of a
neighbourhood, for example, and former ghettos could be arranged to hold focus group
discussions with traders, craftsmen, artisans and farmers.
As the survey results suggest, caution should be taken as people’s views about market
opportunities, and skills needs are likely to be influenced by perceptions of the support
the international community can provide or has previously provided in the region (see
figure 8). Inputs are easily influenced and framed based on conceptions of existing
livelihoods, rather than on an accurate assessment of market potential. An oppor tunity
may be profitable for the individual but not be scalable to a group because no unserved
demand exists. An example is common requests for assistance to start a shop, because
rather than serving any new demand, such shops would instead parcel up existing
(and declining) demand among an increasing amount of actors. A participatory market
assessment that brings businesses and aspiring entrepreneurs or employees together
can create awareness about market viability.
The following overview presents some initial thoughts for livelihood opportunities by
sectors based on the interviews with experts in Agadez. For each of these economic
sectors with high potential for growth and employment, specific short-term and long-
term measures should be developed. This overview offers some initial thoughts.
69% Commerce
Agricultural production
10%
Livestock farming 9%
Hospitality industry 4%
Transport of goods 3%
Transport of people 2% 3% Other
Figure 8 Respondents’ pr eferred sector in which to develop activities if funds were
available
33
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
Box 4. Livelihood opportunities by sector
Agriculture and pastoralism
Agadez has been and will remain an agro-pastoral economy. Although some
produce is already sold nonlocally and even expor ted, untapped potential is
available. Strengthening existing processing facilities and introducing additional
ones could be considered because they would ensure a higher added value,
increase the lifespan of produce and make products easier to transport long
distance, thereby bringing new markets within reach. Enabling conditions
required to access new markets include improvements in road conditions and
marketing efforts to introduce the concept of using processed foodstuffs.
Cooperatives might be able to facilitate these developments. Declines in both
sectors now threaten the survival and further development of these cooperatives,
many of which have grown and professionalised not only thanks to long-term
development cooperation and support from AREVA, but also facilitated by a
steady demand from migrants and mine workers. Access to new markets has
absolute priority and the aspired integration of Agadez in the country’s south as
a gateway to the wealthy north Nigerian market indicates part of the solution.
The recent maintenance work on the road connecting Agadez with Aderbissinat
is provisional at best and much larger investments are required to enable trade
between Agadez and Zinder.
Products in the region with potential wor th exploring include oranges,
grapefruits, melons, raisins, tomatoes and other vegetables. Grain, which is
currently imported, and spirulina might also be crops that could be developed.
Additionally, storage facilities may decrease the fluctuations in revenue, as it
would allow local producers to delay sales until higher price points, and might
allow for sales to spread to cover limited periods of drought. Professionalisation
of the agricultural sector, and demonstration that substantial profits can be
made, may also make the sector more attractive to the young people again.
During the gold rush, many young people quit agriculture for more lucrative
mining activities, causing a labour shortage in the agriculture sector. The decline
in mining will not automatically translate into a supply of agricultural labour.
Significant upscaling will be needed to make the sector more attractive again.
On a related note, pastoralism is currently producing only limited amounts
of commercial side products. Given the availability of the necessary facilities
in Agadez, dair y products and leather manufacturing could be scaled up
significantly and provide in livelihoods of people currently considering these
inputs as waste.
A word of caution is merited, however. The area around Agadez depends on
flash floods from the mountainous area northeast of the city, which replenishes
34
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
groundwater along the wadi. Rainfall is in the region is subject to long-term
fluctuations due to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation. When a new dry phase
in the cycle starts, approximately two decades of dryness can be expected.
Temperature patterns in the North Atlantic seem to indicate that a new dry phase
may commence within a matter of years. Such a period will severely constrain
opportunities for agro-pastoralist livelihoods in Agadez (and in much of the
rest of the Sahel). At the local level, measures for optimising agro-pastoralist
livelihoods with substantially less water can be promoted to enhance resilience.
Nonetheless, the need for people to engage in (circular) migration to meet
their food and income requirements will increase. At the broader Sahel level,
a substantial increase and change in the migration dynamics can be expected.
Short-term measures
• Offer cooperatives a market for processed agricultural produce guaranteeing
fair prices and stable quantities (see recommendation 4).
• Negotiate long-term orders between international organisations, military
missions, larger hotels and the existing cooperatives so that they can keep
operating (see recommendation 4).
• Offer skills training in irrigation and supply production facilities, as well as
micro credit schemes to help cooperatives to professionalise and attract
young people.
Mid- to long-term measures
• Invest in infrastructure and infrastructure maintenance (see
recommendation 8).
• Reform of the agro-pastoral sector’s rural infrastructure and governance can
increase production and support access to new markets. Improvements in
watering facilities for livestock and road infrastructure will facilitate access to
new markets. Productivity can be improved by making the services required
to acquire and operate new types of equipment available. Examples of such
services are credit facilities, training as well as maintenance and repair
services.
• Development of postharvest processing to ensure production for new
markets is viable.
35
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
Artisanal handicrafts and jewellery
This once thriving sector went in decline because it lost access to a market
rather than due to environmental factors. Factors such as high transports costs
have only a negligible impact on the margins on ar tisanal jewellery. Removing
obstacles to access well-established markets in Europe, France in particular, will
allow artisans to export again. Complemented with training to market and selling
their products online could facilitate a substantial rise in the sector’s revenues.
Short-term measures
• Ensure the French consulate and other European embassies in Niamey ease
the visa application processes of handicraft traders with excellent track
record (see recommendation 6) .
• Revive the old practice of public commission of artisan work to beautify and
equip state buildings and other public offices.
Mid- to long-term measures
• Revive the Office du Tourism and team up with the artisan workers organised
in associations to cope with the crisis of tourism in the region.
• Ensure availability of skills, equipment and infrastructure required to enable
online sales and international shipping
Mining
Although the uranium sector is facing a slowdown, it still generates considerable
revenues. Currently, these revenues bypass Agadez to a significant extent.
Developing suppliers to the sector such as chemical laboratories, ore transport,
(mining) vehicle maintenance services and so on might be able to shift business
from Niamey towards Agadez, especially when ore prices pick up and sites
currently in development go into the production stage.
Like the uranium sector, gold is facing a slowdown because surface deposits
in many areas are nearing depletion. Full-fledged exploration of deeper gold
deposits is yet to start, however. Chinese, Nigerien and Sudanese companies
have acquired permits in 2016, and a Japanese company is expected to enter
Djado, but access for informal miners is likely to be restricted. When professional
operations come into production, local inhabitants might be able to benefit
as well by developing support services for the mining industry, much like the
uranium industr y.
36
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
Mid- to long-term measures
• Ensure clear communication throughout the development of new mining sites
to make local SMEs aware of the types and volumes of services required
during development and throughout operation of the site. By ensuring that
detailed documentation on the expected volumes (and their changes over
time) as well as quality standards of required goods and services is available
and easily accessible, potential suppliers are able to plan their production
and investments in capacity and expertise. Documentation could be made
available through, for instance, the Agadez antenna of the chamber of
commerce, and announced by radio. Furthermore, points of contacts at major
mining operations could be made accessible for local suppliers to ensure that
questions they might have regarding procurement volumes, planning and
quality standards can be answered (see recommendation 5).
• Support the development of local SMEs with potential as suppliers to ensure
they can develop to the point at which they can produce at the scale and
quality required in the sector. A supplier development programme could be
developed in collaboration with mining companies. A program could start
with screening local companies for their potential as suppliers for low-risk
items, based on regular supplier due diligence procedures, communicating
to the companies on exactly what aspects improvements are required.
Subsequently, companies with potential as competitive suppliers could
be identified, and targeted support could be provided aimed at ensuring
companies per form at the required level. Depending on the good or ser vice,
this may entail support to a supplier on a number of aspects in order to
align supplier capabilities with the buyer needs. Support may entail capacity
development, recruitment of relevant expertise, training, certification,
development of management procedures, quality management procedures,
production processes or planning to ensure on-time delivery (see
recommendation 2).
• Ensure the availability of human resources qualified to work in the sector
and access to (import) the required equipment. Training or exchanges of
personnel with other companies involved in the sector elsewhere (or both)
may be leveraged for this purpose.
• Press for greater transparency in the transfer of development taxes from
central state to regional level. Initiate a public-private dialogue between
government authorities and mining companies to increase mutual
understanding of needs and benefits of mining operating for communities,
local and central government and company (see recommendation 7).
37
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
Infrastructure
Poor road quality is a considerable constraint on private-sector development.
Investments in road construction could bring in a significant amount of
temporar y jobs, next to bringing down cost in most sectors. Training small
and medium-sized enterprises in road maintenance services could provide
some opportunities for the longer term, and might reduce risk for developing
construction companies by providing them with a relatively secure base income.
Investments in health and education infrastructures are also urgently needed.
Short-term measures
• Invest in public work schemes to rehabilitate road infrastructure or other
infrastructural domains (see recommendation 3).
Mid- to long-term measures
• Complete building the cement plant in Malbasa, construction on which has
been on hold for a year.
• Strengthen training providers to equip SMEs with the skills needed to
undertake road maintenance.
• Provide training to road operating agency personnel on the development of
appropriate preventative road maintenance schedules and budgets.
Private security
Private security is in considerable demand given factual and perceived insecurity
in the region. As military sources in Agadez indicate, a high likelihood for
Agadez to remain marked zone rouge in the years to come, the security protocol
of international organisations, NGOs and hotels will require the use of private
security companies in the long term. In addition, demand for private security
services may receive an additional boost if mining sites go into operation again.
Although private security may not be a desirable growth sector, given its reliance
on continued banditry and organised crime, it does provide an exceptional
opportunity to reach former smugglers and ex-combatants by using the sector
as a stepping stone to transition back to peaceful and legal forms of livelihood,
by providing employees with an uniform, a phone, maybe a motorcycle at one
point, and ideally a career path, a job in private security matches young men’s
expectations of manhood and a better life more easily than the prospect of
becoming a productive farmer or garbage collector. In addition, belonging to
a company with a corporate identity and the possibility of receiving training in
38
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
technical and soft skills will ease former smugglers’ and other youths’ integration
into society.
Short-term measures
• Provide training to employees in technical and soft skills (such as conflict
management, mediation, deescalating communication and reporting skills).
• Provide support to employers to professionalise their management,
equipment and training curricula to support personnel retention and
professional and ethical service deliver y.
Small trade
Labour with good basic or specialist skills is in low supply. Growing businesses
are thus constrained or forced to make considerable upfront investments in
training of new personnel. They face unpredictable levels and frequency of
extortion and increased transaction costs.
Short-term measures
• Promote communication technologies to report incidents of extortion along
different trading routes and communicate them publicly, for instance through
the local radio.
• Intensify the ongoing dialogue with Niamey authorities to immediately stop
the beautification campaign and offer adequate forms of compensation
for the entrepreneurs whose workshops were destroyed (see
recommendation 6).
• Ensure the success of the ongoing business plan competition in Agadez and
communicate success stories by local radio (see recommendation 2).
Mid- to long-term measures
• Support SMEs in their growth by offering business development services
and facilitate training, coaching and matchmaking to link aspiring
entrepreneurs and labourers to the market providing training in professional
or entrepreneurial skills (see recommendation 5).
• Support the development of the key infrastructure (such as electricity)
required for these companies to operate (see recommendation 8).
39
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
Women entrepreneurs
Agadez women dominate several sectors: they make up the majority of traditional
handicraft production, except for jeweller y, run successful cooperatives in
agricultural processing and identified market potential in henna treatment
services and carpet making. The latter activities have the advantage of being
compatible with their other productive (farming) and reproductive tasks women
are expected to perform. A significant number of women from the region leave
Agadez to work as maids in Algeria.
Opportunities exist in other professions, such as dentists and opticians, for which
respondents identified a significant shortage
Short-term measures
• Offer women producer and artisan cooperatives a market for processed
agricultural produce guaranteeing fair prices and stable quantities (see
recommendation 4).
• Involve women in the identification of skills needs and market opportunities,
that they perceive as both desirable and practical (see recommendation 1).
Mid- to long-term measures
• Ensure women’s input into measured aimed at creating an enabling business
environment through chambers, associations and cooperatives (see
recommendation 5).
2) Ensure ongoing business plan competition becomes a success
With support from the World Bank and others, the ‘House of the Enterprise’ of the
Chamber of commerce in Niamey launched a nationwide business plan competition
with the goal to promote small- and medium-sized enterprises. Six hundred proposals
were submitted through the regional chamber of commerce in Agadez to Niamey, and
additional ones by entrepreneurs directly. Although called business plans, many of the
proposals instead resembled lists of items required to run a business.77 At the time of
our field research, 600 proposals from all regions had been pre-selected. The candidates
will receive two months of training to professionalise their proposal, after which a
77 Personal inter view with representative of r egional chamber of commerce. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
40
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
second selection round will identify 300 businesses that will be accompanied in the
process of implementing their business plan during a 18-month period.78
Regional authorities expressed some concerns about the process wondering how many
proposals from the Agadez region would be accepted, but young people reacted usually
very positively.79 The initiative, already at an advanced stage of implementation, offers
a unique opportunity to make the implementation of the selected business plans from
Agadez a success, and to communicate the success accordingly. All necessar y support
should be provided to ensure the winning entrepreneurs from Agadez become role
models to inspire others and counterbalance the quickly spreading feelings of being
left out once again as a region. Although not on the ground in Agadez, the incubator
CIPMEN could offer high-quality business advice and has successfully done so in the
past.80
In its design, the business plan competition is partially comparable to the Reconversion
Plan, which is described in a companion report, ‘Local governance opportunities for
sustainable migration management in Agadez’. The aim of the latter plan is to reintegrate
actors involved in the migration economy throughout the entire region by providing them
with seed funding to set up their own businesses. In practice, the plan builds on the
lessons learnt in the aftermath of the rebellion, when former combatants were reinserted
in society by providing support for small projects. To date, a small pilot project had been
funded that allowed for the distribution of a total of XOF 145,000,000 (EUR 221,000).
Applications could either be submitted individually (for XOF 800,000 to 1,500,000 /
EUR 1,220 to 2,287) or in a group (up to XOF 4,000,000 / EUR 6,098).81 Lessons from
the nationwide business plan competition could be applied here to ensure that the
implementation of these projects will result in the successful development of local
businesses and long-term economic development.
78 Per sonal inter view with repres entative of the ‘Hous e of the Enter prise’ at the chamber of co mmerce. 2017.
Niamey, Niger, June. A promising example of s uch a business plan, related by a repr esentative of the
Incubator CIPMEN , plans to coll ect and rec ycle metal garbage. The enterpr ise is run by t wo young adult s
who already extracted tin and exported it to Niger ia. They emp loy 50 employ ees, low-skilled, did a proper
due diligence in prepar ation of the project or business, and collabor ate with SOPAMIN (Areva’s uranium
mine), which has a new director. CIPMEN offer ed training for them in Niame y, IOM financed . Personal
inter view with representative of C entre Incubateur des P ME au Niger (CIPMEN) . 2017. Niamey, Niger, June
(http://w ww.cipmen.org).
79 Pers onal inter view wit h representative of the regional chamber of co mmerce. 2017. Agadez, Nige r, June.
80 In the pas t, CIPMEN has coache d several successful social enterprises in Agadez, including in social media,
documen tary mov ies and the garbage colle ction and recycling bu siness mentioned earlier.
81 Républic du Nige r. 2017. ’Rapport des travau x de la réunion d ’installa tion et de la pr emière ses sion
ordinaires de la commission consultative régionale de l’administration territorial (COCORAT)’. Also see:
Hadan, I. 2017, ‘Agad ez: La colère des act eurs de la migration,’ NigerDiaspora, 28 A ugust; online interview
with NGO Tamakrast. 2 017, August.
41
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
3) Road construction and maintenance for immediate short-term employment
Poor road conditions were identified by many market players as a main obstacle to
business development. Different infrastructural initiatives (such as electricity, roads,
irrigation) are under way, though in very early stages, involving support from the
World Bank ( WB), the Agence française de développement (AFD) and Germany’s
KfW development bank and implementation capacity from the private sector.82 Such
efforts, if undertaken in a labour-intensive manner, can create income opportunities
for a significant number of low-skilled people. Although the employment generated is
temporar y, any effort to enhance infrastructure should draw on and strengthen whatever
private-sector capacity is available locally. If strengthened, domestic small and medium-
sized companies will not only be able to take on road maintenance work in the medium
to long term, they might also have the ability to absorb the trained short-term labour
hired for the public road construction in the first place.
4) Source locally
Foreign visitors in Agadez are no longer tourists but instead members of militar y
missions, journalists and aid workers. Although this situation is a temporar y one and all
efforts should be geared towards bringing tourists back to the region, these new actors
do present an existing market that, if served locally, can generate urgently needed
jobs and income immediately. International development agencies and EUCAP Sahel
have established an existence in town and the US military mission has just completed
building their bases near Agadez. An assessment of the skill sets, skills level and labour
capacity required in the coming years to secure and maintain these premises will give
an indication of what kind of support will be needed to match the immediate and mid-
term demand for local products and services. International agencies should commit to
source locally as much as possible. This will decrease the grievances people in Agadez
have started to signal vis-à-vis the missions and the international community more
generally, one interviewee asking, ‘How does Agadez benefit from their presence? It is
us who can preserve peace in the region, they need us more than we need them. So
why did the EU and the Americans pay the central government authorities and not the
regional authorities to set up shop in Agadez? ’83 Whether accurate or not, the statement
testifies to the growing anger towards these missions. Advocating the ser vices and
82 Personal inter view wit h representative s of regional chamber of commerce. 2017. Ag adez, Niger, June.
83 Perso nal inter view with r epresentative of Regional Council, focus group discus sions with youth and female
artisans. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
42
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
products needed via the local radio will ease the matchmaking between local supply and
demand.84
5.2 Invest in an enabling business environment
The 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants has not led to any improvements
in the business climate. Yet the environment was less than enabling long before the law
was passed. The urgency to spark private-sector activity could serve to reform the wider
ecosystem. The entr y points for income-generating activities identified in the previous
section aim to bring quick positive impact. Additional measures are required to enable
structural change. Among the key structural obstacles highlighted by interviewees
were a lack of entrepreneurial attitude, endemic corruption, lack of access to markets,
deficient infrastructure and the Agadez security label (zone rouge).
5) Inject entrepreneurial thinking into ‘une culture de l’argent facil’
Many people in the region are quick to move into new livelihoods once it is
demonstrated money can be made or financing is available. Fewer, however, are
adept at spotting new market opportunities or able to grow their business to service
demand beyond their own or local needs. Professionalisation of profitable enterprises
by incorporating entrepreneurial thinking, new ways of working, new technologies or
new sales channels are limited. As observed more often in fragile contexts, Agadez
displays a trading culture that prioritises ‘activities that generate easy money quickly,’
prioritising opportunism over creativity. The Toubou in particular are accused of earning
fortunes from the smuggling industry without investing into productive value addition
in the local economy.85 Yet promising entry points to promote and reward a culture of
entrepreneurship exist. A case in point is a group of experienced entrepreneurs running
well-equipped small- to medium-sized workshops in the industrial areas of Agadez.
Interestingly, their success owes everything to the long history of labour migration that
most families in Agadez share and that influences Agadez youths’ persistent desire
to travel to Libya.86 Faced with deteriorating security and crime in southern Libya,
many young carpenters, electricians, plumbers, mechanics from Agadez — who
spent several years in Libya to practice their trade, earn a living and save money for a
future investment at home — have returned home in recent years. With solid working
84 The potential information function of radio stations is discussed in more detail in a companion report Local
governance opportunities for sustainable migration management in Agadez. An inspiring ex ample of an
initiat ive that connects loc al entrepreneurs in fragile marke ts to (temporarily) military and peacebuilding
missions, but also more sustainable markets is Building M arkets, a platform that connects local mar kets to
domest ic, regio nal and international supply chains (s ee http://buildingmarkets.or g).
85 Personal inter view with representative fr om the chamb er of commerce. 2017. Niamey, Niger, June.
86 Focus group discu ssion with youth repr esentatives. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June.
43
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
experience, on-the-job training and often-imported machinery from Libya they perfectly
know how to operate, these entrepreneurs have all the critical elements to business
success. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that these former migrant labourers
are best positioned to serve as role models for success in Agadez, discouraging their
employees, often not much younger than themselves, from trying their luck north of the
desert.
Another way of promoting entrepreneurship and innovation could be to engage a
selection of well-established large family business people in Agadez, the local business
elite who have made significant contributions to the development of Agadez over the
past decades, for instance in the fields of road construction, mining and trading.87
They could be introduced to the most compelling business ideas of young people.
Experienced entrepreneurs could act as coaches and mentors and even investors for
emerging businesses, and young aspiring entrepreneurs could inject fresh thinking
into the established family business while growing under its wings. Facilitating the
interaction between the two generations would also help preserve the fragile social
fabric of a community that today faces numerous growing tensions.88
6) Remove obstacles to access to markets
Although access to finance is not a major bottleneck for most businesses in Agadez,
access to markets has proven more difficult than it was. The French embassy has
declined numerous visa application from Tuareg artisans who used to travel from
Agadez to France twice a year, and from there onto other Schengen countries, to sell
their products at festivals and jewellery shops. After decades of compliance with the visa
regulations, this year many artisans are stranded in Niamey and wait for an opportunity
to give their jewellery to another trader who does get a visa to enter Europe and agrees
to sell on their behalf.89 Immediate action should be taken to enable the artisans to
travel again. Another example of obstructed market access concerns the hundreds of
artisans who used to run their workshops near the old mosque at the historic city centre.
In preparation of the Independence Day festivities in December 2016, and as part of an
Agadez beautification campaign, workshop owners received 48 hours’ notice before
their premises were levelled by bulldozer. For many of them, ever ything they had built
in a lifetime was demolished in 30 minutes: tailors, handicrafts, book shops. Because
they received no compensation, these micro entrepreneurs had to relocate and start
87 The chamber of commerce of Agadez is currently comple ting a study about the loc al busines s elites, m ostly
family ent erprise s. A list of names and contact details c an be obtain ed from the director general.
88 A centr al challenge in terms of loc al investm ent capacity is that many of the larger c apitalis ts from Agadez
are now based and prefer to invest in the South, in particular in real est ate, petr ol, trans port and money
transfer services. Neve rthele ss, thes e business men tend to employ youth fr om Agadez.
89 Personal inter views wit h artisans. 2017. Niamey and Agade z, Niger, June.
44
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
from scratch.90 Many of them took to the street to demonstrate in protest, but quit when
things risked turning violent. Anger towards both local and central authorities runs deep,
however.91
7) Promote greater transparency and accountability through larger companies
Because complaints about corruption practices are on the rise, a particular focus in all
private-sector development initiatives should be put on accountability and transparency,
both mechanisms for and adherance to them.92 Private companies can set examples
and act as champions in instigating a culture of accountability. Because mining
companies might at some point resume operations, mechanisms should be put in place
to avoid misdirection of funds and ensure that the 15 percent development tax actually
reaches the communes.93 A concerted effort by the international community, ideally in
collaboration with (established or new) mining companies, could leverage their influence
to press for greater transparency in the transfer of corporate contributions from central
state to regional level. Donors could initiate public-private dialogue sessions precisely
on the interlinkages between transparency, the business case for a company to obtain
a social licence to operate and the risk of increasing the propensity of violent attacks.94
This would not only be to the immediate benefit of surrounding local communities, but
also contribute to improving stability of the wider ecosystem, in which these companies
operate.
90 Two inter viewees were vict ims of the demolitions, a well-known female dres smaker and the o wner of a
newspaper kiosk.
91 P ersonal intervie w with artisan repr esentat ive. 2017. Agadez, Nig er, June.
92 This trend of grow ing numbers of checkpoints and incr easing amoun ts of extortion was echoed thr oughout
the inter views and focus group discussions, straddling loc al government officials, entrepreneurs and civil
society representatives.
93 Acco rding to the Regional Council of Agadez , the centr al government authorities have retained between
XOF 12 and 13 million (EUR 18,300 to 19,800) tha t should have been channelled to Agadez instead.
Recent ly, the Regional Council won a court c ase obliging s everal mining corporations (including SOM AI,
COMIN AC and SONIC HAR) to pay the regional state. P ersonal intervie w with representative of the Re gional
Council. 2017. Agadez, Niger, June .
94 A case in p oint is the kidnapping of seven employee s of AREVA , a mining company operatin g near Arlit
and its contractor SOGEA-SATOM in Sep tember 2010. See BBC. 2010. ‘Fr ench nationals among seven
worker s kidnapped in Niger,’ 16 September, http://ww w.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11325749 (accessed
September 2017).
45
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
8) Invest in infrastructure
Inadequate provision of power, bad roads and unreliable access to water were each
identified as structural business obstacles.95 They make operating a business difficult
and costly. Improvements in the environmental factors will lower costs, thereby
raising margins on existing products, and make new kinds of production viable. The
AFD and the EU are also planning on installing a hybrid electricity plant, the AREVA
company looked into solar energy to enable irrigation, and the Tunisian company MBC
installed solar-driven street lamps (which local electricians are not equipped to repair).
The companies Manutention Africain and Komatsu, in turn, have been in charge of
electricity provision in the region and have seen some success. Large investments
will require systems in place for checks and balances. If not succumbing the risk of
corruption, such visible improvements in infrastructure will not only unleash economic
potential and create employment, but also send a clear message of commitment to the
population of Agadez.
9) Consider exempting Agadez from the zone rouge to send a more positive signal to
foreign investors
Attracting and cofinancing foreign investment with risk-sharing modalities would
be a useful way to start off and diversify economic activity in several sectors. More
importantly, in light of rising tensions, larger visible investments will help shift the
perspective from the decline and frustration to hope for growth in the future. Take, for
example, cement. Although cement is currently imported from Nigeria, Benin and Togo,
a partially finished cement factory stands unused in Malbaza and other projects exist for
Tahoua region. Investments in road construction might provide the necessary impulse to
get the factory into production.
Yet significant foreign investment will remain a far-off scenario unless the security
code for Agadez town changes from red to orange. A more nuanced cartography
of risks, comparable to the one for Chad, would strengthen the ultimate security
guarantor against terrorism: the region’s population and their commitment to peace and
development.96 Interestingly, the Nigerien MAE only labelled the regions red after seven
employees of AREVA and SATOM in Arlit were kidnapped on 16 September 2010 (and
not right after the second rebellion). Changing the security label of Agadez town back
to orange will not be enough to attract investors; more positive guarantees are needed.
95 Inter views w ith representatives of the Regional Counc il, chamber of commerce and mayor’s of fice. 2017.
Agadez, Niger, June.
96 Only th e border re gions are mar ked as zones with a stric tly negat ive travel a dvice. See France Diplomatie.
2017. ‘Conseils par pays – Tchad’. 27 Septe mber. http://w ww.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/conseils-aux-voyageurs/
conseils-par-pays/tchad/#securite (accessed September 2017)
46
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
Yet it is a measure that can be with immediate effect and would act on the insight from
experience in fragile settings more generally that security requires development as much
as development requires security. Last, although easing investors’ and entrepreneurs’
access to the region can have stabilising effects, consistent pressure on large
companies such as the French-owned AREVA to adhere to social and environmental
standards will equally abate people’s frustrations in the region.97
5.3 Ensure conflict sensitivity
Although opportunities need to materialise quickly, it is equally important that support
strategies are carefully planned to not reinforce existing tensions and fuel frustrations.
10) Avoid exclusive targeting of smugglers
Considering the deep entanglement of the migration value chain with other sectors
of the local economy, alternative income-generating opportunities are needed for
more than the direct migration actors — that is, drivers and ghetto owners — alone.
Exclusive targeting of smugglers will inevitably reinforce the stigma and exacerbate
emerging tensions between perceived winners and losers of the 2015 Law Against the
Illicit Smuggling of Migrants. IOM’s short skills trainings were successful in decreasing
resentments between host communities and migrants by offering the courses to both
groups.98
11) Keep in mind that process and perception matter as much as outputs and facts
Closing down an entire industry and replacing it by alternative, mostly smaller, income
generating activities is inevitably a highly contested affair. Clear communication
about future interventions, eligibility criteria for beneficiaries and intended outcomes
is critical and as relevant as the outcomes themselves. Local radio stations can help
pass such information on time. Similarly, despite all the good intentions and a sound
implementation process, an intervention can still be perceived as unfair and biased.
This is particularly the case when a legacy of marginalisation and mistrust prevails
among the population towards local authorities or between groups in the population.
The implementation of the Reconversion Plan is a case in point, in that people took to
the streets to express their anger about what they perceived as a lack of transparency
97 Pour ia Amirshahi. 2014. ‘Zone rouge au Niger : L’urgence d’une modification de la car te du MAE,’
17 Septembe r, http://w ww.pouriaamirshahi.fr/2014/09/17/zone-rouge-au-niger-lurgence-dune-
modification-de-la-carte-du-mae/ (ac cessed September 2017); personal inter view wit h repres entative of
regional chamber of co mmerce. 2 017. Agadez, Niamey, June.
98 International Organization for Migration. 2016. ‘Vocational Trainings in Agadez’.
47
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
and fairness in the process of awarding funding to applicants. Close monitoring not just
of the results but also of people’s perceptions is important to not further undermine
legitimacy of local authorities or fuel violent confrontation.
12) Avoid any form of market distortion
As this report has shown, despite being in decline, the economy in Agadez has
reasonable potential. It is important to strengthen whatever market initiatives exist
and to not crowd out small informal businesses by bringing in aid, or to upset well-
established local market players by undermining their (often semi-formal) economic
transactions. Interviewees used Diffa region as an example, where by catering to the
pressing needs of irregular migrants and host communities international humanitarian
aid has made it increasingly difficult for local entrepreneurs to provide products and
services on a market basis.99 The risk of development aid crowding out local market
players is fur ther problematic because it can have destabilising effects if these market
players see their business being challenged. For example, international support of
the Nigerien armed forces, a critical safeguard of the regions’ stability, is crucial and
should be sustained in the long term. Yet the donation of vehicles to strengthen the
army’s capacity should be planned in light of possible negative effects it could have on
the Toubou’s flourishing cross-border car trade with Libya. Although relatively small
in size and questionable in nature (vehicles are smuggled into Niger and then formally
registered in Agadez), this trading business is significant for the region’s stability,
because the group dominating it is also the main victim of the migration mitigation
measures: most smugglers currently in prison are Toubou. Any additional, even minor,
intervention that (inadvertently) further undermines the Toubou’s economic existence
could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.100 In other words, the donation of cars
in the context of a booming car market should be implemented in a way that does not
cause further destabilisation.
99 Concr ete examples were obt ained in a personal inter view wit h representative of CIPMEN. 2017. N iamey,
Niger, June.
100 Alt hough the entire car business is under control of a handful wealt hy Toubou, given t he trade’s size, a
whole sup ply industry of micro-, small- and medium-sized local businesses has develope d around them,
mostly informal, so me formal: several car parks have be en established in town, young men are employed to
watch, c lean and sell t he vehicles. Other s are hired to deliver car s to Niamey. Between 20 and 3 0 new cars
(mostly Toyota and KI A) are driven in convoys fr om Libya to Agadez ever y week, protected by the Nigerien
military.
48
Conclusion
As some of the Agadez region’s key economic sectors (tourism, artisan handicrafts and
uranium mining) fell in decline over the past few years, a boom in the migration and gold
industry provided a windfall. The migration industry offered direct jobs for approximately
6,000 to 7,000 people and indirect incomes to reportedly more than half of the
households in Agadez. Yet migration flows started circumventing the city in the course
of 2017 as a consequence of the 2015 Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants and
EU policy, and, because surface gold deposits are running low, economic opportunities
in the region are becoming increasingly few.
The impact of these recent developments can best be understood in historical context.
Frustrations are not only caused by the immediate decline of livelihoods, but also fuelled
by the bitter reminder of the post-rebellion period when rebellion leaders were promised
alternative sources of income that never materialised. As a result, economic despair
and mistrust run even deeper in Agadez today than they did in the 2000s. Both direct
employment in the migration value chain as well as demand in secondary sectors are
in decline as passenger volumes through the city have fallen. As a result, the reduced
traffic along the Agadez migration route has led to a decrease in other trade and
smuggling activities as well, making inputs and commerce less lucrative. This is partly
due to a reduced purchasing power and partly to increased transaction costs, because
informal levies on goods have increased and transpor t of goods has become more time
intensive. Increasing banditr y and corruption from newly empowered security actors is
raising the cost of doing business even more. Despite minor upticks in private security
and hospitality, opportunities to generate a livelihood are in decline and feelings of
despair and injustice spreading quickly.
In spite of these challenges, opportunities for economic development exist. In the
immediate term, existing skill sets and entrepreneurial capacity, as well as ongoing
initiatives can be leveraged to identify market opportunities and enable small businesses
to grow and generate employment. Direct support for entrepreneurs and workers at the
micro level should be complemented by more structural measures to produce a business
environment, which enables small and medium-sized firms (both formal and informal)
to compete. Finally, in light of the increasingly fragile fabric of Agadez and its position
in a highly volatile region, it is of utmost importance to ensure that any intervention be
designed and implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner.
49
Appendix: Methodology
The repor t builds on a combination of survey data, focus groups, key informants, and
interview data. The first explorative stage of the research (May 2017) consisted of
gathering secondary socioeconomic and conflict data on the Agadez region through
a survey of a random sample of 597 respondents (Agadez population = 118,244, z =
1.96, ME = 0.04). Randomisation was ensured through the random selection of 14
Agadez neighbourhoods (see map) . In each of these neighbourhoods, researchers
used the method of randomly selecting households and individual respondents within
these households as commonly applied by the Afrobarometer. The distribution of
survey respondents approximates the gender and ethnic distribution in the region.
Nevertheless, and in lieu of recent census data, we remain very careful with the
extrapolation of our sample findings to the entire Agadez population in our discussion of
the survey data.
Toudou
Nassarawa
Oumouardan
Sabon Gari
Angoualbay
Azim
Amarouet
Tawayen
Katanga
Pays-Bas
Dagamanet
Obitara
Misrata
Tadresse
Figure 9 Map of the neighbourhoods of Agadez where the survey took place
The survey gathered information about the respondents’ relevant demographic
characteristics, the (sub)sector or industry in which they work, experienced changes
in access to livelihoods (such as assets or skills, activities, employment opportunities),
50
Migration and Markets in Agadez: Economic alternatives to the migration industr y
experienced changes in access to governance (such as access to security provision,
justice, conflict mediation, and interest representation), and experienced changes in the
number and types of inter-group conflicts. Although a majority of questions provided
the respondent with the ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refuse to answer’ choices, our two-tailed test
showed no statistical significance of these two answer categories. In our discussion of
the survey results, we therefore exclude all ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refuse to answer’ entries.
During the second research stage (June-July 2017), EPGA and Clingendael conducted
60 key informant interviews with state authorities, elected authorities (Regional Council,
mayor, Megional Council), traditional authorities (sultan, chef de quartier, chef de
femme), Touareg elites, Toubou elites, local and international NGOs, religious leaders,
news media, members of the private sector, and chambers of commerce. In addition,
we conducted eight focus group discussions with migrants (two focus groups), (former)
migration facilitators (two focus groups), young entrepreneurs (two focus groups) ,
and female artisans and producers (two focus groups). The key informant interviews
and focus group discussions allowed for the further exploration of the effects of the
migration industry and migration-mitigating measures on Agadez. In addition, these
interviews allowed for the identification of potential economic growth sectors and of
bottom-up initiatives that could be suppor ted to support the stability and economic
development of Agadez
51
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