At the end of the Cold War,1 the economies of Africa2 and Asia3 were remarkably different. Africa was still a poor, backward, failing, and nonperforming continent. Eight countries in Asia had earned international reputation as “Tigers” or High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs), being richer, progressive, and developing. This was, indeed, a kind of puzzle for some reasons. First, at independence
... [Show full abstract] in the 1960s, Afro-optimists, including Western powers, believed that, with its vast natural resources, Africa would develop faster than Asia. Africa’s growth potential was predicted to reach 7 percent annually. Optimists argued that Africa was not a part of the poor world described by the economists of the 1950s as one ravaged by the “vicious cycle of poverty” and the “ever-widening gap” between poor nations and the rich industrial world.4 None of these was realized. Second, historically, Africa and Asia shared the common fate of enslavement, colonial exploitation, and underdevelopment by foreign powers.5 Only one country in each of the two regions, Ethiopia and Thailand, respectively, escaped formal colonization; their freedom from colonial rule was a post-Second World War phenomenon.6 This suggested a common destiny. However, that was not to be. Third, up to the 1960s and 1970s, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and many countries in Asia were at about the same economic level.