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CSS STUDY
Zurich, June 2018
Lisa Watanabe,
Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
Islamist Actors: Libya and Tunisia
© 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
Contact:
Center for Security Studies (CSS)
ETH Zurich
Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW
CH - 8092 Zurich
Switzerland
Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25
css@sipo.gess.ethz.ch
www.css.ethz.ch
Author: Lisa Watanabe
Supervision: Oliver Thränert, Head of Think Tank
Research assistant: Anja Bodenmann
Layout: Miriam Dahinden-Ganzoni
Availability: This study can be accessed online at www.css.ethz.ch.
Please cite as: Lisa Watanabe, Islamist Actors: Libya and Tunisia (Zurich:
Center for Security Studies, 2018).
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 4
Introduction 5
1 Islamism in Libya 7
1.1 Mainstream Islamists
(The Muslim Brotherhood) 7
1.2 Post-jihadis (LIFG/LIMC Veterans) 11
1.3 Sala Parties (Al-Watan and Al-Umma
Al-Wasat) 14
1.4 ‘Quiestist’ Salas (Madkhalis) 16
1.5 The Importance of Libya’s Islamists 18
2 Islamism in Tunisia 19
2.1 Mainstream Islamists (Ennahda) 19
2.2 Sala Parties (Hisb Ut-tahrir and
Jabhat Al-Islah) 22
2.3 Quietist Salas (Sala Ilmiyya) 23
2.4 The Importance of Tunisia’s Islamists 25
Concluding Remarks 26
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
4
Executive Summary
While much attention has thus far understandably been
focused on jihadi actors in Libya and Tunisia, other Is-
lamist actors, who are not focused on armed jihad, de-
serve greater scrutiny. The latter emerged as key actors in
the post-uprising environments of these countries. In the
immediate transitional period, mainstream Islamist ac-
tors, such as the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and
Construction Party (JCP) and Ennahda in Tunisia were,
along with their allies, able to exert considerable inu-
ence, bringing them into conict with non-Islamist ac-
tors. How they now adapt and position themselves with-
in their national contexts will be important for stability in
a post-conict Libya and for the democratic transition in
Tunisia, both of which are not only essential for regional
stability, but also for European security, given the myriad
of security challenges that fragile and conict-afflicted
countries can generate.
Though the environments in which Islamists in
Libya and Tunisia operate are considerably different, some
similarities may be observed. Mainstream Islamists in
both countries have lost ground since 2012, though they
remain politically relevant. While the Muslim Brother-
hood in Libya has seen its inuence diminish signicantly
since the outbreak of civil war in mid-2014, the UN politi-
cal process has provided channels of continued, albeit re-
duced, political inuence. Moreover, the movement’s as-
sociation and potentially shared agendas with powerful
brigades that support the UN-backed Government of Na-
tional Accord (GNA) may also provide it and its party with
sympathizers in Libya’s future security structures. The in-
uence of Ennahda in Tunisia has also contracted since
the 2013 – 14 political crisis that shook the country. Its
continued importance is largely due to a further recogni-
tion of the secular nature of the Tunisian state and a rec-
ognition that its continued political sway depends on its
acceptance by non-Islamist political parties and societal
forces.
If mainstream Islamists may still be considered
signicant political actors, the same cannot be said of the
more conservative Sala political actors. The latter have
failed to gain any real political relevance in their own
right. In Libya, several Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC) veter-
ans formed Sala political parties, though their almost
complete absence in Libya’s rst elected parliament, the
General National Congress (GNC), radically circumscribed
any political ambitions they might have had. Neverthe-
less, their links to important brigades do give them inu-
ence on the ground in several parts of the country. Sala
parties in Tunisia have also fared poorly. Whilst they en-
joyed the support of Ennahda early on in the transition,
Ennahda has since distanced itself from them, increasing
their political isolation. Their lack of political traction ap-
pears largely due to a failure to appeal either a more mod-
erate Islamist audience or a large enough ultra-conserva-
tive constituency. In particular, their message has been
lost on ultra-conservative youth.
Quietist Sala actors, who usually shun political
engagement, could make gains at the expense of Sala
political parties, especially in Libya. Quietist Salas have
been under pressure in Tunisia since the start of the po-
litical crisis in 2013, which has limited their capacity to ex-
pand and institutionalize their networks. This could result
in more ultra-conservative youth gravitating towards ji-
hadi Salasm. In Libya, by contrast, nominally quietist
Salasm, notably Madkhalism, has been gaining a greater
foothold. The GNA in the West and General Haftar’s Liby-
an National Army (LNA) in the East both rely on Madkhali
brigades. This could eventually lead to their integration
into future police and security structures, thereby boost-
ing Madkhali inuence in state structures. Madkhalis
have also increased their presence within the religious
sphere in eastern Libya, providing Madkhali clerics with
channels through which to expand their support base in
this already more conservative part of the country that
has traditionally been a hotbed of radicalization.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
5
Introduction
Islamists1 have emerged as key actors in the post-uprising
environments of Libya and Tunisia. Their agendas and rel-
ative importance are likely to have implications for the
evolution of the political landscapes and stability of these
countries. Tunisia’s democratic transition remains fragile
and vulnerable to tensions between Islamist and non-Is-
lamist political forces. Post-Qadda Libya has yet to fully
emerge from the civil war that broke out in mid-2014, it-
self partially caused by polarization between Islamist and
non-Islamist actors. How Islamist actors adapt to and po-
sition themselves within their new and evolving environ-
ments will be vital to the success of the democratic tran-
sition in Tunisia and stability in a post-conict Libya, both
of which are essential for regional stability, as well as se-
curity in Europe. The latter, not least because fragile and
conict-afflicted contexts provide opportunities for the
growth of violent extremism and can contribute to acute
irregular migratory ows.
Libyan Islamist actors, notably the Muslim
Brotherhood and the now fragmented Libyan Islamic
Movement for Change (LIMC) - formerly the Libyan Islam-
ic Fighting Group (LIFG) – had played a signicant role in
the uprising against the Qadda regime.2 After Qadda,
they became involved in the political transition process,
either through the establishment of political parties - the
Muslim Brotherhood established the Justice and Con-
struction Party (JCP) and former leaders of the LIFG/LIMC
set up the Sala parties Al-Watan and Al-Umma Al-Wasat
– or through their members’ involvement in transitional
governance structures.3 When the second civil war broke
out, the Muslim Brotherhood, the JCP, the Sala parties
and Sala-leaning independents aligned themselves with
the General National Congress (GNC) and its government
in Tripoli, forming the Libya Dawn coalition. The less orga-
nized and supposedly quietist Madkhali Salas found
1 Although the boundaries between Islam and Islamism are to some
extent blurry, it is worth making a distinction between them. Islam may
be thought of both a corpus of ideas about religion in its spiritual form
and a set of ideas about politics, economics, society and war. Islamism
is a project of political mobilization of Islam. In broad terms, Islamism
may involve the promotion of beliefs, laws or policies that are considered
religious in character. Sunni Islamism contains several currents of Is-
lamism. Some Islamists embrace political Islamism, which places greater
emphasis on engagement in politics than on preaching, and generally
advocates obtaining power by political rather than armed means. Other
Islamists may be quietist and reject involvement in politics. Others still
may be jihadi and condone violence as a means of achieving their aims.
See Ahmad Tufail, “Towards a Denition of Islam and Islamism,” MEMRI
Inquiry & Analysis Series, 8 September 2017; Margot Badran, “Under-
standing Islam, Islamism, and Islamic Feminism,” Journal of Women’s
History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2001), p. 47; International Crisis Group, “Under-
standing Islamism,” Middle East / North Africa Report, No. 372, 2 March
2005, pp. 1 – 3.
2 Noman Benotman, Jason Pack and James Brandon, “Islamists,” in: The
2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadda Future, ed.
Jason Pack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 193.
3 Omar Ashour, “Between ISIS and a Failed State: The Saga of Libyan
Islamists,” Brookings Institute Working Paper, August 2015, p. 6.
themselves on both sides of the conict4, some aligning
themselves with the GNC and its government and others
with the House of Representatives (HoR) and its govern-
ment in Bayda/Tobruk. While some of Libya’s Madkhalis
are still aligned with General Haftar’s Libyan National
Army (LNA), who is close to many politicians in the HoR,
others cooperate with the UN-backed Government of Na-
tional Accord (GNA), headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj.
While Tunisian Islamists did not play a signi-
cant role in the removal of Ben Ali, they have played an
important role in the transitional process, with the Mus-
lim Brotherhood-derived Islamist party Ennahda emerg-
ing as a major political actor and participating in succes-
sive governments. Ennahda has even attempted to
remodel itself in order to be more acceptable to non-Is-
lamist political forces and the population at large. Follow-
ing the departure of Ben Ali, a small percentage of Salas
also established political parties, notably Jabhat Al-Islah,
Hisb Ut-tahrir, Al-Asala and Al-Rahma.5 Quietist Salas
also adapted their behavior to the altered domestic situa-
tion in Tunisia, operating more openly, engaging in
preaching and charitable work, forming associations and
even lobbying politically for issues of concern to them6,
tough they have come under pressure since 2013.
The contexts in which Libyan and Tunisian Is-
lamists operate is very different, therefore. In Libya, Is-
lamists are struggling to ensure their place in the coun-
try’s future, without the parameters of a sustainable
political settlement having been nalized and in a situa-
tion in which armed groups continue to wield inuence in
the absence of strong governance structures. How they
and associated brigades are positioning themselves will,
consequently, affect their future inuence in the country.
In Tunisia, by contrast, Islamists are working within the
established political parameters of a edgling democrac y.
How Islamists actors relate to the young democratic or-
der will affect their survival within the political system
and their traction within society as a whole.
To-date, much attention has understandably
been on jihadi Islamist actors in Libya and Tunisia, who
seek to impose their views about the centrality of Islamic
practice for social and political life through violent means.
However, Islamists, who are not focused on armed jihad,
deserve greater scrutiny. The latter are likely to help shape
the future of Libya and Tunisia. This study looks at several
4 Palwsha L- Kakar and Zahra Langhi, “Libya’s Religious Sector and Peace-
building Efforts,” United States Institute for Peace, 2017, p. 13.
5 Stefano M. Torelli, Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, “Salasm in
Tunisia: Challenges and Opportunities for Democratization,” Middle
East Policy XIX, No. 4 (2012), pp. 146 – 7; Georges Fahmi, “The Future of
Political Salasm in Egypt and Tunisia,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 16
November 2015; Monica Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salasm:
Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterranean Politics 18, No. 1
(2013), p. 109.
6 International Crisis Group, “Tunisia: Violence and the Sala Challenge,”
Middle East / North Africa Report, No. 137, 13 February 2013, pp. 14 – 15;
Anouar Boukhars, “The Politics of North African Salasm,” Orient II
(2016), p. 55.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
6
types of key Islamist actors. Among the political Islamists,7
it examines mainstream Islamists, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood in Libya and Ennahda in Tunisia, who have
gone the furthest in terms of accepting democratic norms
and principles, and are the most pragmatic with regards
to the application of sharia law. Within the more conser-
vative Sala current8, it looks at post-Jihadis, some of
whom have embraced political Islam, even though they
remain more conservative in their approach to politics
and religion than mainstream Islamists, as well as quietist
Salas, who generally eschew political engagement and
reject armed resistance against Sunni Muslim regimes.
7 Political Islamists place greater emphasis on engagement in politics than
on preaching, and generally advocate obtaining power by political rather
than armed means. See International Crisis Group, “Understanding
Islamism,” pp. 1 – 3.
8 Adherents of Salasm seek to model their behavior on the pious prac-
tices of the rst three generations of Muslims after the Prophet Moham-
med.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
7
1 Islamism in Libya
During and after the uprising, Islamist actors re-emerged
in Libya, playing politically and militarily important roles.
The outbreak of civil war in the country in mid-2014 led
most to coalesce within the Libya Dawn coalition, with
the exception of Madkhalis, who joined competing sides
in the conict. The collapse of the Libya Dawn coalition
against the backdrop of the UN political process has seen
Islamists fragment further.
1.1 Mainstream Islamists
(The Muslim Brother-
hood)
Background and Objectives
The Muslim Brotherhood rst established a presence in
Libya in 1949, when three Muslim Brotherhood members
ed to Libya from Egypt after having been accused of in-
volvement in the assassination of former Egyptian prime
minister Mahmoud Al-Nuqrashi Pasha in 1948. They were
followed by Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic schol-
ars, and several years later by members of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, who took refuge in Libya following
the 1952 Free Officers’ coup in Egypt. This small constella-
tion of like-minded individuals disseminated Muslim
Brotherhood ideas in the country. Disillusionment with
Arab nationalism after the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War generated enough interest in Islamism in Libya
to lead to lead to the establishment in 1968 of Muslim
Brotherhood branches in Tripoli and Benghazi. However,
when Qadda came to power in 1969, the movement
was banned and many of its members ed abroad.9
The Muslim Brotherhood experienced a revival
or sorts in the 1980s. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolu-
tion, Muslim communities in the West became increas-
ingly interested in Islamism. Libyans living and studying in
the US established a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood,
called Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya. Some of its members re-
turned to Libya in the early 1980s and attempted to re-
vive the movement domestically. However, many among
them were either imprisoned or executed. Despite regime
repression against Islamists in the 1980s and 90s, the
movement did continue to operate clandestinely, with its
inuence boosted by Qatar’s promotion of the Muslim
9 B. Chemitsky, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood on the Rise,” MEMRI Inquiry
and Analysis Series, No. 828, 24 April 2012.
Brotherhood via Al-Jazeera and popular Muslim Brother-
hood websites, many of which were connected to the
high-prole Qatar-based Muslim cleric Yousef Al-Qa-
radawi.10
In the mid-2000s, the movement’s attitude to-
wards the regime shifted as a result of the reform initia-
tives of Qadda’s son, Saif Qadda, which were aimed at
neutralizing opposition forces in Libya through coopta-
tion. Reconciliation with Islamists, including the Muslim
Brotherhood, was offered in return for its recognition of
the regime, renunciation of violence and official revision
of its aims. The Muslim Brotherhood took up Saif Qad-
da’s offer. As a result, it replaced active opposition to the
Qadda regime with tacit cooperation, which included
praise for Saif Qadda’s reform efforts. Despite the move-
ment’s reconciliation with the regime, its presence within
Libya remained limited.11
When the revolution began, the Muslim Broth-
erhood’s leadership was dispersed, with some senior g-
ures in Libya and many abroad. The overseas leadership
met in an Islamic cultural centre in Zurich, Switzerland, on
30 and 31 January 2011 to discuss the upcoming “Day of
Rage” in Libya, which was planned for the 17 February
and the likelihood that the population would follow the
Egyptian and Tunisian examples and call for the depar-
ture of Qadda. When momentum behind the protests
accelerated, they met again in Switzerland on 19 Febru-
ary, at which time they decided to side with the rebels.12
The Muslim Brotherhood leadership subse-
quently ordered their cadre based abroad to prepare to
return to Libya. Those already in Libya were instructed to
participate socially and politically in the uprising. The
movement was notably supportive of the creation of the
National Transitional Council (NTC), the body that politi-
cally represented the revolutionary forces and would later
govern Libya in the immediate transitional period. At the
same time, it sought to boost its limited domestic pres-
ence, by organizing the distribution of aid and establish-
ing media outlets.13
After Qadda was killed in October 2011, senior
gures of the Muslim Brotherhood returned to Libya and
the movement set about creating an organizational struc-
ture with which to expand its domestic presence. The
movement elected Bashir Al-Kibti as its general supervi-
sor. Al-Kibti had been in exile in the US for 33 years and
10 Ibid.; Mary Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place: Libya’s Islamists During and
After the Revolution,” in The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath, eds.
Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015), p. 178; “Is-
lamist Movements in Libya: Chances and Challenges of Political Power,”
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Libya Office, 2015, p. 5; Ashour, “Between ISIS
and a Failed State”; Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” pp. 196 – 7.
11 Robin Wright, The Islamist Are Coming: Who They Really Are (Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), p. 51; Ashour, “Between ISIS
and a Failed State,” p. 3; Mehran Kamrava, Beyond the Arab Spring: The
Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014), p. 125.
12 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 181.
13 Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 217.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
8
had returned during the uprising in Libya. The move-
ment’s shura council (consultative committee) then ap-
pointed two deputy general supervisors, a general secre-
tariat and created an executive committee and a number
of departments.14
Several months later, in March 2012, the move-
ment announced the creation of the Justice and Con-
struction Party (JCP). Muhammad Sawan, who was im-
prisoned under the Qadda regime and was previously
head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s shura council (consul-
tative committee) became leader of the party. The move-
ment presented the party as organizationally indepen-
dent from the movement and open to all those who
wished to join. The party declared its aim to be the estab-
lishment of sharia law as the main source of legislation.
However, it has also stated that the state should be civic,
suggesting a separation between religion and the state.
Such ambiguity may have been due to the party’s desire
to gain domestic and international acceptance, while at
the same time appealing to a conservative domestic sup-
port base.15
Alliances
National
From the beginning of the post-uprising period, the Mus-
lim Brotherhood enjoyed the support of former Brother-
hood member and inuential cleric, Ali Al-Sallabi. The
movement initially participated in Al-Sallabi’s National
Gathering, which sought to bring together Islamists un-
der a broad umbrella movement that had a nationalist
orientation with an Islamic reference. However, internal
differences led the Brotherhood to pull out of the Nation-
al Gathering, which also allowed it to publicly distance it-
self from post-jihadis within it, notably former members
of the LIFG, which was perceived as important for the
movement’s domestic and international acceptance.16
During the initial transitional period, the Mus-
lim Brotherhood was represented in the NTC, which pre-
sided over the country before elections were held in 2012.
Within the NTC, the movement found common cause
with other NTC members, who believed that sharia law
should inform legislation. These included individuals such
as Ali Al-Isawi, Vice Chair of the NTC’s executive commit-
tee, Jalal Al-Dghaili, the NTC’s defence minister, and An-
14 Chemitsky, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood on the Rise.”
15 B. Chemitsky, “Libya on Eve of General National Congress Elections – A
Political Review,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 853, 4 July 2012;
Omar Ashour, “Libya,” in Rethinking Political Islam, eds. Shadi Hamid and
William McCants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 105 – 6.
16 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 195; J. Millard Burr, “Libya – Ali Al-
Salabi and the Re-Emerging Muslim Brotherhood,” American Center
for Democracy, 13 October 2014, “Partnership in Terrorism: Muslim
Brotherhood-Qatar Role in Libya,” Egypt Today, 4 July 2017; Ashour,
“Libya,” p. 105.
war Fituri, who was in charge of transport and communi-
cation.17
In Libya’s rst parliament, the GNC, the JCP did
not hold the largest number of seats. Nevertheless, it was
able to wield considerable inuence over the legislative
process by deftly forming coalitions with independent
deputies, particularly those in the Sala-leaning Loyalty
to the Martyrs Blood bloc, which was led by the only for-
mer LIFG/LIMC deputy in the GNC, Abdul Wahhab Al-Qaid
of the Al-Umma Al-Wasat party, and Misratans who sup-
ported Sawan.18
When a rift emerged in the GNC and degener-
ated into civil war in mid-2014, the JCP joined forces with
the Sala-leaning Loyalty to the Martyrs Blood bloc and
GNC deputies, who represented localities and tribes that
had played an important role during the uprising. Togeth-
er, they formed the Libya Dawn coalition. Brigades that
backed this loose political coalition included the Libya
Shield Forces in the West, comprised largely of Misrata
brigades. In order to counter Haftar’s Libya Dignity Opera-
tion in the East, Brotherhood-allied brigades, including
the powerful 17th February Martyrs Brigade and the Raf-
falah Al-Sahati Brigade, established by LIFG/LIMC veteran
and brother of Ali Al-Sallabi, Ismail Al-Sallabi, banded to-
gether with Ansar Al-Sharia to form the umbrella armed
group the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC),
of which Wissam bin Hamid, a senior Brotherhood gure,
would become a commander.19
International
The JCP appears to have connections to other Islamist
parties, including Tunisia’s Ennahda and the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) in Turkey.20 The Muslim Brother-
hood movement in Libya also has ties to Brotherhood
branches in other countries. Historically, as mentioned, it
had especially strong links to the Egyptian Muslim Broth-
erhood. Such international linkages, particularly those to
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, have generated nega-
tive publicity for the JCP, especially during the 2012 parlia-
mentary elections. This has led the movement to down-
play its relations with other Muslim Brotherhood
movements and to claim that its ties to the Egyptian
17 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 195.
18 Mary Fitzgerald, “Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood Struggles to Grow,” Foreign
Policy, 1 May 2014; Vijay Prashad, “Libya: The Battleeld of the New Arab
Cold War,” Mada Masr, 23 February 2015; Ecaterina Cepoi and Marius La-
zar, “Democracy vs. Islam,” in Democracy and Security in the 21st Century:
Perspectives on a Changing World, ed. Valentin Naumescu (Newcastle-
upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), p. 410.
19 “Qatar, Muslim Brotherhood, Libyan AQ-Affiliated Militias,” The Qatar
Insider, 4 July 2017; Tom Stevenson, “Gulf hands in Libya,” Middle East
Eye, http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/in-depth/features/gulf-hands-lib-
ya-955435705; “Developments of the Libyan Scene between the Internal
Crisis and the External Intervention,” Middle East Observer, 2 November
2016; Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: Continuity and Change, second edi-
tion (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 95.
20 “AKP Hosts Dignitaries from All Over the World,” Hurriyet Daily News, 30
September 2012.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
9
Muslim Brotherhood are purely ideological.21 Indeed,
there is a debate going within the Libyan Muslim Brother-
hood about whether the movement should separate it-
self from the broader transnational movement.
The movement is also reported to be close to
actors in Qatar and Turkey. Former member of the Libyan
Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Al-Sallabi, is known to have
strong ties with the Qatari royal family, as well as Yousef
Al-Qaradawi, head of the Qatar-based International
Union of Muslim Scholars. Al-Sallabi is reported to have
channeled Qatari assistance to brigades in Libya during
the uprising , including the Brotherhood-allied Misrata bri-
gades and 17th February Martyrs Brigade. Turkey is also
reported to have provided support to these brigades. Qa-
tari and Turkish support for them is alleged to have con-
tinued during the civil war.22
Vectors of Inuence
National
Due to successive regime crackdowns against the move-
ment, the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to build up a
broad support base during much of the Qadda era. It,
therefore, set about doing so throughout the uprising and
early transitional period in order to boost its relevance in
Libya. In 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood established a
charitable organization called Nida Al-Khayr. The latter
organized the delivery of aid from the Gulf in coordina-
tion with a number of charitable organizations on the
ground in Libya. It became a key vector for creating a
broader support base within Libyan society. The linkages
it formed with local charities also helped to increase the
movement’s relevance in the country. The Muslim Broth-
erhood also created a number of media outlets, including
Sabil Rahid, Shabab Libya and Libya Lion in order to diffuse
its message to the general public.23
When the NTC became Libya’s transitional gov-
erning body, the movement was able to exert consider-
able inuence within it. Approximately, one fth of NTC
seats were held by Muslim Brotherhood members, with
several members holding cabinet seats under its execu-
tive committees, which functioned like cabinets, rst un-
der the leadership of Mahmoud Jibril and then under that
of Abdul Raheem Al-Keib. These individuals included
Abdullah Shamia, a former university professor at Beng-
21 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 196 – 7; Chemitsky, “Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood on the Rise.”
22 “Qatar, Muslim Brotherhood, Libyan AQ-Affiliated Militias”; Stevenson,
“Gulf hands in Libya”; Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Proxy War in Libya,” War on
the Rocks, 15 January 2015; Vijay Prashad, “Libya: The Battleeld of the
New Arab Cold War,” Mada Masr, 23 February 2015; Marc Lynch, “In Un-
charted Waters: Islamist Parties Beyond Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2016, p. 11.
23 Ashour, “Between ISIS and a Failed State,” p. 4; Karim Mezran, Fadel
Lamen and Eric Knecht, “Post-revolutionary Politics in Libya: Inside the
General National Congress,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, May 2013, p. 2;
Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 217.
hazi University, who was imprisoned under Qadda and
appointed economy minister, as well as Salim Al-Shaykhi,
who was exiled in Britain and held the post of minister of
religious affairs.24
Their representation in the NTC provided the
Muslim Brotherhood with a means of inuencing devel-
opments in ways that would help to consolidate the
movement’s traction in Libya’s emerging public institu-
tions, particularly those related to security. The Brother-
hood used its presence in the NTC to push hard for the
creation of parallel security structures through which it
could incorporate Brotherhood-linked brigades into the
country’s security institutions. Abderrezak Al-Aradi, a
leading Brotherhood and NTC member, helped to create
the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), originally con-
ceived as a parallel police force comprised of members of
brigades, whose mandate was initially restricted to Tripo-
li and then later expanded to other cities. The SSC was
nominally under the authority of the Interior Ministry,
where Brotherhood member Omar Al-Khadrawi, was
deputy interior minister. Its command structure also in-
cluded Muslim Brotherhood members, such as Fawzi
Wanis Al-Qadda, deputy head of the Benghazi SSC.25
Another parallel security structure that was set
up under the NTC was the Libya Shield, conceived as a re-
serve army. It incorporated powerful brigades, many of
which were close to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Broth-
erhood-allied Misratan brigades formed the backbone of
the Central Shield Force and commanded the Western
Libyan Shield Force. The Libya Shield Force in the East in-
corporated elements of the 17th February Martyrs Bri-
gade, the Raffalah Al-Sahati Brigade, both of which have
strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.26
During this period, the Muslim Brotherhood
also worked to increase its inuence in local councils that
had been set up to govern liberated cities during uprising.
The movement came to dominate the Tripoli Military
Council (TMC), a grouping of brigades that captured Trip-
oli from pro-Qadda forces, and the Benghazi Local Coun-
cil. It also had sizable inuence in the Misrata Local Coun-
cil.27 The creation of the Dar Al-Ifta (now closed down),
the religious authority responsible for interpreting Islamic
law, during this time also boosted the Muslim Brother-
hood’s inuence. Prominent cleric and head of this body,
24 Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 217.
25 Wolfram Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps
and Conicts in the New Libya,” SWP Research Paper, May 2013, p. 16.
26 Amanda Kadlec and Hassan Morajea, “The Dawn Divides: The Islamic
State and Libya’s Inter-Islamist War,” War on the Rocks, 11 February
2015; Joseph Walker-Cousins, “Security Sector Transformation in Arab
Transitions: Working for Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Beirut, 17 – 18 December 2012, pp. 22 – 3.
27 Sari Arraf, “A Short Guide to the Conict,” The War Report 2017, Geneva
Academy, June 2017, p. 8; “Developments of the Libyan Scene between
Internal Crisis and the External Intervention”; Mattia Toalda, “Libya and
Egypt: Analogies, Differences and Regional Factors,” Aspen Online, 4 June
2014; Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution,” p. 16.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
10
Sadiq Al-Ghariani, is also reported to have ties to the Mus-
lim Brotherhood.28
Although the JCP did not win a plurality in the
2012 parliamentary elections, it, nevertheless, held ve
cabinet positions in the GNC’s rst government under Ali
Zeidan, including those for oil, electricity, housing, econo-
my and sport, as well as the post of deputy prime minis-
ter. In January 2014, these ministers resigned from the
government in an effort to weaken Zeidan, who was an
NFA ally. After having successfully forced his departure,
the JCP eventually found a more accommodating prime
minister in Ahmed Maiteg, a Muslim Brotherhood ally,
who was appointed in May 2014.29
The party was not only able to wield inuence
in Ahmed Maiteg’s government, but was also able to
dominate the GNC as a result of the alliances it built with
independents, which proved more cohesive than those of
the non-Islamists in the GNC, giving the JCP even greater
sway in the governing body. In May 2013, the JCP and its
allies were able to push through the Political Isolation Law
that banned Qadda era officials from participating in
politics for 10 years. This legislation weakened its oppo-
nent, the nationalist-leaning National Forces Alliance
(NFA), by forcing a number of the latter’s deputies to re-
sign.30
When the GNC’s mandate ended in mid-2014
and new elections were held to elect its successor, the
House of Representatives (HoR), the JCP won even fewer
seats than in 2012. Fearing a backlash against Islamists,
the JCP and its allies, refused to cede power to the HoR
and continued to hold sessions in the GNC.31 In the con-
text of the civil war that followed, brigades that had con-
nections to the Muslim Brotherhood and JCP politicians,
sided with the GNC. These brigades including those from
Misrata that formed the bulk of the Libya Shield forces,
and Libya Shield East as part of an umbrella group called
the BRSC, which also comprised the Muslim Brotherhood-
linked 17th of February Martyrs Brigade and the Raffalah
Al-Sahati brigade. The LROR, which was created in 2013
by the GNC to perform law and order functions in Tripoli
and later in Benghazi, again close to the Brotherhood, also
joined the Libya Dawn coalition.32
28 “Islamist Movements in Libya,” pp. 9 – 10; “Libya’s National Accord Govt
Shuts Down Office of ‘Mufti of Qatar’,” Al-Arabiya English, 1 June 2017.
29 “Muslim Brotherhood Party Quits Libya’s Government,” Al-Arabiya Eng-
lish, 21 January 2014; “Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s Tenuous Hold,” IISS
Strategic Comment, Vol. 20, Comment 21, June 2014.
30 Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 218; Cameron Glenn, “Lib-
ya’s Islamists: Who They Are - And What They Want,” The Wilson Center,
8 August 2017; “Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s Tenuous Hold”; Fitzgerald,
“Finding Their Place,” p. 200.
31 Glen, “Libya’s Islamists: Who They Are”; “Mohammed Sowan,” Counter
Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/
mohamed-sowan.
32 “Libya Revolutionaries Joint Operations Room (LROR),” Terrorism, Research
& Analysis Consortium, https://w ww.trackingterrorism.org/group/libya-
revolutionaries-joint-operations-room-lror.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood has since
lost a great deal of inuence, the UN political process that
led to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) has, neverthe-
less, provided it with a means of continued inuence in
several governing bodies established under the Agree-
ment. The High State Council, which acts as an advisory
body to the GNA, comprises some JCP politicians, given
that it is made up of a pool of politicians that were elect-
ed to the GNC in 2012. The new president of the High
State Council, Khlaid Al-Mishri, is also a JCP member. HoR
politicians are, however, uneasy about Islamist inuence
in the High State Council, which has led to discussions
about its composition, which could have future implica-
tions. The Muslim Brotherhood and the JCP currently have
allies within the GNA’s Presidency Council (PC), including
Ahmed Maitig, who serves as vice president of the PC,
and Abdessalam Kajman, who is a member of the PC.
However, overcoming the current deadlock in the UN po-
litical process is likely to lead to modications to the LPA.
This is likely to lead to a reduction in the number of mem-
bers in the PC from nine to three, which, in turn, is likely to
mean that in the future there will be fewer members
within it whose agendas might overlap with the Muslim
Brotherhood.33
Although the Muslim Brotherhood does not
control any brigades as such, its inuence may also be
boosted by its connections to brigades that have clout
with the GNA. This is particularly the case with regards to
Misratan brigades that formed most of the Libya Shield
forces. While these brigades may not contain a high num-
ber of Muslim Brotherhood members, they are likely to be
sympathetic to the movement due to their alliance with it
in the Libya Dawn coalition.34 They have since fought un-
der the banner of the GNA to drive Islamic State (IS) forces
out of the city of Sirte in 2016 and are still loyal to the
GNA. While the structure of future security forces in Libya
remains to be dened, it is possible that these brigades
could be integrated into a future unied Libyan army, giv-
en their importance and as a means of incentivizing them
to disband. Should this occur, it could provide the Muslim
Brotherhood with support from within Libya’s future se-
curity structures. In Tripoli, the Muslim Brotherhood also
has traction through its ties to the TMC. In the East, its
links to the BRSC give it some inuence on the ground35,
even though the BRSC has been largely decimated.
33 “Roundtable: The Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood,” CSIS, https://www.
csis.org/events/roundtable-crisis-muslim-brotherhood; “A Quick Guide
to Libya’s Main Players,” ECFR, http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_lib-
ya_conict; Interview with Rhiannon Smith, Managing Director, Libya
Analysis, Managing Director, Eye on ISIS in Libya, 7 December 2017.
34 Interview with Smith, 7 December 2017.
35 “Developments of the Libyan Scene between Internal Crisis and the Ex-
ternal Intervention”; Moutaz Ali, “Bunyan Marsous Derides Ghwell Coup
as LROR Declares Support,” Libya Herald, 18 October 2016.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
11
International
The JCP’s international prole has beneted from positive
coverage on Al-Jazeera. Within the context of the civil
war, so too have brigades with ties to the Muslim Brother-
hood, such as the former Libya Shield forces and the LROR.
Support for the UN-backed GNA, which is backed by the
majority of the international community, has enabled it
to maintain its political relevance internationally. Its as-
sociates in the former Libya Shield forces have also gained
positive media coverage and international praise for the
role they have played in the GNA-led ght against IS.36
This could increase calls for them to be integrated into a
future Libyan army.
1.2 Post-jihadis
(LIFG/LIMC Veterans)
Background and Objectives
The LIFG has its roots in a clandestine jihadist movement
led by Emir Awatha Al-Zuwawi that was formed in the
1980s. After it was discovered by the Qadda regime in
1989, many of its members ed the country to ght
against the Soviets in Afghanistan, including key leaders,
such as Abdel Hakim Belhadj, the overall leader of the
group, and his deputy, Saami Al-Saadi. There, its militants,
including Belhadj, developed relations with their Al-Qae-
da counterparts, though the movement itself is not
thought to have been officially allied with Al-Qaeda. In-
deed, its objectives were primarily national, rather than
transnational. Some of the Libyan “Afghans”, as they be-
came known, returned to Libya and officially establishing
the LIFG in 1990. Its aim was the removal of Qadda
through violent means and the establishment of sharia
law in Libya.37
The LIFG initially operated clandestinely. How-
ever, it was discovered by the authorities in 1995, which
forced it to publically declare its existence. This had disas-
trous consequences for the group. A brutal crackdown by
the regime followed, which resulted in the LIFG waging a
three-year insurgency in eastern Libya, where the group’s
36 “Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s Tenuous Hold; Naji Abou-Khalil and
Laurence Hargreaves, “Libyan Television and Its Inuence on the Security
Sector,” USIP Special Report 364, April 2015, p.3; “Justice & Construction
Party Condemn Ghariani,” Libya Herald, 19 August 2017.
37 “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stan-
ford University, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/675#cite; David Witter, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG),” ISW Fact Sheet, 8 April 2011.
support base was strongest.38 Open conict with the re-
gime reduced the group’s domestic capacity considerably.
A number of the group’s leaders including Al-Saadi and
Belhadj ed abroad, though they were eventually extra-
dited to Libya, with the help of US and the UK. Those lead-
ers who remained in the country, were imprisoned.
In prison, LIFG leaders formed a tight-knit group.
They gradually began to rethink the group’s strategy. This
process of reection coincided with an amnesty initiative
launched by Qadda’s reformist son, Saif Qadda, facili-
tated by the former Brotherhood member and Qatar-
based Islamic scholar, Ali Al-Sallabi, who acted as interme-
diary between imprisoned LIFG leaders and the regime.
This dialogue process led members of the group’s shura
council to issue a document in 2009 in which the group
publicly renounced armed jihad against the regime. As a
result, a number of LIFG members, including Belhadj, Al-
Saadi and another of Belhadj’s deputies, Khalid Al-Sharif,
were released from prison.39
The reconciliation process helped the group to
present itself as a credible opposition force at a time
when political reform seemed possible in Libya, due to
Saif Al-Qadda’s reformist agenda. Abroad, it gave exiled
LIFG members greater room to organize. However, not all
LIFG members embraced reconciliation with the regime.
LIFG militants in the UK and Switzerland, who had by the
mid-2000s become fairly independent from the LIFG lead-
ership in Libya, continued to oppose the Qadda regime.
In 2009, they formed the Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC), which rejected reconciliation with the re-
gime.40
Although LIFG leaders in Libya distanced them-
selves from the LIMC during the reconciliation process,
this would change once the uprising began in 2011. LIFG
members based in Libya and associated with Belhadj, de-
cided to accept the non-reconciliatory stance of the LIMC
and to support the uprising against Qadda. Against the
backdrop of potentially momentous change, the LIFG re-
incarnated itself as the LIMC. The latter elected a shura
council comprised of most of the LIFG shura council mem-
bers, including Belhadj, Al-Saadi, Al-Sharif, as well as Ab-
dul Wahhab Al-Qaid, Abdel Basit Abu Hliqa and Miftah
Al-Dhuwadi. While the LIFG had been opposed to democ-
racy throughout most of its existence, the LIMC shura
council expressed support for the democratic process.
The group’s apparent moderation appeared to be in-
formed by the conviction that Islamism and democracy
were not necessarily incompatible and, moreover, that
democratic mechanisms could serve the objectives of Is-
38 Ashour, “Between ISIS and a Failed State,” p. 5.
39 Frederic Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya,” Carnegie
Papers, September 2012, p. 9; Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 179.
40 Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” pp. 204 – 6.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
12
lamists, as appeared to be demonstrated by the AKP’s ex-
perience in Turkey.41
Those LIFG/LIMC members, who fought against
forces loyal to Qadda, brought with them considerable
paramilitary experience. Indeed, some would play a sig-
nicant military role during the uprising. Belhadj became
commander of the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, which
was one of the rst brigades to form during the uprising
and played an important role in the liberation of Tripoli. In
eastern Libya, Abu Hliqa and several of his associates
formed the Umar Al-Mukhtar Battalion, comprised of de-
fectors from the Libyan army and LIFG/LIMC members.
The Umar Al-Mukhtar Battalion joined the powerful,
eastern-based 17th February Martyrs Brigade, which was
itself led by Ismail Al-Sallabi, senior gure in the LIFG/
LIMC and brother of Ali Al-Sallabi. Former LIFG member,
Abdul Hakim Al-Hasidi, formed the Derna Brigade, which
was later renamed the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade 42
However, the fall of the regime caused LIFG/
LIMC to fragment. Some LIFG/LIMC veterans retained mil-
itary roles. A number of the brigades commanded by
LIFG/LIMC members continued to play an important role
in Libya’s fractured security sector, making their com-
manders inuential gures in the country. Other more
radical former LIFG/LIMC members among the brigade
leaders, such as Al-Hasidi, joined the jihadi Sala cur-
rent.43 A number of leading LIFG/LIMC gures entered the
political arena, securing roles in NTC executive commit-
tees. Al-Sharif was appointed deputy defence minister in
two of the interim governments of the NTC. Sadiq Al-
Ghaithi Al-Ubaidi, a former LIFG prisoner, was also made a
deputy defence minister and Al-Dhuwadi became deputy
minister for the martyrs and the missing. Under the sec-
ond interim government headed by Ali Zeidan, Abu Hliqa
was made deputy interior minister.44
When the rst parliamentary elections were
held in 2012, several LIFG/LIMC veterans participated in
the electoral process. Belhadj left the TMC that year in or-
der to run as a candidate for the party that he founded,
Al-Watan, though the party failed to win any seats. Al-
Saadi founded his own party, Al-Umma Al-Wasat, which a
number of former LIFG/LIMC leaders joined, including Al-
Sharif, Al-Dhuwadl and Al-Qaid. Al-Qaid was allocated Al-
41 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 179, 182 – 3, 198 – 9.
42 Ibid., pp. 190 – 1; Nicholas A. Heras, “On the Front Lines in Eastern Libya,”
Militant Leadership Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 5, June 2016; Abigail Haus-
lohner, “With Libya’s Ascendant Islamists: ‘Don’t Get the Wrong Idea’,”
Time Magazine, 30 March 2012.
43 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 188, 202; “Abu Salim Martyrs
Brigade,” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, https://www.track-
ingterrorism.org/group/abu-slim-martyrs-brigade.
44 Walker-Cousins, “Security Sector Transformation in Arab Transitions,”
p. 23; Andrew McGregor, “Qatar’s Role in the Libyan Conict: Who’s on
the Lists of Terrorists and Why,” Aberfoyle Security, 14 July 2017; Fitzger-
ald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 197 – 8.
Umma Al-Wasat’s only seat in the GNC45, which he used
to good effect.
Alliances
National
In the GNC, Al-Qaid led the Salast-leaning Loyalty to the
Martyrs Blood bloc, which was allied in the governing
body with the JCP, and continued to be allied with it with-
in the context of the civil war as part of the Libya Dawn
coalition. Following the collapse of the Dawn coalition
and the establishment of the UN political process, Belh-
adj’s Al-Watan party now supports the GNA, along with
its allies the Muslim Brotherhood and the JCP, while Al-
Saadi’s Al-Umma Al-Wasat rejects national reconcilia-
tion.46
Against the backdrop of the civil war, brigades
comprising LIFG/LIMC veterans formed alliances with
armed groups that comprised Muslim Brotherhood and
Ansar Al-Sharia members. Following the uprising, Ismail
Al-Sallabi had formed a new group with some members
of the 17th February Martyrs Brigade, called the Raffalah
Al-Sahati Brigade. When the civil war broke out in mid-
2014, the Raffalah Al-Sahati Brigade, as mentioned in the
previous section on the Muslim Brotherhood, came to-
gether with the Muslim Brotherhood-allied 17th February
Martyrs Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia to form the umbrella
group the BRSC to counter Haftar’s LNA in the East. The
BRSC counted among its commanders several high prole
gures from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansar Al-
Sharia, including Wissam ben Hamid (now deceased), a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Ali Al-Zahawi,
Ansar Al-Sharia’s now deceased leader.47
The BRSC’s links to Ansar Al-Sharia were further
reinforced though its close ties to the Benghazi Defence
Brigades (BDB), which was formed in June 2016 to oppose
the LNA in the eastern city of Benghazi.48 Given the uid
nature of Libya’s armed groupings, a number of BDB com-
manders are also commanders within the BRSC, including
Ismail Al-Sallabi, who was a commander in the BRSC, Ah-
mad Al-Tajuri, who was a BRSC commander in West Beng-
hazi, and Faraj Shiku, commander in the BRSC’s 17th Feb-
ruary Martyrs Brigade. Through their membership of the
BDB these commanders are associates gures with ties to
45 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 200; Jamie Dettmer, “Brother of Al-Qa-
eda Commander Killed in Drone Strike a Major Candidate for Presidency
of Libya’s Parliament,” Fox News World, 1 June 2013; Kwasi Kwarteng and
Leo Docherty, “Inside Libya: Chaos in the Mediterranean,” Conservative
Middle East Council, March 2017.
46 Mohamed Eljarh, “After ISIS Defeat in Sirte Challenges Remain,” The
Atlantic Council, 11 July 2017.
47 Heras, “On the Front Lines in Eastern Libya”; “Wissam Ben Hamid Dead
Says Arrested Ansar Spokesman; 13 Militants Reported to Have Blown
Themselves Up,” Libya Herald, 6 January 2017; “The Nine Entities Added
to the Qatar-backed Terror List,” Al-Jazeera English, 25 July 2017.
48 The BDB has recently expressed a readiness to disband.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
13
Ansar Al-Sharia, including Ahmed Al-Shaltani, now de-
ceased, but once a leading gure in Ansar Al-Sharia.49
LIFG/LIMC veterans also have links to Ansar Al-
Sharia through the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade. Sufyan bin
Qumu, a former LIFG/LIMC member, who was a member
of the Brigade and an associate of Osama bin Laden in Su-
dan, is also reported to have been a leader in Ansar Al-
Sharia, for example.50
International
Several LIFG/LIMC veterans have ties to a number of
countries. Qatar, in particular, appears to have been an es-
pecially important organizational hub for the movement
during the uprising. Qatari authorities seem to have de-
veloped relations with BRSC commander Ismail Al-Sallabi.
The latter is believed to have been associated with
Ghanim Al-Kubais, head of the Qatari intelligence.51 Qatar
also fostered links to Belhadj.
In addition to ties to Qatar, Belhadj is also
thought to have signicant linkages to Turkey. In 2013, he
was reported to have reached out to the AKP to seek as-
sistance with laundering money looted during the over-
throw of Qadda and in gaining refuge in Turkey. While
there is no evidence to suggest that the AKP provided
such assistance, Belhadj does now divide his time be-
tween Libya and Turkey. He has signicant nancial and
real estate investments in Turkey, allegedly made possible
thanks to the looted money.52
As well as their links to various countries, for-
mer members of the LIFG/LIMC have also been accused of
having ties to jihadi groups in other countries, notably in
Tunisia. Belhadj was accused in 2013 of having been im-
plicated in the murder of two leftist politician in Tunisia,
which the Tunisian government claimed were carried out
by the Sala organization Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia (AST). In
addition, Belhadj was accused of having sheltered AST
leader, Abu Iyad Al-Tunisi, in Libya following the assassina-
tions. He is also alleged to have trained AST militants in
Libya. However, Belhadj has denied involvement in the
murders, as well as any connections to AST. Proof of the
49 “Saraya Defend Benghazi (BDB),” Terrorism Research and Analysis
Consortium, https://w ww.trackingterrorism.org/group/saraya-defend-
benghazi; Abdul Kadder Assad, “Benghazi Defense Brigades Explains Its
Political Vision in Black and White,” The Libyan Observer, 12 March 2017;
Nathaniel Barr and Madeleine Blackman, “A New Threat to Libya’s Stabil-
ity Emerges,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 14, Issue 16; “Benghazi Defence
Brigades Admit Deaths of Leading Members,” Libya Herald, 12 December
2016.
50 Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya,” p. 11.
51 Lamine Ghanmi, “Qatar-backed Jihadist Group in Libya Disbands” The
Arab Weekly, 2 July 2017; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab
Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 24 September 2014; “What You Need to Know
About the Five Libyans on the Terror List,” Al-Arabiya English, 9June 2017.
52 “Turkish WikiLeaks Cache Links AKP and Libya’s Al-Qaeda Chief Belhaj,”
NSNBC International, 20 July 2016; Sudarsan Raghavan, “These Libyans
Were Once Linked to Al-Qaeda. Now They Are Politicians and Business-
men,” The Washington Post, 28 September 2017; “Turkey, Qatar Accused
of Delivering Weapons to Libyan Militants, Egypt Today, 17June 2017.
exact nature of the relationship between Belhadj and AST
is ultimately lacking.53
Ties to transnational jihadi groups, such as Al-
Qaeda, also appear to exist. Abdul Basit Azuz, who fought
against the Soviets in Afghanistan, spent several decades
in the UK before relocating to the Pakistani-Afghan bor-
der area in the late 2000s, is reported to have been associ-
ated with the LIFG/LIMC inuenced Abu Salim Martyrs
Brigade. He was allegedly sent by Ayman Al-Zawahiri to
Libya in order to help Al-Qaeda gain a foothold in the
country following the death of Qadda. The BRSC, in
which Ismail Al-Sallabi was a commander, also contains
Al-Qaeda-linked individuals, such as Mohammed Ali, who
was convicted in Jordan of plotting suicide attacks in the
name of Al-Qaeda against the airport in Amman in 2007.
In addition, the BDB, of which Ismail Al-Sallabi is also a
commander, is allegedly backed by Al-Qaeda. The precise
nature of BDB’s connection to Al-Qaeda remains unclear,
though.54
While both the BRSC and BDB have apparent
links to Al-Qaeda, this does not seem to preclude cooper-
ation with ghters loyal to IS. The BRSC has fought along-
side Islamic State (IS) against the LNA in Benghazi and the
BDB has cooperated with IS militants during an operation
against the LNA in late June 2016. Indicative of such col-
laboration, senior member of the BDB, Ahmed Bakir, was
arrested by the Misrata Counter Terrorism Unit for coop-
eration with IS.55
Vectors of Inuence
National
A number of brigades formed or led by LIFG/LIMC veter-
ans have retained inuence on the ground in several ar-
eas across the country following the uprising. This in-
cludes the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, which, along
with a number of other brigades, controls much of the
capital.56 In the East, the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade main-
tains considerable inuence in Derna, engaging in smug-
gling activities. It was also reported to have trained
would-be foreign ghters for the Syrian conict.57
Belhadj remains a prominent political gure
and still wields inuence in Tripoli as a result of his former
connections to the TMC. Although he now presents him-
53 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kathleen Soucy, “Abdelhakim Belhadj and
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
8October 2013.
54 “The Nine Entities Added to the Qatar-backed Terror List”; Wehrey, “The
Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya,” p. 10; Barr and Blackman, “A New
Threat to Libya’s Stability Emerges.”
55 “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players”; “Other Jihadi Actors,” Eye on ISIS
in Libya, 5 September 2017; “Saraya Defend Benghazi (BDB).”
56 Dettmer, “Brother of Al Qaeda Commander Killed.”
57 “Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade”; Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security in Eastern
Libya,” pp. 10 – 11; Christopher S. Chivis and Jeffery Martini, Libya after
Qadda: Lessons and Implications for the Future (RAND Corporation,
2014), p.18.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
14
self as a business man – his political career not having
been very successful – many Libyans say that he is inu-
ential behind the scenes, pulling the strings with LIFG/
LIMC veterans. He is also well-respected by the Muslim
Brotherhood, as well as in other Islamist circles.58
The civil war has also enabled Ismail Al-Sallabi
to increase his inuence in the East as one of the most
powerful commanders in the BRSC and the BDB. While
the BRSC and its constituent parts have been decimated
in clashes with the LNA, there is no doubt that ghters in
the East continue to support the brigades that make up
the BRSC. Ali Al-Sallabi is also an associate of GNA De-
fence Minister Colonel Mahdi Al-Barghathi. In theory, he
would be well-positioned to play a role in any future Liby-
an army. However, his links to jihadi actors and the de-
cline of both the BRSC could work against this.59
The proles of former LIFG/LIMC members, no-
tably Ismail Al-Sallabi and Belhadj, have also been boost-
ed through control of various media outlets. The BRSC has
several media outlets of its own, including Al-Saraya Me-
dia Centre, which it uses to publicize its activities and also
to diffuse its agenda, and Bushra Media Establishment, a
pro-BRSC online media group, which also became that of
the BDB. Belhadj, in turn, has his own TV channel, Nada
TV, which has been used to promote the operations of the
BRSC and the BDB. It also re-diffuses reports featured by
the Al-Saraya Media Centre.60
International
The successes of LIFG/LIMC militants during the uprising
were not only attributed to the movement’s ability to
adapt its message and image to the changed national
context, but also to the movement’s relations with Qatar.
The military roles of LIFG/LIMC veterans, which translated
into political inuence for some, was aided by arms sup-
plies and other forms of support from Qatar.61 As com-
mander of the 17th February Martyrs Brigade, Ismail Al-
Sallabi is believed to have received aid and arms from
Qatar, channeled, as noted earlier, through Al-Sallabi’s
brother, Ali, who was at that time of the uprising based in
Doha. When Ismail Al-Sallabi formed the Raffalah Al-Sa-
hati Brigade, this support is thought to have continued in
the form of funding and arms.62 Tripoli Revolutionaries
Brigade, when led by Belhadj, received infantry training
from Qatari Special Operations Forces in the Nafusa
58 Interview with Smith, 7 December 2017.
59 Raghavan, “These Libyans Were Once Linked to Al-Qaeda.”
60 “The Nine Entities Added to the Qatar-backed Terror List”; Barr and Black-
man, “A New Threat to Libya’s Stability Emerges.”
61 Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 226; Alastair MacDonald,
“Analysis: As Libyans Wrangle, Qatar in Wings,” Reuters, 8 November
2011.
62 Lamine Ghanmi, “Qatar-backed Jihadist Group in Libya Disbands” The
Arab Weekly, 2 July 2017; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab
Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 24 September 2014; “What You Need to Know
About the Five Libyans on the Terror List,” Al-Arabiya English, 9 June 2017.
Mountain area, where it was based during the uprising.
Qatari Special Operations Forces were even reported to
have been on the ground during the Tripoli Revolutionar-
ies Brigade’s assault on Qaddaf’s fortress, the Bab al-Azi-
zya Compound. Qatar’s support for Belhadj also appears
to have continued beyond the uprising. The TMC, which
Belhadj led following the death of Qadda, is also report-
ed to have received funds from Qatar. Following Belhadj’s
resignation from the TMC, Qatari support for him could
have continued. His Al-Watan party is notably rumoured
to receive Qatari nancial support.63 However, his per-
ceived links to Qatar may be a liability for any future po-
litical ambitions he may have.
1.3 Sala Parties
(Al-Watan and Al-
Umma Al-Wasat)
Background and Objectives
As indicated, those LIFG/LIMC veterans, who entered the
political arena following the fall of the Qadda regime,
fractured into two main political parties, one more mod-
erate than the other. Former LIFG/LIMC leader, Belhadj, as
mentioned, resigned from the TMC in order to run in the
parliamentary elections in 2012 as a candidate for the
party that he had formed, Al-Watan. The latter is com-
prised of a wide range of gures, some of which are not
Islamist. Among its members are business people, mem-
bers of the Muslim Brotherhood and more liberal-leaning
Libyans, who had been implicated in civil society activi-
ties during the course of the uprising.64 Reective of its
diverse composition, Al-Watan presents itself as a broad-
based political party with an Islamic reference. As such, it
claims to accept the civic nature of the state65 and does
not seek to make sharia law the basis of legislation.
The other, more ideologically conservative, par-
ty to emerge in 2012 was Al-Umma Al-Wasat. The latter
was founded by Al-Saadi, one of Belhadj’s deputies and
former head of the LIFG’s religious committee. A signi-
cant number of LIFG/LIMC veterans followed Al-Saadi and
63 Mary Fitzgerald, “The Syrian Rebels’ Libyan Weapon,” Foreign Policy, 9
August 2012; Ian Black, “Qatar Admits Sending Hundreds of Troops to
Support Libya Rebels,” The Guardian, 26 October 2011; Stevenson, “Gulf
Hands in Libya”; Jonathan Schanzer, “Qatar’s Suppor t of The Worst of the
Worst In Libya Must End,” Newsweek, 4 June 2017; “Qatar’s Role in the
Libyan Conict: Who’s on the Lists of Terrorists and Why,” Jamestown
Foundation, 14 July 2017.
64 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 200.
65 Frederic Wehrey, “The Brave New World of Libya’s Elections,” Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 26 June 2012.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
15
joined his party, resulting in the party being dubbed the
“LIFG political wing” in local media. Among them were Al-
Sharif, another of Belhadj’s deputies, Al-Qaid, senior
member of the LIFG and brother of the high-level Al-Qae-
da militant Abu Yahya Alibi, and Al-Dhuwadi. In line with
its more conservative agenda, Al-Umma Al-Wasat seeks
to establish sharia law in Libya. Consequently, it does not
accept the idea of a civic state.66
Alliances
National
On the national stage, Al-Watan has links to several prom-
inent actors, including former Muslim Brotherhood mem-
ber and leader of the Hisb Al-Watan (formerly the Nation-
al Gathering and not to be confused with Belhadj’s
Al-Watan party), Ali Al-Sallabi. Belhadj and Ali Al-Sallabi
formed particularly close ties when the latter assisted in
securing the release of Belhadj and other LIFG members
from prison in the mid-2000s. During the uprising, this re-
lationship would prove crucial to Belhadj’s military role,
especially during the capture of Tripoli by rebel forces.
Other key gures in the party are also known to have links
to Ali Al-Sallabi, including Ismail Gritli, an Al-Jazeera jour-
nalist, who returned to Libya from the UK in 2002 and co-
authored a book with him.67 Al-Watan’s composition and
ideological orientation has also led the party to nd com-
mon cause with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose mem-
bers are present in Al-Watan and with which the latter
allied during the Libyan civil war as part of the Libya Dawn
coalition. As part of this coalition, Al-Watan could rely on
the support of the Muslim Brotherhood-tied Libya Shield
forces, which include the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade,
which Behadj once commanded.68
Not surprisingly, Al-Umma Al-Wasat has ties
with more conservative gures in Libya’s political and re-
ligious spheres. As a member of the GNC, Al-Qaid was af-
forded ample opportunity to forge ties with other conser-
vative members within the body, especially independent
Sala-leaning GNC deputies within his Loyalty to the
Martyrs Blood bloc. This parliamentary bloc was itself al-
lied with the JCP.69 The party’s leader, Al-Saadi, is also al-
66 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 200; Wehrey, “The Struggle for
Security in Eastern Libya,” p. 10; Wehrey, “The Brave New World of Libya’s
Elections”; Omar Ashour, “Libya’s Defeated Islamists,” The Straits Times,
19 July 2012.
67 Karim Mezran and Eric Knecht, “Actors and Factors in Libya’s Revolution,”
in Political and Constitutional Transitions in North Africa: Actors and
Factors, eds. Justin O. Frosini and Francesco Biogi (London & New York:
Routledge, 2015), p. 89; “Documents Provided to the Select Committee
on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi,” US
Government Printing Office, 2012, p. 1418.
68 “Is the Balance Changing in Libya?” Orsam Foreign Policy Analyses, 31July
2015.
69 Karim Mezran and Alice Alunni, “Libya: Negotiations for Transition,” in
Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat, ed. I William
Zartman (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2015),
p. 278.
legedly connected to Sadiq Al-Ghariani, an inuential
cleric within Libya’s religious sphere, who was appointed
Libya’s rst director of Dar Al-Ifta and is reported to have
links to the Muslim Brotherhood70
International
Al-Watan is reported to maintain close relations with Qa-
tar and is even alleged to be nanced by Qatar.71 Al-Saadi
and his Al-Umma Al-Wasat party may also have had simi-
lar links. Al-Saadi’s name appears on a terror list issued by
the HoR following the publication of the Arab states’ ter-
ror black list of Qatari or Qatari-allied individuals, which is
suggestive of potential links to Qatar.72
Vectors of Inuence
National
During the 2012 parliamentary elections, which allowed
political parties to run in conjunction with independent
candidates, both Al-Watan and Al-Umma Al-Wasat faired
extremely badly. Al-Watan suffered a stunning defeat. It
failed to win any seats in the GNC, even Belhadj, who was
a high prole gure, failed to win a seat in his constitu-
ency of Tripoli’s 13th district. The poor performance of
the party may have been due to Belhadj’s connections to
Ali Al-Sallabi, and the perception that the party was under
the inuence of Qatar.73 Al-Umma Al-Wasat did slightly
better, winning one seat, which was allocated to Al-Qaid,
who used his position well. During his time in the GNC,
Al-Qaid was leader of the Sala-oriented Loyalty to the
Martyrs Blood bloc. This bloc was able, in alliance with
the JCP, to wield considerable inuence in the GNC. In ad-
dition, Al-Qaid was head of the GNC’s National Security
Committee.74
International
During the 2012 elections, Belhadj and his Al-Watan party
received a great deal of attention in the international
press. El-Watan’s support for the UN-led political process,
in which it has participated, has also led to a more posi-
70 McGregor, “Qatar’s Role in the Libyan Conict”; “Documents Provided to
the Select Committee,” p. 1420; Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution,”
p.15.
71 Schanzer, “Qatar’s Support of The Worst”; “Qatar’s Role in the Libyan Con-
ict: Who’s on the Lists of Terrorists and Why,” Jamestown Foundation,
14 July 2017.
72 Interview with Smith, 7 December 2017.
73 Benotman, Pack and Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 216; “It’s Political Party Time
in Libya: The Key Players,” France 24, 2 July 2012.
74 “Jihadism’s Foothold in Libya,” The Washington Institute, 12 September
2012; Dettmer, “Brother of Al Qaeda Commander Killed.”
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
16
tive international image than that of Al-Umma Al-Wasat,
which has been a staunch opponent of reconciliation.75
1.4 “Quiestist” Salas
(Madkhalis)
Background and Objectives
The quietist Sala strain in Libya is largely composed of
followers of the Saudi sheikh Rabi bin Hadi Al-Madkhali.
The latter shuns participation in parliamentary democra-
cy, as well as armed resistance, in favour of strict loyalty
to rulers and observance of Islamic practice. In the 1990s,
the Saudi government promoted Al-Madkhali’s teachings
in the Kingdom as a means of discrediting the domestic
Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Sahwa movement, and ji-
hadi Salasm. While his inuence has declined domesti-
cally over the years, with the religious establishment dis-
tancing itself from him, he is likely still viewed by the
Saudi government as useful thanks to his unquestioning
support for the established rule in Saudi Arabia. His posi-
tion within a government-funded Islamic university in
Medina is indicative of this.76 Al-Madkhali has also devel-
oped a following abroad, including in Libya. Advocates of
Madkhalism were invited to Libya by Qadda in the 1990s
to counter the inuence of the Muslim Brotherhood and
the LIFG. Over the years, the movement has gained trac-
tion in the country.77 Support for Madkhalis in Libya was
channeled through Qadda’s son, Saadi Qadda, who
was the point man between Madkhalis and the regime.78
Not only did Madkhalism take root during Qadda years;
its adherents managed to inltrate the security services.79
When the uprising began in 2011, Al-Madkhali
urged his followers not to join the rebels and to stay at
home, declaring that participation in the uprising would
cause tnah (chaos). As a result, many of his followers did
not side with the rebels, although some did participate in
the uprising in Tripoli, which began on 20 August 2011.
75 “It’s Political Party Time in Libya: The Key Players”; “Libya’s Abdulhakim
Belhadj: ‘We Are Working to Find a Solution to End This Crisis’,” Euronews,
14 February 2015; Andrew Engel, “Libya’s civil War: Rebuilding the
Country from the Ground Up,” The Washington Institute Near East Policy
Research Notes, No. 25, April 2015, p. 5
76 Jamie Dettmer, “Ultraconservative Salasts Destroy Su Landmarks in
Libya,” Daily Beast, 9 April 2012.
77 Ahmed Salah Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game Work-
ing with Madkhali Salasts,” Atlantic Council, 3 November 2017; Andrew
McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis: A Prole of Salast
Shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali,” Aberfoyle Security, 19 January 2017.
78 Wolfram Lacher, “La fragmentation de la Libye se produit autour de la
répartition des ressources,” Le Monde, 22 May 2017.
79 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis”.
After Qadda, Madkhalis formed “anti-vice” squads
aimed at enforcing Madkhali moral precepts. They also
destroyed Su shrines and mosques, due to their opposi-
tion to Susm’s veneration of saints and the dominant
Maliki School of jurisprudence. Within the context of the
civil war, Madkhalis joined opposite sides in the conict,
with some aligning with the Libya Dawn coalition and
others joining the Libya Dignity coalition.80 Their subse-
quent alliances with the UN-backed GNA and Haftar’s
LNA has increased their inuence in the country.
Alliances
National
Several armed groups that are inuenced by Madkhalism
are allied with the GNA. The powerful RADA Special De-
terrence Force, led by Abdel Raouf Kara, a key Madkhali
gure in Tripoli and based in the capital, is the most prom-
inent of the western-based Madkhali brigades. RADA be-
gan life as one of the anti-vice squads set up following the
uprising. It falls under the authority of the Ministry of the
Interior and operates out of a base at Tripoli’s Mitiga air-
port, where it runs its own prison. The force is thought to
count approximately 1,500 in its ranks, amongst which
are former army officers opposed to General Haftar. RADA
not only opposed Haftar and the LNA, but also the cleric
Sadiq Al-Ghariani, who backs the National Salvation Gov-
ernment in Tripoli and is reported to have ties to the Mus-
lim Brotherhood.81 A RADA sub-unit, the Crime Fighting
Apparatus (CFA), which is also based in Tripoli and has ties
to Madkhalis, was believed to be responsible for the 2016
kidnapping of Sheikh Nadir Al-Omrani, a member of Al-
Ghariani’s now closed Dar Al-Ifta and critic of Al-Madkha-
li’s fatwas.82
Another Madkhali-leaning and Tripoli-based bri-
gade is the Abu Salim Central Security Force, led by Abdul
Ghani Al-Kikli. It controls a detention centre in the Abu
Salim neighbourhood of Tripoli. Like RADA, it is loyal to
the GNA. It is also allied to another powerful Tripoli Bri-
gade, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, once led by Bel-
hadj and now commanded by Haitham Al-Tajuri, which
also backs the GNA and recently expelled El-Ghwell’s Na-
80 Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game”; Frederic Wehrey,
“Quiet No More?” Carnegie Middle East Center, 13 October 2016; Mc-
Gregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis”; Fitzgerald, “Finding Their
Place,” p. 187.
81 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis”; Wehrey, “Quiet No
More?”; “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players”; Emily Estelle, “A Strategy
for Success in Libya,” American Enterprise Institute, November 2017,
footnote 90, p. 59; McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis.”
82 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis”.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
17
tional Salvation Government from its headquarters at the
Rixos hotel in Tripoli.83
The 604th Infantry Battalion is another Mad-
khali inuenced armed group allied with the GNA. It was
formed following the murder of a Sala cleric, Khaled bin
Rajab Al-Firjani, who was killed by IS militants for con-
demning the group. Al-Firjani’s brother ed to Tripoli and
established the group, with the support (including the
provision of arms) of RADA. The group is estimated to
comprise some 450 ghters (as of the end of 2015) made
up largely of Misratans, although it also includes ghters
from other parts of the country, such as Sirte, Bani Walid,
Tripoli, Zintan and Sabah. The 604th Infantry Battalion
participated in Operation Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous, the an-
ti-IS operation launched in 2016 against IS in Sirte by bri-
gades loyal to the GNA. Despite the group’s cooperation
with the GNA, its leader does have ties to Haftar, who
hails from the same Firjan tribe84, raising questions about
the group’s long-term loyalties.
Following a 2016 fatwa calling on Madkhalis to
join Haftar’s campaign against the BDB, due to its per-
ceived closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi
Salas, some Madkhalis have allied themselves with Haf-
tar and the LNA. Many of the Madkhalis who have backed
Haftar militarily, as a result of their anti-Muslim Brother-
hood and anti-jihadi Sala stance, are former members of
the Salast Tawhid Brigade, initially led by the now de-
ceased Izz Al-Din Al-Tarhuni. Following the latter’s death
in early 2015, the Brigade disintegrated. Its members have
since joined several units of the Haftar’s LNA, including
the 302 Special Forces Battalion, the Marine Special Forc-
es and the 210 Mechanized Infantry Battalion.85 Another,
less prominent Madkhali leaning armed group that is al-
lied with the LNA is the Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade.86
International
Saudi support for Madkhalis has been reported. The abil-
ity of the Madkhali brigades to increase their manpower
by offering attractive salaries and to build up signicant
military capacity is alleged to be at least partly due to
funding from Saudi sources. However, this remains specu-
lative. Saudi government support may take other forms,
though, such as support for Madkhali preachers. Saudi
Arabia has sent Madkhali clerics to eastern Libya, with the
83 UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 4 March 2016 from the Panel of Ex-
perts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed
to the President of the Security Council,” 9 March 2016, p. 20; Valerie
Stocker, “How Armed Groups Are Plundering Libya’s Banks,” Middle East
Eye, 10 April 2017.
84 Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game”; Wehrey, “Quiet No
More?”; UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 1 June 2017 from the Panel
of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council,” 1 July 2017, p. 13.
85 “HoR approves Salamé’s Action Plan,” Libya Herald, 21 November 2017;
McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis.”
86 “Video Circulates of Purported LNA Execution of IS Member,” Libya Her-
ald, 25 February 2017.
approval of General Haftar, for example.87 Madkhali cler-
ics operating in the East include Salem Al-Wissari, Hamed
ben Issa, Abdel Al-Qwarsha, Faraj Al-Maliki, Al-Mabrouk
Al-Qadi, Massoud Al-Nadhuri and Ezzedine Mouham-
mad.88 Moreover, following the abduction of Al-Omrani,
Al-Ghariani claimed that Madkhalis had been directed by
their counterparts in Gulf States to murder Libyan clerics.
However, the abduction was reported to have been car-
ried out on the orders of the Egyptian Madkhali Moham-
med Said Raslan89, suggesting that Egyptian Madkhali
networks may also have inuence with their counterparts
in Libya.
Vectors of Inuence
National
Madkhalis appear to be using their alliance with Haftar to
increase their inuence in the East, where they are report-
ed to be gaining support in some sections of society.
Madkhalis not only control many mosques in the East, but
are also reported to control the General Authority of Aw-
faq and Islamic Affairs, the religious authority set up of
the Bayda government. Indeed, locals have expressed
concern that a state institution is propagating an extrem-
ist ideology.90 Integration of Madkhalis into LNA units
may also be serving to extend Madkhali inuence in east-
ern Libya, which could have implications for a future Liby-
an army, should LNA units that comprise Madkhalis be
integrated into any such unied structure.91
In the West, Madkhalis have signicant traction
on the ground in Tripoli, particularly through RADA, as
well as other brigades led by Madkhalis, including the Abu
Salim Central Security Force. Together with the Tripoli
Revolutionaries Brigade, the Madkhali brigades largely
control much of Tripoli.92 The Abu Salim Central Security
Force’s inuence with the GNA may have been further
boosted in March 2017, when it ejected the National Sal-
vation Government from its headquarters at the Rixos
hotel in Tripoli.93 Indeed, the GNA depends on support
from these brigades in the capital. In Misrata, where the
87 Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli, “Libyan Crisis: International Actors
at Play,” in Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis, eds. Karim Mezran and Arturo
Varvelli (Atlantic Council; ISPI, 2017), p. 53.
88 UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 1 June 2017,” p. 95.
89 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis”; “Grand Mufti Accuses
Madkhali Followers of Being Foreign Agents and Planning to Kill Libyan
Clerics,” Libya Herald, 23 November 2016.
90 Jamie Prentis, “East Libyans Protest Against Order Curtailing Travel
Abroad,” Middle East Eye, 26 February 2017; Ahmed Salah Ali, “Haftar
and Salasm: A Dangerous Game,” Atlantic Council, 6 June 2017; Ab-
dulkader Assad, “Haftar Makes Way for Saudi Extremist Clerics to Preach
in Eastern Libya,” The Libyan Observer, 14 January 2017.
91 Estelle, “A Strategy for Success in Libya,” p. 44
92 Stocker, “How Armed Groups Are Plundering Libya’s Banks.”
93 Ahmed Alumami, “Tripoli Armed Factions Take over Rival’s Compound in
Heavy Fighting,” Reuters, 15 March 2017.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
18
604th Infantry Batallion is based, Madkhalis are also said
to exert inuence over the Misrata Muncipal Council.94
Were Madkhalis to come together to form a
bloc, they could wield more inuence. However, the fact
that not all of them followed Al-Madkhali’s fatwa to unite
with Haftar’s LNA, as well as their presence on opposing
sides of the civil war, suggests that their local allegiances
predominate for the time being. Although they are not a
united force, their alliances with Haftar and the GNA may
serve to strengthen an ultra-conservative Sala strain
within Libyan security structures and within the religious
and societal spheres in Libya. Madkhalis also have the ad-
vantage of being able to present themselves as security
providers, as well as uncorrupt, which could be appealing
to a population in dire need of security and good gover-
nance. Their growth is potentially concerning, since Mad-
khalis are against mainstream Islamists, who are likely to
continue to have an important role in Libyan politics.
Madkhalis unquestioning support for rulers could also
have implications for stability in Libya over the long run,95
should undemocratic forces become pre-eminent in the
country and seek to gain religious legitimacy by aligning
themselves with Madkhalis.
International
Madkhali support for the GNA in Tripoli and their partici-
pation in the ght against IS does help to boost interna-
tional acceptance of Madkhali brigades. In the East, Mad-
khali suppor t for Haftar’s LNA raises Libyan Madkhalis
signicance in Saudi Arabia as a potential channel of in-
uence in North Africa.
1.5 The Importance of
Libya’s Islamists
Political support for the uprising, as well as the role of Is-
lamist-linked revolutionary brigades, helped to grant the
Muslim Brotherhood inuence in post-Qadda gover-
nance and parallel security institutions. Although its po-
litical weight has waned since 2014, the UN political pro-
cess and the institutions created under the UN-brokered
LPA have provided vectors of continued inuence for the
movement. This inuence is likely to diminish further, if
modications to the LPA are implemented. Brotherhood-
associated brigades that are loyal to the GNA, especially
those in the former Libya Shield forces, also serve to give
the Muslim Brotherhood inuence. Should they become
94 Emadeddin Zahri Muntasser, “Libya’s New Menace: Madkhalism,” Inter-
national Policy Digest, 3 February 2017.
95 Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game.”
incorporated into future police and army structures, this
would give the movement associates within these struc-
tures, who are sympathetic to its agenda.
LIFG/LIMC veterans never reached the same de-
gree of political relevance as the Muslim Brotherhood,
though a few did gain political relevance following the
uprising, largely due to aligning with the Muslim Brother-
hood. However, the importance of some former LIFG/
LIMC members has been boosted by the signicance of
powerful brigades commanded by LIFG/LIMC veterans,
particularly in Tripoli and eastern Libya. These brigades
have lost some of their weight recently, though. Whether
the prominence of LIFG/LIMC veteran commanders will
translate into inuence within future security structures
is likely to depend on how their links to jihadi Sala actors
are perceived.
While Madkhalis, for the most part, did not play
a signicant role in the uprising, they have taken sides in
the civil war. As such, they have succeeded in making
themselves relevant to both the GNA and Haftar’s LNA.
This could translate into a future presence within police
and army structures. As a result of the political fragmen-
tation of Libya and Haftar’s tolerance of Madkhalism, the
latter is also gaining a rmer foothold in the religious
sphere in the East, giving its adherents channels through
which to continue to increase their following in this party
of the country.
In sum, then, the political inuence of Islamists,
particularly that of Muslim Brotherhood, has declined
since 2014. However, the UN political process has provid-
ed a channel through which they may remain politically
relevant, albeit to a much reduced degree. Moreover, the
importance of brigades associated with Islamist actors
has provided them with vectors of inuence in the West
and the East, which could translate into inuence in Lib-
ya’s future security structures. Should such brigades be-
come integrated into a unied army structure, their op-
posing agendas could affect unity within it. The growth of
Madkhalism in the East could also pose challenges to a
revived democratic transition in Libya, if undemocratic
forces are predominant at any time. It could also reinforce
ultra-conservativism in this already more conservative
part of the country.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
19
2 Islamism in
Tunisia
After the uprising that removed Ben Ali from power and
enabled a democratic transition to begin in Tunisia, a
number of Islamist actors entered the political arena, in-
cluding the mainstream Islamist party Ennahda and more
conservative Sala parties, such as Jabhat Al-Islah and
Hisb Ut-tahrir. At the same time, the quietist Sala cur-
rent within society grew, represented above all by Ansar
Al-Sahria Tunisia in the early phase of its evolution, al-
though the latter later became a jihadi organization.
2.1 Mainstream Islamists
(Ennahda)
Background and Objectives
Ennahda has its roots in the Jamaa Al-Islamiyya, which
began as a student movement in the 1970s with the aim
of bringing Islamist thought linked to the Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt to Tunisia. It sought to do so through
preaching at university campuses and in mosques. In a
similar way to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it re-
cruited at the grassroots level and nanced the move-
ment through membership payments. The group was
banned in 1973, though it continued to operate clandes-
tinely.96
A split within the movement between those
members wedded to the intellectual heritage of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in Egypt and those, like Rachid Ghannou-
chi (later the leader of Ennahda), who believed it was not
compatible with the Islamic traditions of Tunisia, emerged.
This led the latter faction to form the Mouvement de la
tendance islamique (MTI) in 1979. The MTI was commit-
ted not only to social activism, but also political action
aimed at challenging the secularization of Tunisia under
former president, Habib Boughuiba. Although its creation
was an expression of the desire to develop a type of Is-
lamism that would have traction within Tunisia, the MTI is
believed to have maintained links with the Muslim Broth-
erhood in Egypt. The precise nature of their relationship
96 Alaya Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and
Participation: 1980 – 2008,” The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 14,
No. 2 (2009), pp. 258, 260; Anne Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia: The History
of Ennahda (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), p. 37; Azzam Tamimi,
“Rashid Al-Ghannushi,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics,
eds. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shanin (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), p. 214.
was unclear, though. Some analysts believe that MTI was
initially formally associated with the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, though intellectually independent. At the
very least, individual members of MTI are thought to have
sworn allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood.97
The MTI announced its existence in 1981 and
applied for a license to operate as a political party within
the context of a political opening initiated by Bourghuiba
prior to parliamentary elections that year. MTI’s political
programme included a call for the revival of Tunisia’s Is-
lamic heritage and a commitment to the democratic pro-
cess. However, MTI was not granted a license to operate
as a political party and the public announcement of its
existence led the government to ban the movement. The
ensuing crackdown against the movement saw Ghannou-
chi imprisoned until he was released in 1984 under a gen-
eral amnesty granted to MTI militants. Following the gen-
eral amnesty, the movement was able to function
somewhat openly until attacks in Sousse and Monastir in
1987, for which MTI was blamed, led to another period of
repression against the movement and Ghannouchi’s im-
prisonment and death sentence.98
In 1988, the incoming president, Zine El-Aba-
dine Ben Ali, released Ghannouchi and other MTI mem-
bers. As Ben Ali moved to establish a multiparty system,
Ghannouchi changed the movement’s name to the En-
nahda (Renaissance) Mouvement in order to remove the
reference to Islam in its name and make it eligible to apply
for a license as a political party. While Ennahda was not
granted a license to operate as a party, members of the
movement did run as independents in the 1989 parlia-
mentary elections. Although they won 14.5 per cent of
the vote, none were allowed to take up seats in parlia-
ment and the election results prompted another crack-
down against the movement, this time leading to Ghan-
nouchi’s exile and the movement’s disappearance from
the public arena in Tunisia. Some of its underground
structures did remain, though. During his exile, Ghannou-
chi’s became convinced that an Islamic form of democra-
cy could be advanced through participation in the demo-
cratic process.99
When the removal of Ben Ali in 2011 enabled
Ennahda’s legalization as a political party, the need for so-
cietal acceptance and inclusion within the political sys-
tem, particularly against the backdrop of the political cri-
sis in 2013/14 and the ouster of Morsi in Egypt, led to a
radical reorientation of Ennahda. Ennahda no longer
seeks to establish sharia law, which means that it accepts
the civic nature of the Tunisian state and, moreover, can
embrace human rights without those rights being cir-
97 Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia, pp. 42, 46, 50.
98 Ibid., pp. 55, 57, 61 – 2.
99 Tamimi, “Rashid Al-Ghannushi,” pp. 217 – 8; Wolf, Political Islam in Tuni-
sia, pp. 71, 107.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
20
cumscribed by Islamic law.100 In 2016, to further reduce
the perception that Ennahda was too close to the jihadi
Sala current in Tunisia, another important milestone
was reached towards becoming a civic party. Ennahda
sought to distance itself from political Islam by redening
itself as a national democratic party based on Islamic val-
ues, justied by the separation of its political and reli-
gious activities.101
Alliances
National
Ennahada has entered into formal political alliances with
non-Islamist parties. Following the 2011 parliamentary
elections, Ennahda entered into an alliance with two non-
Islamist parties that had not campaigned on a strong an-
ti-Islamist ticket, notably the social democratic Ettakatol
and the centre-left Congress for the Republic (CPR). How-
ever, their alliance with Ennhada caused serious ruptures
within them. During the course of the so-called troika
government, almost 50 per cent of Ettakatol and CPR’s
parliamentarians resigned from their parties to protest
the alliance with Ennahda.102
Whilst leading the troika government, Ennahda
also maintained close ties to Sala parties, especially with
Jabhat Al-Islah, which it considered an ally. Relations with
Sala actors at this time also extended to AST, whose
leaders had spent time in prison with those of Ennahda.
In the early phase of the transition, Ghannouchi met with
AST leader, Abu Iyad Al-Tunisi, and provided advice on
how AST could increase its inuence in Tunisia.103
However, Ennahda’s links with AST during its
leadership of the troika government led to repeated ac-
cusations of it being too lenient with Salas, particularly
members of AST. Its tolerant stance towards AST was ap-
parently due to a desire not to push them further into the
fringes or to lose their potential political support, as well
as a result of Ennahda’s own partially conservative sup-
port base. However, distance between Ennahda and AST
would grow when ties to the latter became a liability, par-
ticularly after AST was allegedly implicated in the 2012
attack on the US Embassy in Tunis. The rupture between
Ennahda and AST would become even more serious fol-
100 Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion?
The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conserva-
tive Party,” Democratization, Vol. 20, No. 5 (2013), pp.861 – 2.
101 Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia, pp. 160 – 2; Larbi Sadiki, “Tunisian En-
nahda’s ‘Second Founding’,” Afro-Middle East Centre, 3 July 2016; Sayida
Ounissi, “Ennahda from Within: Islamists or ‘Muslim Democrats’,” Brook-
ings Rethinking Political Islam Series, February 2016, p. 8.
102 Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia, p. 135.
103 Anne Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’? Religion and Politics in Post-
revolutionary Tunisia,” The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 18,
No. 4 (2013), p. 567; “Rached Ghannouchi,” Counter Extremism Project,
https://w ww.counterextremism.com/extremists/rached-ghannouchi;
Bill Roggio, “‘Moderate’ Islamist Leader in Tunisia Strategizes with Al
Qaeda-linked Salasts,” FDD’s Long War Journal, 16 October 2012.
lowing the assassination of two leftist politicians in 2013
for which AST was deemed responsible.104 At the same
time, Ennahda’s political survival increasingly depended
on acceptance by non-Islamist political parties and soci-
ety at large as opposition forces called for the troika gov-
ernment to step down for allegedly having failed to do
enough to curb the growth of Sala violence in the coun-
try.
Ennahda was forced to cede power in early 2014
and to enter into a dialogue process with opposition par-
ties. The elections that followed that same year, saw Ni-
daa Tounes, a broad-based non-Islamist party, form a co-
alition government that included the populist Free
Patriotic Union and the liberal Afek Tounis, as well as En-
nahda. Inclusion of the latter was not initially sought,
though it proved necessary in order for Nidaa Tounes to
secure a parliamentary majority. Ennahda seems to have
understood that compromise with Nidaa Tounes was es-
sential for its long-term survival. Even though Ennahda is
now the largest party in parliament, due to the resigna-
tions of Nidaa Tounes parliamentarians in 2016, Ennahda
would not be able to form a governing majority without
Nidaa Tounes in the event of a vote of no condence for
the Nidaa Tounes government. Both parties, therefore,
need each other for the time being105, suggesting that En-
nahda will continue to work with Nidaa Tounes.
International
Ennahda maintains ties with a number of other Islamist
parties abroad. Relations with Morocco’s Justice and De-
velopment Party (JDP) appear to be particularly close.
Both parties have shared their experiences with one an-
other. The PJD was recently a source of inspiration for En-
nahda with regards to the separation of the party from
the religious movement. Ennahda seems to have studied
what the PJD did before it announced a similar separation
between political and religious activities in 2016.106
As mentioned, Ennahda has also been close to
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Though there is no evi-
dence of formal ties between them, Ennahda did view the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as an ally until it became a
liability for Ennahda following the 2013 ouster of the
Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, which coincided
with the political crisis in Tunisia.
Links between Ennahda and the AKP in Turkey
have also been strong, although not all of Ennahda’s lead-
ership have viewed AKP as a model for the party, due to
104 Camille Tawil, “Ennahda Reconsiders Ties with Tunisian Salast Groups,”
Al-Monitor, 30 May 2013; “’Political Islam’ and the Muslim Brotherhood
Review,” Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, November
2016; Anne Wolf, “New Tunisian Salast Party: A Threat to Democratic
Transition?” Open Democracy, 14August 2012.
105 Wolf, “An Islamist Renaissance”; Zeinab Marzouk, “Thirty-one Deputies
Resign as Nidaa Tounes Loses Majority,” Tunisialive, 9 November 2015.
106 Mohammed Masbah, “North Africa’s Islamist Parties Provide Important
Lessons in Secularization,” Chatham House, 28 February 2017.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
21
the AKP’s organizational structure and the dominance of
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan within it. Repression in
Turkey following the 2016 attempted coup may also be
prompting Ennahda to re-evaluate the extent to which it
wishes to be publicly associated with the AKP.107
Ennahda’s leadership is also close to Qatar,
which like Turkey under the AKP, has sought to foster
strong relations with Islamist parties in the region. While
leading the troika government, many signicant projects
in strategic sectors of the economy were awarded to Qa-
tar, often in the absence of sufficient transparency. Accu-
sations that Ennahda has received funding from Qatar
have also been recurrent since Ennahda entered politics
in 2011. In the run up to the 2012 parliamentary elec-
tions, for example, Ghannouchi was rumoured to have re-
ceived substantial funding from the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh
Hama ben Khalifa al-Thani, in order to nance Ennahda’s
electoral campaign. More recently, in 2017, the Parti
Destourien Libre (PDL) led a complaint with the prosecu-
tor of the primary court calling for investigations into the
nancing of Ennahda, particularly in relation to allega-
tions it has received nancial support from Qatar.108
Although Ennahda’s leadership enjoys close relations
with Qatar, it also maintains links with Saudi Arabia. En-
nahda began to soften its stance towards Saudi Arabia
following the ouster of Morsi in Egypt and the political
crisis in Tunisia, enabling a slight realignment of Tunisia’s
foreign policy under the Nidaa Tounes-led coalition. En-
nahda’s leaders appear to be attempting to cultivate good
relations with the Saudi royal court by reassuring Saudi
Arabia that it is not intent on exporting political Islam to
the wider region. Ennahda’s modied position vis-à-vis
Saudi Arabia was also facilitated by the latter’s greater
forbearance towards mainstream Islamists following the
conclusion of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. The 2017 crisis
between Qatar and the GCC could yet see Ennahda lean
more towards Saudi Arabia, though support for Qatar
within the context of the crisis is still strong among its
constituencies.10 9
107 “Ennahda Party of Tunisia,” The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch,
https://www.globalmbwatch.com/ennahda-party-of-tunisia/; Wolf,
Political Islam in Tunisia, p. 154; Monica Marks, “Tunisia’s Islamists and
the ‘Turkish Model’,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2017), pp. 107,
111 – 14.
108 “Tunisia to Investigate Qatari Funding of Ennahdha Party,” Qatarileaks,
30 August 2017; “Comment Ennahdha a vendu la Tunisie au Qatar,”
Webdo, 19 November 2012; Sarah Louden, “Political Islamism in Tunisia:
A History of Repression and a Complex Forum for Potential Change,”
Mathal, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2015), p. 13; Kristina Kausch, “‘Foreign Funding’ in
Post-revolution Tunisia,” AFA/FRIDE/HIVOS, 2013, p. 10; Hanin Ghaddar,
“Qatar Bets on Islamists,” The Wilson Center, 7 February 2013.
109 Ruth Hanau Santini, “Bankrolling Containment: Saudi Linkages with
Egypt and Tunisia,” Memo Prepared for the Workshop, “Transnational
Diffusion, Cooperation and Learning in the Middle East and North Af-
rica,” 8 – 9 June 2016; Hussein Ibish, “Saudi Arabia’s New Sunni Alliance,”
New York Times, 31 July 2015; Youssef Cherif, “The Gulf Crisis Threatens
Tunisia’s Stability,” Atlantic Council, 8 November 2017.
Vectors of Inuence
National
Ennahda’s participation in government has translated
into a considerable capacity to inuence the domestic po-
litical scene, although Ennahda has sought compromise
with non-Islamist parties when doing so. At the helm of
the troika government, Ennahda was also able to use its
position to facilitate the inclusion of its allies, such as
Sala political parties, within the political system, and
was thus able to facilitate the growth of an AST support
base that to some extent overlapped with its own.110
However, its capacity to promote actors whose agendas
at least partially overlap with its own has since dimin-
ished as the Ennahda has strategically distanced itself
from Sala actors.111
Close relations between Qatar during the troika
government may have had the advantage of demonstrat-
ing to the electorate that it, as leader of the governing co-
alition, had good relations with a wealthy country that
was willing to invest in Tunisia. Ennahda’s lawyers also al-
legedly received Qatari funds with which to help fund
media outlets sympathetic to Ennahda.112 The extent to
which relations with Qatar are favourable to domestic in-
uence is changing, though, as remaining neutral in the
Qatar-GCC crisis has become paramount.
International
Ennahda has several channels through which it can exer t
inuence internationally. Ghannouchi is reported to be
the deputy head of the international Muslim Brotherhood
organization. He is also a high-ranking member of a num-
ber of Islamist organisations in Europe, including the Dub-
lin-based European Council on Fatwas and Research
(ECFR), which is presided over by Al-Qawadari and aims to
provide interpretations of Islamic law to European Mus-
lim minorities, and the International Union of Muslim
Scholars (IUMS), an association of theologians, which is
also presided over by Al-Qawadari.113
Ennahda has also beneted from positive cov-
erage on Al-Jazeera and the London-based newspaper
that was launched by a Qatari company, Al-Araby Al-
Jadeed. Al-Jazeera in particular has been an important
channel for constructing a positive public image for the
party, which was perceived as especially important given
the negative publicity the party received in Saudi and
110 “’Political Islam’ and the Muslim Brotherhood Review.”
111 Tawil, “Ennahda Reconsiders Ties with Tunisian Salast Groups”; Chris-
tine Petré, “How Ansar al-Sharia Grew in Post-revolutionary Tunisia,”
Middle East Monitor, 11 March 2015.
112 Youssef Cherif, “Tunisia’s Elec tions amid a Middle East Cold War,” Atlantic
Council, 22 October 2014; Kausch, “‘Foreign Funding’ in Post-revolution
Tunisia,” p. 7.
113 “Rached Ghannouchi,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.coun-
terextremism.com/extremists/rached-ghannouchi; Kyle Shideler, “U.S.
Institute for Peace Hosts High Level Global Muslim Brother… Again,” The
Counter Jihad Report, 27 October 2015.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
22
Emirati media outlets when it was at the helm of the troi-
ka government. However, support from Qatar’s media
outlets is likely to be less of an asset within the context of
the Qatar-GCC crisis. Relations that Ennahda is fostering
with Saudi Arabia could prove an important means of
damage limitation for the party.
2.2 Sala Parties (Hisb
Ut-tahrir and Jabhat
Al-Islah)
Background and Objectives
Several Sala parties were established following the 2011
uprising. While all have a relatively limited following
within the Sala current, the most inuential among
them are Jabhat Al-Islah and Hisb Ut-tahrir. Jabhat Al-Islah
was legalized under the troika government led by Ennah-
da. It was created by an older generation of Islamists. Its
initial leader, Mohamed Khouja, was a member of the Tu-
nisian Islamic Front, which was formed by a group of
hardline members of the MTI in the mid-1980s and advo-
cated domestic jihad. Khouja was succeeded in 2015 by
Rachid Tarjani.114
The party advocates the establishment of an Is-
lamic caliphate and believes that sharia law should form
the basis of the constitution and legislation. It has, never-
theless, renounced violence and seeks to work within the
democratic system to achieve these ends. It does not ac-
cept a separation between religion and politics or the
idea of the nation state. However, like Ennahda, it is at-
tempting to secure its position with the Tunisian demo-
cratic system. This has led it to try to reconcile Sala val-
ues with the Tunisian political context. To this end, it
recognizes that some elements of civil law may be com-
patible with sharia law. It also advocates some democrat-
ic values, such as freedom of expression, as long as they
are circumscribed by Islamic guidelines.115
Hisb Ut-tahrir’s agenda is more conservative
than that of Jabhat Al-Islah. It is part of a broader pan-Is-
lamic movement that rst emerged in Tunisia in the
1980s, operating clandestinely until it was legalized as a
political party in 2012. Led by Ridha Belhaj, Hisb Ut-tahrir
is also committed to the establishment of sharia law and
an Islamic caliphate. However, unlike Jabhat Al-Islah, it be-
114 Heidi Reichinnek, “Jabhat Al-Islah (JI)/ Tunisien,“ Philipps Universität Mar-
burg, March 2015, p. 1; Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’?” p. 570.
115 Wolf, “An Islamist Renaissance,” p. 570; Aaron Zelin, “Who Is Jabhat Al-
Islah?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 July 2012.
lieves that an Islamic revolution is required to achieve
these ends. As a result, it does not support democracy or
participate in elections, mostly focusing instead on
preaching.1 16
Alliances
National
As noted, both Jabhat Al-Islah and Hisb Ut-tahrir have to
varying degrees been allied with Ennahda. Relations be-
tween Ennahda and Jabhat Al-Islah, nevertheless, have
been closer than those between Ennahda and Hisb Ut-
tahrir. This is likely to be due to the more reformist agenda
of Jabhat Al-Islah, as well as the ties forged between the
leaders of both parties in the 1980s. From early on, Ghan-
nouchi demonstrated support for Jabhat Al-Islah by at-
tending its inaugural conference. In turn, Jabhat Al-Islah
has lent tactical support to Ennahda. When Jabhat Al-Is-
lah members ran as independents in some regions during
the 2012 parliamentary elections, it encouraged its sup-
porters to vote for Ennahda in the regions in which it did
not run. Despite their cooperative relations, Jabhat Al-Is-
lah has been critical of the concessions that Ennahda has
made to non-Islamist par ties.117
Jabhat Al-Islah and Hisb Ut-tahrir also had good
relations with AST before it was designated a terrorist or-
ganization by the Tunisian authorities in 2013. Hisb Ut-
tahrir co-organized at least one demonstration with AST,
which called for the establishment of sharia law and an
Islamic caliphate. While Jabhat Al-Islah has not co-orga-
nized events with AST, it has participated in AST-orga-
nized demonstrations and promoted the latter’s events
on its social media outlets. Neither party joined the au-
thorities in condemning AST as a terrorist organization.118
International
Jabhat Al-Islah’s international linkages are fairly limited,
partly due to its narrow social base and lack of nancial
resources. It has attempted to connect with Sala parties
in Egypt. However, this has become infeasible after the
ouster of President Morsi in 2013.119 Hisb Ut-tahrir has
more substantial international ties. It is alleged to receive
116 “Tunisia Calls for Ban on Islamist Party Hizb ut-Tahrir,” The New Arab, 8
September 2016; Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’?”p. 570; “The Involve-
ment of Salasm/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to
Rebel Groups Around the World,” Directorate-General for External Poli-
cies, Policy Department, European Parliament, 2013; “Tunisia Legalizes
Second Hardline Islamist Group,” Al Arabiya, 18 July 2012.
117 Ghassan Ben Khalifah, “Tunisia’s Salast Emergence Puts New Players
on Political Stage,” Al-Monitor, 23 September 2012; Monica Marks, “Who
Are Tunisia’s Salas?” Foreign Policy, 28 September 2012; Zelin, “Who Is
Jabhat Al-Islah?”
118 Alaya Allani, “Mouvements religieux radicaux pendant la transition:
L’exemple d’Ansar Al-Charia en Tunisie : naissance et expansion. Perspec-
tives 2011 – 2014,” UNDP Tunisie, 12 July 2014, p. 226; Zelin, “Who Is
Jabhat Al-Islah?”
119 Correspondence with Anne Wolf, Research Fellow at Girton College,
University of Cambridge, UK, 12 December 2017.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
23
support from Jordan and Turkey. It is also part of a global
organisation that is present in over 40 countries world-
wide. It, thus, has close relations with other national
chapters of Hisb Ut-tahrir, some of which are openly hos-
tile to the West.120
Vectors of Inuence
National
Jabhat Al-Islah has sought to appeal to voters situated to
the right of Ennahda. However, it has failed to generate a
signicant support base amongst this section of society.
Its members ran as independents in both the 2012 and
2014 elections, though failed to win any seats on both oc-
casions, even though it attempted to tap into AST’s sup-
port base. Many Salas are scornful of Jabhat Al-Islah,
given that they view the electoral process as a futile
means of achieving an Islamic caliphate and the imple-
mentation of sharia law. While the party has managed to
attract a small following amongst older Salas, its asso-
ciation with this older generation of Islamists has tended
to reduce its appeal among younger Salas.121
While Hisb Ut-tahrir’s refusal to promote
change through participation in the electoral process
might have made it more appealing to ultra-conserva-
tives, it has still failed to generate a signicant support
base with which to expand its inuence nationally.
Through its activities, including preaching, it does, never-
theless, have constituencies in several areas of Tunisia. It
is notably popular in some hotbeds of radicalization, such
as Ettadhamen in the greater Tunis area. Its failure to
build up a broader base of support may be due to the par-
ty’s failure to develop an agenda sufficiently adapted to
the Tunisian context, as well as a comparative lack of
funding.122 Its ability to exert inuence nationally is also
likely to be hindered by the authorities’ efforts to crack-
down on it. The party was prevented from holding its an-
nual conference in 2016 and its activities have been tem-
porarily suspended on two occasions, most recently in
2017, in response to inciting hatred and undermining
public order.123
120 Alaya Allani, “Spécialiste des mouvances Islamistes: ‘Le danger Salaste
menace nos institutions’,” Réalités, 24 July 2014; Roggio, “‘Moderate’
Islamist Leader in Tunisia.”
121 Ewan Stein, Frédéric Volpi, Fabio Merone, Kawther Alfasi and Larissa
Alles, “Islamism and the Arab Uprisings,” A CASAW-AHRC People Power
and State Power Report, June 2014, p. 14; Wolf, “New Tunisian Salast
Party”; Reichinnek, “Jabhat Al-Islah (JI)/ Tunisien”; Alaya Allani, “Mouve-
ments religieux radicaux pendant la transition,” p. 226.
122 Stein, Volpi, Merone, Alfasi and Alles, “Islamism and the Arab Uprisings,”
pp. 14 – 5; Allani, “Spécialiste des mouvances Islamistes”; “Hizb ut-tahrir :
Le retour du Califat comme solution?” Leaders, 14 October 2012.
123 “Tunisia Radical Islamist Party Banned for One Month,” News 24, 7
June 2017; “Tunisie: un parti islamiste radical souhaite ‘enterrer’ la
démocratie,” Le Point International, 16 April 2017; “Tunisian President
Moves Against Party Threatening To ‘Cut Off Heads’,” Middle East Eye, 2
September 2016.
International
Jabhat Al-Islah’s limited international linkages mean that
it also has few international vectors of inuence. By con-
trast, Hisb Ut-tahrir’s membership in a broader interna-
tional movement means that it benets from promotion
through the Hisb Ut-tahrir’s central media office. While
the Tunisian chapter of Hisb Ut-tahrir does not have a
great deal of inuence within the broader movement, it
does receive support from Hisb Ut-tahrir in Jordan in par-
ticular.124
2.3 Quietist Salas
(Sala Ilmiyya)
Background and Objectives
Many quietist Salas in Tunisia are uninstitutionalized,
though attempts have been made to organize them. The
most prominent group to do so was AST. The latter does
not t neatly into the quietist category, though. At its in-
ception, it was ostensibly quietist. However, it evolved
into a jihadi movement. Nevertheless, it does deserve at-
tention, due to the role that it played in expanding Salaf-
ism in Tunisia through preaching and charity work before
it became jihadi.
AST was established in 2011 by Abu Iyad Al-Tu-
nisi, a former member of MTI, who managed to ee the
country during the crackdown against Islamists under
Ben Ali. From exile in Afghanistan, he co-founded the ji-
hadi Tunisian Combat Group. His arrest in Turkey in 2003,
resulted in his extradition to Tunisia, where he was im-
prisoned until the general amnesty in 2011 led to his re-
lease.125
AST seeks to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia
governed by sharia law. However, unlike Sala parties,
such as Jabhat Al-Islah, it sought to do so from the bot-
tom up by promoting Sala ideology through a variety of
activities, including preaching, charity work and enforce-
ment of moral behavior. While the latter often involved
vigilante-type behavior by AST followers, the organiza-
tion did not initially call for jihad in Tunisia. It did encour-
age its members to wage jihad abroad, particularly in Syr-
ia, however. Its position regarding domestic jihad changed
during 2013, following the organization’s designation by
124 See Hisb Ut-tahrir’s central media office Website: http://www.hizb-ut-
tahrir.info/en/index.php/leaet/tunisia.html; Allani, “Spécialiste des
mouvances Islamistes.”
125 Stefano Maria Torelli, “A Portrait of Tunisia’s Ansar Al-Shari’a Leader Abu
Iyad al-Tunisi: His Strategy of Jihad,” Militant Leadership Monitor: Person-
alities behind the Insurgency, Vol. VI, Issue 8, 2013, p. 9.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
24
the Tunisian authorities as a terrorist organization, al-
though this shift was never officially announced.126 AST
has now fragmented, with some of its members having
ed abroad, especially to Syria and Libya.
Alliances
National
AST initially received strong public support from a highly
inuential jihadi cleric, Sheikh Khattab Idrisi, who spent
several years in Saudi Arabia studying under Wahhabi
clerics and gained popularity following the fall of Ben Ali.
There has been some speculation that Idrisi could have
been one of AST’s leaders. However, his early ties to the
organization remain unclear. At the very least, Idrisi seems
to have served as a spiritual guide to the organization’s
members, who viewed him as one of the only credible
clerics in Tunisia. In addition to support from Idrisi, AST
beneted from the support of Sala charities that are be-
lieved to have helped to raise funds for the organiza-
tion.127
As mentioned, AST counted among its allies the
Sala political parties, including Jabhat Al-Islah and Hisb
Ut-tahrir and initially Ennahda, as noted earlier. Al-Tunisi
had close ties with key gures within Ennahda’s leader-
ship, including Ghannouchi and Sadok Chouroue, former
president of Ennahda. Al-Tunisi is known to have met with
Ghannouchi in the early phase of the transition. However,
as indicated, cooperation between AST and Ennahda dis-
sipated from 2012 onwards.128
International
AST is believed to have received support by patrons in
several Gulf States. Much of the organization’s literature
is thought to have been donated from Saudi Arabia,
where it was printed. A Sala charity in Kuwait was also
reported to have supplied food and medical supplies to
AST. Concrete evidence to support such claims is difficult
to come by, though.129
Ties to the now disbanded Ansar al-Sharia in
Libya (ASL), the Libyan jihadi group with links to Al-Qaeda,
which sought to establish sharia law in Libya through
preaching, charity, vigilante-style violence and armed
struggle, have also been reported. While AST and ASL are
not affiliates, linkages between the two appear to have
126 “Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia,” The Mackenzie Institute, 12 April 2015; Allani,
“Mouvements religieux radicaux pendant la transition,” p. 219; “Ansar Al-
Sharia in Tunisia,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterex-
tremism.com/threat/ansar-al-sharia-tunisia-ast.
127 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Tunisia Arrests Leading Sala Cleric,” The Washington
Institute Policy Analysis, 25 October 2013; “Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia.”
128 Anne Wolf, “Religious Violence in Tunisia Three Years after the Revolu-
tion,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 24 February 2014; Synda
Tajine, “A Jihadist Comes Home And Tunisia Cracks Down,” Al-Monitor, 20
September 2012; Roggio, “‘Moderate’ Islamist Leader in Tunisia.”
129 Louden, “Political Islamism in Tunisia,” p. 13.
existed. The extent of these ties is, nevertheless, disput-
ed. While some observers claim that the two organiza-
tions maintained operational, nancial and logistical con-
nections, others believe that they operate independently
from one another.130
Although AST denied having formal ties with
Al-Qaeda, it was loyal to the latter. Al-Tunisi is also report-
ed to have links with Al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama
bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Additionally, two other
AST leaders, Sami Ben Khemais Essid and Mehdi Kam-
moun, are known to have been involved in Al-Qaeda op-
erations in Italy before returning to Tunisia and joining
AST. The organization is also believed to have received
guidance from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
According to Tunisian and US governments, funding has
also been provided to AST by AQIM.131
While the AST leadership is closer to Al-Qaeda
than IS, AST has expressed support for IS and has encour-
aged its members to travel to Syria to join the group. In
2014, an important AST leader, Kamel Zarrouk, joined IS in
Syria. The same year, AST spokesman, Seifeddine Rais,
pledged allegiance to IS, although it is thought that he did
so on an individual basis, rather than on behalf of the AST.
Nevertheless, his pledge of allegiance appeared to prompt
a number of AST militants to depart for Syria, where they
subsequently joined IS.132
Vectors of Inuence
National
AST was able to gain ground after the uprising partly due
to its charity work, particularly in neglected areas of the
country, such as the governorates in the South, the Inte-
rior and the Northwest. Its support base was also built
through the distribution of printed material, its media
outlet, the Qayrawan Media Foundation (QMF), and its
Facebook page.133 The crackdown against the organiza-
tion has considerably limited these activities, although it
is possible that some of its members continue the organi-
zation’s charitable work in rural areas of the country,
away from the watchful eye of the authorities. Moreover,
the organization may still be able to rely on support from
Sala sheikhs to remain relevant.
130 “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia),” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford
University, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/
groups/view/547; “Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia.”
131 Thomas Jocelyn, “Ansar Al-Sharia Responds to Tunisian Government,”
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 3 September 2013; “Ansar Al-
Sharia (Tunisia)”; “Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia.”
132 “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia).”
133 Petré, “How Ansar Al-Sharia Grew in Post-revolutionary Tunisia”; Allani,
“Mouvements religieux radicaux pendant la transition,” pp. 212, 228;
“Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia)”; Aaron Y. Zelin, “Shabab Al-Tawhid: The Re-
branding of Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia?” The Washington Institute Policy
Watch 2250, 9 May 2014.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
25
International
AST’s loyalty to Al-Qaeda meant that it could rely on pub-
licity via the Al-Qaeda Forum Ansar Al-Mujahidin Arabic
Forum (AMAF).134 Following the outlawing of AST in 2013,
many AST members are believed to have redeployed to
Libya, where they were reported in 2014 to be regrouping
under the name of Shabab Al-Tawhid as a way of main-
taining the AST network without attracting the attention
of the Tunisian authorities.135
2.4 The Importance of
Tunisia’s Islamists
Tunisian Islamists that have entered the political arena af-
ter Ben Ali have been successful only to the extent that
they have adapted their aims to the Tunisian context. En-
nahda’s effort to do just that is the product of a long evo-
lution that reached new heights following the uprising,
when the party no longer insisted on the implementation
of sharia law, and more recently, when it sought to fur-
ther emphasize the separation of religion and politics.
While this transition towards a civic party has undoubt-
edly helped to secure Ennahda’s place within the demo-
cratic system in Tunisia, it has been accompanied with
the reduced capacity to promote more conservative Is-
lamists within the politics and society, who could have
constituted potential allies. Among the latter, Sala par-
ties have in any case failed to gain much traction within
the political system. They have failed to appeal to ultra-
conservative youth, who have tended to either gravitate
towards the quietist Sala current or to join the Sala ji-
hadi stream.
134 “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia).”
135 Zelin, “Shabab Al-Tawhid”; Stefano Maria Torelli, “Tunisian Jihadists
Establishing New Networks with Libyan Islamists,” Terrorism Monitor,
Vol. 12, Issue 11, 30 May 2014.
CSS STUDY Islamist Actors
26
Concluding Remarks
While the political inuence of Libya’s mainstream Is-
lamists, notably the Muslim Brotherhood and its JCP, was
considerable in the immediate post-Qadda years, largely
due to strong alliances with members of Sala parties
and Sala-leaning independents in the GNC, their politi-
cal inuence has declined since the civil war began in mid-
2014. That said, most have maintained vectors of inu-
ence within the context of the UN-led political process,
although their political clout could be further reduced
within the context of an effort to revive the UN-led recon-
ciliation process. The Muslim Brotherhood’s associations
with brigades that back the GNA means that it could have
some sympathizers within future unied and reformed
security structures, should these brigades be integrated
into them. In the event of such a development, the Mus-
lim Brotherhood could have overlapping agendas with
parts of Libya’s future “deep state”.
Non-mainstream Islamist actors have generally
failed to gain much political traction in Libya. LIFG/LIMC
veterans have garnered limited political support, as repre-
sentatives of Sala parties. However, brigades with ties to
them have become important actors on the ground in
some areas of the country. The power of these brigades
has been reduced recently, though. Nevertheless, it could
be possible that LIFG/LIMC veterans might be represent-
ed in future security structures, though their links to ji-
hadi Sala actors could well preclude this from transpir-
ing. Madkhali brigades that have gained in prominence as
a result of the civil war, may also form part of police and
army structures in the future, which could add an ele-
ment of instability due to their opposition to the Muslim
Brotherhood. Their increased following in the East, which
is likely to continue to be supported by external actors,
including Saudi Arabia, could also lead to the further
growth of ultra-conservativism and possibly radicaliza-
tion in the East, which has historically been a hotbed of
violent extremism and foreign ghter recruitment.
Tunisia’s Islamists have been struggling to nd
their place within a very different context characterized
by the existence of established governance structures
and a secular state. Ensuring continued political inuence
within this context has led to the further moderation of
Ennahda, which has become ever more mainstream in
terms of its acceptance of civic law and democratic norms
and principles. By contrast, a mismatch between the
agendas of the more conservative Sala parties and the
Tunisian context has limited their signicance, especially
with young Salas, who may be more inclined to shun
politics or even embrace violence.
Although the environments in which Islamists
operate within Libya and Tunisia are different, in both
countries mainstream Islamists are likely to maintain
some, albeit reduced, inuence. By contrast, more conser-
vative political Islamists, notably Sala parties, are likely
to remain fairly insignicant in their own right. This leaves
room for the nominally quietist Sala current. The latter
may, at least in the Libyan case, continue to grow, with
the potential for some of its adherents to become radical-
ized.
The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich specializes in research, teaching, and information
services in the elds of international relations and security policy. The CSS also acts as a consultant to
various political bodies and the general public. The Center is engaged in research projects with a
number of Swiss and international partners, focusing on new risks, European and transatlantic security,
strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.
