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Administering the Surplus: The Grand Coalition’s Fiscal Policy, 2013–17
Abstract
This article studies the tax and fiscal policies of the second grand coalition under Chancellor Merkel. It demonstrates that the government contented itself with merely administering balanced budgets or surpluses, instead of seizing the opportunity of exceptionally good economic conditions and low interest rates to implement important structural reforms and increase investment in public infrastructure. This outcome can be explained by two factors: (1) diverging fiscal policy preferences between the two coalition partners, and (2) uncertainty in the face of the continuing euro crisis. The article substantiates this claim on the basis of quantitative data on policy outputs and the structure of revenues and expenses, and by qualitatively tracing the policy processes leading to the few fiscal decisions that were of major importance: the reform of inheritance taxation, packages against tax evasion and avoidance, and a reform of the federal equalisation payments system. The analysis shows that in these more far-reaching decisions the coalition acted in response to external constraints – including decisions from the constitutional court, international cooperation, and legal action by Länder governments – rather than on its own political initiative.
... In many ways, the first half of the final Merkel government was still characterised by policies very much in line with this image. Despite good fiscal health and urgent investment needs, the coalition valued fiscal stability over everything else (Rixen 2019). As we will show in this article, however, the second half of the legislative period, which was dominated by the pandemic, broke with this established orthodoxy. ...
... In the German public emerged a lively debate about the debt brake already before the pandemic. There were increasingly loud questions about the logic of running budget surpluses in a context of negative interest rates, in particular since German digital and physical infrastructure were widely considered to need much higher investment (Rixen 2019). This debate gave rise to somewhat unexpected coalitions. ...
... The existence of this new party put pressure on the CDU/CSU in particular, but also on the SPD. Therefore, similar to the need for more public investment (Rixen 2019), there was strong functional pressure to reform European fiscal policy and many policy proposals (e.g. the Monti et al. (2016) as one of the most prominent ones), but no sign that the grand coalition would address this. While the refugee crisis, Brexit and the Trump presidency pushed Merkel towards working together with France on a common EU foreign and security policy (Oppermann and Brummer THIS ISSUE), this did not spill over towards a common EU fiscal policy. ...
The Covid pandemic confronted the Merkel IV government with unprecedented fiscal challenges. We argue that the government’s response to these challenges constitutes a break with established patterns of German fiscal policy orthodoxy in at least three areas. First, the government suspended the debt brake and gave up the ‘Schwarze Null’ without much debate. Second, it implemented a fiscal rescue package that struck a new balance between the interests of the export and the domestic sector. Third, the government supported a coordinated fiscal response on the European level thereby giving way to debt pooling across EU member states. The article traces the groundwork for these changes that was laid in the first two years of the government and then compares the German fiscal response to Covid-19 with German policy during the Financial Crisis. We conclude by discussing whether Germany has shifted to a new fiscal policy regime.
... During the last decade, the partisan composition of German governments shifted from strongly leaning towards the centre-right between 2009 and 2013, to featuring from 2013 onwards a grand coalition between the Christian-democratic parties (CDU-CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). Both the CDU and SPD campaigned on pro-welfare positions during the 2013 and 2017 elections (Bremer, 2019;Rixen, 2019). The SPD's entry into the cabinet constitutes a potential source of change in the policy course of German governments, creating the political conditions for moving from a conservative to a potentially more expansive policy approach. ...
... In 2013 this approach to public spending was strengthened even further, with the introduction of a law establishing that the government's structural deficit should not be higher than 0.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (European Commission, 2019a). The introduction of these legal obligations strongly influenced Germany's fiscal output during the 2010s (Rixen, 2019). After having risen quickly in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, German public spending was brought below the revenues level within the course of one legislature, marking the beginning of several years of fiscal surpluses. ...
... The conservative fiscal approach was most strongly pursued during the years of the centre-right second Merkel government (2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013), with the CDU's finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble being a strong advocate of fiscal consolidation and the junior coalition partner Free Democrats (FDP) being strongly against public overspending (Rixen, 2019). Despite the SPD replacing the FDP in government after the 2013 elections, the prudent fiscal policyapproach continued under the third Merkel government (2013)(2014)(2015)(2016)(2017). ...
Since the early 2010s, budgetary policy-making in EU member states has been subject to tighter European constraints. While recent research shows the relevance of intergovernmental negotiations for setting European policy priorities, little is known about how much political alternation in government still matters for national budgetary agendas. This paper investigates this question in Germany, one of Europe’s most powerful and financially stable countries. Drawing on original data, the paper first shows how political alternation in German cabinets changes governments’ budgetary agendas. Secondly, it shows how this alternation also influences the formulation and adoption of European policy recommendations. Based on these findings, the paper argues that governments in financially stable countries can pursue alternative policy agendas, but that these need to find consensus at both the national and European level. The range of alternatives is therefore inevitably contingent upon the national institutional framework and country’s relative strength within the EU.
... Das Eintreten der Bundesregierung unter Angela Merkel für strenge Fiskalregeln verschaffte Deutschland in diesen Jahren den Ruf als "Sparmeister Europas" (Blyth 2013;Haffert 2016;Klein und Pettis 2020;Matthijs 2016). Zugleich kritisierten relevante Teile der deutschen Öffentlichkeit die geringen öffentlichen Investitionen in einer Phase sehr günstiger fiskalischer Bedingungen, unter anderem in Digitalisierung, Bildung und Forschung sowie nicht zuletzt in die Energieinfrastruktur (Rixen 2019). Dies gilt vielen heute als das negative haushaltspolitische Vermächtnis der Regierungen Merkel I bis IV. ...
In the 2010s, German government pursued a structurally conservative budgetary policy, resulting in weak public investments despite favorable fiscal conditions. How can this be explained? Recent literature on the German budgetary regime has primarily cited the tradition of ordoliberalism and the conservative German welfare model to explain this typical pattern of expenditure policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. Instead, this contribution offers an institutional-sociological explanation that focuses on the fundamental relationship patterns between government, parliament, and the state-bureaucracy underlying fiscal policy. According to the principle of ministerial autonomy (Ressortprinzip), the relatively independent ministers, along with their top civil servants, are the key protagonists in German federal budget negotiations, where party politics and departmental politics overlap. Within the traditional role structure of the German cabinet system, the finance minister holds a particular position of power, suggesting his self-presentation as a “minister of thrift.” Conversely, representatives of coalition parties and the Bundestag, as well as the administrative heads of other ministries, possess specific profiles of power resources. These constellations generate incrementalist interactions within the executive, resulting, depending on the circumstances, in the expansion of marginal expenditure scope or in the reduction of voluntary spending. These negotiations run counter to encompassing investment planning. Despite its formal budgetary sovereignty, the role of the Bundestag is restricted to communicating support or disapproval of single ministers. As a result, the institutional power and role profile of the ministries, manifested in budget negotiations where the Federal Ministry of Finance traditionally acts as a powerful veto player, ensure the continuity of structurally conservative fiscal policy across changes in power.
... The patterns in the three countries are in line with recent analyses showing that fiscal consolidation gradually disappeared from the policy agendas of national governments from 2014 onwards (Karremans 2021b). The disappearance of fiscal consolidation initiatives is most visible in Germany, arguably because, in addition to having some important changes in the composition of the cabinet, from 2014 onwards it started performing fiscal surpluses (Karremans 2021a;Rixen 2019). Nonetheless, the presence of this same trend in fiscally troubled countries like France and Italy suggests that it is not only linked to Germany's improved macroeconomic conditions. ...
... Yet, Germany to has been enveloped by challenges in the form of immigration, digitalisation, and most recently reducing its historical reliance on Russian gas. A heterogeneous, often-contradictory portrayal of Germany has subsequently formed in the literature, simultaneously characterising it as an environmental leader and laggard (Amelang et al. 2020;Schreurs 2016), fiscally astute while short-sightedly austere (Rixen 2019) and both a benefit to and inhibitor of the European Union (Baun 2005;Smith 2005). Amidst such debate, one of the few consensual features is the centrality of automobiles to Germany's export-driven growth model (GTAI 2022). ...
... But despite their undeniable success in boosting the German economy, these support programs were soon again phased out and expansionary fiscal policy did not prove a lasting driver of demand-led growth (though the unplanned expenses related to the refugee crisis in 2015 increased government outlays; Söllner 2018). Instead, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) fetishized a balanced budget and enshrined it in the constitutional debt break, which left the Social Democratic governing partner (SPD) virtually no room to implement redistributive tax reforms (Rixen 2019). Despite the dire need for an improved public infrastructure, public investments stagnated because the responsibility for them often laid with cashstrapped Länder and local governments while administrative bottlenecks left many funds unused (Roth and Wolff 2018). ...
Growth model theory has turned the focus of comparative political economy scholars on the demand drivers of economic growth. But while its proponents emphasize the variety and inherent instability of growth models, research so far has been more concerned with the emergence and coherence of stable growth models than in the process of change. We argue that growth model change can be understood as a process of financial rebalancing on the level of institutional sectors. When an overindebted sector is forced to deleverage, a politically contested process emerges over the path of adjustment. We derive various ways in which each sector can contribute to this process of financial adjustment, which we conceptualize as the activation of macroeconomic ‘compensation valves’. This process shapes the trajectory of economic performance during financial crisis and determines whether a new feasible growth model can emerge in its aftermath. We apply our analytical lens in a comparative case study of Germany and the Netherlands during the Great Recession. We conclude that future research on growth models should more explicitly problematize the ability of political economies to adapt to financial instability.
... All these measures pushed down household shares of national income and thus pushed up national savings rates, primarily in the form of business profits and government surpluses (Pettis 2015a). 17 Meanwhile, Germany's public and private investment lagged (Roth and Wolff 2018;Rixen 2019), and the push factor of transnational banking (Borio, James, and Shin 2014), combined with the pull factor of less-developed Southern states seeking Northern capital (Jones 2016a), sent these funds abroad (Fratzscher 2014;Nachtwey 2018). ...
This article privileges an institutional explanation rooted in the financial sector for the persistent German trade surpluses of the past 15 years. Specifically, it explains the disruptive consequences of a long-running stagnation in domestic investment in combination with rising German savings, particularly from corporate and government actors. It links these outcomes primarily to policy changes in the early and mid-2000s. The article also offers a constructivist explanation of how German elites have understood (and often misunderstood) the trade surplus. I characterise German elites as using a formula of ‘normalise and apologise’ to explain away worries about the surplus. The result is what one might call a ‘political narrative of unbalanced growth.’ The argument concludes with implications for the tense German-American economic relationship.
... As a result, the SPD only pushed for relatively small increases in public investment and, officially, never questioned the doctrine of balanced budgets. 22 Rather, it was content to administer the budget surplus jointly with its coalition partner (Rixen, 2018). ...
The transformation of Germany's political economy in the last few decades has strongly been influenced by the SPD. Still, the economic programme of the SPD remains contested since several authors characterise the party's economic platform differently. This paper reconsiders the political economy of the SPD in light of evidence from the Great Recession. It combines quantitative content analysis with process tracing in order to situate the party in research on the moral economy of contemporary Germany. The quantitative content analysis shows that the SPD attempted to shift its position on the welfare state and economic liberalism in response to the crisis, but it remained wedded to orthodox fiscal policies. Based on elite interviews with social democratic politicians and policy-makers, the paper explains this response with the absence of an economic paradigm. Weakened by internal conflict, the SPD made programmatic decisions with reference to electoral calculations and it remained trapped by its pre-crisis support for economic supply-side policies. Therefore, the SPD was unable to oppose the conservative economic discourse in Germany and failed to develop a consistent economic programme in response to the Great Recession.
Wenn in einer Demokratie die Politik systematisch den politischen Präferenzen bestimmter sozialer Gruppen folgt, wohingegen die anderer missachtet werden, wird der Grundsatz politischer Gleichheit beschädigt. Die neue Responsivitätsforschung untersucht, ob politische Entscheidungen mit dem Willen der Bürger_innen übereinstimmen und wenn ja, wessen Meinungen umgesetzt werden. Dabei zeigt sich in den USA eine deutlich selektive Responsivität der Politik zulasten der Armen. Wir untersuchen erstmals, ob in Deutschland ähnliche Muster in der politischen Responsivität wie in den USA festzustellen sind. Dazu werten wir 252 in den DeutschlandTrend-Umfragen gestellte Sachfragen für den Zeitraum von 1998 bis 2013 aus. Die Fragen beziehen sich auf zum Zeitpunkt der Erhebung diskutierte Politikänderungen und Reformen aus einem breiten Spektrum politisch relevanter Themen. Die Auswertung dieser Daten zeigt einen deutlichen Zusammenhang zwischen den getroffenen politischen Entscheidungen und den Einstellungen von Personen mit höherem Einkommen, aber keinen oder sogar einen negativen Zusammenhang für die Einkommensschwachen. In Deutschland zeigt sich somit eine ähnliche Schieflage politischer Repräsentation wie in den USA, obwohl sich die beiden Staaten in ihren institutionellen Voraussetzungen stark unterscheiden. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutieren wir abschließend mögliche Erklärungsmechanismen ungleicher Responsivität.
Tax policy was at the heart of the Merkel II government's reform agenda. The CDU/CSU and FDP promised significant tax cuts and simplifications of the tax system. During their term, however, they remained the least active of all German governments of the last four decades. Why? This article argues that a combination of factors relating to the dynamics of electoral competition and structural problem pressure can explain this outcome: The new constitutional debt brake and the Euro Crisis foreclosed the traditional ‘solution’ of glossing over the conflict within the coalition between its economically liberal constituency (FDP and parts of CDU/CSU) and pro-welfare state constituency (other parts of CDU/CSU) by combining tax reductions with continued high spending. The result was a devastating loss for the FDP in the 2013 elections, and a victory for the CDU/CSU which profited from positioning itself as a moderate and stabilising political force in uncertain times of crisis.
This study examines postwar patterns in macroeconomic policies and outcomes associated with left-and right-wing governments in capitalist democracies. It argues that the objective economic interests as well as the subjective preferences of lower income and occupational status groups are best served by a relatively low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic configuration, whereas a comparatively high unemployment-low inflation configuration is compatible with the interests and preferences of upper income and occupational status groups. Highly aggregated data on unemployment and inflation outcomes in relation to the political orientation of governments in 12 West European and North American nations are analyzed revealing a low unemployment-high inflation configuration in nations regularly governed by the Left and a high unemployment-low inflation pattern in political systems dominated by center and rightist parties. Finally, time-series analyses of quarterly postwar unemployment data for the United States and Great Britain suggests that the unemployment rate has been driven downward by Democratic and Labour administrations and upward by Republican and Conservative governments. The general conclusion is that governments pursue macroeconomic policies broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political constituencies.
Im August 2005 wurde der Universitätsprofessor Paul Kirchhof von Angela Merkel zum Schattenfinanzminister nominiert. Diese
Entscheidung war ein wesentlicher Grund für das enttäuschende Wahlergebnis der CDU. Kirchhofs steuerpolitische Ideen boten
der SPD eine willkommene Angriffsfläche, um die CDU als unsozial und neoliberal darzustellen. Bei den Wahlkampfauftritten
Gerhard Schröders gehörte die spöttische Bezugnahme auf den „Professor aus Heidelberg“ zum Standardrepertoire und versinnbildlichte
die Abgehobenheit, Bürgerferne und soziale Kälte, die die SPD der Union vorwarf. Doch obwohl die Steuerpolitik im Wahlkampf
eine wichtige Rolle spielte, hat sie im Regierungshandeln wenig Raum eingenommen. Die zentrale These dieses Beitrags lautet,
dass die Große Koalition in der Steuer- und Finanzpolitik nur die notwendigsten Anpassungen vorgenommen hat, weil man sich
regierungsintern wegen unterschiedlicher Policy-Präferenzen nicht auf weit reichende Reformen einigen konnte.
The article investigates the cohesion of public discourse by members of the Merkel III government on three challenges of European governance: the negotiations on UK withdrawal from the EU, the management of the Greek debt crisis, and political responses to the entry of migrants into the EU and the refugee pact with Turkey. The rationale is to assess how unfolding controversy on German leadership in the EU prompted by these challenges is reflected in claims-making in relation to three frameworks of reference: namely, the supranational institutions and policies of the EU, the definition of German EU policy at the level of intergovernmental negotiation, and domestic policy in the context of European developments. Based on a mixed-method review of debates in the Bundestag, the main findings highlight the tension between two different forms of parliamentary debate: on the one hand, a mostly normative discourse making the case for the stability and continuity of EU policies by the Chancellor and other members of the Grand Coalition government; on the other, the projection of party political claims to call for policy modification at the EU and intergovernmental level, exposing fissures and even direct contestation between coalition partners, particularly in the controversy on the migrant crisis.
In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’
Als sich abzeichnete, dass Finanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble schon 2014 einen Haushalt ohne neue Schulden geschafft hatte, klopften sich die Politiker der großen Koalition enthusiastisch auf die Schultern: Von einem »Meilenstein« war die Rede, von einem »Quantensprung« und von einer »historischen Zäsur«. Im Land der schwäbischen Hausfrauen verkörpert die »schwarze Null« Solidität und den Erfolg des deutschen Wirtschaftsmodells. Doch was verbirgt sich hinter dieser symbolmächtigen Zahl? Lukas Haffert untersucht die große Popularität der deutschen Überschüsse in historischer und vergleichender Perspektive. Er zeigt, welche Erfahrungen andere Länder mit ausgeglichenen Haushalten gemacht haben, und leitet daraus wichtige Lehren ab. Sein Fazit ist ernüchternd: Deutschlands Fiskalpolitik folgt gegensätzlichen Zielen, zwischen denen die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates zerrieben wird. Die »schwarze Null« löst diese Zielkonflikte nicht etwa auf, sie verschärft sie zum Teil sogar.
Demokratische Wahlen setzen programmatische Alternativen voraus. Wie diese Wahlprogramm-Analyse mit dem Duisburger-Wahl-Index (DWI) nachweist, warben die Parteien CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Die Linke und die Piraten bei der Bundestagswahl 2013 mit unterscheidbaren inhaltlichen Angeboten um die Gunst der Wähler. Wenngleich inzwischen einige traditionelle Differenzen nivelliert zu sein scheinen, lassen sich gerade im Detail klare Unterschiede zwischen den Parteien markieren. Die Konflikte verlaufen nach wie vor primär zwischen dem sogenannten »bürgerlichen« und dem »linken« Lager. Während die programmatische Homogenität bei den Parteien links der Mitte (SPD, Grüne, Linke und Piraten) vergleichsweise stark ausgeprägt war, gab es zwischen CDU/CSU und FDP eine ganze Reihe konfliktträchtiger Themen, wie an den Beispielen Mindestlohn, Mietpreisregulierung, doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft und Vorratsdatenspeicherung exemplarisch deutlich wird.
Der Beitrag beschreibt das deutsche Parteiensystem zur Bundestagswahl 2013 anhand der programmatischen Positionen auf einer einzelnen (Links-Rechts-)Achse und vergleicht diese mit den Positionen zu den beiden vorausgegangenen Bundestagswahlen. Zu diesem Zweck zieht die Analyse die Informationen aus dem Wahl-O-Mat heran. Mittels Skalierung werden daraus die relativen Ähnlichkeiten und Positionierungen der Parteien gewonnen, per Clusteranalyse wird spezifischer geprüft, welche Gruppierungen oder Lager sich auf der Basis der verwendeten Daten ergeben. Weiterhin werden die extrahierten Positionen mit den Daten des Comparative Manifesto Project sowie mit der Selbstverortung der Anhänger und Wähler der Parteien verglichen. Die Auswertung der Wahl-O-Mat-Daten suggeriert eine geringfügige Annäherung zwischen den beiden Volksparteien zur Wahl von 2013, allerdings bleibt die bekannte Struktur von zwei Lagern deutlich bestehen, insbesondere nachdem die Piraten 2013 im Vergleich zu 2009 weiter links verortet werden und weil die AfD sehr nahe an der Union und klar im bürgerlichen Lager liegt. Die Befunde sprechen überdies insgesamt nach wie vor für die Brauchbarkeit einer einfachen Links-Rechts-Achse im bundesdeutschen Kontext.
Dieser Beitrag skizziert Kernelemente der ältesten Theorieschule der vergleichenden Staatstätigkeitsforschung, die wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel als Hauptantriebskraft für Politikwandel identifiziert. Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Ländern in Bezug auf sozio-ökonomische Basisstrukturen werden als Ursache von Politikkonvergenz gesehen. Neben einer Diskussion der zentralen Bausteine dieses Theoriegebäudes wird anhand von Anschauungsbeispielen aus mehreren Politikfeldern die empirische Tragfähigkeit dieser Theorieschule untersucht. Der letzte Abschnitt diskutiert die Stärken und Schwächen dieses Theoriegebäudes.
In the three decades to the recent economic downturn, wage gaps widened and household income inequality as measured by GINI increased in a large majority of OECD countries. This occurred even when countries were going through a period of sustained economic and employment growth. This report analyses the major underlying forces behind these developments. It examines to which extent economic globalisation, skill-biased technological progress and institutional and regulatory reforms have had an impact on the distribution of earnings. The report further provides evidence of how changes in family formation and household structures have altered household earnings and income inequality. And it documents how tax and benefit systems have changed in the ways they redistribute household incomes. The report discusses which policies are most promising to counter increases in inequalities and how the policy mix can be adjusted when public budgets are under strain. "Analyses rely on simple statistical techniques that are accessible to a large readership... the graphic and charts are of great help to gain a quick visual grasp of the various issues addressed."
This article examines the model of social learning often believed to confirm the autonomy of the state from social pressures, tests it against recent cases of change in British economic policies, and offers a fuller analysis of the role of ideas in policymaking, based on the concept of policy paradigms. A conventional model of social learning is found to fit some types of changes in policy well but not the movement from Keynesian to monetarist modes of policymaking. In cases of paradigm shift, policy responds to a wider social debate bound up with electoral competition that demands a reformulation of traditional conceptions of state-society relations.
Kaum ein anderes Politikfeld unter Rot-Grün — ausgenommen die Arbeitsmarkt- und Sozialpolitik — war so umstritten wie die
Finanz- und Steuerpolitik. Die in keynesianischer Tradition stehende Politische Ökonomie (Heise 2002; Bofinger 2004; Hickel 2006) betrachtete den finanzpolitischen Kurs von Rot-Grün, zumindest seit dem Rücktritt von Oskar Lafontaine als Finanzminister
(März 1999), mit kritischem Blick. So wurde ein „viktorianischer Tugendpfad“ bemängelt (Krätke 2001), der aus Sparsamkeit, ausgeglichenem Budget und schuldenfreiem Staat bestehe. Auf der anderen Seite argumentierten Monetaristen
und Neoklassiker diametral, indem sie Deutschland auf dem Weg in die Schuldenfalle sahen (Sinn 2004) und auf die langfristigen intergenerationalen Wirkungen der Verschuldung durch implizite Leistungsversprechen (Bonin 2001) hinwiesen. Überwiegende Meinung innerhalb der verschiedenen ökonomischen Denkschulen war somit, dass die Finanzpolitik von
Rot-Grün mehr oder weniger eine Tragödie darstellte. Ob dieses Verdikt wissenschaftlichen Kriterien standhält, soll im Folgenden
untersucht werden.
Der Koalitionsvertrag nimmt die Gesellschaft in die Pflicht
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