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T
Thirteen Misunderstandings
About Natural Selection
Laith Al-Shawaf
1
, Kareem Zreik
2
and
David M. Buss
3
1
Department of Psychology, University of
Colorado, Colorado Springs, CO, USA
2
Department of Economics, Lebanese American
University, Beirut, Lebanon
3
The University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, TX, USA
Introduction
The theory of evolution by natural selection is the
unifying paradigm of biology and indeed of all the
life sciences –it explains and integrates a huge
diversity of known findings and predicts an aston-
ishing number of new ones (Alcock 2009; Coyne
2009). It has been famously suggested that noth-
ing in biology makes sense except in the light of
evolution (Dobzhansky 1973). Prominent philos-
opher Daniel Dennett has said “If I were to give an
award for the single best idea anyone ever had, I’d
give it to Darwin, ahead of even Newton and
Einstein and everyone else”(Dennett 1996,
p. 21). Indeed, scientists, historians of science,
and philosophers of science generally regard evo-
lutionary theory as one of the most predictively
powerful and explanatorily successful theories in
the history of science (Alcock 2009; Coyne 2009;
Dawkins 2009; Dennett 1996).
And yet, despite the simplicity of the core
idea and its universal acceptance in the scientific
community (e.g., Pew Research Center 2015),
misunderstandings regarding natural selection
abound. Such misconceptions even appear in col-
lege textbooks and among students who have
taken college-level evolutionary biology courses
(Alters and Nelson 2002; Gregory 2009; Nehm
and Reilly 2007; Nehm et al. 2008; Winegard
et al. 2014). A review of ten textbooks in social
psychology revealed at least one factual error
about inclusive fitness theory in each, and typi-
cally two to three (Park 2007). In this entry, we
briefly identify and dispel 13 of the most perva-
sive misunderstandings of evolutionary theory.
Misunderstanding 1: Natural Selection Is
a Random, Chance-Driven Process
Probably the most pervasive misunderstanding
about natural selection is that it is a chance
process.
In simplified form, evolution takes place in two
steps: mutation and natural selection (in reality,
the process is more complicated than this). In the
first step, random genetic mutations arise. These
mutations may turn out to be beneficial, detrimen-
tal, or neutral. This step is random, involves no
foresight, and does not take into account what the
organism “needs”or would benefit from. Indeed,
more mutations turn out to be detrimental than
beneficial. In the second step, mutations with
#Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018
T. K. Shackelford, V.A. Weekes-Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_2158-2
harmful effects on reproduction are filtered out by
natural selection, which acts like a sieve (Dawkins
1982). By contrast, those that have beneficial
effects on reproduction are more likely to be
passed on and increase in frequency over time.
This second step is quintessentially non-
random: some mutations make it past natural
selection’sfilter precisely because they are bene-
ficial, and others fail to make it past the filter
precisely because they are harmful. This is the
opposite of randomness: it is an orderly and pre-
dictable process in which there is a logical con-
nection between the effect a mutation has and its
likelihood of making it past the filter of natural
selection. By contrast, a random process would be
unpredictable and would have no systematic con-
nection between the effects of a mutation and its
likelihood of making it into the next generation.
The problem seems to be that people some-
times confuse mutation (which is random) with
natural selection (which is not random). To make
matters worse, they may conflate one or both of
these processes with evolution, which is the out-
come of these processes (see Misunderstanding
#11 for more detail on the distinction between
evolution and natural selection).
To avoid these errors, it helps to remember that
natural selection is the nonrandom sorting of ran-
domly mutated genes. Finally, because natural
selection is not random, the process it drives –
evolution –is also not random.
The misunderstanding that natural selection is
a chance process is particularly pernicious
because of its downstream effects. It is nearly
impossible that a random, chance-driven process
could explain the complexity, utility, and apparent
purposiveness of the adaptations we see in the
biological world. As a result, falling into the erro-
neous belief that natural selection is a random
process might lead some people to reject evolu-
tion altogether on the basis of a conceptual
mistake.
Misunderstanding 2: Natural Selection Is
Primarily About Survival
It is common to think of natural selection as being
primarily about survival, but in truth, it is primar-
ily about reproduction. Differential reproductive
success –not survival –is the driving engine and
the “bottom line”of evolution. It is possible to
illustrate this point using both logic and empirical
evidence.
To illustrate the point logically, imagine two
genes, each of which has two distinct effects
(these are called “pleiotropic effects”). Gene
A leads the animal in which it resides to live to
be 100 years old, but makes it infertile. Gene
B leads the animal in which it resides to die at
25 years old, but after having had several off-
spring. Which gene will have greater representa-
tion in the next generation? The answer is that
gene B will be well represented, whereas gene
A will be entirely absent . This thought experiment
helps to demonstrate that when the two conflict,
reproduction trumps survival.
It is also possible to illustrate empirically that
when survival and reproduction conflict, survival
takes the backseat. Examples abound. The pea-
cock’s tail is a massive burden to survival but is
crucial in seducing peahens (Darwin 1871; Cronin
1993). Human testosterone is a powerful immu-
nosuppressant but human females are attracted to
testosterone-dependent traits such as a strong jaw-
line and a high shoulder-to-hip ratio (Buss 2015;
Al-Shawaf & Lewis 2018). Male redback spiders
willingly offer themselves to their mates for
cannibalization –they die, but in doing so, they
double their paternity relative to noncannibalized
males (Andrade 1996,2003).
In other words, when it comes to evolution,
reproduction is more important than survival.
Many species take this to an extreme, living only
long enough to reproduce and then dying imme-
diately thereafter. This is so common in nature that
the phenomenon has a recognized name –
semelparity –and examples of species that do it
2 Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection
range from desert agave plants to butterflies to
bamboo plants to Pacific salmon (Quammen
1985). Perhaps even more morbid are those spe-
cies that successfully reproduce –only to be
promptly devoured by their offspring. The matri-
cidal gall midge Miastor does this, producing
larvae that eat it alive from the inside out
(Quammen 1985). The key point is that in evolu-
tion, survival is important only insofar as it even-
tually leads to reproduction. Both logical thought
experiments and an abundance of empirical exam-
ples illustrate that when survival and reproduction
conflict, it is invariably reproduction that wins
(Alcock 2009; Dawkins 1976; Hamilton 1964;
Williams 1966).
Misunderstanding 3: “Natural Selection”
Refers to an Agent That Actively
“Selects”the Best Organisms for the
Next Generation
“Natural selection”is an unfortunate misnomer. It
gives the impression that some kind of causal
agent is actively “selecting”traits for inclusion
in the next generation. Nothing could be further
from the truth: there is no agent and there is no
selection. Stated differently, there is no guiding
hand in the process of natural selection –the
process is blind, mechanistic, and passive.
“Differential reproductive success by virtue of
heritable differences in design”is a much more
accurate description of the process: some organ-
isms reproduce more than others, and this simple
fact is the key driver of evolution by natural selec-
tion. But because “differential reproductive suc-
cess”is a mouthful, scientists and laypeople alike
often use “natural selection”as shorthand. That is
perfectly fine as far as it goes, but it is helpful to
remember that this is just shorthand for a longer
and more cumbersome phrase.
In sum, “differential reproductive success”is a
little wordy, but it is more accurate in that it
(a) describes what is actually occurring, (b) does
not suggest the presence of a hidden causal agent,
and (c) does not misleadingly imply some form of
active selection. It may therefore be beneficial for
readers and writers to bear in mind that “natural
selection”is a linguistic shorthand rather than a
descriptively accurate term for the process that
drives evolutionary change.
Misunderstanding 4: Natural Selection Is
Teleological –It Is Working Toward a
Goal or Final Purpose
Natural selection does not have a final goal or
telos. It also has no foresight –in other words, it
is impossible for natural selection to take into
account future conditions. Though the products
of selection can be beautiful and complex, the
process itself is blind and mechanistic.
For example, if a certain species of mammal
would benefit from evolving a slightly thicker
coat of fur, this does not mean that natural selec-
tion will guide it toward that goal. First, a benefi-
cial mutation must arise that contributes to said
trait. This stage of the process is entirely random
and is not affected by what the animal “needs”or
would benefit from. In fact, harmful mutations are
much more common than beneficial mutations
(because there are many more ways to disrupt a
functioning biological machine than to improve
it). Second, if the new mutation happens to confer
a survival or reproductive advantage, natural
selection will favor it, and it will tend to increase
in frequency as the generations pass. But it is
impossible for natural selection to anticipate
future needs and lead species toward a distant
goal state, as natural selection cannot look ahead
and does not have goals.
Nor does natural selection inevitably lead to
“progress”in the sense of greater intelligence or
greater complexity. A common misconception is
to think of evolution as progressive –always
improving or moving toward greater complexity.
In reality, there is no predetermined direction to
evolution. Natural selection can easily cause a
species to lose complexity when the environment
demands it (see e.g., Misunderstanding #6 and
Al-Shawaf and Zreik 2017). For example, several
species have slowly evolved to lose their sight
after moving into pitch-black caves. Since sight
is no longer useful in such an environment, natural
selection led these species to lose their vision and
Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection 3
channel the metabolic resources previously used
for sight to other physiological needs such as
immune function or cell repair.
Natural selection is a tinkerer, not an engineer
(Jacob 1977). An engineer can look ahead to her
final goal and implement changes that help her get
closer to that final goal. She can also return to the
drawing board any time she pleases to fix a mis-
take. By contrast, natural selection cannot look
ahead, has no goal, and can only build adaptations
based on the genetic variants already available in
the population at the time. In short, natural selec-
tion has no telos or endgame.
Misunderstanding 5: Natural Selection
Favors the Survival of The Species
One of the most common misconceptions about
evolution is that natural selection favors the sur-
vival of the species. In reality, natural selection
works primarily at the level of the gene and the
individual bodies in which genes reside –not at
the level of groups, subspecies, or species
(Hamilton 1964; Williams 1966).
George Williams, one of the most important
evolutionary biologists of the twentieth century,
showed several decades ago that group selection
is theoretically possible –but likely to be
extremely rare in nature. For group selection to
work, several preconditions must be in place –and
these preconditions are themselves very rarely
met in nature (Williams 1966). Recent years
have witnessed a resurgence of interest in group
selection (e.g., Wilson and Sober 1994; Henrich
2004), but most evolutionary biologists and psy-
chologists agree on the following: (1) group selec-
tion is theoretically possible, but (2) genic-level
and individual-level selection are considerably
stronger than group-level selection, (3) there is
no clear empirical evidence that group selection
applies to humans, and (4) group selectionist
thinking does not appear to have led to any test-
able new hypotheses (Delton et al. 2011; Krasnow
et al. 2012,2015,2016; Krasnow and Delton
2012; Pinker 2012). By contrast, orthodox genic-
level and individual-level selectionist thinking
have led to many hundreds of testable hypotheses,
which have in turn led to thousands of empirical
studies. This suggests that, unlike genic-level and
individual-level thinking, group selectionist
thinking may not be especially generative or fruit-
ful as a scientific theory (Alcock 2017).
An important sidenote is worth mentioning:
even if group selection turns out to be more wide-
spread in nature than we previously thought, it
would still not be the case that adaptations evolve
for the good of the species. Even dyed-in-the-
wool group selectionists are primarily focused
on small, local groups –not whole species. It is
therefore incorrect, for example, to think we have
sex “to perpetuate the species”. We have sex
because we are the descendants of ancestors
whose sex led to reproduction, and so we inherited
their tendency for sexual motivation. An inciden-
tal side effect of this is that the species as a whole
may sometimes benefit. Outcomes that are bene-
ficial to groups can indeed occur, but they are not
the proper biological function of adaptations, they
are incidental side effects.
Misunderstanding 6: Natural Selection
Builds Perfectly Designed Biological
Mechanisms
There are several constraints that limit
natural selection’s ability to craft optimally
designed mechanisms. These include (a) time
lags, (b) historical constraints, (c) constraints due
to available genetic variation, (d) unavoidable
trade-offs, (e) imperfections at one level due to
selection at a different level, (f) mistakes due
to environmental unpredictability, and (g) antag-
onistic pleiotropy (Al-Shawaf and Zreik 2017;
Dawkins 1999). We highlight only three of these
in this entry: time lags, historical constraints, and
unavoidable trade-offs (for a more thorough dis-
cussion, see Al-Shawaf and Zreik 2017).
Time lags refer to the fact that natural selection
is a slow and gradual process. Animals are
adapted to past environments, not current envi-
ronments (Dawkins 1999). If the environment
changes rapidly, natural selection may be too
slow to catch up. For example, human taste pref-
erences for fat, sugar, and calorie-dense foods
4 Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection
were adaptive when food was scarce during the
evolution of our species. By contrast, in today’s
world of cheap and ubiquitous fast food, these
same taste preferences lead to obesity, type II
diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases (Buss
2015). The environment has changed too quickly
for the slow, cumulative process of evolution to
catch up. Time lags have rendered our previously
adaptive taste preferences maladaptive.
A second important constraint on natural selec-
tion comes from a species’evolutionary history.
Once a species has evolved a certain nervous
system or body plan, this constrains what it is
capable of evolving next. Given their current
body plan, it would be difficult or impossible for
elephants to now begin to evolve wings, say, or an
exoskeleton. Once a species finds itself on a cer-
tain evolutionary trajectory, this limits where it
can go next. In other words, the phylogenetic
background of a species affects what it is capable
of evolving next –history constrains evolution.
Unavoidable trade-offs impose a third con-
straint on natural selection. Gazelles under preda-
tion pressure from wolves may evolve longer legs,
enabling them to run faster and increasing their
likelihood of escape. But longer leg bones are
more brittle and more likely to break. The gazelles
therefore face an unavoidable trade-off: longer,
more gracile bones with enhanced capacity to
flee but increased likelihood of breaking, or
shorter, more robust bones with a lower likelihood
of escape. The key point is that every adaptation
comes with a cost, and this leads to unavoidable
trade-offs. Trade-offs, in turn, make it impossible
to optimize every parameter simultaneously.
These constraints, along with several others,
make it impossible for natural selection to build
perfectly designed biological mechanisms (see
Al-Shawaf and Zreik 2017; Dawkins 1999, for
an extended treatment of the constraints on natural
selection). It is because of these constraints on
natural selection that we are left with suboptimal
designs such as the vertebrate eye (which has a
blind spot) and the human esophagus and trachea
(whose inelegant setup poses a serious choking
hazard). Natural selection can build complex and
functional mechanisms. It can even build mecha-
nisms so sophisticated and impressive that
engineers are studying them in an attempt to rep-
licate their structure and function in artificial sys-
tems (e.g., the luminescence of fireflies, the sonar
of bats, and the adhesive abilities of geckos;
Bhushan 2009; Kim et al. 2012; Murr 2015).
Nonetheless, despite these impressive feats, the
constraints on natural selection limit its ability to
craft truly optimal biological mechanisms.
Misunderstanding 7: Evolution Implies
Genetic Determinism
One of the most widespread misunderstandings is
that evolution implies genetic determinism. That
is, many are under the impression that naturally
selected behaviors or psychological mechanisms
are genetically determined –that the claim “Xisa
product of natural selection”is equivalent to the
claim “X is genetically determined.”It is
emphatically not.
First, evolution by natural selection is an envi-
ronmentally driven process, and it would not exist
at all without the environment. Adaptations (the
products of natural selection) require environmen-
tal input at every stage of their emergence:
(a) initial evolution, (b) ontogenetic development,
and (c) immediate activation (Buss 1995). Stated
differently, adaptations only evolve in the first
place because of an environmental challenge,
often referred to as an “adaptive problem”(Buss
1995; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Subsequently,
adaptations require environmental input for their
proper development during an organism’s
lifespan. And finally, adaptations require environ-
mental input for their immediate activation in the
present. This means that the environment is cru-
cial to every product of evolution at every stage of
the evolutionary process.
The second problem with the idea that natural
selection implies genetic determinism has to do
with the fact that nothing is determined by genes
or environment alone. Genes and environment,
working together, jointly codetermine every
aspect of an organism –from its ears to its per-
sonality. Neither genes nor environment is capa-
ble of doing this alone. After all, genes are like a
recipe for making a body, and environmental
Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection 5
input is like the raw ingredients. The ingredients
alone are impotent, and the recipe alone is equally
impotent (e.g., Dawkins 1976; Ridley 2003). As
such, no credible scientist thinks the products of
evolution are genetically determined, and the
claim that a psychological mechanism is a product
of natural selection is not in any way equivalent to
the claim that it is genetically determined.
It might be worth adding here that the often-
misunderstood concept of heritability (percentage
of variance in a phenotypic trait due to genetics)
does not refer to a single individual; it refers to
how much of the differences between individuals
are due to differences in their genes as opposed to
differences in their environments. For example, if
the personality trait of extraversion has a herita-
bility of 60%, this does not mean that Bob’s extra-
version is 60% due to his genes and 40% due to
his environment. Instead, it means that 60% of the
differences between individuals in their extraver-
sion is due to differences in their genes, and 40%
is due to differences in their environments. For a
single organism, every single trait is jointly
codetermined by genes and environment. This
even includes traits with 0% heritability or 100%
heritability –there is simply no other way to build
an organism. Stated differently, we must distin-
guish between two levels of analysis: the individ-
ual level (in which we are concerned with
individual organisms) and the population level
(in which we are concerned with the differences
between organisms). Partitioning an outcome like
height, IQ, or extraversion into percent due to
genes and percent due to environment is mean-
ingful at the population level of analysis but
meaningless at the individual level of analysis.
A quip by Donald Hebb illustrates this point
well: when asked whether nature or nurture
makes a greater contribution to personality, he
replied, “Well, which contributes more to a
rectangle’s area –its length or its width?”
(Meaney 2001).
In sum, there are two key points about the
relationship between evolution, genes, and envi-
ronment. First, environmental input is essential to
the emergence and activation of all evolved mech-
anisms. Second, genes and environment jointly
codetermine everything from an organism’s
morphology to its behavior. For both of these
reasons, it is wrong to think that evolution bears
any relationship to genetic determinism.
Misunderstanding 8: Adaptations Must
Be Present at Birth (or Must Emerge Very
Early in Life)
An odd but widespread assumption is that
adaptations –the products of natural selection –
must be present at birth or must emerge very early
in life. Features not present early in life are auto-
matically assumed to be “learned,”not the product
of natural selection. One key problem with this
line of reasoning is that it mistakenly pits learning
and evolution against each other as if they are
competing explanations, when in fact they are
not (for an extended discussion of the compatibil-
ity between learning and evolution, see e.g.,
Al-Shawaf et al. 2018; Lewis et al. 2017; Symons
1979; Tinbergen 1963). The other key problem is
that there is simply no basis for the arbitrary
assumption that the products of natural selection
must be present at birth.
Teeth and breasts illustrate what is wrong with
this principle: they are both adaptations par excel-
lence, but they are not present at birth. Instead,
they emerge at the appropriate developmental
stage of the organism’s life. Natural selection
builds adaptations that emerge at the correct
point in ontogenetic development, not adaptations
that are necessarily present at the moment a baby
is born. Teeth and breasts (and pubic hair and
facial hair, etc.) emerge later, when they are
needed, during the appropriate life stage. The
same goes for walking and bipedalism: newborn
infants cannot walk, but nobody doubts that
bipedalism is a biological adaptation. Similarly,
nobody doubts that flight or vision are exquisite
biological adaptations, despite the fact that many
newly hatched bird offspring can do neither.
In sum, adaptations –the products of natural
selection –can “come online”during the prenatal
phase, shortly after birth, or much later in life.
There is no theoretically principled reason to stip-
ulate that they must be present at birth. That is not
how natural selection works –it works to produce
6 Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection
adaptations that come online during the develop-
mental phase in which they are needed, not ones
that are present at a particular arbitrarily selected
moment.
Misunderstanding 9: The Products of
Evolved Mechanisms Are Fixed and
Unchangeable
A key misconception is that if a certain behavior is
the output of a mechanism built by natural selec-
tion, it is fixed and unchangeable. For example,
people worry that if there is evidence of an evo-
lutionary basis for aggression, warfare, or sexual
infidelity, this somehow means that these undesir-
able outcomes are inevitable.
In reality, evolved mechanisms are flexible and
their outcomes are rarely fixed. All evolved mech-
anisms require environmental input. Often,
changing the input is enough to change the output.
For example, all humans have callus-producing
mechanisms in their hands. These evolved physi-
ological mechanisms are designed to produce cal-
luses in response to repeated friction of the skin.
But this does not mean that the outcome –
calluses –is unavoidable: simply remove the fric-
tion by wearing gloves, and these mechanisms
will no longer produce calluses. By modifying
the input, you have successfully changed the out-
put (Buss 2015).
Behaviors produced by natural selection are no
more fixed or set in stone than calluses. Indeed,
evolved psychological mechanisms are exqui-
sitely context-dependent and environmentally
sensitive (see Al-Shawaf et al. 2018, for an
extended treatment of the centrality of context in
evolutionary psychology). Even if socially unde-
sirable behaviors such as aggression, warfare, or
romantic infidelity have an evolutionary basis,
this does not mean that we are stuck with them
forever. Indeed, a wealth of evidence shows that
war, violence, and other forms of aggression have
been steadily declining throughout human history
(Pinker 2011). In fact, our best chance of changing
or eliminating socially undesirable behaviors will
come from understanding them more deeply.
Only when we understand the inputs, evolved
decision rules, and outputs involved in an unde-
sirable outcome will we have the information
necessary to try to change it.
Misunderstanding 10: You Can Use the
Principles of Natural Selection to Bypass
the Psychological Level of Analysis and
Predict Behavior Directly
It is common to think –especially among evolu-
tionists who do not have a background in
psychology –that there is nothing wrong with
going directly from the principles of natural selec-
tion to predictions about behavior, skipping the
psychological or information-processing level of
analysis. But skipping the level of psychological
adaptations –the information-processing machin-
ery built by natural selection –can lead one astray
(Cosmides and Tooby 1987).
Consider incest aversion. Studies suggest that
the mind uses a few key cues during childhood to
tag individuals as siblings, marking them as
unsuitable sexual partners. Chief among these
are childhood co-residence (years spent growing
up with the other child in the same house) and
maternal perinatal association (if you are the older
sibling, observing your mother breastfeeding the
other child). The human mind uses these two key
informational inputs to tag someone as a sibling
and consequently produces incest aversion at the
thought of having sex with them. Normally, sib-
lings encounter these cues during childhood and
nonsiblings do not. But sometimes there is a
mismatch –and these mismatches are revealing.
For instance, in the phenomenon of Taiwanese
minor marriages, a young female child is
betrothed to a young male child, and they are
both raised by the boy’s parents in the boy’s
parents’house. Because they grow up together
in the same household (childhood co-residence),
their brains mistakenly tag each other as siblings,
producing incest aversion. As a consequence, the
individuals involved in Taiwanese minor mar-
riages report less sexual interest in one another,
lower fertility rates, lower relationship satisfac-
tion, and higher divorce rates (Lieberman et al.
2007; Lieberman and Symons 1998). In essence,
Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection 7
the mind mistakenly coded a nonrelative as a
sibling because it received the key informational
input of childhood co-residence (Lieberman et al.
2003,2007).
This process can fail in the opposite way, too:
genetic siblings who do not receive the key infor-
mational inputs of childhood co-residence and
maternal perinatal association may fail to psycho-
logically tag each other as siblings, leaving open
the possibility of being sexually attracted to each
other later in life. This is exactly what happened to
some siblings who were separated at birth, grew
up apart, and later in life found each other and fell
in love (Childs 1998). This outcome makes no
sense unless you take into account the
information-processing level of analysis. If you
attempt to go directly from the principles of natu-
ral selection to behavior, the phenomenon appears
incomprehensible –they are genetic siblings, so
why are they sexually attracted to each other? By
contrast, if you do not skip the information-
processing level of analysis, the difficulty imme-
diately disappears: these siblings were reared
apart, so their minds did not receive the key infor-
mational inputs needed to produce incest aver-
sion. That is why they are capable of being
sexually attracted to one another.
In short, if you leapfrog the psychological level
of analysis and attempt to go directly from the
principles of natural selection to statements
about behavior, you will make mistakes in both
prediction and explanation (Cosmides and Tooby
1987). This brings to mind two quotes from foun-
dational evolutionary thinkers, one by Donald
Symons and the other by John Tooby and Leda
Cosmides. To paraphrase Don Symons, the evo-
lutionist should focus on psychology and infor-
mation processing. When he ignores these in
favor of observable behavior, he is like the drunk
looking for his key under the lamppost: he knows
he dropped it in the dark, but under the lamppost
the light is better (Symons 1979).
And as Tooby and Cosmides wrote so elo-
quently, “The fact that the brain processes infor-
mation is not an accidental side effect of some
metabolic process. The brain was designed by
natural selection to be a computer. Therefore, if
you want to describe its operation in a way that
captures its evolved function, you need to think of
it as composed of programs that process informa-
tion”(Tooby and Cosmides 2005, pp. 16–17). In
short, if you want to maximize the accuracy of
your evolution-based predictions and explana-
tions, you would do well not to skip the
information-processing level of analysis.
Misunderstanding 11: Natural Selection
Is the Only Driver of Evolutionary
Change
Another important misconception is that natural
selection is the only driver of evolutionary change.
A variant of this misunderstanding is the erroneous
belief that the terms “evolution”and “natural
selection”are more or less interchangeable.
In reality, evolution is the outcome, and there
are four evolutionary forces that drive it: muta-
tion, genetic drift, gene flow, and natural selection
(e.g., Futuyma and Kirkpatrick 2017). Mutation is
a random heritable change in a gene or chromo-
some and constitutes part of the raw material on
which natural selection works. Genetic drift is the
random, chance-driven change in allele frequency
from one generation to the next. Gene flow, some-
times called admixture or migration, is the move-
ment of genes from one population to another.
Natural selection, the fourth evolutionary force
and the subject of this entry, is most accurately
described as nonrandom differential reproductive
success (see Misunderstandings #1 and #2).
To be clear, while natural selection is not the
only driver of evolutionary change, it is a key
one –and most scientists agree that it is the most
important one (Alcock 2009; Dawkins 1976;
Dennett 1996; Williams 1966). It is also the only
evolutionary force capable of fashioning adapta-
tions or creating the appearance of design, the
explication of which is the central explanatory
task of evolutionary biology (Darwin 1859;
Williams 1966).
This is an important point: while there are four
different evolutionary forces, only one of them –
natural selection –can create adaptations designed
to solve environmental problems. The other three
forces can cause evolution –defined as a change
8 Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection
in allele frequencies in a population over time –
but only natural selection can fashion complex
specialized mechanisms like the porcupine’s
quills, the turtle’s shell, or the angler fish’s bait,
all exquisitely designed to solve key environmen-
tal problems in these animals’lives.
In sum, natural selection is only one of four
evolutionary forces, but it is the only one capable
of fashioning adaptations.
Misunderstanding 12: Evolutionary
Hypotheses Are Primarily Post-Hoc
Storytelling –Also Known as “Just-So”
Stories
One of the most widespread misunderstandings of
evolutionary science –and of evolutionary psy-
chology in particular –is that evolutionary
hypotheses are post-hoc storytelling, also known
as “just-so stories”(Gould and Lewontin 1979).
Nothing could be further from the truth. There are
two ways to appreciate why this is a mistake.
First, as in all sciences, evolutionary psychol-
ogists can proceed in two ways: using the top-
down or bottom-up approach. In the top-down
approach to science, researchers generate hypoth-
eses and predictions directly from theory and sub-
sequently go out and test their hypotheses. Since
hypotheses and predictions in this approach are
made a priori on the basis of theory, it is impos-
sible for the top-down approach to be open to the
charge of just-so storytelling.
By contrast, in the bottom-up approach,
researchers first make an observation, and then
generate a hypothesis to explain why that obser-
vation might have occurred. This approach to
science is potentially open to the charge of post-
hoc storytelling, but only if the researcher stops
after generating a hypothesis and fails to derive or
test any new predictions from that hypothesis.
Whether or not a proposed explanation counts as
just-so storytelling depends entirely on this last
step: if the researcher in question simply chooses
to believe her hypothesis without generating and
testing any novel predictions, then she is guilty of
just-so storytelling. If, by contrast, the researcher
uses the proposed hypothesis to generate novel,
testable predictions, the charge falls flat.
A cursory look at published evolutionary psycho-
logical papers makes it clear that most evolution-
ary psychological hypotheses are not open to this
accusation, either because they used the top-down
approach to generate a priori predictions (e.g., see
Al-Shawaf 2016), or because they used the
bottom-up approach but subsequently generated
and tested novel predictions.
A concrete way of remedying the confusion
here is simply to list examples where an evolu-
tionary approach started from theory, generated
novel hypotheses, and then used those hypotheses
to derive new predictions which were subse-
quently tested in the lab and the field. There are
literally hundreds of such examples, and many of
them have been included in easy-to-read tables in
previous journal articles. We therefore do not rep-
licate them here but instead direct the reader to
three articles where they can find plenty of such
examples –as well as much more detailed discus-
sions of why evolutionary hypotheses are emi-
nently falsifiable. Key papers that include such
tables and discussion are Buss et al. (1998),
Ketelaar and Ellis (2000), and Lewis et al. (2017).
The underlying mistake seems to be thinking
that if a discipline is partly historical in nature
(as are the evolutionary sciences), that makes the
discipline unfalsifiable and prone to just-so story-
telling. But if that were the case, all disciplines
with a historical component –including, for
example, astrophysics, cosmology, and geology –
would be exercises in just-so storytelling. This is
obviously incorrect. Whether or not a scientific
discipline includes a historical component is not
relevant in differentiating good science from just-
so storytelling. What is relevant is whether the
scientists in a given discipline –regardless of
whether that discipline includes a historical
component –use their hypotheses to generate
novel predictions that can be tested in the present
day. If they skip this crucial step, they may be
engaged in just-so storytelling. By contrast, if they
use their hypotheses to generate and test novel
predictions about previously unobserved phe-
nomena, they are engaged in normal, productive
science. It is the latter that characterizes most
evolutionary psychological research (for full
Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection 9
discussions, see Buss et al. 1998; Confer et al.
2010; Ketelaar and Ellis 2000; Lewis et al. 2017).
Misunderstanding 13: Natural Selection
Has Stopped for Our Species, So Humans
Are No Longer Evolving
The thirteenth misconception is that humans have
stopped evolving because natural selection has
ceased operating on our species. This erroneous
line of reasoning points out that we have eradi-
cated many diseases, and that modern medicine
keeps humans alive when they would have surely
died in ancestral populations. There are at least
three reasons why this does not warrant the con-
clusion that humans have stopped evolving.
First, we have not eradicated all diseases. Peo-
ple still die of cardiovascular problems, sexually
transmitted diseases, respiratory diseases, cancer,
and plenty of other illnesses. Every year, about
800,000 children die from diarrhea-related prob-
lems alone (Center for Disease Control and
Prevention 2015). It is true that WEIRD societies
(Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic; Henrich et al. 2010) have made
great medical progress, but as a species, we are
far from having eradicated all sources of death and
disease. The vast majority of the world still suffers
from many illnesses, some of which are fatal. And
of course this is to say nothing of warfare, homi-
cide, and other causes of death.
Second, even if we had eradicated all sources
of disease, this would not imply the cessation of
evolution. Recall that it is differential reproduc-
tion, not survival, that is the bottom line of evolu-
tion (see Misunderstanding #2). As long as some
humans are still reproducing more than others,
natural selection is still operating. This means
that, putting survival aside, there are plenty of
sources of selection still operating on our species:
mate competition, mate selection, mate retention,
romantic infidelity, childrearing, investment in
genetic relatives, grandparenting, altruism, social
betrayal, free-riding, status hierarchy negotiation,
and more. Eradicating disease does not remove
important selection pressures related to social pro-
cesses, mating processes, and differential
reproductive success. Indeed, not only are humans
still evolving, but the pace of our evolution has
sped up over the last 10,000 years (Cochran and
Harpending 2009).
Third, it is important to remember that there are
three prerequisites for evolution: (1) variation
(organisms in a population vary), (2) inheritance
(some of this variation is passed on to offspring),
and (3) differential reproductive success (as a
result, some of these organisms reproduce more
than others). As long as ingredient #3 (differential
reproductive success) still obtains, natural selec-
tion is still operating. And as long as all three
prerequisites are still in place –as is the case
among humans –evolution is still occurring. Con-
sequently, humans are still evolving, and will be
for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
The theory of evolution by natural selection is
regarded by scientists as one of the most parsimo-
nious, explanatorily successful, and predictively
powerful theories in the history of science
(Alcock 2009; Coyne 2009; Dawkins 2009;
Dennett 1996; Dobzhansky 1973). Its parsimony
and simplicity suggest that it should not be diffi-
cult to understand, but misconceptions still
abound, even among scientists. There are likely
several reasons for this, including insufficient
educational exposure to the principles and find-
ings of evolutionary biology as well as social and
ideological biases that serve as impediments to
understanding (e.g., Von Hippel and Buss 2017).
Ironically, some of these errors may also be rooted
in the fact that our evolved cognitive systems
make it difficult for us to understand evolution
correctly (e.g., Evans and Lane 2011; Legare
et al. 2013; Shtulman and Schulz 2008).
This entry has tackled what we see as the
13 most important misunderstandings about evo-
lution and natural selection (see Table 1). This list
is not exhaustive. For example, due to space con-
siderations, we were unable to discuss such mis-
understandings as the notion that something is
good because it is natural, the intuition that natural
selection must always lead to change, or the idea
10 Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection
that evolution is “just a theory”(e.g., Dawkins
2009). Nevertheless, we have attempted to clear
away the most common impediments to an
accurate understanding of natural selection. We
hope this entry helps readers to avoid these
Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection, Table 1 Misunderstandings about natural selection vs.
accurate alternatives
Misconception Accurate alternative
Natural selection is random and so
is evolution
Mutation is random, natural selection is nonrandom, and as a consequence,
evolution is also nonrandom
Survival is the bottom line of
evolution by natural selection
Differential reproduction is the bottom line of evolution by natural selection.
Survival is tributary to reproduction, and when the two conflict, reproduction
trumps survival
There is an agent doing the
“selecting”in natural selection
There is no agent and no active “selection”. The process is blind and passive, and a
more accurate term for natural selection would be “differential reproductive
success”
Evolution is teleological –the
process has a final goal, endgame,
or telos
Evolution is not teleological and has no final goal, endgame, or telos. Natural
selection is blind and cannot peer into the future
Evolution favors the “survival of
the species”
Most evolutionists agree that group selection is a much weaker force than genic-
level and individual-level selection. Adaptations do not routinely evolve to benefit
groups, and the survival of species is not a goal of evolution
Natural selection builds perfectly
designed biological mechanisms
Natural selection builds functional mechanisms that are often impressive but are
nonetheless suboptimal. This is because there are several unavoidable constraints
on the power of selection (e.g., time lags and trade-offs)
Evolution implies genetic
determinism
Evolution does not imply genetic determinism. An evolutionary perspective
highlights the centrality of the environment at every stage: the initial evolution of
adaptations, their ontogenetic development, and their immediate activation in the
present
Adaptations must be present at
birth (or must develop very early
in life)
Natural selection builds adaptations that “come online”at the appropriate
developmental stage of life, not adaptations that are necessarily present at birth.
Teeth and breasts illustrate this principle
The products or outputs of
adaptations are fixed and
unchangeable
Evolved mechanisms are flexible. Because environmental input is crucial to the
products of adaptations, it is often possible to change the output by simply
modifying the input (e.g., calluses)
You can use the principles of
evolution to predict behavior
directly, bypassing psychological
adaptations
Information processing is the key intervening step between the principles of
evolution and predictions about behavior. Skipping this step can lead to errors in
both prediction and explanation
Natural selection is the only driver
of evolutionary change
There are four drivers of evolutionary change: mutation, migration, genetic drift,
and natural selection. Natural selection is very important, and it is the only viable
explanation for the structure and function of adaptations, but it is only one of four
drivers of evolutionary change
Evolutionary hypotheses are
inherently unfalsifiable “just-so”
stories
Most evolutionary hypotheses are eminently falsifiable. When researchers use the
top-down approach to generate a priori predictions, the “just-so”charge falls flat.
When researchers use the bottom-up, observation-driven approach, whether the
charge falls flat depends on whether the researchers use their hypotheses to
generate novel, testable predictions. For an extended discussion, see Buss et al.
1998; Confer et al. 2010; Ketelaar & Ellis 2000; Lewis et al. 2017
Humans have stopped evolving
because natural selection has
ceased for our species
Humans are still evolving and natural selection is still ongoing in our species. We
have not eradicated all sources of death and disease –and even if we had, the
bottom line of evolution is differential reproduction, not survival. As long as some
humans still reproduce more than others, natural selection is still ongoing in our
species
Thirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection 11
misunderstandings and to think about the process
of evolution in a rigorous and clear-headed
manner.
Cross-References
▶Adaptations
▶Falsifiability
▶Genetic Determinism
▶George Williams
▶Natural Selection
▶Problems With Group Selection
▶Richard Dawkins on Constraints on Natural
Selection
▶The Handicap Principle
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