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Taking a Theological Turn in Legal Theory: Regional Priority and Theology in Transoxanian Ḥanafī Thought
Abstract
This article focuses on two characteristics of the mature, post-formative Transoxanian Ḥanafī school. The first is the centrality of Transoxanian scholarly identity to the school, which I address by treating Transoxania as an intellectual center at a geographic periphery. I seek to turn our attention to the priority of the Transoxanians’ regional identity (as Ḥanafīs) with Samarqand and mā warāʾ al-nahr, the area “beyond the Oxus river,” otherwise known as Transoxania. I argue that the Ḥanafīs of Transoxania defined themselves among––not separate from––the larger Ḥanafī school through reference to Samarqand and to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī in a constellation of issues in legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) with particular theological associations. I contend that in this time period, these scholars should not be considered “Māturīdī,” but rather “Ḥanafī-Samarqandī,” as the geographic association is a greater defining factor of their theological––and thus, legal theoretical––commitments than is the figure of al-Māturīdī himself.
The second characteristic is the theological turn. Post-formative Transoxanian Ḥanafī scholars place more emphasis than their predecessors have done on the theological principles underlying legal theory. They demonstrate this in their introduction of theological debates and associations into the genre of legal theory writing. As a result of the theological turn, this period gives us a clearer sense of the absolute certainty demanded by the discipline of theology and the probability accepted by legal theory.
In multiple places in the Qur’an, we encounter the story of Moses in Sinai returning to his fellow Israelites after having received from God the “tablets” ( al-alwāḥ ). He returns with anger, however, as he learns that many of his fellow Israelites have taken to worshiping “the calf” ( al-ʿijl ), a “lowing” calf made of jewelry (Q 7:148, 20:88) and widely assumed to be golden. The aggrieved Moses condemns the practice. And in just one version of the story, in Q 2:54, he issues a peculiar command: “so repent to your creator and kill yourselves” ( fa-tūbū ilā bāriʾikum fa-qtulū anfusakum ). This Mosaic directive appears at first blush to parallel the biblical version of the story, specifically Exodus 32:27, where Moses commands the Levites to kill many of their fellow Israelites. Although the details are disputed, this general conception of a large-scale execution was adopted by many Muslim exegetes. The Mosaic “kill yourselves” command, however, stands in stark contrast to various qur’anic directives pertaining to Muḥammad’s community. The latter include the prohibition, “Do not kill yourselves” ( wa-lā taqtulū anfusakum ) (Q 4:29). One might explain this disparity by invoking abrogation ( naskh ): the final law ( sharʿ ) revealed to Muḥammad repealed certain aspects of the Mosaic law, including the “kill yourselves” command; alternatively, the latter could have been an exceptional, standalone case. But not every exegete took the Mosaic command in Q 2:54 to be confirmation of the biblically supported notion of mass execution, opting instead to proffer a dissenting view. A minority of influential theological rationalist ( mutakallim ), Sufi, and modernist exegetes imagined unfulfilled or alternative “killings,” for instance, a “killing” of the ego or a “mortification.” I maintain that the qur’anic commentary of the Ḥanafī theologian Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) of Samarqand represents an important intervention in this discourse. In the present paper, I analyze his ostensibly unprecedented, multifaceted version of the dissenting view. Al-Māturīdī offers not just linguistic, but also well-developed intratextual reasons for rethinking the prevailing reading of the “kill yourselves” command. Invoking other qur’anic versions of the same Mosaic narrative, al-Māturīdī asserts that—contrary to the biblical version—the Qur’an presents the command as having been issued after the guilty ones repented. And through linguistic and thematic analyses of certain key qur’anic terms and notions appearing elsewhere (including Q 2:84, 4:66, and 9:111), he presents persuasive hermeneutic reassessments of the “kill yourselves” command. He also shows how even a literal reading of the command need not suggest consummated killings. Furthermore, although al-Māturīdī himself does not mention it, one additional strength of the dissenting view is that it offers the most straightforward explanation for why the mysterious person who “led” the Israelites “astray” ( aḍallahum ) through the creation and worship of the golden calf (Q 20:85), the “Sāmirī” (al-Sāmirī), is, per the prevailing understanding, spared execution and continues to live. The end result is a version of the dissenting view that, while not irrefutable, is coherent, concisely described yet relatively sophisticated, and plausibly compelling.
The Māturīdīs think that, without revealed law, human beings can grasp through speculative reasoning that some actions are good ( ḥasan ) and some are bad ( qabīḥ ). This article addresses the ontological aspect of such ethical rationalism. An analysis of the texts of legal theory shows that the sixth/twelfth-century Māturīdīs approached moral values in a non-realist way. Specifically, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144?), who identifies himself as a true successor of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), demonstrates that goodness ( ḥusn ) and badness ( qubḥ ) are neither real accidents nor divine command and prohibition; rather, “good” and “bad” just express one’s natural or rational approval and disapproval of objects and actions, and Prophetic law shapes some of the natural likes and dislikes. On this account, I conclude that al-Samarqandī’s view, shared by his contemporaneous fellow Māturīdīs such as Abū l-Thanāʾ al-Lāmishī (d. after 539/1144) and Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142), challenges the current standard interpretations of the Māturīdī ethics as realism or divine command theory.
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