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PRIF Report 3/2018
DEALING WITH CHINA IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA
DUTERTE CHANGING COURSE
PETER KREUZER //
LEIBNIZ-INSTITUT HESSISCHE STIFTUNG FRIEDENS- UND KONFLIKTFORSCHUNG (HSFK)
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE FRANKFURT (PRIF)
Cover:
Chinese President Xi Jinping welcomes Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte before the Leaders’
Roundtable Summit of the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation at Yanqi Lake,
© picture alliance / Photoshot
Text license:
Creative Commons CC-BY-ND (Attribution/NoDerivatives/4.0 International).
The images used are subject to their own licenses.
Correspondence to:
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Baseler Straße 27–31
D-60329 Frankfurt am Main
Telephone: +49 69 95 91 04-0
E-Mail: kreuzer@hsfk.de
https://www.prif.org
ISBN: 978-3-946459-31-6
Recapitulating the developments of the past years of escalation and the surprisingly successful
how to deal prudently with an assertive China in the South China Sea.
took the unprecedented step of bringing a case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
The aftermath of this step was that bilateral relations chilled to an all-time-low, with China retali-
ating by escalating its activity in the disputed areas: small low-tide elevations were transformed into
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erational capacity of the Chinese Navy and Airforce. The Philippines in turn were highly successful in
gathering political support from leading democracies, and also managed to strengthen their security
ties with its old ally, the United States, and establish new ones with other regional powers, foremost
among them Japan and Australia.
the Chinese claims than most observers had anticipated. China lost almost all its maritime claims in
the disputed regions of the South China Sea. It is hardly surprising that the award was perceived as
vindicating the Philippine strategy of resorting to international law in order to prevail in the dispute
over sovereignty and sovereign rights with China by the Philippine administration of Benigno Aquino
and its western supporters alike.
This report largely follows the assessment of the new Philippine administration of Rodrigo Dute-
that the Philippine strategy of publicly confronting China through the unilateral seising of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration prompted Chinese assertiveness and most probably contributed to the
Chinese decision to pursue its great-power ambitions in a more drastic way. Thus, it was clearly
unsuccessful, if the aim was either to stop Chinese assertiveness, lessen the threat of escalation or
should be understood as an act of lawfare, insofar as it breached the informal agreement of regional
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tion of arbitration as a consensual step of competing claimants.
would have been substantial. China would most probably have further advanced its strategy of es-
and harbors, and simultaneously aggressively denied the Philippines access to vast stretches of the
sea it claimed for itself.
Yet, two weeks before the PCA award, the new Philippine President Duterte, who immediately
shifted course and offered to mend fences with China, was inaugurated. His offer to ignore the award
for the time being enabled China to respond in kind without loss of face or admission of defeat.
Since then, the all but broken down bilateral communication channels have been re-established
partner and source of loans for the Philippine development program focused on infrastructure, the
respect to the eventual peacefulness of China’s rise has returned to the region.
This report argues that the PCA-award was important as it imposed serious and rising reputa-
tional costs on China. If the Philippines had pressed its case further, China would either have had
to continue its aggressive stance on the ground or publicly concede defeat (a nearly inconceivable
scenario). This threat of worsening reputational costs was one important precondition for China to
respond positively to the Duterte initiative.
For the immediate future, it is crucial to keep alive the memory of the costs associated with as
well as the limitations of the strategies of mutual if asymmetric assertiveness that triggered the
policy shift. In the longer run, substantial progress in institutionalizing working mechanisms for sus-
regulations to environmental standards and non-traditional security threats.
One crucial lesson from the analysis of past dynamics is that premature and unilateral efforts at
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cation of international arbitration (or other legal instruments) can be perceived as a strategic move
aimed at winning a contest through law that cannot be won otherwise. Under such circumstances
lawfare or the use of law as a weapon of war.
a positive way to its core needs and predicaments and thus provide incentives for the lessening of
asserting power unilaterally.
lawfare
This report addresses the question of how to deal prudently with China in the South China Sea (SCS).
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the Philippines had attracted the most international attention during the past years until the summer
China as an outright challenge, to which it responded with highly assertive steps on the ground in the
South China Sea.
-
dation after the new Philippine government under President Duterte decided to abruptly replace a
confrontational stance with a conciliatory approach towards China.
Chinese assertiveness is taken as a given in much of the literature. The standard advice for Chi-
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needs and predicaments and thus also provide incentives that allow China to reciprocate by reducing
its assertiveness and focus on non-competitive dimensions of bilateral relations. Neither strategy
former widens the sphere and level of contention and thereby the threat of militarized disputes, the
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ment, lessening threats of mutual escalation as a result.
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as well as Japan. Most important was the Philippine decision to unilaterally invoke the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) to rule on a number of questions that would in the worst case all but oblit-
erate the vast Chinese sovereignty claims on much of the South China Sea.
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ing on its nine-dash line
(NM), based on the control of islands, were rendered null and void.
1 Strictly speaking the PCA is not in itself a judicial body. It “consists of an International Bureau which acts as a registry
and provides an administrative structure for arbitral tribunals. The PCA also maintains a list of arbitrators, compiled
by the States parties to the Convention, which is designed to assist State parties in the selection of international ar-
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ment, it was an outright failure to the newly elected Duterte administration due to the tremendous
attendant costs. The Aquino strategy did not prevent China from further asserting its claims in the
jets, bombers and warships. Further, there was no feasible option for the Philippines to enforce the
ruling without running the risk of militarizing the dispute. Finally, the Philippines seemed to have lost
out economically due to its hardline stance during the years of confrontation.
-
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nisms geared towards reducing the danger of escalatory dynamics and establishing an overall coop-
Chinese island building and militarization, the massive acts of unilateral assertion resulted in rising
Chinese intentions in the Southeast Asian region, and strengthened bonds between the Philippines
a window of opportunity to escape from the costly dynamics of escalation that had dominated the
preceding years. By promising to ignore the PCA ruling for the time being Duterte allowed China to
The results of this initial shift and subsequent developments have been promising, with an at
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work that centers on economic cooperation and a new role for China as a crucial partner in Philippine
development.
It is argued that the Philippine success in the PCA arbitration was a necessary precondition for
the relatively positive Chinese response to the Duterte initiative. It directly and indirectly occasioned
rising costs for China that made it amenable to a reduction of assertiveness. However, had the Philip-
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and rising confrontation, as the only way out for China would have required conceding defeat. Con-
sequently, the Duterte shift was equally necessary in order to be able to defuse and step away from
mutual confrontation. However, the Duterte strategy of embracing China would have had less effect
in the absence of the preceding arbitration, given that China would then not have felt the pain associ-
ated with its otherwise rather successful assertiveness on the ground.
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advanced by the lesser power.
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Taiwan (ROC), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have claimed larger or smaller portions
in the Spratly Islands off the east coast of the Philippines.
China (ROC) sailed to the largest of its islands, renamed it Taiping Dao and departed. In the same year
Philippine President Elpido Quirino declared that the Philippines perceived the Spratlys as vital to its
security and would hence claim it. However, during the following years government action seemed
Tomás Cloma, (without government endorsement) claimed much of the Spratly Island territory for
himself on the right of discovery as terra nullius. Philippine President Magsaysay denied that this
meant that the Philippines had claimed the islands. Despite this, both the Republic of China (ROC)
and the second by strong protests at any infringements of its sovereignty claims.
Fig. 1: The South China Sea (Source: CartoGIS services, College of Asia and the Pacic, The Austra-
lian National University - South China Sea in color (
maps/islands-south-china-sea), converted to black and white (grayscale))
Afterwards the islands were all but forgotten until the oil rush
off the coast of Palawan spurred the idea of subsea riches that might be claimed for the Philippines.
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his Freedomland (Kalayaan) to the Philippine state. One year earlier, (South) Vietnamese troops were
islands held by South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese response was to occupy additional elevations
in the Spratlys, all of which were taken over by the Vietnamese government after the Communist vic-
several islands to strengthen its claim.
It was only then that the People’s Republic of China decided to become active on the ground. Un-
resulted in an uproar in later times seems to have hardly bothered the Philippine leadership at that
issue in the then upcoming visit of Philippine President Corazon Aquino to China (See Manila Stan-
suppressed large scale demonstrations on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, resulting in high numbers
that violated human rights and to a contender for global hegemony.
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the Philippine government authorized a research vessel operated by the Philippine Navy to survey for
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nese position hardened after Ramos underscored the Philippines’ close links with the United States
nearer to Philippine metropolitan territory than those it had hitherto controlled. This time, the “reac-
moral outrage, aimed at humiliating China as a belligerent Goliath, warning against the “Tibetization”
of the South China Sea and that China’s actions “may invite diplomatic quarantine reminiscent of
world reaction to the massacre of students and workers at Tian’anmen Square some years.” In this
6 PETER KREUZER
democracy and its opponents. In line with this, Ferdinand Ramos threatened authoritarian regimes
Yet, it is important to note that the Ramos government, despite this hardline stance, maintained
bilateral communication channels. This eventually resulted in a bilateral code of conduct (COC), as
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tions, the bilateral COC as well as the subsequent bilateral meeting of top leaders signaled that the
strategy for dealing with China has been described as “bi-multilateralism” by Richard Heydarian, in
other words “directly engaging with the Chinese leadership while rallying regional support to rein in
Crisis continued on a lesser level with ups and downs to the end of the Ramos Presidency and into
once during their tenures, Arroyo was a frequent visitor to China, and managed to initiate a bilateral
to which Vietnam acceded only one year later. This honeymoon was accompanied by a number
of huge infrastructure projects that were to be supported by Chinese loans and skyrocketing bilat-
embedded in an overarching framework dominated by mutually enticing opportunities.
This came to an end when the Arroyo government came under severe attack for corruption and
selling out the country to China. Fighting for its political survival, the Arroyo government changed
was back as a threat to Philippine security, even if still in a subdued way. The short-lived notion of
claimed that this “should remind us that […] there will always be nations that will show might and
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zette, no year).
For the
Driven by domestic concerns, the Arroyo government also abandoned its conscious effort at
equi-balancing the United States and China and turned back to the traditional foreign policy line of
enmity deriving from the Spratly dispute. It was simply that neither side took any interest in giving pri-
-
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6 the opponents demonstrated during these few years that
-
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ough Shoal Incident (see below), it is important to note that this was preceded by a number of smaller
-
ident Aquino nevertheless “was considerably more reticent in pursuing strong economic relations
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projects with Chinese participation, most prominently the North Rail project and the Chinese share in
the Philippine National Grid Corporation continued to sour relations. Policy also shifted with respect
-
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tively be argued that management aims at establishing sustainable mechanisms that reduce the salience of a given
out a mutually satisfactory agreement between the parties involved […] without necessarily dealing with its funda-
7 This project aimed at providing a railway link connecting Metro Manila to the provinces in northern Luzon.
8 PETER KREUZER
to the South China Sea. Distancing itself from its predecessor the Aquino government renamed Reed
Bank, in the northeastern part of the Kalayaan islands, Recto Bank in honor of a “late senator and
Philippine lawmakers and an army general visited Philippine occupied Pag-Asa island in the Spratlys.
There they proposed renaming the whole region the West Philippine Sea. Chinese criticism that the
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ship to withdraw. The Philippines in turn sent patrol aircraft and escort vessels to accompany the
8 A few days earlier, it
dissident Liu Xiaobo and thereby seemed to appease China, it simultaneously turned to a policy of
opposing every Chinese move in the South China Sea by acts of counter assertion. The new line with
Address, where he contended:
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ed territories. Shortly afterwards, Chinese Maritime Security vessels confronted a Philippine Navy
escalated as the two contending forces opposed each other for several weeks. Even though both
sides initially withdrew their vessels from the area, the Chinese returned, and have since then blocked
Up to this point in time, both sides had largely played according to the established informal rules
-
-
-
10
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Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, in the wake of the Scarborough shoal incident, Philippine “China
hawks,” led by Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario “advocated for a full-blown diplomatic offensive
term lawfare denotes “the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military
LAW FARE
compulsory arbitration according to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
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of core terms of UNCLOS, such as the terms island and rock. From the outset it was clear that the
The second case aimed at minimizing the number of legal islands in order to minimize the reach of
any Chinese territorial claim within the Philippine claimed EEZ. Years earlier China had tried to avoid
it does “not accept any of the obligatory procedures provided for in […] the Convention with respect
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addressed without considering matters which are or have been validly removed from the jurisdiction
the dispute. From the Chinese position it thereby violated one core foundation of international adju-
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theless is a broad consensus on its core determinants, all of which include that any arbitration rests
on the prior mandate conferred on the arbitrators by the parties to the dispute. This may be framed as
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ed with the power to adjudicate the dispute in the place of […] courts by rendering a decision having
unilateral decision of the Philippines and the eventual acceptance of the case by the PCA cannot be
PETER KREUZER
easily reconciled with this principle of consensualism that sets arbitration apart from adjudication.
only about the
interpretation of UNCLOS. The intended and realized effect, however, was a legal delegitimation of
Chinese territorial claims.
In its quest to win the case, the Philippines also disregarded well established knowledge about
the (factual) preconditions for successful arbitration:
“The use of arbitration to solve territorial disputes can be successful only where the par-
ties are committed to resolving the dispute peacefully through arbitration, and that such a
commitment is unlikely if the dispute involves an issue considered to be of vital national
importance. For arbitration to successfully resolve such disputes, the parties must have a
modicum of trust in each other and be willing to accept the fact that they may lose. Thus,
legal interpretation while aiming at a decision that delegitimated China’s territorial and maritime
claims, the Philippines utilized the arbitration panel as if it were a court, and successfully used this
pretense to defeat China indirectly.
Equally dramatic for China was that the Philippines were highly successful in spreading and as-
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eign Minister Del Rosario portrayed the Philippines as simply aiming at “implementing a rules-based
approach” and at a global system “that will be just and fair to all states, regardless of economic size
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tive according to which the Philippines are a true believer in international law and that international
law and its organs “serve as the great equalizer among States, allowing countries, such as my own,
was framed as one between might (China) and right (Philippines), the ruling stylized as a momentous
precedent with global impact:
11 Here the core problem seems to be that China is perceived as having opted out of compulsory arbitration through its
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tion tribunal’s perspective, there was no need for a special arbitration agreement, as Chinese consent was already
12
rulings on territorial claims and concluded that “states are less likely to comply when the stronger disputant is asked
“There are some who could not believe that the Arbitral Tribunal would have the courage
to apply the law to a country like China. There are those who think the rule of law in inter-
Only seldom noted is that by turning to international compulsory arbitration the Philippines not only
various other tit-for-tat strategies that had characterized previous decades never aimed at producing
Such a binding ruling may be ignored by a strong power, however, only at substantial costs. Com-
-
as beforehand gains and losses have a preliminary character, binding arbitration has an inevitable
the decision.
In view of their refusal to participate in the arbitration process and the successful efforts of the
onwards China acted decisively by transforming small elevations in the sea, occupied by Chinese
huge harbors, airports and substantial military defense equipment. As the Philippines did not budge
and retract their case at the PCA, local incidents between Philippine and Chinese actors in the South
speculative at the least.
PETER KREUZER
Fig. 2: Philippine Export to Selected Countries in Billion US$ (Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority,
various datasets)
The assumption of Chinese reprisals is also disputable because of the continued rise of Chinese
-
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dras, who disclosed that the government was prepared in case the Chinese minority owner of the
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines tried to sabotage the country’s power supply (Gonzales
and “huge planned investments were either lost or ‘forgotten’ due to the sanctions China has im-
Most threatening from the Philippine perspective was that China clearly bypassed the Philippines
in its One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR).
various Chinese maps produced before the PCA ruling clearly bypassed the Philippines (see below).
13 The One Belt One Road initiative is a comprehensive development strategy aimed at enhancing international trade
14
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mained stalled for the time being, whereas at the same time concrete projects were hammered out
with a large number of other countries.
themselves in a very uncomfortable situation. To China the immediate negative repercussions with
the South China Sea” (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, no year).
However, wider repercussions grew as more and more Southeast Asian countries grew wary of
Chinese intentions in the region and questioned the Chinese narrative of a peaceful rise of China. Not
only relations with other claimant countries deteriorated, but non-claimants also voiced their oppo-
sition to China, such as Singapore, whose Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong criticized that “outcomes
cannot be determined just by might is right, I think international law must have a big weight in how
argued in an opinion piece for the Singaporean Straits Times that Xi Jinping’s idea of a “great reju-
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China had alienated almost all regional powers that were not overly dependent on it for economic
China had not only lost the normative contest for the hearts of Southeast Asian leaders, it had also
United States an ideal opportunity to strengthen its bonds not only with the Philippines, but also with
other Southeast Asian countries, most importantly with Vietnam, and to gain additional legitimacy for
its policy of countering Chinese claims with its Freedom of Navigation operations. Furthermore, other
deepened in the following years.
15
Japan and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines. ( Less than
one year later a further agreement followed that allows Japan to supply military equipment to the Philippines (Philip-
PETER KREUZER
regulations to allow multi-role response vessels to be supplied to the Philippine Coast Guard (Japan
Even European states signaled their enhanced interest in a rule-based order for South East Asia,
with the French Minister of Defense, Le Drian, even proposing that European navies could take an
Clearly, prospective costs to China were rising dramatically. On the basis of a positive PCA ruling,
the Philippines could press its case in the international community, rallying “multilateral diplomatic
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dom of Navigation Operations. Such a development would have forced Sino-Philippine relations into
a dangerous circle of escalation that would have been hard to control.
From the perspective of the Aquino administration, its strategy had been a complete success, as the
Philippine President Aquino lauded the PCA for its “fair judgement” and declared the ruling a “victo-
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pressly thanking the “community of responsible nations” that supported the Philippines. He further
is unlawful, coercive, and contrary to the correct principles that govern relations between
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proach the UN General Assembly to appeal to the global village of nations.” (Del Rosario
Clearly, if the Aquino government had stayed in power, the situation would not have been perceived as
a dead end, nor would the development of bilateral relations and the Chinese foray in the South China
Yet, to a growing number of Filipinos, the costs seemed to have been rising, with success being
-
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continuing the course at that juncture threatened the Philippines with huge economic costs. The
previous years showed how the country had seemingly been left out of the Chinese Belt and Road
Philippines, could resort to economic coercion. This might easily throttle the Philippine economy.
of Chinese sanctions. Finally, the United States consistently shied away from committing itself to the
danger that the Philippines would have to confront China on its own, if the latter chose to further es-
This critical line was strongly advocated by the incoming President Duterte. Duterte set out from
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ceeded in gaining important international political support, this could not be translated into a policy
that prevented Chinese assertiveness on the ground. It was actually perceived as causing the unprec-
edented level of assertive moves by the Chinese which had resulted in a severe deterioration of the
dispute have led to the completion by China of facilities that are inherently designed for
military purposes in some of the rock features within our EEZ, while we stand completely
To the new administration the Philippines had clearly lost out with respect to their own immediate
against evil, or David against Goliath, and linked it to the Sino-US contest for regional and global hege-
distrust and suspicion […] In turn this has impelled China to dig in and take on a hard-line position on
Already in the early phase of campaigning presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte made it clear that
rights in the South China Sea, he argued that the Aquino government’s strategy was not viable, as
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PETER KREUZER
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curity issues in the South China Sea to the strengthening of bilateral trade and Chinese support for
‘If you want to talk, let’s talk. Or you might just want to open this as a mutual corridor and
His running mate, the current Foreign Minister Cayetano, supported the view that the new govern-
ment would not compromise on the Philippine claims but would emphasize toning down the differ-
ences and refocusing discussions on joint endeavors that do not force any side to give up on sover-
presidency. High ranking Chinese diplomatic personnel met Duterte several times. Duterte’s running
changed their course in reporting on the Philippines. The notoriously hard-hitting Global Times even
provided a blueprint for a shift towards a reset of the bilateral relations along a more cooperative line
Duterte’s inauguration, the Global Times wrote:
favor the Philippines, giving Duterte leverage in bargaining with China. Manila and Beijing
might reach a reconciliation: The Philippines will be asked to employ a low-key approach to
16
Given those signals, it came as no surprise that both sides revived bilateral communication as soon
-
bers of the Philippine Council on Foreign Relations and the Philippine Ambassadors Foundation, both
of which are broadly in favor of the new policy line under Duterte, visited China and re-established
In early October President Duterte appointed Jose Santa Romana, a long-time resident journalist in
Beijing and President of the Philippine Association of Chinese Studies (PACS), new Philippine ambas-
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Santa Romana’s appointment was followed by the most outstanding highlight of the new era of
had been successfully arranged on short notice and during which Duterte talked to both President
Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang among others. He brought home from his visit Chinese contract
the core infrastructure projects of the Philippine President’s Build Build Build program (Philippine In-
frastructure Transparency Portal, no year). Since then, Philippine President Duterte has visited China
and met Xi several times, with top Chinese politicians reciprocating, most prominently Chinese Pre-
Yet, these top-level meetings were only the tip of the iceberg of a dramatically improving and swiftly
multiplying plethora of Philippine delegations visiting China and corresponding visits of Chinese dele-
gations to the Philippines. Long dormant bilateral conduits were revitalized as the Joint Commission
on Economic and Trade Cooperation, while others were newly established as the China-Philippines
Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea and the Joint Coast Guard Committee
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of change was the visit of three Chinese warships to the home city of President Duterte, Davao, in
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PETER KREUZER
it has shied away from strengthening its grip on Scarborough Shoal. The militarization of the newly
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gressive action. It is, however, framed differently by the current Philippine government. To the Duterte
recent years, but whether China stops with the elevations it occupied earlier or establishes a pres-
ence on others. As Presidential spokesman Harry Roque formulates the new line:
“As long as there is [no] reclamation of new islets or reefs, then we continue to respect that
they are true to their commitment. […] But I think from the very beginning, China, we knew
was militarizing the area by reclaiming these areas and by using them as military bases […].
The point is, has there been a breach of Chinese commitment not to reclaiming any new
asser-
tiveness
Fig. 3: Sino-Philippine Law enforcement incidents (Source: CSIS, no year).
China also proved supportive of Philippine interests with respect to the long-delayed Code of Con-
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tion, it was now willing to sign at least a “framework” agreement for a future COC during the ASEAN
long way to go to arrive at a feasible option, the two governments have been in continuous discussion
on this subject. Three developments need to be noted that may help to establish a new discourse on
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of the President still pending. Second, there has been a bid by the China National Offshore Oil Cor-
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Oceanology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Marine Science Institute of the University
of the Philippines in waters east of the Philippines (Benham Rise and East of Mindanao) (Pazzibugan
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taken “in water under Philippine jurisdiction” and has also aimed at creating a “good atmosphere for
Simultaneously, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Cayetano disclosed that the two countries
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ritorial claims. The aim of the discussion is an agreement that “conforms to both Philippine law and
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17
18
PETER KREUZER
Fig. 4: Philippine Exports to China (percent change on same month last year) (Source: Philippine
Statistics Authority: Foreign Trade Statistics (Export), various issues, https://psa.gov.ph/business/
foreign-trade)
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second only to South Korea. Even more important, Chinese have overtaken Korean tourists during
the last few months and have become the top spenders (Philippine Department of Tourism, no year).
A similar shift occurred with respect to total approved Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
also be further mentioned that in contrast to foreign trade and tourism, China is not an important
player with respect to foreign direct investment in the Philippines. Japan, Korea, the United States, the
Netherlands, Singapore, the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands and a host of other countries
clearly outpace China in this respect.
Fig. 5: Approved Chinese Foreign Direct Investments in Million PhP (Source: Philippine Statistics Au-
thority. Various quarterly Foreign Investments reports).
Finally, the above-mentioned Chinese promises of support for Philippine infrastructure investments
are slowly gaining traction. The various projects initiated during the visit of Philippine President Dute-
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River Pump Irrigation Project to the North-South Railway Project, all the way to the Binondo-Intra-
muros and Estrella-Pantaleon Bridge projects that link the northern and southern parts of Metro Ma-
nila. The China Development Bank and the Philippine Bases Conversion and Development Authority
Further, Chinese state-owned enterprises are bidding in a number of public works projects in the
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Initiative. Finance Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez III commended China for its Belt and Road Initiative
however, this initiative enhances cooperation instead of repelling interaction” (quoted in: Tubayan
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lating dispute with China has, at least for the time being, not resulted in a weakening of the Philippine
PETER KREUZER
legal position. At the same time, it eased not only bilateral relations with China but also allowed for
that allow better and timely communication of mutual misgivings and their processing prior to them
incentive of rising costs has also been partly replaced by newly developed gains that may provide
an added impetus for searching for sustainable means for less confrontational management of the
Relations between China and other claimants have also improved, although less than those with
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way creating a more favorable overall framework for cooperation. Yet, when Vietnam decided to uni-
halfway between Vietnam and (East) Malaysia, China forced Vietnam to abandon this gas-drilling
For the Philippines and the other South East Asian claimants, current opportunities are mainly
economic. For China they are more on the “symbolic” level of politics, as China may regain the rela-
tively broad acceptance of its self-image of a peacefully rising power in Southeast Asia that it enjoyed
Chinese foreign policy:
“Beijing’s diplomacy has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the re-
gion. As a result, most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a construc-
19
20
Three years later specialists from the Congressional Research Service argued that by
regional organizations on such issues as territorial disputes and trade, Beijing has largely
allayed Southeast Asian concerns that China poses a military or economic threat.” (Lum/
This fairly positive image has been severely damaged mostly due to Chinese assertiveness in its
few years, the pendulum seems to have swung back to a perception of a threatening China that was
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learning that in its quest for respect it has to grant equal respect to its counterparts and make wise
use of its superior military power.
Currently, regional leaders seem to be content with the new messages emanating from China and
appreciates “the goodwill of China to be more open and their willingness to cooperate and strengthen
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ment spokeswoman Hua Chunying who said:
“The trust between China and ASEAN countries is so precious and the stability in the South
China Sea is a hard-won outcome. […] China stands ready to continue to work with relevant
parties to vigorously advance the consultation on the Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea (COC) and maritime practical cooperation and commit ourselves to upholding peace,
stability, prosperity and development in the South China Sea” (China Ministry of Foreign
The ASEAN discourse on the security situation in the South China Sea has been similarly moderate
21 During the previous two years Indonesian policy towards China had shifted, as Indonesia took a much stronger
PETER KREUZER
and the avoidance of any “actions that may further complicate the situation,” in the annual meeting
neighbors, and stand for a concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security
-
ry arbitration under UNCLOS and fabricating a case that did not touch upon territorial questions, well
move by the Philippines. However, it clearly went against the dominant regional practice and political
prudence, as it was clear that this move would engender heightened resistance and confrontation.
brought to arbitration, and only with the consent of all contending states. This is also a general norm
given that Europe and the United States generally do not invoke international institutions in the settle-
Chinese intransigence follows that of other big powers that chose to push their national interests
when these collided with international law. As Gent and Shannon show, even when stronger states
have agreed to compliance in the arbitration or adjudication of territorial claims, actual compliance
from the power balance. If this is so in those cases where the opponents had agreed on giving “up
-
posed on one party, especially if this is the stronger one.
Currently the old
measures, symbolic politics and economic cooperation as the means for embedding the potential
This shift would not have been possible under the Aquino government, as it perceived the situation
as neither massively hurting Philippine interests nor as a dead end. The new Philippine government
of Rodrigo Duterte based its evaluation of the outcome not on the symbolic rewards of international
more comfortable bilateral relations. It then took the risk of public signaling its new interpretation of
the current situation as a costly dead end and also proposed resetting relations. In many respects
Initial signals were already being made by the presidential candidate Duterte early in his cam-
paign, and thus had no consequences for Philippine foreign policy. Yet, this early phase of signaling
was crucial, because it allowed the presidential candidate to test the reaction of China without hav-
it was a risk-free option to test whether the gamble was worthwhile. It was also an option to test the
waters with respect to domestic support, which was quickly forthcoming after having been silenced
host of (former) diplomats who had been sidelined under Del Rosario came out with their open sup-
port for a recalibration of foreign policy, China also signaled its willingness to respond positively to a
-
essary initial reciprocal steps to kick start bilateral relations and mend fences.
That this is not to be mistaken for compromising on Philippine claims vindicated by the PCA rul-
The PCA award is one core factor that differentiates the present status quo from the one during the
early years of the new millennium. The other is the memory of the mounting costs of intransigency in
-
management with the Philippines and the regional perceptions of China that are slowly shifting back
to “less of a threat and more of an opportunity” should entice China to compromise in everyday prac-
tice, as long as this does not require any compromises in principle.
Given the thoroughly established myth of the South China Sea belonging in one way or another
to China, shifts towards a more realistic appraisal that may allow for compromise solutions can be
international supporters. However, the low-key reaction of the Chinese population to the PCA ruling
-
If we assume that states are learning organisms, then one of the core lessons of the past de-
cades could be that dispute settlement is crucially dependent on timing, and that for the foreseeable
-
PETER KREUZER
-
-
For the time being the Duterte initiative has had clearly positive results in containing the threaten-
ing dynamics of a slowly escalating spiral of mutual confrontation. Subsequent developments have
established a fragile new status quo from which promising opportunities have emerged for both
least the Philippines political practice and rhetoric, as well as the guarded optimism that is growing
in the ASEAN region, show that (re-)gaining the position of a benevolent big power is not beyond the
grasp of a sensible Chinese policy that focuses more on the power of persuasion and less on the
power of superior might.
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