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Unieburgers en de Sociale Bijstand
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Abstract
Dit hoofdstuk behandelt de toegang van Unieburgers tot de sociale bijstand op grond van de Participatiewet in het licht van Europeesrechtelijke en nationale sociale rechten. Ik bespreek allereerst de ontwikkeling van het recht van Unieburgers op bijstand in de gastlidstaat en de opkomst en relevantie van Europese sociale grondrechten (paragraaf 5.2). Hierna beschrijf ik de huidige bestuurs- en rechtspraktijk in Nederland voor verschillende ‘categorieën’ Unieburgers. Deze praktijk toets ik aan het recht op vrij verkeer en non-discriminatie van Unieburgers zoals dat voortvloeit uit EU verdragen en Sociaal Handvest en zoals dat is geïnterpreteerd door het Europees Hof van Justitie (paragraaf 5.3). Op basis van nationale jurisprudentie en voorbeelden betoog ik vervolgens dat de wijze waarop Nederland de sociale rechten van Unieburgers implementeert – hoewel soms verdedigbaar onder het Europees recht en vaak zelfs voortvloeiend uit de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie – spanningen kan opleveren met het grondrecht op minimale middelen van bestaan. Bovendien worden deze spanningen verder versterkt door een rigide toepassing van de kostendelersnorm in de bijstand (paragraaf 5.4). Ik besluit met de conclusie dat deze grondrechtelijke spanningen niet alleen te wijten zijn aan de interpretatie en strikte toepassing van Unierecht door Nederlandse autoriteiten, maar dat het ook een fundamenteler dilemma van het Europese vrij personenverkeer blootlegt.
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Dit artikel analyseert de ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse rechtspraktijk ten opzichte van de toegang van economisch inactieve EU-burgers tot de bijstand. Binnen de veronderstelde grenzen van de abstracte burgerschapsjurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie hebben de Nederlandse autoriteiten getracht een zo restrictief mogelijk regime tegenover ‘bijstandstoeristen’ te vormen. Het resulterende beleid is een treffend voorbeeld van een ‘verdiende’ vorm van sociaal burgerschap.
A ‘dually open’ free movement system has evolved in the European Union (EU), granting EU citizens the right to free movement within the Union as well as cross-border welfare rights. Some scholarly literature and public debates have characterised the system as corrosive to the nationally organised welfare state, which will become a ‘magnet’ for the European poor. This paper examines how the German and Danish welfare states have responded to the ‘dual open’ system and its outcomes in terms of EU citizens’ take-up rate of non-contributory benefits between 2007 and 2015. We show that the domestic responses were mostly restrictive and that outcomes remained rather stable. Our findings do not support the welfare magnet thesis but instead identify a tendency to a bifurcated social protection system for EU citizens in Germany.
This paper seeks to make a contribution to the study of personhood in EU free movement law by linking a historical and doctrinal analysis with the internal transformation of the homo economicus in economic liberalism. It is argued that a shift can be observed in the government of mobility from “freeing up” the ability of the worker as a relatively passive subject tied to external economic mechanisms to the targeting of the individual him/herself as a responsible, active bearer of economic capability or “human capital”, whereby past socio-economic conduct and prospective economic activity serve as the thresholds for the entitlement to rights. The essence of the “new” homo economicus of EU free movement law is situated at the intersection of the social and economic, serving as a rational frame for the government of the European mover on the basis of a mutual responsibility between the Union citizen and his/her host Member State towards social and economic activity, self-sufficiency and integration.
http://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/tijdschrifteuropeesrecht/2015/10/NtER_1382-4120_2015_005_010_002
The concept of social security is vague and the idea of social rights as human rights is highly controversial. So, the origin of the concept of social security will be outlined and characterised as to its historical and conceptual content. In addition, during the post-World War II reconstruction of Europe and the world, human rights got an enormous momentum. It brought about the international turn in the development of human rights. This chapter deals with social security as a human right. This right found its first expression as an international legal guarantee in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR). It gave rise to social rights as human rights of the second generation. Within an international system to secure human rights, it was established by this instrument as a non-binding declaration of principles. In the subsequent development the principle achieved the status of an enforceable human right. This approach changed the conceptual basis of human rights legislation substantially. Before this human rights’ international turn, human rights were conceived as the key domain of national legislation. It became evident that the independent national state could no longer reliably guarantee human rights protection. The human right of social security made it mandatory for the states to establish a universal and comprehensive system of social security with a wide range of substantial benefits to each human being. To respect this international human rights commitment became imperative to all states.
There is little doubt that the European Union suffers from a legitimacy deficit. However, the causes of this deficit and, as a consequence, the remedies are contested. This article wants to show that an important, but often overlooked, cause for the legitimacy deficit lies in the overconstitutionalization of the EU. The European Treaties have been constitutionalized by the ECJ, but are full of provisions that would be ordinary law in states. Constitutionalization means de-politicization. What has been regulated on the constitutional level is no longer open for political decision-making. Thus, in the EU political decisions of high salience are not only withdrawn from the democratically legitimized institutions, but also immunized against political correction. Therefore, the consequences from the constitutionalization have to be drawn: The Treaties should be reduced to those norms that reflect the functions of a constitution, whereas all the other parts have to be downgraded to the level of secondary law.