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Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia

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Abstract

The global rise of populist campaigns against democratic governments has revived the long-standing scholarly debate on how democracies can best defend themselves against anti-democratic challenges. While some view an aggressive militant democracy approach as the most effective option, others propose accommodation of populist actors and voters. Others again suggest a merging of the two paradigms. This article analyzes how the government of Indonesian President Jokowi has responded to the unprecedented Islamist-populist mobilization in the capital Jakarta in late 2016. Unsystematically mixing elements of all available options, Jokowi’s administration pursued a criminalization strategy against populists that violated established legal norms, and launched vaguely targeted but patronage-oriented accommodation policies. As a result, the government’s attempt to protect the democratic status quo from populist attacks turned into a threat to democracy itself. Indonesian democracy, I argue, is now in a slow but perceptible process of deconsolidation.

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... Selain itu kemunduran demokrasi juga disebabkan oleh munculnya pemimpin otoriter yang didukung oleh legitimasi elektoral, lemahnya peran partai politik dalam mengedepankan nilai-nilai demokrasi substantif, serta relasi jaringan patron klien dalam sistem politik, dominasi kelompok oligarki dalam pemerintahan, serta struktur ekonomi politik di Indonesia (Luthfi Makhasin, 2022). Fakta kemunduran demokrasi juga diperkuat oleh laporan lembaga pengindeks demokrasi, seperti The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2020-2021), Freedom House (2019/2020) dan juga Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia (IDI) 2019/2020) (Jati, 2021 (Mietzner, 2018) . ...
... Studi mutakhir yang berkaitan dengan pembubaran organisasi Islamis pasca Orde Baru adalah pembubaran organisasi Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia melalui Peraturan pemerintah No. 2 Tahun 2017. Studi yang berkaitan dengan pembubaran organisasi HTI kecenderungannya melihat aspek politik hukum pembubaran HTI (Aswar, Bin Mohd Yusof, et al., 2020) dan pembubaran HTI ditinjau dari aspek sosial, politik dan demokrasi di Indonesia (Arifianto, 2017;Burhani, 2017;Mietzner, 2018). Lebih lanjut, studi Hilmy fokus melihat masa depan organisasi Islamis Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia dalam konteks demokrasi di Indonesia setelah dibubarkan oleh pemerintah (Hilmy, 2020). ...
... Untuk menganalisis pembubaran organisasi Islamis yang merupakan fokus kajian dalam artikel ini, penulis menggunakan teori konfrontasi dan akomodasi relasi antara Islam dan politik di Indonesia yang telah dipetakan oleh Effendy (2011). Selain itu, pembubaran organisasi Islamis juga dilihat dari perspektif relasi antara demokrasi, negara, dan gerakan non demokrasi (Mietzner, 2018). Kedua kerangka tersebut dijadikan acuan dalam melihat pembubaran organisasi Islamis di bawah pemerintahan Jokowi. ...
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The state policy under the Jokowi government, which ban Islamist organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), has reaped pros and cons in socio-political and religious discourse in Indonesia. Those who support the disbandment consider that the state's stance in taking a firm stance against religious organizations that prioritize non-democratic actions is in accordance with the law. Meanwhile, those who reject it think that the government's policy is contrary to the freedom of association and assembly guaranteed by the constitution in a democratic system. This study aims to explain the banning of Islamist organizations under the Jokowi government. The method used is qualitative, in which the data were based on online media coverage of the banning of Islamist organizations. The data were analyzed with content analysis techniques. This research shows that the government's policy of banning Islamist organizations without going through the judicial process (which tends to be authoritarian and repressive) led to a setback of democracy in Indonesia. Disbanding the Islamist organization further strengthens the confrontation between Islamist groups and the state and also declines the development of democracy in Indonesia. The state tends to choose a militant-democratic approach in dissolving Islamist organizations rather than promoting a dialogical-accommodative approach. This study recommends that guiding social organizations is much better than promoting a repressive approach through laws and regulations, as has occurred with HTI and FPI.
... Concerning state policy towards the Islamist movement, various studies that emerged focused on highlighting the state's attitude which is considered as a democratic regression. They acknowledge the threat of these Islamic movements to democracy in Indonesia, but government policies are also considered undemocratic and become a boomerang for democracy in Indonesia itself (Mietzner, 2018;Power, 2018;Warburton and Aspinall, 2019). Other works specifically discuss in specific the state policy on the Islamist movement, such as Gustrieni Putri (2022) wrote about the state repression strategies on Islamic defender front (FPI) from 2016 -2021 that are including arrest the members; creating bad narratives on FPI`s ideology and activities, and dissolving the movement (Putri, 2022). ...
... Along with the Islamist protests and political mobilization, the narrative of counterradicalism, counter-intolerance, and safeguarding NKRI and Pancasila was echoed by the Joko Widodo government. Mietzner (2018) has put that the government has taken three steps of criminalization to counter the opposition during the heightened 2016 Islamist mobilization. ...
... The first step was taken the night before the 212 (2 December) Demonstration 2016 in Monas, where several activists, main nationalists, were arrested because of suspicion of insult and treason against the government. Those activists were Rahmawati Soekarno Putri, Ratna Sarumpaet, Eko Suryo Santjojo, Adityawarman Thahar, Kivlan Zein, Firza Huzein, Alvin Indra and Ahmad Dhani (Mietzner, 2018). ...
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After enjoying free and open political conditions for a long time, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a transnational political Islamist movement, had to face the government's coercive response in 2017 when the government decided to disband this movement in consideration of violations of state principles and threatening the Republic of Indonesia. This paper tried to elaborate on the country's stigmatization efforts against HTI to create a negative picture of this group. The concept used is a stigmatization approach in the study of social movements as one of the state's strategies in repressing a movement that is considered threatening. The method used is qualitative, with data taken from books, journals, and online media sources. This article concludes that the Indonesian government has successfully used the stigmatization method to inhibit the influence of HTI in Indonesia. Stigmatization is carried out through various narratives against this movement, especially related to threats to ideology and political traditions in Indonesia.
... Formed by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab in 1998, the FPI established itself as a proviolence, far-right movement dedicated to Islamizing Indonesia. Indeed, the FPI was frequently involved in a kind of vigilantism they portrayed as acts necessary to protect the ummah and Islam from "vice" (Barton 2021;Amal 2020;Fossati and Mietzner 2019;Mietzner 2018). These violent acts, which ranged from attacking nightclub patrons, venues serving alcohol, and brothels, to assaulting Ahmadiyya Muslims and destroying their places of worship, have brought the FPI a reputation as a dangerous and aggressive group (ABC News 2020). ...
... Ugur and Ince (2015, p. 42) observe "three major causes" behind the rise of the FPI in Indonesia: "the perception that Islamic faith is threatened by global and local forces and the faith should be protected, the demand that Islamic Sharia's 'universal' laws should be implemented and enforced by the state, and the claim that they support state's law enforcement officers in the fight against immorality, misdeeds and big sins". The FPI capitalizes on the perception that Islam and the ummah require defending, not merely in Indonesia but worldwide, by claiming that the group will protect Islam and Muslims from the internal and foreign forces that wish to do them harm (Barton 2021;Mietzner 2018;Hadiz 2016, p. 112;Wilson 2015). The FPI does not focus on winning seats in parliament. ...
... The influence of the FPI grew during the 2010s when the group became a powerful presence in the Defending Islam Movement (Aksi Bela Islam/ABI) and National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Councils Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI/GNPF MUI). ABI, which was a coalition of far-right groups dedicated to Islamism and which included both the FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), was formed to protest Ahok's 'blasphemous' remarks on the misuse of the Qur'an by Islamist activists and politicians (Maulia 2020;Nuryanti 2021;Adiwilaga et al. 2019;Fossati and Mietzner 2019;Hadiz 2018;Mietzner 2018). Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (most commonly known by his Hakka nickname 'Ahok'), was accused in 2016 and later convicted of blaspheming against Islam. ...
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This article examines whether a ‘civilizational turn’ has occurred among populist movements in Indonesia. It focuses on the civilizational elements in the populist discourse of the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front/FPI) in Indonesia. The article traces the FPI’s history and growing influence on politics and society in Indonesia in the 2010s. This article argues that the FPI has instrumentalized religious discourse, and through it divided Indonesian society into three groups: the virtuous ummah, corrupt elites, and immoral internal and external non-Muslim enemies, especially the civilizational bloc ‘the West’. This instrumentalization gained the group a degree of popularity in the second decade of the post-Suharto period and strengthened its political power and ability to bargain with mainstream political parties. The article uses the FPI’s actions and discourse during the Ahok affair to demonstrate the civilizational turn in Indonesian populism. The article shows how the FPI grew in power during the Ahok affair, in which a Christian Chinese politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, was accused of blasphemy by Indonesian Islamists and later convicted on the same charge by an Indonesian court. The FPI was a leading part of a broad coalition of Islamist groups and individuals which called for Ahok to be charged with blasphemy; charges which were eventually laid and which led to Ahok being sentenced to two years imprisonment. The FPI, the article shows, framed Ahok as a non-Muslim Christian and therefore a ‘foreign’ enemy who was spreading moral corruption in Indonesia, governing ‘elites’ as complacent in combating immorality and positioned themselves as defenders of ‘the people’ or ummah. From the security perspective of the state, the FPI presented a critical threat that required containing. As a result of the growing power of the group, the FPI was banned in 2020 and Rizieq was imprisoned, while Ahok was politically rehabilitated by the Widodo government. Although the FPI’s banning is considered the most effective nonpermanent solution for the state, there is evidence that the FPI’s discourse has been adopted by mainstream political actors. This article, then, finds that the growth of the FPI during the second decade of the post-Suharto period, and their actions in leading the persecution of Ahok, demonstrates a civilizational turn in Indonesian Islamist populism.
... Recent analyses have highlighted the illiberal turn of President Joko Widodo (Mietzner 2018;Bland 2020;Power and Warburton 2020). This illiberal turn, however, is not the result of a recalcitrant parliament and the perils of presidentialism. ...
... Rather, Joko Widodo's executive aggrandizement has been justified by the growing extremist Islamic mobilization in street protests and during elections. In Mietzner's (2018) terms, Joko Widodo has been 'fighting illiberalism with illiberalism'. At the same time, Joko Widodo has done little to protect the LGBT community and religious minorities as attacks on their civil liberties mounted. ...
... The occasion for Jokowi's 'authoritarian turn' (Power 2018) came midway through his first term when Islamists who remained implacably opposed to his presidency staged mass protests over blasphemy charges of which Widodo's deputy and successor as governor of Jakarta had been convicted in 2017. Widodo chose to fight back against illiberalism with escalating illiberal measures of his own (Mietzner 2018). At the same time, Widodo did little to protect civil liberties as attacks against the LGBT community and religious minorities mounted . ...
... Wacana politik identitas dipicu, salah satu faktor determinannya adalah momentum selama pilkada Daerah Khusus Ibu Kota (DKI) Jakarta 2017. Banyak studi yang telah dicurahkan mengenai politik identitas pada pilkada DKI Jakarta, baik yang menyorot secara khusus tentang politik identitas Islam (Khamdan & Wiharyani, 2018;Romli, 2019;Sawri, 2020) maupun aspek gerakan kebangkitan populisme Islam (Hadiz, 2018;Jati, 2017;Mietzner, 2018). Tidak hanya selama kampanye pilkada DKI Jakarta 2016 saja, politik identitas Islam mendominasi peta perpolitikan saat itu. ...
... Satu hal yang belum banyak dikaji tulisan-tulisan sebelumnya adalah fakta tentang kontestasi di internal umat Islam Indonesia adalah perebutan ruang publik kekuasaan di antara kekuatan politik identitas Islam, yakni kekuatan Islam politik atau Islam radikal versus Islam moderat. Para sarjana lebih melihat fenomena pilpres sebagai fenomena populisme Islam seperti ditunjukkan Hadiz (2018), Mietzner (2018, dan sebagainya. Fakta ini bukan hanya berhenti pada perebutan wacana maupun politik praktis belaka. ...
... Hadiz menyebutnya sebagai kebangkitan new-Islamic populism (populisme Islam baru) (Hadiz, 2016). Bahkan, Mietzner lebih vulgar lagi menyebutnya sebagai Islamist populism (populisme Islamis) (Mietzner, 2018 Dalam konteks pilkada DKI Jakarta, Ahok harus ditolak sebagai pemimpin karena ia bukan orang Islam (Kristen), Cina, serta representasi dari oligarki maupun asing, khususnya kepentingan Cina. Sementara, pada pilpres 2019, Jokowi dinarasikan sebagai figur, alih-alih seorang muslim yang taat, bahkan tidak mengakomodasi kepentingan 'ummah.' ...
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This article examines an important aspect that has not been widely studied in previous writings, namely the dimensions of the contestation of radical Islamic groups and moderate Islamic groups in the 2019 electoral political stage. The representation of radical Islam is represented by the GNPF-MUI which includes Islamic organizations such as FPI, FUI, Larkar Jihad and others. Meanwhile, moderate Islam is represented by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), some Muhammadiyah and other moderate mass organizations. Behind the frenzy of "Action for Defending Islam" 411, 212, reunion 212, as well as other issues during the 2019 presidential election electoral campaign, there is actually an aspect of the contestation of the two camps in the struggle for Islam in the public sphere and in power politics. Radical Islamic groups carrying the spirit of nativism 'Islamic populism' voiced the agenda of 'political Islam' into the realm of state power through the Prabowo-Sandi camp. Meanwhile, identity political groups are still promoting 'Islam wasyatiyah' with the symbol of the Republic of Indonesia at a fixed price through the Jokowi-Amin camp. This article is based on a qualitative method with a literature study approach from various sources. From the contestation of the two groups, in the end, moderate Islam won, represented by the election of the Jokowi-Makruf Amin pair. Amin, no doubt, does represent the moderate current of Islam where he previously served as Rais Aam of the Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU) Executive Board. In addition, the pair's victory shows that the dynamics of moderate Islam in Indonesia are still embraced by the majority of Muslims in Indonesia.Keywords: Identity politics; Radical Islam; moderate Islam; 2019 presidential election. ABSTRAK Artikel ini menelaah tentang aspek penting yang belum banyak dikaji tulisan-tulisan sebelumnya, yakni dimensi kontestasi kelompok radikal Islam dan kelompok Islam moderat dalam panggung politik elektoral 2019. Representasi dari Islam radikal diwakili GNPF-MUI yang di dalam terdapat ormas Islam seperti FPI, FUI, Larkar Jihad dan sebagainya. Sedangkan, Islam moderat direpresentasi oleh ormas Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), sebagian Muhammadiyah dan ormas moderat lainnya. Di balik hingar-bingar “Aksi Bela Islam” 411, 212, reuni 212, maupun isu lain selama kampanye politik elektoral Pilpres 2019, sesungguhnya terdapat aspek kontestasi dua kubu tersebut dalam perebutan Islam dalam ruang publik maupun politik kekuasaan. Kelompok Islam radikal mengusung semangat nativisme ‘populisme Islam’ menyuarakan agenda ‘Islam politik’ ke dalam ranah kekuasaan negara melalui kubu Prabowo-Sandi. Sedangkan, kelompok politik identitas tengah tetap menggelorakan ‘Islam wasyatiyah’ dengan simbol NKRI harga mati melalui kubu Jokowi-Amin. Artikel ini berbasis metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi literatur dari berbagai sumber. Dari kontestasi kedua kelompok tersebut, pada akhirnya dimenangkan oleh Islam moderat yang direpresentasi melalui terpilihnya pasangan Jokowi-Makruf Amin. Amin, tidak diragukan, memang mewakili arus Islam moderat di mana ia sebelumnya menjabat sebagai Rais Aam Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU). Selain itu, kemenangan pasangan ini menunjukkan dinamika Islam moderat di Indonnesia masih dianut mayoritas muslim di Indonesia.Kata kunci: Politik identitas; Islam radikal; Islam moderat; pilpres 2019.
... Since the emphasis of Aspinall's study is about the challenge that Prabowo and his supporter vocalized, which located largely inside the established political system, the focus of this political study is mainly on the analysis of how the established political institutions function. Marcus Mietzner (2018), a professor from the same department with Aspinall, published his study on Fighting Illiberlism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia. In his study, Mietzner analyzes how the government of Indonesian President Jokowi has responded to unprecedented Islamist-Populist mobilization in Jakarta in the late 2016. ...
... Recent studies of populism in Indonesia are often associated with right-wing movements affiliated with religious ideology and cultural sentiments (Arifin, 2019; Hadiz, 2019). The populist movement carries these three elements, religion with all its symbols and ornaments, hatred of local culture and some efforts of religious indigenization, and protest to legitimate political power related to the democratic systems and the public policies that do not support the interests of the movement (Mietzner 2018;Muhtadi, 2019;Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018, Cf.;Hara, 2017;Hadiz, 2016Hadiz, , 2018Hefner, 2019;Amal, 2020). One of the strongest articulations of this kind of religious populism, to mention an example, is the mass movement and mobilization, orchestrated by the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) and its affiliated supporters, which for some period of time has occupied and endangered the public spaces and facilities. ...
... Their good positions in the governmental institutions make them influence public discourses that challenge and criticize the common concepts of freedom, human rights, tolerance, diversity, and peaceful politics (Cf. Mietzner, 2018). ...
Article
This study deals with the political theory of Thomas Hobbes and its implications to the political dynamism in Indonesia. The aim of this research is to analyze the philosophical concept of Hobbes on human rights and the theory of liberalism, and its relevance to the current situation in Indonesia, which has recently been exposed to the politics of populism. The presence of the populist movement is not new in Indonesia; but the rise of the politics of identity, it could threaten the protection of human rights and liberal democracy. We utilize the methodology of text analysis based on Hobbes’s original writing, Leviathan, and his other political treatises to explore his account on human rights and liberalism, and then employ Hobbes’s thoughts to investigate the phenomenon of populism. We divide the study into two sections, the first deals with the philosophy of human rights which Hobbes elucidates in the perspective of his hypothetical notion of the state of nature, the concept of authority, and his theory of liberalism; the second discusses populism in Indonesia today. The study found that the concept of human rights and liberalism would lead to awareness of mutual respect in society, while the populist movement becomes a real challenge to the implementation of human rights and the development of liberal democracy. The philosophy of human rights is in accordance with the political dynamism of Indonesian society. On the contrary, the populist movement could possibly plunge the country into a conflictual precipice of religious, racial-regional, and socio-political identities.
... Since the emphasis of Aspinall's study is about the challenge that Prabowo and his supporter vocalized, which located largely inside the established political system, the focus of this political study is mainly on the analysis of how the established political institutions function. Marcus Mietzner (2018), a professor from the same department with Aspinall, published his study on Fighting Illiberlism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia. In his study, Mietzner analyzes how the government of Indonesian President Jokowi has responded to unprecedented Islamist-Populist mobilization in Jakarta in the late 2016. ...
... Recent studies of populism in Indonesia are often associated with right-wing movements affiliated with religious ideology and cultural sentiments (Arifin, 2019; Hadiz, 2019). The populist movement carries these three elements, religion with all its symbols and ornaments, hatred of local culture and some efforts of religious indigenization, and protest to legitimate political power related to the democratic systems and the public policies that do not support the interests of the movement (Mietzner 2018;Muhtadi, 2019;Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018, Cf.;Hara, 2017;Hadiz, 2016Hadiz, , 2018Hefner, 2019;Amal, 2020). One of the strongest articulations of this kind of religious populism, to mention an example, is the mass movement and mobilization, orchestrated by the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) and its affiliated supporters, which for some period of time has occupied and endangered the public spaces and facilities. ...
... Their good positions in the governmental institutions make them influence public discourses that challenge and criticize the common concepts of freedom, human rights, tolerance, diversity, and peaceful politics (Cf. Mietzner, 2018). ...
Article
Full-text available
This study deals with the political theory of Thomas Hobbes and its implications to the political dynamism in Indonesia. The aim of this research is to analyze the philosophical concept of Hobbes on human rights and the theory of liberalism, and its relevance to the current situation in Indonesia, which has recently been exposed to the politics of populism. The presence of the populist movement is not new in Indonesia; but the rise of the politics of identity, it could threaten the protection of human rights and liberal democracy. We utilize the methodology of text analysis based on Hobbes’s original writing, Leviathan, and his other political treatises to explore his account on human rights and liberalism, and then employ Hobbes’s thoughts to investigate the phenomenon of populism. We divide the study into two sections, the first deals with the philosophy of human rights which Hobbes elucidates in the perspective of his hypothetical notion of the state of nature, the concept of authority, and his theory of liberalism; the second discusses populism in Indonesia today. The study found that the concept of human rights and liberalism would lead to awareness of mutual respect in society, while the populist movement becomes a real challenge to the implementation of human rights and the development of liberal democracy. The philosophy of human rights is in accordance with the political dynamism of Indonesian society. On the contrary, the populist movement could possibly plunge the country into a conflictual precipice of religious, racial-regional, and socio-political identities.
... One of the most prominent groups, until its recent ban, was FPI (Yilmaz and Barton 2021a; Yilmaz and Barton 2021b), formed by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab in 1998 after the fall of Suharto. Shihab and FPI boldly espoused right-wing Islamism as their ideology and over the years they had taken on vigilante activism to "save" Islam from "vice" through their moral policing activities (Amal 2020;Fossati and Mietzner 2019;Mietzner 2018). The group has opted for forceful Salafist ideology implementation, seeking its roots in Saudi Islamist theology (Barton 2021). ...
... There were two election campaigns: the official campaign where candidates talked of policies (such as education and entrepreneurship) and the more emotive "unofficial campaign" online where voters were asked not to vote for Ahok because he had allegedly insulted the Quran, or more covertly, because he had Chinese heritage (Tapsell 2020, p. 11). A heavily-edited Ahok campaign video surfaced in late 2016 and went viral, contributing to the rapid emergences of the mass right-wing movement: Action to Defend Islam-Aksi Bela Islam- (Nuryanti 2021;Barton et al. 2021b;Amal 2020;Mietzner 2018). Anti-Ahok protests accused the Governor of Jakarta of blasphemy. ...
... While the elections did not see the front runners of the Action to Defend Islam ultimately victorious, it did force Jokowi to assume a more 'Islamic' outlook and stance to appeal to the recent rise in religiosity (Nuryanti 2021;Yilmaz and Barton 2021a;Barton et al. 2021b;Yilmaz 2020). The events surrounding the Ahok video clearly demonstrate the power of social media in the context of the propagation of Islamist populism, given that the video was heavily edited and misconstrued Ahok's statements to evoke emotions of ummah stemming from their sensitivities towards religion (Nuryanti 2021;Amal 2020;Mietzner 2018). ...
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Populism has been on the rise in many countries. As a result, studies on populism have proliferated. However, there are very few studies that investigate and compare different types of populisms in a single nation-state. Furthermore, how these different populists in the same political milieu use cyberspace has not been comparatively studied. This study addresses these gaps by looking at a variety of populist forces within Indonesia that have emerged as major actors and identifying the uses of cyberspace in populist political mobilisation. This paper argues that the three main types of populism that predominate in political rhetoric (religious, chauvinistic, and technocratic) do not exist in isolation but rather borrow from each other. This is reflected in their cyberspace activities.
... There are two points of view about ABI3 conducted by the 212 Islamic Group. Fealy (2016) stated that the action was not an Islamic movement, while Hadiz (2018) and Mietzner (2018) stated otherwise. However, in this research, this action was considered as an Islamic movement. ...
... However, in this research, this action was considered as an Islamic movement. While Hadiz (2018) stated that the cause of the presence of ABI 3 was the existence of an oligarchic system and Mietzner (2018) stated that an open and democratic political system allowed ABI 3 to emerge, this research saw the causal factor of this action was the discourse on the government led by Jokowi as secular. Along with this factor, another factor that had driven this action to rise since 2016 till today and could be accepted widely in Indonesia was because of the ideological nation of public space, the creation of political momentum, and a change in the group's approach from a street group to institutionally oriented one. ...
... Although ABI 3, known as the 212 action, aimed to prosecute Ahok, the action was also carried out to express the disappointment of Islamist members who are members of the 212 Islamic Group against Jokowi's government (Mietzner 2018). The group felt disappointed and angry with Jokowi because the Solo's former mayor was considered secular and not profitable for Islam (Natsir 2017). ...
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The 212 Islamic Group was in opposition with the government of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in the 2019 presidential election. This group made militant resistance against Jokowi in the presidential election. This resistance influenced the presidential election contestation became more dynamic and fierce. The fierce contestation had divided the community into two camps, namely the pros and cons of Jokowi. This study explored and analyzed the resistance of the 212 Islamic Group against the government in the 2019 presidential election. This study was a qualitative study, interviewing 12 informants, consisting of the 212 Islamic Groups, Moderate Islamic Groups, Indonesian Ulema Council, online media, and academics. This study showed that The 212 Islamic Group can offset the government’s political influence so that the presidential election becomes more dynamic and balanced. However, the resistance of this group can be substantial (prominent) because of the narration about the rise of Islam and their ability to ideologize mosques and social media. This paper concluded that there was a resistance of the 212 Islamic Group to the country because Jokowi was considered secular and detrimental to Islam in politics and law, such as disbanding Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
... It was formed by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab in 1998, who remained active until the organisation was banned in 2020. A right-wing and ideologically Islamist activist group, the FPI achieved notoriety for frequent vigilante actions to "save" Islam in Indonesia from "vice" through their moral policing activities Amal 2020;Fossati and Mietzner 2019;Mietzner 2018). ...
... The group's core ideology is derived from their ultra-orthodox, Salafist understanding of the principles of Islam. In a political environment marred by corruption, its hard-line rhetoric and anti-establishment agenda led to significant social and political influence (Mietzner 2018). Using a populist discourse which divides society into two groups, "the people" and "others", the FPI used religious identity to determine who may be counted among "the people" and who must be excluded Barton 2021a, 2021b). ...
... The group claims Indonesia's "establishment" is un-Islamic, because it has made the Qur'an "subordinate" to the constitution. The FPI therefore calls for the implementation of a strict Sharia system in Indonesia, which would override the human made constitution and replace it with divine law Mietzner 2018;Hadiz 2016, p. 112;Wilson 2015). ...
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The first quarter of the twenty-first century has witnessed the rise of populism around the world. While it is widespread it manifests in its own unique ways in each society, nation, and region. Religious populism, once rarely discussed, has come to take a more prominent role in the politics of a diverse range of societies and countries, as religious discourse is increasingly used by mainstream and peripheral populist actors alike. This paper examines the rise of religious populism in Indonesia through a study of the widely talked about, but little understood, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI—Front Pembela Islam). The case study method used to examine the FPI provides a unique insight into a liminal organization which, through populist and pro-violence Islamist discourse and political lobbying, has had an outsized impact on Indonesian politics. In this paper, we identify the FPI as an Islamist civilizationist populist group and show how the group frames Indonesian domestic political events within a larger cosmic battle between faithful and righteous Muslims and the forces that stand against Islam, whether they be “unfaithful Muslims” or non-Muslims. We also show how the case of the FPI demonstrates the manner in which smaller, liminal, political actors can instrumentalise religion and leverage religious rhetoric to reshape political discourse, and in doing so, drive demand for religious populism. The paper makes two arguments: First, the FPI is an example of a civilizationist populist movement which instrumentalises religion in order to create demand for its populist solutions. Second, that as Islamic groups and organisations in Indonesia increasingly rely on religio-civilizational concepts of national identity, they become more transnational in outlook, rhetoric, and organisation and more closely aligned with religious developments in the Middle East.
... Hardline Islamism has been used to spew hatred to those who are seen as the "outsiders." Shihab has used his "anti-establishment agenda" to incite people to take up arms (Mietzner, 2018). His narrative hinges on inciting "fear" among his followers. ...
... By placing the Qur'an (in line with Wahabi thinking) above the state and the democratically elected government, the FPI has urged its militia members to continue their actions against "the Other" on the ground that it is necessary to bring sharia to Indonesia (Mietzner, 2018;Hadiz, 2016: 112;Wilson, 2015). Hadiz (2016: 112) argues that "[The FPI is] believed to be involved in criminal activity, including racketeering, even as they ardently oppose the presence of 'dens of vice' such as nightclubs, pubs and massage parlours." ...
... Rizieq Shihab has twice served time for hate speech inciting LPI members to attack tourist spots or target non-Muslim and Ahmadiyya groups and villages (Jahroni, 2004: 218). While some politicians initially valued the LPI and FPI as useful counters to civil rights protests, these vigilantes have become harder to control and have used their street power to challenge the state (Facal, 2019;Juoro, 2019: 28;Mietzner, 2018;Hookway, 2017). ...
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Muhammad Rizieq Shihab has been one of the most well-known faces of the far-right in Indonesia since the late 1990s. As a radical Islamist scholar with links to Saudi Arabia, Shihab has spent the last three decades as an anti-state voice of the “pious Muslim majority” in Indonesia. He claims to position himself as a “righteous” and “fearless” leader who is dedicated to defending Islam—the faith of “the people.” In 2020 Shihab was arrested for holding large public gatherings, as part of his ‘moral revolution’ campaign, in the middle of pandemic lockdowns. However, his radical Salafist message continues to inspire thousands to action.
... After a large demonstration on December 2, 2016, at the National Monument, Ahok was finally successfully imprisoned. Also, Ahok, who ran again for governor of Jakarta in 2017, suffered a defeat (Mietzner, 2018). ...
... In the context of the state policy towards the 212 movement, various studies seemed to highlight the state's attitude that is believed to reduce the quality of democracy in Indonesia (democratic regression). They acknowledge the threat to democracy in Indonesia posed by Islamic movements, and the government's policies are also seen undemocratic and have become a boomerang for democracy in Indonesia itself (Mietzner, 2018;Power, 2018;Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). ...
Article
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Repressive approach is one of the state's responses to social movements taken to restrain or limit the action of a movement that always strives for a social change process in society. In this context, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam – FPI) are two Islamic groups that recently after 2016 have been active in pressuring the government on various political issues. The government responded to these two groups with repressive measures such as stigmatization, criminalization, and dissolving or banning the organization. This study aims to discuss the details of government policies in responding to both HTI and FPI in Indonesia using comparative analysis by collecting secondary data from the media, books, and journals relevant with this study. This study found that the Indonesian government has used various means to repress HTI and FPI, such as intimidation, stigmatization, and disbandment to the organizations.
... The report cites a few examples, from Trump's efforts to dismantle Obama administration policies enacted in the same authority to protect sexual and gender minorities, to hasty reversals under the executive on immigration with "blatantly discriminatory" bans on travel from select Muslim-majority countries on claims of national security (Freedom House 2020). Still another study judging the nature of American democracy against a large dataset from democratic regimes at the agency of elected officials (Bermeo 2016;Cheeseman and Klaas 2018;Ercan and Gagnon 2014;Foa and Mounk 2017;Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018;McCoy and Somer 2019;Mietzner 2018;Waldner and Lust 2018). ...
... Yet as scholars have observed in recent decades, with the rise of so-called pseudo-democracies, hybrid, illiberal, or competitive/electoral authoritarian regimes, holding elections is insufficient alone to distinguish a democracy from autocratic regimes or grey area in between (see, e.g., Bogaards 2009;Cassani 2014;Cheeseman and Klaas 2018;Diamond 2002;Mietzner 2018;Levitsky and Way 2010;Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019;Waldner and Lust 2018). As a start, citizens in a democracy hold rulers accountable for their actions and channel interests in competitive, regular, and fair elections (Schmitter and Karl 1991). ...
Thesis
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This thesis examines Democratic and Republican party platforms over the 1980-2016 period in a content analysis to test claims of partisanship increasing on identity lines in American politics. As a key issue facing democracies in recent years, polarization has coincided with challenges for democratic governance. Cases of ‘pernicious’ polarization that extend partisan rifts into social life, and especially those that feature an ‘existential’ or ‘formative rift' dynamic as in the US case, may be prone to intractable partisan conflict and politics amenable to democratic erosion. The tensions may also create space for democracy enhancements. The findings of the content analysis offer support for increasing partisan-identity polarization in American politics in recent decades. Republican party platforms seem to increasingly reproduce a historical majoritarian appeal on religious-cultural or ethnic identity lines, in contrast to Democratic party platforms that likewise increasingly contest the meaning of ‘American’ in more identitarian albeit inclusive in a multicultural sense of community and belonging. KEYWORDS: deconsolidation, democracy, democratic erosion, identity, nation, partisanship, polarization
... In today's time, the expression of incorrect political views by people is easier than before though social media. Authoritarian populism is defiant of current legalities and constitutional norms and perceive them as obstacles to carry mandate of the general will and resort to illiberal tactics that lead to democratic deconsolidation (Mietzner, 2018). Populists tend to show emotional link towards the general will of the people and instil a zero-tolerance and uncompromising notion for it, for the sake of its advancement. ...
... This can attest as an authoritarian populism in which it is defiant of current legalities and constitutional norms (Mietzner, 2018). For ATM, they carry the traditional values and beliefs of Christian religion, in which its conservative laws need to be upheld to bring about order to the country. ...
Article
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The study focused on populist elements in the South African political landscape, by political individuals and political parties. It bases its literature on populism in democracy, its core elements and conceptualisation from different writers from North, Latin American and Europe. These sources of information were used to analyse the conditions of populism in South Africa. The study found that there is a variation of populistic elements in South Africa. There is left-wing populism that has taken the South African political landscape by storm, with its huge role for putting trivialised discourses in public debates which pertains the majority poor black marginalised people. Also, a huge room of potential growth can be seen from the right-wing aligned populism, which calls for nationhood in terms of instilling Christian faith-based values and also calls for economy and security be a preference for South African citizenry. Populism in South Africa has acted as a restorative mechanism of democratic values instead of diminishing them, but in the long run it may be divisive, as it is conditioned according to racial and classist lines.
... Jokowi, aynı zamanda elit olmayan bir aileden geldiği için ne seçkin siyasi ailelerden ne de askerî kökenden gelmeyen farklı bir siyasetçi olarak görülmektedir. Aynı zamanda Jokowi, esas olarak onu kendilerinin temsilcisi olarak gören alt-orta sınıftan destek almıştır (Mietzner 2015 Marcos Sr., Filipinler ulusunun ötekisini, Marcos rejimine ve Filipinler ulusunun "kabul edilmiş" kimliğine karşı çıkmaya çalışanlar olarak tanımlayarak Filipinler ulusunu betimler. Bu tanıma göre Filipinler ulusunun düşmanları, Marcos'un zorunlu kıldığı ulusal birleşmeyi kabul etmeyen çeşitli siyasi ideolojilere sahip farklı aktörlerden oluşmaktadır. ...
Book
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This book is the first book about The Philippines Studies in Turkey. Filipino, Indonesian and Turkish authors studying the Philippines and Southeast Asia Studies contributed to this chapter. The book themes are decolonial studies, international migration, Filipino politics, history, agriculture, and the international relations of the Philippines. The language of the book is Turkish, but the authors are planning to English and Tagalog new volumes in the future.
... Jokowi, aynı zamanda elit olmayan bir aileden geldiği için ne seçkin siyasi ailelerden ne de askerî kökenden gelmeyen farklı bir siyasetçi olarak görülmektedir. Aynı zamanda Jokowi, esas olarak onu kendilerinin temsilcisi olarak gören alt-orta sınıftan destek almıştır (Mietzner 2015). Diğer yandan Joko Widodo, kendisine zıt profildeki siyasi bir rakiple karşı karşıya kalmıştır. ...
Chapter
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Bu yazı, Endonezya ve Filipinler’de demokratikleşme sürecinin gerilemesinin sebeplerinden biri olan popülizmi daha derinden analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. İlk olarak siyasi bir vaka olarak popülizmin Güneydoğu Asya Bölgesi’nde nasıl ortaya çıkıp geliştiği açıklanacaktır. Güneydoğu Asya Bölgesi’ndeki popülizm vakası, sanıldığından daha erken dönemlerde ortaya çıkmış ve Güneydoğu Asya siyaset tarzlarını ve siyaset sistemlerini etkilenmiştir. İkinci olarak bu yazıda, hem Endonezya’da hem de Filipinler’de popülizmin her iki ülkenin siyaset sistemi içerisinde nasıl yer aldığı incelenecektir. Benzer siyasi tecrübelere sahip olmalarına rağmen Endonezya ve Filipinler’deki popülizm vakaları farklı konjonktürlerde gerçekleşmiştir. Bu nedenle, Endonezya ve Filipinler, kendilerine has bir popülizm tecrübesi yaratmışlardır. Bu yazının en sonunda, Filipinler başkanlık seçimi sonrasında Filipinler Cumhuriyeti’nin devlet başkanlığı koltuğunu yeniden kazanan Marcos Hanedanı’nın yükselişi analiz edilecektir. Yazının son kısmında Filipinler başkanlık seçimi ve 2024 yılındaki Endonezya başkanlık seçiminde karşılaşılabilecek olası sorunlar ve alınabilecek dersler anlatılacaktır.
... Even though it is anti-moderate, FPI does not try to eliminate Pancasila, but instead hopes for the return of the first principle before the change, namely "the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents" (Mietzner, 2018). The FPI, Wahdah Islamiyah, FUI, and Dzikir Group do not take a moderate stance. ...
Article
From 2016 to 2019, mass protests were organized by the "Islamic Defense Action 212" in Jakarta. Protests carried out by Islamic populists and the widespread use of identity politics have sparked an escalating wave of intolerance that has led to fractures in inter-religious relations in Indonesia. The phenomenon of intolerance described above is one of the main cases that researchers will analyze by tracing its impact on the continuity of inter-religious dialogue in Indonesia. This research was conducted using a descriptive qualitative analysis approach. This research found that there is a threat to inter-religious dialogue, namely the impact of increased intolerance, which has contributed to increasing the attitude of exclusivity from several Muslim groups in Indonesia toward non-Muslim religious communities. If the Islamic populist actions that occurred in 2019 were repeated in the next few years, especially before the political year, it would undermine the order of peace among religious communities in Indonesia, and dialogue between religions would be difficult to implement. Keywords: Islamic populists, identity politics, religious intolerance, harmony, interreligious dialogue
... In the Indonesian context, spiritual traditions and religions have historically been a part of its socio-political consciousness and epistemologies; and even more perceptible in its democratisation era (1998 until now) where tensions between religious conservatism and more inclusive religio-spiritual discourses were salient. Some of the post-1998 governments, democracy activists, and moderate religious leaders have engaged in efforts to contest and curb the growing conservatism, anti-democratic Islamist groups, the persecution of religious minorities, and terrorist bombings (Fealy 2019;Mietzner 2018). Correspondingly, in the field of education, international and Indonesian studies on democratic education have discussed similar tensions between religious truth claims and democratic multicultural citizenship (e.g., Ahmad 2004;Wijaya Mulya, Aditomo, and Suryani 2021) or exploring religious discourses which are supportive of democracy (e.g., Saada and Gross 2017). ...
Article
Contemporary scholars have called for more diverse conceptions and practices of alternative ‘democratic’ education to contest the increasingly neoliberal and neoconservative educational systems. The current study responds to this call by exploring how the notion of ‘democratic’ education can be enriched using the contextual practices of education in Indonesia. Co-constructing qualitative data through site visits, document analysis, and interviews with leaders of five uniquely ‘democratic’ Indonesian schools, the current study seeks to expand the ‘thin’ understandings of democratic education characterised by ostensibly universal democratic virtues such as freedom, equality, social justice, and participation. Exploring what democratic education looks like when understood through the collective sensibilities of Indonesians, analysis revealed at least three alternative constructions of democratic education practiced by participating schools, namely, locally-grounded, embodied, and spiritual democratic education. By identifying and circulating these alternative constructions, it is hoped that the notions of democratic education might be continuously reimagined and diversified.
... There are several accounts which discussed this topic such as Warburton and Aspinall (2019) who argued that Indonesian democracy is an illiberal democracy and emphasized on structural, agential and popular forces in Yudhoyono's Administration and Joko Widodo's Administration that led the Indonesian democracy itself to regression. Scholars such as Power (2018) and Mietzner (2020) noted that Indonesian democratic regression cannot be separated with the rise of populist movement which could be seen in Prabowo Subianto's presidential campaign in 2014 and 2019, yet Jokowi rather opt to fight the populist surge with illiberal means or as Mietzner (2019) puts it as authoritarian innovations. These innovations are criminilisation towards the populist movement, manipulation of law enforcement and efforts to undermine oppositions (Power 2018;Mietzner 2019b). ...
Article
The development of Indonesian democracy is slowly regressing under Jokowi’s Administration, amidst that regression, two massive student movement occurred in 2019 and 2020. Despite the scale of the movement, those movement couldn’t maximize their success. This article attempts to answer two questions regarding that matter, first, why the student movement in Jokowi’s Administration couldn’t achieve success? Second, is the student movement still viable to do a social change? To answer those questions this article examined the moral force doctrine which constructed along with the student movement throughout the history. This article argue that the moral force doctrine needs to be abandoned because it made the student movement have an obscure position towards the establishment and limiting the student movement to build alliances with other political groups. Yet, the student movement still viable to do a social change in a time of crisis even it doesn’t change its doctrine.
... This was particularly obvious with military coups in Thailand in 2014 and Myanmar in 2021 (Prajak and Veerayooth 2018; Ardeth and Khun 2021). Democratic backsliding via executive aggrandizement has been subtle but steady in Indonesia under Joko Widodo (president since 2014) while it was much more dramatic and bloody with the election of Rodrigo R. Duterte as Philippine president in 2016 (Mietzner 2018;Thompson 2021). Malaysia's brief democratic experiment began after an opposition coalition won a surprise victory in the 2018 general election. ...
Preprint
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It is a common misunderstanding that the "Asian Values" discourse is about Asia. Originally dubbed "Confucian values," it became "Asian" in order to serve as a causeway connecting the discourses of Singaporean and Malaysian authoritarian leaders in the early 1990s. Not seriously engaging with a storied "Asianisms" debate about common values in the region, it was crudely essentialist. In the face of perceived external and internal challenges, proclaiming democracy as culturally alien proved a useful authoritarian tool. Earlier manifestations of this reactionary culturalism in the region functioned similarly, e.g., "Thai-style democracy." These discourses shaped political agendas, as efforts by democratic oppositionists throughout Southeast Asia to develop a counter narrative of "vernacularized" liberalism demonstrated. Not surprisingly, an Asian Values-style exculpatory discourse has been revived alongside a recent autocratization wave in Southeast Asia. Comparativists interpreting such arguments as a defense of indigenous values and constructivists imagining Asian Values contributing to a Southeast Asian regional identity have inadvertently contributed to legitimizing such authoritarian normative claims.
... Among other things, some researchers link the deconsolidation of democracy and the attempts of the ruling elites to suppress the populist wave with repressive measures, the excessive tendency of the state bureaucracy to solve problems of inequality through redistribution, anti-democratic fluctuations within the ruling elites, the apathy of civil society, the partiality of justice, the emergence of new Internet media and "fake news," institutional dysfunction, etc. (Mietzner 2018;Corbett 2020;Mărcău 2019) Thus, within the framework of this study, we will consider the deconsolidation of democracy as a systemic crisis of the democratic regime, consisting of the repeated opportunistic behavior of the elites, the erosion of support for democracy on the part of society, the development of centrifugal tendencies in the behavior of the main political actors , as well as cumulative social, political and cultural trends towards a greater spread of anti-democratic practices. ...
Article
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This article analyzes the hierarchy of factors in the development of crisis trends in a consolidated democracy using the example of the United States of America. The authors assess the surge of political instability in the United States, which led to the deconsolidation of the liberal democracy regime, through the prism of centrifugal processes within the American elite and the erosion of democratic institutions over the past 30 years. The main problem of the study is the contradiction between the crisis of democratic regimes in the countries of the Euro-Atlantic region and the high indicators of the factors of the consolidation of democracy, according to classical political science theories. The authors use the path analysis method to determine the main path and hierarchy of factors of erosion of the liberal democracy regime in the United States, which is an example of the "old" democracy and, according to traditional political science, is the most protected from destructive processes. Consideration of the case of deconsolidation of the liberal democracy regime in the United States, thus, sheds light on the possible ways of democracy reversion and risk factors for stability of democratic political systems.
... Given his status as a former general, Special Forces Commander and son-in-law of Suharto, it is reasonable to imagine that Prabowo's supporters would be more inclined towards authoritarian nostalgia. However, there are also reasons to hypothesise that Jokowi supporters might hold such views: first, they are the incumbents, and incumbents want to stay in power; and second, members of the Jokowi government in particular have openly expressed authoritarian ideas, and taken some authoritarian steps (Mietzner 2018;Power 2018). ...
... Among various studies relating to the dynamics of the Jokowi administration's political policies, Mietzner (IPAC 2019;Mietzner 2018) found that the Jokowi administration had erroneously responded to the unprecedented Islamic-populist mobilization in Jakarta at the end of 2016 by criminalizing the populist Muslim group. is was considered a breach of established legal norms. ...
Article
This article investigates the online media reporting of Islamophobic policies during the presidency of Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s current president. The study comprises a critical discourse analysis, which identifies three reporting dimensions, namely micro, mezzo, and macro. The article finds that discriminatory policies against Indonesian Muslims have triggered the emergence of news of Islamophobia in government policies. Politically, this causes Islamophobic propaganda, which, for the government, is a form of discourse struggle, the aim of which is to secure public support. Reports of government-backed Islamophobic propaganda moved the government to amend some of its policies, and facilitated the emergence of counter-narrative news, which refuted these accusations of Islamophobia. This study also shows that accusations of Islamophobia against the government are a result of the trauma many Muslims experienced, historically, long before the Jokowi presidency.
... The number of scholarly works on the contemporary democracy in Indonesia keeps increasing in line with the political development in this country, which tends to be quite dynamic. Recently, experts have highlighted the influence of populism on democracy (Aspinall 2015, Hadiz & Robison 2017, Hadiz 2018, Mietzner 2018, Mietzner 2020, Rakhmani & Saraswati 2021 and the signs of the declining democracy in this country (Aspinall 2010, Fealy 2011, Mietzner 2012, Hadiz 2017, Aspinall & Mietzner 2019, Warburton & Aspinall 2019, Aspinall et al. 2020, Power & Warburton 2020. However, there are rare studies on the administration of election management body (EMB) and the human resources management of this body. ...
Article
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The prevailing national regulation on the recruitment of PPK, PPS, and KPPS staff sets forth that those temporary officers can be of service for only two periods of general election and cannot be involved afterwards. This regulation actually has positive aspect, but is not easy in its implementation. This article aims at examining the challenges and problems faced by the election management body at local level (Regency KPU) in preparing the human resource of ad hoc staff for the 2019 general election in Indonesia. This article was based on a qualitative research conducted in 2020 in Banyumas Regency, Central Java. This article shows that challenges that had to be faced by Regency KPU in the recruitment of ad hoc employees were the duration of screening and the way village leaders socialized the information regarding the recruitment. Whereas, the involvement of young generation and women as general election ad hoc workers in Banyumas was still low because of a number of factors, from know-how of general election to having lack information of the recruitment. This study concludes that actor’s action choice is limited by a number of matters, such as the path previously taken, rules regulating the agency, and social-political context.
... Previous studies showed that Indonesia performed Islamic populism (Hara, 2018;Mietzner, 2018) or religious populism (Barton et al., 2021) as political mediatization (Dehanas & Shterin, 2018), especially during the 2017 Jakarta Governarial Election (Setijadi, 2017). Unfortunately, there are no specific studies concerned about the main role of media during their reports in the 2017 Jakarta Regional Election. ...
Article
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p class="Default"> Introduction: The mainstream media used political and media logic on religious populism to reinforce ideological changes in contemporary society. This study investigated how media mediatize the 212 rally ( aksi 212 ) and the 2017 Jakarta Governorial Election as religious populism cases. This study also compared how media in Indonesia and India delivered the content based on the majority identity. Methods: This study applied a qualitative approach. Detik.com, Metro TV, and Republika Daily were selected based on their delivery content platform and media ownership. The qualitative content analysis was applied to explore the concepts of political and media logic. Then, the results of Islamic populism in Indonesia were compared with Hindu populism in India. Findings: This study found that the three media mediatized aksi 212 and the 2017 Jakarta Governorial Election as religious populism by using direct interaction. Detik.com was applying media logic while Metro TV and Republika Daily performed political logic. In comparing religious populism between Indonesia and India, the finding confirmed that populism came from a major identity. The finding showed that economic motivation could be escalated in parallel with religious identity. Originality: This study become a novelty since no previous studies investigate the different delivery content platforms and the media ownership including comparing the mediatization process between two countries. Previous studies focused on the media concentration based on media ownership, platform, media landscape, and media policy without a mediatization process and religious populism. The previous studies of the mediatization of religious populism were conducted in a single case.</span
... They simply staged a political demonstration in front of the Parliament, shouting "Allahu Akbar!!" explicitly implying "God, the Greatest", but implicitly meaning "Kill, Go to hell, Kafir., and any other form of hate speech. Another example as set out by Mietzner was that Arab-Indonesian Islamic "clerics" were threatening to "sweep" foreigners from Indonesia (Mietzner, 2018). Other cases, such as sweeping places of interests, restaurants open on Ramadhan day-time, have been around up to now to be exact during the era of reformation (Adi et al., 2019). ...
Article
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The study discusses a triggering issue of those Indonesian Muslims who frequently feel uneasy to socialize with other Muslims with Arabic looks to neutralize Islamic brotherhood in the Indonesian context of unity in diversity. A survey was made available online for over three months to get public responses concerning the issue. Sixty-two responses were collected for further analysis. Findings of the study revealed that most of the respondents expressed fear of Arabic looks because of terrorism-related activities resulting in deep personal hate. Fears were also felt due to the image that such a group of Muslims has deteriorated the local cultures of Indonesian origins. Still, others expressed fears of those distinctive individual Muslims because of a frequent political demonstration staged by those types of Muslims against engineered issues caused by discrepancies in political views to terminate the President. The authors offer recommendations for those with such Islam phobia to learn more about the truth of Islam from distinguished clerics from recognized Muslim organizations or to read Islamic literature to create peace of mind amid the wrong mindset about Islam, and finally to put aside egocentrism in the spirit of unity in diversity, only to fight against radicalism.
... For authoritarian populism, which backs transgressive strongman leaders and is willing to carry out political beliefs that uphold traditional values for the state's unity. [7,21] The view [22] of putting up the rule of state constitutional law, which occasionally commits and utilizes performative violence to display political will and domestic authority, is the same as the authoritarian populism of the village head (kades) who replaces the post of the pesirah's. ...
Conference Paper
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Marga's is a government system that has existed in South Sumatra society in the past. The socio-cultural wealth of the people of South Sumatra has become a special attraction for historical studies, social sciences and development policies. The occurrence of social deviations such as the emergence of the gerandong symptom along Komering Street is a sign that development policies so far have had an invisible negative effect as a result of socio-cultural and political development policies that ignore the historical roots of local communities. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to investigate the history of marga's in overcoming social problems, with a social science approach framework to find a socio-cultural policy model based on community knowledge in the East OKU region, South Sumatra. The method used is to use historical methods and qualitative methods of social science. Based on the results of the study, it can be seen that in the past the marga's community was able to have a better social life. This social integration is maintained in the form of rules of life and marga's government with higher social sanctions than legal sanctions. The development carried out by marga's in East OKU has inserted a lot of ownership rights to the members of the marga's, so that the sense of guarding and inheritance is stronger. Reproduction must be carried out in the form of a variety of socio-physical development as it can be a practical contribution for the current political authorities in making public policy.
... The post-reformation era (after 1998) marked the rise of Islamic Populism in Indonesia, spearheaded by Islamic community organizations of which the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) become the most prominent. Populism, in this sense, is the use of religious values as justification for socio-political activism and identity politics in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2018). Moreover, the building of grassroots movements became one of the main strategies of the Islamic populists. ...
Article
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This paper explores how an Indonesian national youth community uses social media as a radicalization prevention medium. In this paper, the Indonesian youth community’s applied online interventions are explored and evaluated through a mixed-method approach, using a qualitative case study and visual content analysis. The authors conducted semi-structured interviews and analyzed visual content outputs, focusing on the social media strategy enacted to create counter-radicalization narratives, and measuring social media engagement rates as a means of evaluating that strategy. This paper extends existing counter-radicalization studies by adding insights on how youth community-based social media initiatives could contribute as a non-coercive approach in combating radicalization.
... The group played a central role in the anti-Ahok protest during 2016-2017. The nationwide protests, supported by FPI and other right-wing parties, led to the dismissal and imprisonment of Jakarta's ethnically Chinese and religiously Christian governor, on accusations of alleged blasphemy (Yilmaz and Barton 2021;Mietzner 2018;Hadiz 2016). These actions were taken to 'safeguard' the ummah who were "offended" by the comments made by the former governor. ...
Article
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The fusion of religion and populism has paved the way for civilisationism. However, this significant issue is still unresearched. This paper attempts to address this gap by investigating the Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Islamist populism and civilisationism as an empirical case study. While Islamism has been explored in the context of Pakistan, this paper goes beyond and investigates the amalgamation of Islamist ideals with populism. Using discourse analysis, the paper traces the horizontal and vertical dimensions of Imran Khan’s religious populism. The paper provides an understanding of how “the people”, “the elite”, and “the others” are defined at present in Pakistan from an antagonistic and anti-Western civilisationist perspective. The paper finds that “New Pakistan” is indeed a “homeland” or an idolized society defined by Islamist civilisationism to which extreme emotions, sentimentality and victimhood are attached.
... In the larger scale of things, the proportion of Chinese Indonesians elected into executive office since 2003 remains miniscule. Recent critics of democracy in Indonesia have often focused on aspects of democratic deconsolidation in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2018;Warburton and Aspinall, 2019), expressed in the form of state coercion against populist radicals. While these debates are important, other aspects of democracy in Indonesia such as the regression of democratic political representativeness in the context of historical discrimination that favours narrow ethnic or religious markers over a more "substantive representation" should render closer consideration. ...
Article
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Utilising Pitkin’s concept of representation, this article surveys the landscape of Chinese Indonesian political representation since the advent of regional elections in 1999. Analyses of the dataset of individual profiles of Chinese Indonesian executives, as they adopt inclusive-pairing tactics by taking on deputised roles or appeal using charisma, had demonstrated that there was a visible transition from “descriptive” towards more “substantive” forms of political representation in various constituencies – seen as the most important dimension of ideal representation despite the presence of soft ethnic politics. Recent appeals to indigenism ( pribumi-ism), especially in the wake of Jakarta governor Ahok’s failed re-election bid in 2017, had the effect of confining representational politics towards the narrow margins of ethnicity above all else. This article looks at the precarity of thedivide between pribumis and Chinese Indonesians ( Tionghoa) from the perspective of political representation at the regions and fills in the lacuna of political representativeness in post-reform Indonesia – overlooked so far by critiques of democracy. .
... In 2019, the EIU's assessment places the third largest democracy at 64 th position out of 167 countries, making it placed below Timor-Leste (41), Malaysia (43), and the Philippines (54). The key terms used by the Indonesian specialists to examine the current democratic drifts are also varied, from illiberalism (Hadiz 2017), deconsolidation (Mietzner 2018), repressive pluralism (Fealy 2020), to stagnation and regression (Power and Warburton 2020;Warburton and Aspinall 2019)all pointing out to the deteriorating trends of democratic quality. ...
Preprint
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Two decades after Indonesia’s democratization, the party system has been undergoing increasing institutionalization and stability. These can be seen in a number of indicators such as patterns of parties’ vote, medium-term stability of votes, electoral volatility, and changes in parties’ ideological position. This institutionalization and stability emerged despite the declining trend of democratic quality occurring in the country. Drawing the results from five democratic elections between 1999 to 2019, this article finds that these outcomes have been possible given the specific structuring mechanism played by the electoral rules. While the electoral rules have been consistently raising the standard barriers to entry for new players, the timing of issuance and the expected outcomes of those rules made the current system reinforced. This article argues that it is the stability and institutionalization of the party system that helps to maintain Indonesia’s status as an electoral democracy, thus saving the country from getting into the deeper abyss of democratic regression. Keywords: party system, institutionalization, stability, electoral democracy, Indonesia
... After democratization in 1998, right-wing Islamist parties remained marginal players in national politics as they lacked a coherent agenda. Things changed dramatically in 2016, when a charismatic group of preachers used a high-profile blasphemy case to mobilize millions of Muslims with a single-minded call to "defend" Islam from being desecrated within their own homeland (Mietzner 2018). This broad coalition of right-wing populists narrowly lost the 2019 presidential election, sparing Indonesia the kind of discriminatory policies enacted in India under the BJP (Slater and Tudor 2019). ...
Article
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Right-wing populism is threatening pluralist underpinnings of diverse democracies around the world by staking claims of privilege for dominant ethnic groups and undermining minority rights. Existing scholarship has evaluated these threats in terms of the majoritarian vision peddled by charismatic politicians seeking electoral victory and the enactment of discriminatory policies through the dismantling of institutional constraints by those already in power. This article looks beyond these macro consequences of right-wing populism and examines vigilante violence as the mechanism through which these movements articulate and enforce their vision at the grassroots level. It compares the experience of India and Indonesia to evaluate factors that have enabled right-wing populists to deploy vigilantism for dismantling democratic protections against majoritarianism. I argue that the intrinsic properties of vigilantism as an efficient and transformative form of violence make it a valuable tool for right-wing populists. However, its use for political ends in two of the world’s largest democracies is enabled by three factors. First, because pluralist constitutions make it difficult to curtail minority rights through top-down legislation in India and Indonesia, vigilantism has become an appealing extra-legal strategy for undermining these rights from the bottom up. Second, widespread social legitimacy associated with everyday forms of vigilantism allows right-wing populists to scale up local templates of violence for national goals. Third, similar pathologies of state-building in both countries enable right-wing vigilantes to act with impunity. I conclude by arguing that while vigilantism has long been thought of as a way in which disempowered citizens cope with dissatisfactory provision of order by the state, right-wing populists are transforming vigilante violence into means for engineering social dominance.
... There are also several comparative analyses of populism in the region, focusing especially on post-1990s Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (Case, 2017;Vedi R. Hadiz, 2016;Hellmann, 2017;Kenny, 2017Kenny, , 2019aKenny, , 2019bPepinsky, 2017; M. R. Thompson, 2016). The appeal of populism in Southeast Asia has been attributed to various causes including the weakness of political parties (Gammon, 2020;Hicken & Self, 2018;Kenny, 2019b), lower class resentment of economic inequality (Vedi R Hadiz & Robison, 2017; M. R. Thompson, 2016), cleavages among the elite (Case, 2017), dissatisfaction with corruption and misgovernance (Mietzner, 2015; M. R. Thompson, 2010), fear of crime (Curato, 2017;Kenny, 2019a) and, in some cases, resurgent Islamism (Vedi R. Hadiz, 2016;Mietzner, 2018;Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018). ...
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This chapter outlines the experience of populism in democratic Southeast Asia. It outlines an understanding of populism as a political strategy in which leaders seek to directly mobilize the people through mass communication. This approach is especially useful in explaining the trajectory of populism in a region where political parties have been historically weak. The chapter briefly summarizes this historical experience, with a special focus on The Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, the states with the most extended democratic records in the region. The chapter concludes with some suggestions on how this approach to conceptualizing populism may also facilitate theorizing about populism's causes in the region. Keywords Strategic approach; mass communication 1 I would like to thank Oliver Friedmann and Nur Azizah for research assistance. 2
... Still, it largely confines its actions to inflammatory, hateful rhetoric and the largely symbolic violence of mob intimidation. Before being disbanded, the FPI marshaled para-military vigilante groups across the country to "save" the Muslim faith from the "evils" of the "enemies of the faith" (Amal, 2020;Fossati & Mietzner, 2019;Mietzner, 2018). The highly organized militant branch of the FPI has been involved in ethnic-religious rioting, and its members have used force to close down "hot spots" such as nightclubs and parties that it considers "sinful. ...
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This commentary uses a case study of Indonesia's Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) to explore crucial questions regarding the nature of populism in Indonesia. Some see the recent ban of the FPI by the administration of President Joko Widodo as a decisive clash between technocratic governance and right-wing Islamist populism. But while the banning of the FPI represents a significant move against Islamist populism, it will not necessarily weaken it in the longer run. Nevertheless, in a political environment largely devoid of competing forms of conviction politics, the campaigns for the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections will continue to see Islamist populism playing a significant role.
... That the GNPF-MUI were not a political party per se but rather a large group that came together to hold mass rallies, suggests that while populist parties in Indonesia have not attained much electoral success, they remain politically important. Mietzner, for example, argues that the growth of Islamic populism is slowly "deconsolidating" Indonesian democracy, and turning Indonesian away from liberal pluralism altogether (Mietzner 2018). ...
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This paper explores the emerging scholarship investigating the relationship between religion(s) and populism. It systematically reviews the various aspects of the phenomenon going beyond the Western world and discusses how religion and populism interact in various contexts around the globe. It looks at Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity and how in different regions and cultural contexts, they merge with populism and surface as the bases of populist appeals in the 21st century. In doing so, this paper contends that there is a scarcity of literature on this topic particularly in the non-Western and Judeo-Christian context. The paper concludes with recommendations on various gaps in the field of study of religious populism.
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This Element contributes to existing research with an analysis of public understandings of democracy based on original surveys fielded in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It conceptualises democracy as consisting of liberal, egalitarian and participatory ideals, and investigates the structure of public understandings of democracy in the five countries. It then proceeds to identify important relationships between conceptions of democracy and other attitudes, such as satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy, trust in institutions, policy preferences and political behaviour. The findings suggest that a comprehensive analysis of understandings of democracy is essential to understand political attitudes and behaviours.
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This chapter discusses civilizational populism in Muslim majority nations. It begins by discussing the relationship between Islam and populism, and describes how many forms of Islamic populism carry within them an inherent civilizationalism. This is expressed in many Islamist populist discourses, the chapter explains, through the use of the concept of ‘ummah’, or the entire body of Muslims. Many Islamist populists parties and movements, the chapter shows, divide society not merely between ‘the people’ and ‘elites’, but between ‘ummah’ and non-Ummah. This final category often includes ‘the West’, often portrayed in Islamist populism as the civilizational enemy of Muslims. The chapter then provides two case studies of Islam- based civilizational populism: the explicitly civilizational populism of Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party, and the implicitly civilizational populism of the Islamic Defenders Front in Indonesia, a banned militant group led by cleric Muhammad Rizieq.
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This article analyzes the articulation of Islamic thought in the 2014 and 2019 elections, both of which were marked by efforts by progressive and conservative Muslims to dominate public spaces. Contestation was evident in these political discourses, with progressive Muslims advocating for moderatism, political ethics, and tolerance in narratives of inclusivism, pluralism, and tolerance while conservative Muslims seminating extremism, the formalization of sharia law, and intolerance in narratives of exclusivism and homogenization. The analysis questions the continuity-discontinuity, motives, and actors of progressive and conservative Muslim movements and investigates the challenges for progressive Muslims in disseminating their narratives in Indonesia. The result argues that massive religious organizations in Indonesia such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama articulate, internalize, and institutionalize progressive thought within their organizations and educational institutions. This article further recommends progressive Muslims reckon and countermeasure conservativism among religious and political elites whose narratives exploit religious sentiments for practical purposes.
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This article analyses the recent evolution of street-level, small-scale Muslim economies in Java, Indonesia, and the role they have been playing as cultural and material infrastructure for Islamic morality discourses in the wake of the pivotal Aksi Bela Islam 212 (Defend Islam Action 212) rally in Jakarta on 2 December 2016. These small-scale economies are instances of the devolution of halal consumerism in Indonesia, which flows in turn from changes in the landscape of political Islam. These street-level economies provide political Islam with the solidarity of a Muslim cooperative structure, commodifying symbols associated with the rally. Three case studies are presented in support of these arguments. The first is the 212 Cooperative, a chain of minimarts known as ‘212 Marts’ designed as a Muslim alternative to the ubiquitous market forerunners such as Indomaret and Alfamart. Second, we describe an ecosystem of exchange that has evolved around new mosque-based programmes that have invigorated human traffic in and around mosques in Bandung and Yogyakarta. Our third case study is the small-scale lapak traders who follow particular celebrity preachers as they tour, and who operate after Friday prayers. These cases reveal the growing importance of low-end economies (involving low-priced commodities, consumers with relatively low buying capacity, and small-scale traders) in the development of halal consumerism in Indonesia and point to their role in perpetuating morality discourses associated with the 212 rally.
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It is hardly surprising that liberalism has been neglected in studies of Indonesian political thought, with most scholars focusing on nationalism, communism, conservatism, populism, and Islamism. The term ‘liberal’ has long been a byword for the kind of naked individualism and dog-eat-dog capitalism against which mainstream Indonesian nationalism has contrasted itself. This article argues that liberalism has, nevertheless, been present as a counter-narrative throughout Indonesia’s modern history and should be considered as a distinct political tradition. Liberal ideas inform Indonesia’s legal, economic, and political structures and have thrived in sections of the media, the professions, academia, and civil society organisations, reaching their apogee in the unique circumstances of the immediate post-Soeharto period. Repeated efforts to establish overtly liberal political vehicles, though, have gained little traction in a political environment dominated by nationalist and Islamist parties. This article argues that despite the rapid growth of the economy, Indonesia’s middle classes are still relatively weak and dependent, and have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to ally with authoritarian statism when their interests are threatened by populist movements from the left or the right.
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Indonesia, like many other countries around the world, is currently experiencing the process of democratic backsliding, marked by a toxic mix of religious sectarianism, polarization, and executive overreach. Despite this trend, Indonesians have become more, rather than less, satisfied with their country's democratic practice. What accounts for this puzzle? Unity Through Division examines an overlooked aspect of democracy in Indonesia: political representation. In this country, an ideological cleavage between pluralism and Islamism has long characterized political competition. This cleavage, while divisive, has been a strength of Indonesia's democracy, giving meaning to political participation and allowing a degree of representation not often observed in young democracies. While the recent resurgence of radical Islam and political polarization in Indonesian politics may have contributed to democratic erosion, these factors have simultaneously clarified political alternatives and improved perceptions of representation, in turn bolstering democratic participation and satisfaction. This compelling book effectively challenges the wisdom of the role of Islam in Indonesian political life and provides a fresh analysis for debates on democratic backsliding in Indonesia and beyond.
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While recent research on political Islam in Indonesia suggests the growing influence of Islamic political power, the contemporary development also exposes the rarely discussed shortcomings of political Islam. This chapter makes the case that the challenges Islamic political groups face come primarily from themselves. Although they managed to display a robust showing on some occasions, it is shown that the power of Islamic groups has largely been tamed and stagnated. It explores two possible outcomes: the hurdle in maintaining their organizational coherence and the involvement of party leaders in corruption scandals. Additionally, the applied electoral system has contributed to driving Islamic parties more at the fringe, although they maintain to play representative roles in a limited way.KeywordsPolitical IslamInternal coherenceCorruptionParty system
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The purpose of this study is to describe the consistency of PTKI (Islamic Religious College) in fighting for religious moderation in Indonesia. This research is a literature review with a sociological-historical approach. Where through this approach, the revitalization of PTKI's religious moderation becomes a critical discourse to know. The research data is in the PTKI religious moderation movement in social and historical contexts, both in the academic corridor, curriculum, campus activism, and social roles. Data collection techniques with documentation. Researchers documented data on the PTKI movement to fight for religious moderation during the New Order and Post-Reformation eras. Data analysis used the descriptive analysis method. The study results indicate that PTKI is an Islamic institution that is consistent in fighting for the agenda of religious moderation. During the New Order period, PTKI, through campus intellectuals, pioneered the Islamic reform movement and, at the same time, made an essential contribution to the process of democratic socio-political change marked by the 1998 reform movement. In the following period (post-reform), PTKI still presents itself as an agent of moderate Islam who actively teaches, campaigns, and affirms religious moderation in its contestation with radical political Islam groups. However, PTKI's active involvement in responding to religious radicalism has contributed significantly to strengthening Indonesia's moderate Islam in the changing socio-political context.Tujuan penelitian ini guna mendeskripsikan konsistensi PTKI (Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam) dalam memperjuangkan moderasi beragama di Indonesia. Penelitian ini merupakan kajian pustaka dengan pendekatan sosiologis-historis. Di mana melalui pendekatan ini, revitalisasi moderasi beragama PTKI menjadi diskursus yang penting untuk diketahui. Data-data penelitian berupa fenomena pergerakan moderasi beragama PTKI dalam konteks sosial dan sejarah, baik dalam koridor akademik, kurikulum, aktivisme kampus, maupun peran sosial. Teknik pengumpulan data dengan dokumentasi. Peneliti melakukan dokumentasi atas data-data pergerakan PTKI dalam upaya memperjuangkan moderasi beragama pada masa Orde Baru dan Pasca Reformasi. Analisis data menggunakan metode analisis deskriptif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa PTKI merupakan institusi Islam yang konsisten dalam memperjuangkan agenda moderasi beragama. Pada periode Orde Baru, PTKI melalui kalangan intelektual kampus, memelopori gerakan pembaruan Islam dan sekaligus berkontribusi penting dalam proses perubahan sosial-politik demokratis yang ditandai oleh gerakan reformasi 1998. Pada periode berikutnya (pasca reformasi), PTKI masih menampilkan diri sebagai agen Islam moderat yang aktif mengajarkan, mengkampanyekan dan meneguhkan moderasi beragama dalam kontestasinya dengan kelompok-kelompok Islam politik radikal. Bagaimanapun, keterlibatan aktif PTKI dalam merespon gerakan radikalisme agama telah berkontribusi penting bagi penguatan modersdalam konteks sosial-politik yang terus berubah.
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Straipsnyje, remiantis karingosios demokratijos teorija ir kokybine šaltinių analize, siekiama išsiaiškinti, koks Vyšegrado šalyse (Vengrija, Čekija, Slovakija, Lenkija) buvo nacionalinės teisės ir neokaringosios demokratijos santykis ir kaip jis paveikė šių politinių tautų suverenumą 2008–2019 metais. Svarbu suprasti, kokių apsaugos priemonių buvo imtasi ir kuriomis iš jų buvo siekiama apsaugoti demokratines socialines struktūras Višegrado šalyse. Tyrimo rezultatai atskleidė, kad kiekvienos iš Višegrado šalių nacionalinėje teisėje tiriamuoju laikotarpiu buvo numatytos neokaringosios ir pusiau karingosios demokratijos priemonės. Neokaringosios priemonės jau buvo nebeaktualios, nes buvo nukreiptos į apsaugą nuo idėjų ir politinių grupių, kurios tiek Vyšegrado šalyse, tiek visoje Europoje nebuvo plačiai remiamos. Tiriamuoju laikotarpiu veikiantys reglamentai Vyšegrado šalyse nepadėjo jų politinėms tautoms apsisaugoti nuo antidemokratiškų jėgų įsigalėjimo, nepadėjo veiksmingai neutralizuoti naujų populistinių grupių ir hibridinės intervencijos. Pusiau karingųjų priemonių taikymas formuojant politinę tautą buvo paliktas savieigai, ir tai pakenkė Višegrado šalių suverenumui. Viena vertus, antidemokratiškai veikiantys subjektai buvo laikomi demokratijos priešais. Kita vertus, taikant veikiančius reglamentus, iš politinės sferos buvo pašalintos demokratinės jėgos. Kitaip tariant, kiekvienas, kurio pažiūros ir veiksmai nesutapo su valdančiųjų partijų politine darbotvarke arba aiškiai prieštaravo jų interesams, galėjo tapti demokratijos priešu.
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Semenjak kepulangan Imam Besar-nya Rizieq Shihab dari pengasingan di Arab Saudi, organisasi masyarakat Front Pembela Islam (FPI) mengalami serangkaian peristiwa yang berujung pada pembubaran ormas tersebut pada awal Desember 2020. Kepulangan Rizieq yang didengungkan untuk memimpin “revolusi akhlak” tampak ditanggapi secara serius oleh pemerintah sebagai masalah yang mengancam negara. Artikel ini akan membahas bagaimana pemerintah menangani isu FPI pasca-kepulangan Shihab dengan pendekatan keamanan sehingga menggunakan tindakan-tindakan di luar prosedur politik. Metode yang digunakan adalah causal process tracing (CPT) dengan sumber data sekunder. Menggunakan teori sekuritisasi, tulisan ini berargumen bahwa pemerintah menghadirkan masalah terkait FPI sebagai ancaman terhadap ideologi, keamanan, dan kesehatan sebelum mengambil keputusan untuk membubarkan ormas islam tersebut.
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p class="abstrak">This article aims to describe the extent to which Tarbiyah community distrust to the General Elections Committee (KPU) and the Indonesian government as well as factors causing this political distrust. Massive movements protesting and rejecting the result of the Pemilu (General Election) 2019 by supporters of one of the presidential candidates, Prabowo Subianto, were launch when the General Elections Committee (KPU) announced the victory of the incumbent, Joko Widodo. One of the most dominant groups involved in these protests was Tarbiyah community. The method used in this study is qualitative research method by conducting in-depth interviews of Tarbiyah members. The study found that political distrust among them is a symptom of Islamic populism. The Islamic populism imagines itself as the movement that can save Indonesian Muslims from corrupt elites. Artikel ini berupaya menjelaskan sejauh mana ketidakpercayaan politik di kalangan komunitas Tarbiyah terhadap Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) dan pemerintah serta faktor-faktor yang menyebabkannya. Gerakan masif yang memprotes dan menolak hasil Pemilu 2019 muncul di kalangan pendukung Prabowo Subianto (salah satu calon Presiden) ketika Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) mengumumkan hasil Pemilu yang menegaskan kemenangan petahana, Joko Widodo (Presiden Indonesia pada periode 2014-2019). Salah satu kelompok yang paling dominan terlibat dalam protes ini adalah komunitas Tarbiyah. Studi yang menggunakan metode kualitatif ini mewawancarai secara mendalam anggota Tarbiyah. Studi ini menjelaskan bahwa ketidakpercayaan politik di kalangan komunitas Tarbiyah merupakan gejala populisme Islam. Populisme Islam mengimajinasikan dirinya sebagai gerakan yang berusaha menyelamatkan Muslim Indonesia dari para elit yang korup. </p
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Since the demise of Suharto’s New Order in 1998, many observers have noted the growing influence of political Islam in Indonesia, despite its peripheral presence in national politics. A notable development was an unprecedented surge in the influence of Islamists during the 2019 presidential election campaign, many of whom were known for their intolerance of religious minorities. What ideological appeal drove Islamists into unprecedented collective action for the first time since 1998? This paper sheds light on the historical trajectory of the Masyumi and an organization called Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council). More specifically, via an analysis of their discursive efforts, it shows that rather than sectarian exclusivism which has long characterized political Islam in Indonesia, historically embedded anti-authoritarian efforts developed by their predecessors during the Sukarno and Suharto regime have enabled Islamists to engage in collective actions and attract the support of many ordinary Muslims. However, such collective action will not last because they have lost the shared aspirations of their predecessors for an alternative political system.
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Election becomes the main feature of liberal democracy and a prerequisite of the working of democracy. After Indonesia's reformation, an election has played an important role in engaging citizens to participate in the government. It includes the subsequent introduction of elections at the local level that portrays an increasing role of citizens in democracy at the grassroots. Consequently, every position of the regional head, both at the provincial and district/city levels, should involve citizens' direct intervention to implement "the regional head to be democratically elected", the norm outlined in Article 18 (4) of the 1945 Constitution. This paper aims to trace the historical trajectory and development of the direct regional head election and analyze the extent to which its continuities and changes in the last two decades have linkages to the performance of Indonesian democracy. By examining the relevance of regional head elections to Indonesia's contemporary democracy after two decades of reform, this paper specifically reflects on the interpretation of the above constitutional norm through regional head elections, which in practice become problematic because money politics is often unavoidable. This money politics in this local election encourages the regression of the Indonesian democracy because direct regional head elections do not necessarily reduce vote manipulation as had been practiced in regional head votings by members of the Regional People's Representative Council.
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Debate on the quality and durability of Indonesia’s democracy has intensified in recent years. Political scholars had generally praised the country’s democratic achievements and stability in the two decades following the 1998 resignation of long-serving president Suharto. But more recently, a growing number of academics have noted that elements of Indonesia’s democracy are being eroded. While the issue of Indonesia’s democratic backsliding has gained considerable attention and generated much academic literature, few scholars have analyzed why Indonesia has not entered a phase of rapid backsliding or a return to authoritarianism. This article argues the role of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in the consolidation of democracy has been frequently overlooked. By using a qualitative approach involving archival research of the Constitutional Court’s sessions on disputed results in Indonesia’s 2019 elections, this article finds the Constitutional Court has been able to prevent rapid democratic backsliding and even a reversion to authoritarianism, by ensuring competitiveness, participation and accountability in elections.
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In recent years, parties and candidates challenging key democratic norms have won unprecedented popular support in liberal democracies across the globe. Drawing on public opinion data from the World Values Survey and various national polls, we show that the success of anti-establishment parties and candidates is not a temporal or geographic aberration, but rather a reflection of growing popular disaffection with liberal-democratic norms and institutions, and of increasing support for authoritarian interpretations of democracy. The record number of anti-system politicians in office raises uncertainty about the strength of supposedly “consolidated” liberal democracies and highlights the need for further analysis of the signs of democratic deconsolidation. Abstract