Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown and Press Freedom

Abstract

This essay aims to explore the progress and setbacks regarding press freedom in Turkey in line with Ankara’s decade-long efforts for EU accession, and EU standards in particular during Justice and Development Party (AKP) administration over the past decade. Its central theme is to analyze the major components of media system and how press freedom faced obstruction and challenges in Turkey’s everevolving and changing political domain beset by periodic crises and direct and indirect interference from non-governmental actors, bureaucratic power sources and outside elements. The scope of the study spans several decades, but mostly focuses on the past few years. It examines the cases of journalists who faced prison sentences and different forms of legal investigations in Turkey over their journalistic works and how they brought their cases to the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when all options for legal remedy at domestic legal channels have been rendered near impossible. Press freedom in Turkey according to European standards, therefore, happens to be the main theme of the study to offer a comparative analysis regarding entrenched problems in Turkey’s legal system and how the ECtHR involved in cases regarding media freedom. It delves into details of specific cases that were taken by the Strasbourg-based court, which has recently been overwhelmed by tens of thousands of applications from Turkey in the aftermath of a failed coup in 2016. Taken in a broader historical perspective and context, the study aims to provide a background to the problems that have dogged Turkey in terms of media freedom from the EU prism. Given that more than 100 journalists languish in Turkey’s prisons and around 160 media outlets have been shut down in the post-coup crackdown, the issue appears to be currently relevant to today’s politics.According to New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Turkey is the top jailer of journalists in the world. As a methodological framework, the essay will provide a narrative, descriptive history of the media and government relations. It will also offer content analysis and historical assessment to make a compelling case.

Full text

2018
Vol.16 No.30:112
Research Article
Global Media Journal
ISSN 1550-7521
1
© Under License of Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License | This article is available in: http://www.globalmediajournal.com
The Global Network of
Communicaon Scholars
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Bora Erdem*
Society of Professional Journalists, USA
*Corresponding author: Bora Erdem
 boraerdem72@gmail.com
Society of Professional Journalists, USA.
Tel: +1- 352 205 9435
Citation: Erdem B. Turkey’s Democrac
Breakdown and Press Freedom. Global
Media Journal 2018, 16:30.
Introducon: Press Freedom in EU
Haunted by bier memories1 and the profound impact of the
fascism and totalitarianism in 1930s across many of the European
countries, European policy makers moved to consolidate the
social forces of democracy and freedom of expression in the
1 Norman Davis, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt,
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/dec/03/featuresreviews.
guardianreview4 (April 10, 2018).
polical landscape of Western Europe in the aermath of
the Second World War. In the long path to the formaon of
the today’s European Union, ‘press freedom’ emerged as the
central pillar of democrac West and European Convenon of
Human Rights was the foundaonal text that dened freedom
of expression and thought, and press freedom, accordingly. The
aempt aimed to provide an opportunity for plurality, diversity
and alternave voices in public sphere and polical domain, with
no limitaon on the right of any cizen or an outlet to express
any form of thought in any fashion. In a broad reecon of liberal
Turkey’s Democrac Breakdown
and Press Freedom
Received: May 21, 2018; Accepted: May 24, 2018; Published: June 01, 2018
Abstract
This essay aims to explore the progress and setbacks regarding press freedom in
Turkey in line with Ankara’s decade-long eorts for EU accession, and EU standards
in parcular during Jusce and Development Party (AKP) administraon over
the past decade. Its central theme is to analyze the major components of media
system and how press freedom faced obstrucon and challenges in Turkey’s ever-
evolving and changing polical domain beset by periodic crises and direct and
indirect interference from non-governmental actors, bureaucrac power sources
and outside elements. The scope of the study spans several decades, but mostly
focuses on the past few years. It examines the cases of journalists who faced prison
sentences and dierent forms of legal invesgaons in Turkey over their journalisc
works and how they brought their cases to the Strasbourg-based European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) when all opons for legal remedy at domesc legal
channels have been rendered near impossible. Press freedom in Turkey according
to European standards, therefore, happens to be the main theme of the study
to oer a comparave analysis regarding entrenched problems in Turkey’s legal
system and how the ECtHR involved in cases regarding media freedom. It delves
into details of specic cases that were taken by the Strasbourg-based court,
which has recently been overwhelmed by tens of thousands of applicaons from
Turkey in the aermath of a failed coup in 2016. Taken in a broader historical
perspecve and context, the study aims to provide a background to the problems
that have dogged Turkey in terms of media freedom from the EU prism. Given
that more than 100 journalists languish in Turkey’s prisons and around 160 media
outlets have been shut down in the post-coup crackdown, the issue appears to be
currently relevant to today’s polics.According to New York-based Commiee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ), Turkey is the top jailer of journalists in the world. As a
methodological framework, the essay will provide a narrave, descripve history
of the media and government relaons. It will also oer content analysis and
historical assessment to make a compelling case.
Keywords: Turkey; Press freedom; EU; Democrac breakdown

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understanding of democrac systems, press freedom conceived
to be the main touchstone of a democrac society in post-WWII
Western Europe. With the evoluon of the common European
economic market into European Coal and Steel Community, then
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1950s, the Western
concepon of the press freedom became the standard bearer
and the dening element of liberes regulang media business
and publicaons across the Free World during the Cold War [1].
Turkey also looked at EU as the main source of inspiraon and
guidance before adopon of the principles dening, both on
legal and literal terms, the press freedom. Ankara became a
founder of Council of Europe in 1949, and a signing part to the
European Convenon on Human Rights and its relevant arcles
on free press. During its waves of expansion over the past half
century through inclusion of new member countries to the club,
EU set press freedom as one of the main criteria to measure the
readiness of a new member to t the condions existent within
the union. During its progress reports to evaluate the democrac
outlook of a candidate country, rapporteurs assigned by Brussels
for every candidate meculously and laboriously work to come up
with a detailed assessment to judge how much the given country
improves the state of media freedom. The mechanism allows the
EU to see whether a candidate country worked enough to secure
liberes dened by Copenhagen Criteria regarding freedom of
expression and press.
According to cardinal principle prevalent among the foundaonal
philosophy of EU, media freedom is regarded as the dening
element of a democracy and rule of law in a country where
polical authories cannot limit people’s right to access to
informaon and their right to express themselves without any
restricon. Arcle 10 of the Convenon sets media freedom as
follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart informaon and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of froners. This arcle shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasng,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with dues
and responsibilies, may be subject to such formalies,
condions and restricons or penales as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democrac society, in the interests
of naonal security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevenon of disorder and crime, for the protecon of
health or morals, for the protecon of the reputaon and
rights of others, for prevenng the disclosure of informaon
received in condence, or for maintaining the authority and
imparality of the judiciary.2
2 New Handbook on Protecng the right to freedom of expression under
the European Convenon on Human Rights, Council of Europe, hps://
www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/home/-/asset_publisher/
RAupmF2S6voG/content/new-handbook-on-protecting-the-right-to-
freedom-of-expression-under-the-european-convention-on-human-
rights?inheritRedirect=false (April 14, 2018)
In this regard, EU comes up with mechanisms to ensure
media freedom to keep a check on any unwing dri toward
authoritarianism that would se dissent and crical voices.
The ECtHR is one of the instuons, in this respect, and has
jurisdicon and authority to punish signing states for violaon
of the media freedom. In line with its foreign policy orientaon,
diplomac and military realignment with the West in the onset
of the Cold War in the face of Soviet threats, Turkey became3
a party to the European instuons and treaes that regulate
the workings and independence of the press. However, Turkey
has had a dismal record, a disheartening stascs that expose
almost an unbridgeable gap between its commitment to the
principle of media freedom and human rights, and its failure
to live up to its promises in pracce [2]. Between 1959 and
2014, the ECtHR ruled against Turkey 3,095 mes for violaon
of human rights, elevang the country to the top spot as worst
violator.4 Just equally important, out of 591 rulings, 248 ones
took place against Turkey in cases about media freedom within
the same me period. Only in 2014, out of 47 decisions about
freedom of expression violaons, 24 ones were taken in relaon
to Turkey. The history of the ECtHR rulings unmistakably points
to a problemac paern for Turkey where democracy and media
freedom repeatedly suer setbacks.
In legal terms, Turkey has no luxury of ignoring the ECtHR rulings,
whatever the diplomac and polical relaons between Ankara
and Brussels might be at a parcular moment. In a novel and
groundbreaking reform move, the Turkish government amended
the 90th arcle of 1980 constuon in 2004 to pave the way for
adjusng its domesc laws in compliance with EU criteria [3].
With the change, the ECtHR rulings, which oversee whether rights
are violated or not during domesc legal process, have become
binding and nal for Turkey’s legal system. Not surprisingly, the
2004 amendment heralded a new chapter in Turkey’s relaons
with EU. It also opened the way for journalists who believed that
their rights were violated and they failed to get jusce within the
realm of domesc legal channels to apply to ECtHR to hear their
cases.
The 2000s saw a resurgence, or explosion, in personal applicaons
to the Strasbourg-based court. The decade revealed structural
contradicons as well. While Turkey embarked5 on an ambious
reform period in pursuit of its decades-old aspiraons for EU
accession, openings and novel reforms did not correspond to a
tangible progress in individual rights and media freedom.
A Brief History of Press in the Ooman
Empire and Turkish Republic
A brief look at the history of press in late Ooman Empire exposes
3 Meltem Muular Bac, Turkey’s Polical Reforms and the Impact of the
European Union, South European Society and Polics, 10, 1 (2005): 16-30.
4Bora Erdem, Avrupa Standartlarina Gore Turkiye’de Basin Ozgurlugu
(Istanbul: Cinius, 2018), 20.
5Natalie Tocci, “Turkey and European Union, A Journey in the Unkown,”
Brookings Instute, hps://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/Turkey-and-the-European-Union.pdf (April 10, 2018).

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the press world endured a great deal of freedom unseen in a
century when the rst media outlets appeared in the Ooman
Empire. Diversity, pluralism and freewheeling ideas dominated
media before another era of repression and censorship. A brief
and relave atmosphere of freedom aer the downfall of Sultan
Abdulhamid II, however, did not long last. The dictatorship of
the Commiee of Union and Progress (CUP) between 1913 and
1918 constuted a new low-water mark for press freedom,
as the country plunged into a series of devastang wars that
eventually brought the demise of the empire aer the World War
One. What followed aer was a mixed story. During the War of
Independence, the press was again colorful and diverse.
Aer 1925 when a Kurdish rebellion shook the young republic to
its roots, polical authories announced maral law across the
country, and began to impose tremendous pressure on media.8
The 1931 law9 about prinng and press sealed the authoritarian
control of media, with no crical voice that would challenge the
reforms by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was allowed. The strict control
of the press lasted unl mul-party polical life. To become
part of the Western world, President Ismet Inonu allowed the
establishment of another polical party and gave his approval for
mul-party elecons in 1946 [7]. It also had an impact on media.
The ideological split between the right and le in Cold War’s
Turkey rst roared its ugly face in 1945 when prinng machines
of Tan, a le-leaning of newspaper, were looted and smashed by
an angry naonalist mob.10 The 1950 elecons marked a polical
watershed in history of modern Turkey, with historical elecon
defeat of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), founded by
Ataturk. People vented their frustraon at ballot box and brought
Democrat Party (DP) to power. Apart from an-communist
hysteria and crackdown on leist outlets, Turkey’s media saw a
brief period of diverse media outlets. Unfortunately, DP, which
ruled Turkey unl its removal from power by a military coup in
1960, began to exert widening pressure on the press in the nal
days of its rule. Especially in 1959 and 1960, dozens of opposion
media outlets faced outright police raids. Shortly before the coup,
it even formed “Tahkikat Komisyonu” (Invesgaon Commission)
to prosecute opposion lawmakers and journalists. The creaon
of commission with only DP members expectedly produced a
polical storm that eventually brought down the government.
The DP, which was elevated to power by people aer 27-year CHP
rule, exploited and abused its powers, undermining an essenal
tenet of democracy -- media freedom. The next 30 years of press
saw similar ups and downs. During 1970s, the country was bierly
divided over the lines of polical aliaon with the right and
le, with polical violence wreaking havoc and tearing apart the
social fabric. More than 5,000 people were killed between 1975
and 1980. The media epitomized the ideological split between
the right and le. The 1980 military coup swept polical and
8 Erdem, Avrupa Standartlarina Gore Turkiye’de Basin Ozgurlugu, 63, 72.
9 Nursen Mazici, 1930’a Kadar Basinin Durumu ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu,
hp://www.dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/45/809/10292.pdf (April 14,
2018).
10 Bianet, 69. Yilinda Matbaasi Baskini ve Demokrasi Mucadelesi Sergisi,
hps://m.bianet.org/bianet/medya/160539-69-yilinda-tan-matbaasi-
baskini-ve-demokrasi-mucadelesi-sergisi (April 15, 2018).
long-standing challenges that dene a strained relaonship
between media and polical authories. The press was regarded
by the intellectuals of the day as a polical agent to push for social
change and polical reform during the 19th century. Since 1860s,
constuonalists6 and dissidents of the Palace published crical
newspapers abroad to challenge the absolute power of Sultan,
defending the adopon of a new constuon and Parliament to
migate the disastrous eects of the social forces of naonalism
and separasm among ethnic minories. The Empire’s endurance
during the long 19th century, and especially in its second part,
was tested by the trial of triumphant ideology of naonalism,
which swept the enre European polical landscape aer the
French Revoluon. The Sublime Porte faced demands by ethnic
minories on self-determinaon and polical autonomy in the
Balkans. Ooman intellectuals viewed constuonal reform as a
potenal soluon to moderate demands of elites of the Chrisan
cizens, and systemacally used press to advance their cause
in polical domain. This triggered a bier contest between the
Palace and intellectuals, with ominous ramicaons for the press
freedom [4]. Namik Kemal7 and his friends published the Hurriyet
daily (which has no relaon to today’s Hurriyet newspaper) in
Paris in 1868, defending constuonal reforms. It followed by
other crics of the Sultan in other European countries. Either due
to pressure from Istanbul or nancial hardships, dissidents was
forced to shut down their outlets. The diplomac court of the
Sultan also pressured countries, France or Switzerland, to shut
down crical newspapers run by Young Oomans, threatening to
shun them out of lucrave tenders to modernize certain sectors
of the Ooman economy. Reminiscent of Ankara’s showdown
with EU countries over allowing Kurdish media outlets in 2000s,
it unleashed a series of diplomac rows between the empire and
European countries over Istanbul’s pursuit of its dissident cizens
abroad. Today, Ankara seeks to use Interpol to crack down on
its journalists abroad, revealing a similar paern that deeply
entrenched in the psyche of the Turkish state [5].
Though constuonalists enjoyed a brief moment of success
when young Sultan Abdulhamid II endorsed the proposal for a
new constuon and steered the establishment of Constuonal
Assembly in 1876 aer the overthrow of Sultan Abdulaziz by a
bureaucrac coup, the triumph of the young reformist generaon
proved to be short-lived. The outbreak of the Ooman-Russian
War enabled Sultan to dismantle nascent Parliament, reversing
the gains of the Young Oomans, postponing their dreams for
another three decades. The sultan’s 33-year-long reign was
characterized as “repression (isbdat) regime” where media,
all forms of organized dissent and polical opposion were
systemacally suppressed. The era was associated with tyranny,
according to the widely-shared convicon by most of the studies
[6].
Unl a violent takeover of polical power by Young Turks in 1913,
6 Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ooman Thought: A Study in the
Modernizaon of Turkish Polical Ideas, (New York: Syracuse University
Press, 2000).
7 Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ooman Thought: A Study in the
Modernizaon of Turkish Polical Ideas.

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social domain, crushing crical and leist media outlets. With
the takeover of the government, the military-led junta sought
de-policizaon of the college youth by forcing press to be less
occupied with hardcore polical issues [8].
The 1990s saw expansion of private media ownership. The year
of 1990 also marked the breakdown of state monopoly over
television broadcasng. The ourishing of TV channels enabled
diversity and plurality in media. Abundance of new channels and
emergence of new newspapers did not correspondingly point
to a new dawn in terms of freedom of expression [9]. Themes
regarded within realm of naonal security and polical issues of
secularism were sll viewed as taboo and o-limit for discussion
amid newfound enthusiasm in new media age.
EU Process and Media Freedom
Given the turbulent relaonship between decision makers and
media owners, and constant limitaons on performing media
freedom has been one of the enduring sources of fricon between
EU and Turkey. With Turkey being declared as a candidate country
in 1999, Ankara has found itself tasked with a series of reforms to
adjust its domesc legal structure in every eld, criminal jusce
system, human rights, minority rights, business, and media
freedom, in line with EU standards.
The AKP’s rise to power in 2002 heralded a new era in Turkey’s
modern polical history. The AKP’s Islamic roots became source
of concern for potenal clash with democracy and secularist roots
of the polical system. But the party became a loyal and ardent
supporter of EU process, and even enacted groundbreaking
reforms not seen in modern memory. It did more than any other
party to enrich cultural rights of Kurds, expand liberes and
liberalize Turkey’s economy. The pace of reforms baed many
observers and even placed the prospect of Turkey’s accession
to the EU within the realm of possibility [10]. According to
Meltem Muuler Bac, the EU became one of the main drivers of
democrazaon in Turkey in the early 2000s.11 For the AKP, which
aroused genuine fears in secular segments of society, a hosle
bureaucracy and a skepcal military, the EU path is the most
secure way of consolidang its power in the face of challenges
from old guards of Turkey’s polical system.
Months before Islamist AKP’s elevaon to the power in 2002, a
previous coalion government indeed laid the groundwork for
adjusng Turkey’s instuons, legal framework and norms to
be consistent and compliant with EU norms and mechanisms.
Whatever the AKP did between 2002 and 2005, it built on
the reform package enacted in 2002 summer. The coalion
government laid a proposal for eliminaon of death penalty in
that summer, and the AKP government signed it into law in 2004
[11], nally abolishing death penalty that has not been carried
out since 1983. It approved the right to print and broadcasng in
languages other than Turkish in 2004, paving the way for Kurdish
media outlets to be acve and working without legal restricons.
Though billed as a period of reforms, the early AKP era was of
course was not without challenges or aws as Turkey’s notorious
11 Meltem Muular Bac, Turkey’s Polical Reforms and the Impact of the
European Union, South European Society and Polics, 10, 1 (2005): 16-30.
counter-terrorism law, especially the Arcle 301 of Criminal Penal
Code, remained to be legal source of prosecutors to invesgate
journalists, writers and arsts for their crical pieces and opinions.
The vague law gives a great latude to prosecutors to regard any
crical expression of thought quesoning the modern Turkish
naon-state, the naonalist ethos of the state and its pracces
as criminal conduct on charges of “denigrang Turkish naon
or insulng Turkishness.” For instance, Orhan Pamuk’s display
of views that are close to the Armenian posion on the issue of
‘Armenian Genocide’ sparked a legal invesgaon against him.
The ever-comprehensive nature of “naonal security” themes
encompass many layers of social conduct and public dialogue
either in academia or media sphere. Turkey’s legal authories
mostly subscribed to the “naonal security rst” approach and
used relevant arcles in criminal penal code or counter-terrorism
law as juscaon for prosecuon of writers. In this respect,
Hrant Dink, Elif Safak, Ahmet Altan, Orhan Pamuk and a dozen
of other writers faced criminal invesgaons for quesoning
major components of the naon-state or its oppressive pracces
against Kurds, Alevis, le and minority groups [12].
This period saw a surge in applicaons from Turkey to the
Strasbourg-based court. Turkey and Russia occupied the top of
the list of countries, which were sentenced to pay compensaon
and nes to thousands of applicants over violaon of their rights.
The ECtHR ruled against Turkey’s authories in a number of
cases concerning freedom of expression. In 2005, Erbil Tusalp,
a columnist with the le-leaning Birgun daily, wrote a crical
piece against then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan over
allegaons of corrupon. He charged Erdogan and his government
with exploing public resources and employ the term of “stability”
to cloak increasing cases of corrupon from public view. His
accusaons of using religion for polical goals elicited a harsh
reacon from the prime minister who led a lawsuit against the
journalist and sought compensaon. A local court ruled against
the Birgun columnist. The decision was approved by the Supreme
Court in next step. Both Tusalp and Birgun were sentenced to pay
nes against the prime minister. In another piece same year, the
same journalist quesoned the mental health of Erdogan. That
column also triggered another lawsuit and convicon in Turkey’s
courts. The journalist brought the two cases to the ECtHR, which
then ruled against Erdogan and his government. The court said
freedom of expression was applied in broadest sense against
public gures.12 The government insisted that the journalist
went beyond the acceptable bounds of free speech and insulted
personal rights and integrity of the prime minister. The case was
of crucial importance for the reason that it revealed the approach
of then-Prime Minister Erdogan and the government toward
media in a long series of showdowns that nally laid the ground
for full-scale polical mastery of Turkey’s media landscape [13].
In another case concerning free expression, constuonal expert
Mustafa Erdogan wrote an arcle in 2001, cricizing a ruling by
Constuonal Court to shut down Fazilet (Felicity) Party. He faced
a lawsuit by the members of Turkey’s top court. In his arcle,
Professor Erdogan quesoned the decision from legal perspecve
12 Erdem, Avrupa Standartlarina Gore Turkiye’de Basin Ozgurlugu, 241.

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and oered a sober analysis of the structural aws embedded in
Turkey’s criminal jusce system. The problem in shutdown of a
polical party, he construed, was not shortcomings of the legal
framework regulang polical pares and aairs, but rather
the way the members of the court interpreted exisng laws
and constuon from a very narrow angle with an authoritarian
mindset.13 It was not Parliament that failed to enact legislaon
and amend the constuon, the professor noted. The main
obstacle was the Constuonal Court, which had no problem
with shredding liberes, itself, he wrote. In the same arcle, he
quesoned the qualicaon of the members and cricized them
for lacking desire to improve themselves in the legal profession.
His piece sparked a furious reacon from top court members who
led lawsuits against the professor. Turkey’s courts ruled against
Professor Erdogan who eventually brought the issue to the EctHR
[14]. The Strasbourg-based court ruled in favor of the professor
on the ground that he used his right to free expression.
Turkey’s Democrac Breakdown
Turkey’s pivot away from Western-style democracy has taken
place since the early 2010s and taken a full-edged form since the
botched coup in 2016. The polical crackdown on Kurdish acvists
and pro-Kurdish polical party expanded to include Kurdish
journalists in 2011 and 2012.14 Several dozens of journalists were
placed behind bars on the grounds of disseminang terrorist
propaganda and working on behalf of a terrorist organizaon to
advance its cause through use of media tools.
The Gezi Protests in summer 2013 and the outbreak of a
polically explosive corrupon scandal that tainted then-Prime
Minister Erdogan in late 2013 have proved to be a watershed
moment to pinpoint the exact meline for Turkey’s democrac
breakdown. It also signied the ever-growing strangling of media,
with mainstream media outlets nding themselves at the mercy
of polical whims of the authories, mostly Erdogan. The ever-
ghtening grip over media was unmistakably evident during Gezi
Protests when majority of media outlets self-consciously did
not air the erupon of public discontent and became a source
enduring mockery.
The social upheaval over environmental issues metastasized
into display of mass anger in streets where people of all social
convicon and polical aliaon, in mostly secular sectors of
society, registered their dissent with the government’s recent
mega projects that set to transform the urban landscape of
Istanbul. A leaked audio tape featured Erdogan intervening to
change a subtle on a TV screen during Gezi Protests while he
was on a diplomac visit to Morocco. The tape encapsulated
the scope of his micromanagement and overreach, revealing
the depth of his engagement with even small editorial maers
[15]. Erdogan systemacally pressured media owners to re
certain columnists and journalists he deemed to be crical of
him over the past decade. The polical interference in media
took several forms. One was to encourage pliant businessmen
13 Erdem, Avrupa Standartlarina Gore Turkiye’de Basin Ozgurlugu, 242.
14 Joel Silmon, The New Censorship, Inside the Global Bale for Media
Freedom, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 35.
to purchase mainstream media outlets, oering lucrave loans
from public banks.15 The second was direct polical pressure on
media bosses. Media tycoons and barons are loath to be cut o
the hook in public tenders, therefore they sought the good grace
of policians, mostly Erdogan in the Turkish case.
When a massive gra scandal broke out on Dec. 17, in 2013,
Prime Minister Erdogan responded with a sweeping purge in
judiciary and police, inicng a debilitang damage on the rule of
law and judicial independence. Media, too, did not go unscathed
as authories began to choke o crical media outlets through
a series of new laws curbing free expression and unrestrained
access to informaon on internet. The year of 2014, therefore,
began to mark16 a new, dark period for Turkey’s media. In late
2015, authories seized Ipek Medya outlets while in March 2016
the largest newspaper in Turkey, Zaman daily, was taken over
in an outright seizure with police crackdown on the newspaper
headquarters.17
The breakdown of democracy in Turkey is part of a larger
trend that has taken hold around the world. A global surge in
authoritarianism to the detriment of liberal democracy has had a
rippling impact even in democrac EU bloc, as Poland and Hungary
have appeared to be in thrall of populist naonalism. Those two
countries, according to some experts, are no longer viewed as
democrac.18 The loath for Western-style liberal democracy is no
longer held by fringe elements on both sides of the polical aisle,
but has become a mainstream convicon shared by major pares
of the center-right and center-le [16].
According to polical scienst Murat Somer, Turkey also suers
from this global trend, which seriously threatens to tear apart
the ascendancy of liberal democracy as a polical system.19 In
addion to economic crisis, the migraon problem has revived
old issues of identy polics while culture wars now dene
results of elecons and shape next governments across Europe.20
As a recent development, a new generaon of rulers who
owed their ascension to power to democrac means but later
15 Gonca Tokyol, Dogan Medya Grubunun Demiroren’e Sasinda Ziraat
Bankasi Kredisi de Kullanildi, T24 hp://t24.com.tr/haber/dogan-
medya-grubunun-demirorene-satisinda-ziraat-bankasi-kredisi-de-
kullanildi,587250 (April 16, 2018)
16 Kenneth Roth, Erdogan’s Dangerous Trajectory, May 13, 2014, Human
Rights Watch hps://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/13/erdogans-
dangerous-trajectory (April 16, 2018)
17 Safak Timur and Tim Arango, Turkey Seizes Newspaper, Zaman, As Press
Crackdown Connues, The New York Times, March 4, 2016, hps://www.
nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/middleeast/recep-tayyip-erdogan-
government-seizes-zaman-newspaper.html (April 16, 2018).
18 Dalibor Rohac, Hungary and Poland Aren’t Democrac. They’re
Authoritarian. Foreign Policy, hp://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/
hungary-and-poland-arent-democrac-theyre-authoritarian/ (April 16,
2018)
19 Murat Somer, Understanding Turkey’s democrac breakdown: Old vs.
New and Indigenous vs. Global Authoritarianism. Southeast European
and Black Sea Studies, 16(4), 481-503.
20 In Italy Elecon, An-E.U. Views Pay O For Far Right and Populists, The
New York Times, March 4, 2018 hps://www.nymes.com/2018/03/04/
world/europe/italy-elecon.html (April 16, 2018)

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began to subvert democracy have emerged across the globe.
“One of the most crical challenges to the media comes from
a new generaon of popularly elected autocrats -- call them
“democratators”,” Joel Simon wrote in his new book, “The New
Censorship: Inside The Global Bale for Media Freedom.”21
“Deprived of ideological basis for state control of informaon
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the democratators have
adapted to the new global reality,” he noted, elaborang on how
new generaon of autocrats well accommodated themselves to
the new age through use of democrac channels and media. But
this new creed of policians cannot be easily labeled as dictators.
They employ dierent set of methods at their disposal, and they
aenvely dierenate themselves from the use of brute force
deployed by the dictators of the past.
“Dictators rule by force. Democratators rule by manipulaon.
Dictators impose their will. Democratators govern with the
support of the majority. Dictators do not claim to be democrats
-- at least credibly. Democratators always do. Dictators control
informaon. Democratators manage it,”22 Silmon wrote,
idenfying the points of dierence between dictators and what
he called today’s democratators [17].
According to this explanatory framework, Silmon places President
Erdogan in this category and goes, at great length, to describe
how the Turkish strongman formed his autocrac rule through
the mastery of media, managed control of democracy and
suppressing opposion through the legimate tools of exisng
polical system without outright establishing a dictatorial rule.
He scrupulously craed his strategies so as not to alienate tourists
or internaonal community when they engage with Turkey.
He cloaked his repressive regime from public view or outright
observaon through managed media. But this was before the
2016 coup. In the aermath, the repression was and is out there
in plain sight.
The recent literature of polical and social sciences are awash with
studies aer a resurgence of scholarly interest in the resurrecon
of authoritarianism at global scale. In How Democracies Die,
two Harvard scholars Steven Levitsky and Daniel Zibla cite
polical authories’ threatening of civil society and media as
an indicaon of an authoritarian turn in a country.23 The gist
of their argument is that “democracies die in three stages: the
elecon of an authoritarian leader, the concentraon and abuse
of governmental power and nally, the complete repression of
opposion and cizens.” The two scholars also list Turkey as an
example of a democrac breakdown.
Against this backdrop, it is safe to assume that how authories
treat media emerges as one of the crucial indicators of a
democrac outlook of a given country. This angle is parcularly
pernent aer “truth” and “post-truth age” have become the
21 Silmon, The New Censorship, Inside the Global Bale for Media
Freedom, 32.
22 Silmon, The New Censorship, Inside the Global Bale for Media
Freedom, 33.
23 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Zibla, How Democracies Die, (New York:
Penguin Random House, 2018), 24.
main elements of contemporary intellectual debate about
media. The Economist’s depicon of post-truth polics24 sits
well with these debates since Donald J. Trump’s unrelenng
campaign against mainstream media and his portrayal of media
reports as “fake news” [18]. The dawn of the post-truth age is full
of examples with polical leaders waging vendea against media
instuons around the world.
Conclusion: Turkey’s Media aer 2016
Coup
Throughout the 2000s, the story of media in Turkey was once
promising and hopeful given Ankara’s decades-long aspiraons
to become a full-edged member of the world’s most elite
polical club -- the EU. It would have been culminaon of the
country’s century-long foreign policy orientaon set by the
founding father, Ataturk, aer steady and consistent drive toward
integraon with the Western civilizaon. According to scholars,
EU has played a great role in democrazaon of Turkey’s polical
system and helped civilian government tame a military whose
penchant for interference in polical aairs resulted in two direct
and two indirect coups. What started as an inspiring story of a
Turkish model25 represenng successful combinaon of polical
Islam, democracy and a prospering economy for the Middle
Eastern region terribly wandered o the track under the same
government.
Needless to say, the polical control of media marks crumbling
of a democrac system where authories feel unrestrained and
unbound to carry out any policy without fear of public backlash.
Turkey’s lurch toward non-democrac mode of governance did
not happen all of a sudden. President Erdogan’s gradual power
grab through the use of democrac channels points to another
phenomenon called as illiberal democracy where authoritarian
leaders are elected by popular vote, but they slowly expand their
grip beyond checks and balances system step by step. The slow-
moon shipwreck in terms of democrac decline since 2013 has
escalated aer a failed coup in 2016.
The botched coup raled enre naon, killed 241 people
and wounded nearly 2,000 cizens. The nonsensical violence
was ingrained in collecve memory of the Turkish society for
generaons to come. What happened in the putsch’s aermath
was sll an unfolding saga, with disastrous echoes for Turkey’s
democracy, rule of law and media freedom. Numbers are
staggering [19]. President Erdogan and his government used the
aborve coup as a juscaon to launch a sweeping purge in the
military, judiciary, police and civil service. The government has
since ruled the country with decrees, which have the full force
of laws, and placed Turkey under the state of emergency since
24 Post-truth Polics: The Art of the Lie, The Economist, September 10,
2016 hps://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21706525-policians-
have-always-lied-does-it-maer-if-they-leave-truth-behind-enrely-art
(April 16, 2018)
25 Shibley Telhami, The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll, Brookings Instute,
November 21, 2011, hps://www.brookings.edu/research/the-2011-
arab-public-opinion-poll/ (April 16, 2018).

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then. More than 150,000 public servants26 have been summarily
suspended or sacked without due process. According to the
United Naons, Ankara has detained around 160,000 people
since the coup.27 Out of them, more than 50,000 people, including
generals, diplomats, teachers and ordinary cizens, have been
imprisoned on coup-related or terrorism charges. The Turkish
authories placed the blame on faith-based Gulen Movement for
the aempted coup. Both U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen and
his sympathizers reject any link to the coup.
Though the government cracked down on Kurds and the le as
well, members of Gulen Movement have borne the brunt of the
post-coup clampdown. The authories have encouraged social
witch-hunt and urged people to inform on their neighbors,
workplace friends and even their family members if they have any
real or perceived es to Gulen Movement. The toxic atmosphere
of the purge and witch-hunt shaered major components of
Turkey’s social fabric and led to the collapse of mutual trust and
civic dialogue in public domain.
The post-coup crackdown began to unwind central pillars of the
republican democracy and shredded whatever le of judicial
independence aer mass imprisonment of more than 3,000
judges and prosecutors the day aer the coup. It has equally le
the academia in disarray with sacking of nearly 7,000 academics.
All branches of government were hit hard by the purge [20].
Not surprisingly, authories have also crushed crical and
independent media. More than 160 media outlets have been
shut down28 and, according to Turkish Journalists Associaon,
154 journalists have been jailed.29 Some of the journalists were
released later while authories imprisoned new ones. The
damage on exisng instuons and media is beyond repair [21].
Addionally, a controversial referendum on adopon of execuve
presidenal system took place last year. According to European
observers,30 the pre-referendum campaign and the vote took
26 Aria Bendix, Turkey Dismisses Thousands of Police, Civil Sevants
and Academics, The Atlanc, hps://www.theatlanc.com/news/
archive/2017/07/turkey-dismisses-thousands-of-police-civil-servants-
and-academics/533754/ (April 16, 2018)
27 Orhan Coskun, Pro-Erdogan agrees to buy owner of Hurriyet
newspaper, CNN Turk. Reuters, March 21, 2018 hps://www.reuters.
com/article/us-dogan-holding-m-a-demiroren/pro-erdogan-group-
agrees-to-buy-owner-of-hurriyet-newspaper-cnn-turk-idUSKBN1GX23R
(April 16, 2018).
28 Turkey: Silencing the Media, Human Rights Watch, December 15,
2016, hps://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/15/turkey-silencing-media
(April 16, 2018).
29 Coskun, Pro-Erdogan agrees to buy owner of Hurriyet newspaper, CNN
Turk. Reuters.
30 Niamh McIntyre, EU observer in Turkey condemns referendum as
place in unfair condions where opposion who supported the
No vote regarding constuonal amendment had lile chance
and room to express their voice. In contrary, President Erdogan
and cabinet ministers enjoyed great deal of advantages at
their disposal. Both state-run and pro-government media aired
more ads and campaign of the Yes vote [22]. During this period,
mainstream media found itself under great pressure and gave
lile space to the opponents of the constuonal change. A
razor thin victory with 51.4 percent of the votes sealed what the
president craved all for his life -- a shi to execuve presidency
[23]. The 2017 referendum exposed the dismal state of media no
maer what the polical consequences were. The result would
have been dierent had the media been free was a convicon
shared by many.
With the sale of Dogan Media Group to a pro-government
businessmen, the destrucon of mainstream media has been
completed, Cumhuriyet columnist Kadri Gursel wrote aer the
acquision last month [24].31 The deal marked the end of an
era, Andrew Finkel, who in the past worked with Dogan media
outlets, told Financial Times.32
In conclusion, the post-coup crackdown crippled Turkey’s public
instuons, decimated Turkey’s most experienced civil servants
and army generals, and hollowed out its independent and crical
media outlets one by one. Free expression under the state of
emergency has been systemacally targeted [25]. During Turkey’s
military oensive against Kurdish enclave of Afrin, hundreds
of people were detained over their an-war opinions. Tens of
thousands of social media account owners face invesgaon
over their opinions about polical maers. Numbers are baing.
So is the scope and depth of repression. Even Turkey’s already
stalled EU process does not insll any condence for an end to
the protracted state of emergency and the ensuing crackdown on
dissent. Brussels has no leverage or inuence le in dealings with
Ankara [25]. If the past is any guide, Turkey may well pull itself
out of the looming precipice. Aer military coups in the past, and
especially aer the 1980 coup, which saw arrests of more than
hundreds of thousands of people, Turkey gradually found its foot
on right track by recovering its democracy step by step.
‘neither fair nor free,’ The Indepent, April 17, 2017, hps://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/eu-observer-turkey-condemns-
referendum-result-president-erdogan-opposition-parties-demand-
recount-a7686876.html (April 16, 2018).
31 Abdullah Ayasun, Dogan Media Sale Set to Alter Turkey’s Press
Landscape, Globe Post Turkey hps://turkey.theglobepost.com/turkey-
dogan-media-erdogan/ (April 16, 2018).
32 Laura Pitel, Turkish press baron agrees to sell media arm to Erdogan
ally, Financial Times, March 21, 2018 hps://www..com/content/
c4d3c3f0-2d2d-11e8-a34a-7e7563b0b0f4 (April 16, 2018).

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2018
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ISSN 1550-7521
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