A preview of this full-text is provided by American Psychological Association.
Content available from Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2001.
Vol. 80, No. 6. 942-958Copyright 2001 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-3514701/S5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.80.6.942
Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation
and Reactance in Negotiations
Laura J. Kray
University of ArizonaLeigh Thompson
Northwestern University
Adam Galinsky
University of Utah
The authors examined how gender stereotypes affect negotiation performance. Men outperformed
women when the negotiation was perceived as diagnostic of ability (Experiment 1) or the negotiation was
linked to gender-specific traits (Experiment 2), suggesting the threat of negative stereotype confirmation
hurt women's performance relative to men. The authors hypothesized that men and women confirm
gender stereotypes when they are activated implicitly, but when stereotypes are explicitly activated,
people exhibit stereotype reactance, or the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype.
Experiment 3 confirmed this hypothesis. In Experiment 4, the authors examined the cognitive processes
involved in stereotype reactance and the conditions under which cooperative behaviors between men and
women can be promoted at the bargaining table (by activating a shared identity that transcends gender).
Negotiation skills are essential for success in all areas of life
(Bazerman, 1998). Because of the competitive nature of negotia-
tions,
one of the most commonly asked questions is "How well
do men and women do at the bargaining table relative to one
another?" This question usually arises from an implicit theory that
women are inherently more cooperative and collaborative than
men, whereas men are more assertive and demanding than women.
It is these widely held gender stereotypes, regardless of their
accuracy, that lead some people to speculate that men fare better
than women in negotiations. Empirical evidence is consistent with
the typical layperson's perception. In two recent meta-analyses
examining gender differences in negotiations (Stuhlmacher &
Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998), men were
indeed shown to behave more competitively and reap better out-
comes than women did. Whereas these studies establish that a
gender gap does indeed exist, the source of this gap remains
elusive. The question of why men.and women perform differently
at the bargaining table remains a matter of wide speculation, as
research studies that address this question have not been very
conclusive to date and the study of "sex differences" does not seem
Laura J. Kray, Eller College of Business and Public Administration,
University of Arizona; Leigh Thompson, Kellogg Graduate School of
Management, Northwestern University; Adam Galinsky, David Eccles
School of Business, University of Utah.
Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted while Laura J. Kray and Adam
Galinsky were postdoctoral fellows at Northwestern University. The stud-
ies were supported in part by National Science Foundation Grants SES-
0073682 and SBR-9870892.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Laura J.
Kray, Eller College of Business and Public Administration, University of
Arizona, P.O. Box 210108, Tucson, Arizona
85721.
Electronic mail'may
be sent to kray@bpa.arizona.edu.
politically nor intellectually correct. We seek to fill this void by
studying the processes that underlie gender differences at the
bargaining table.
In this article, we report four experimental investigations of men
and women at the bargaining table. We were guided by two major
research questions: (a) Under what conditions do men versus
women prevail in claiming the most resources at the bargaining
table? and (b) Under what conditions are mixed-gender negotiators
able to seek mutually beneficial agreements? In Experiment 1, we
examined how the perceived diagnosticity of a negotiation can
create stereotype threat in women. In Experiment 2, we examined
how activating gender stereotypes can create a male advantage at
the bargaining table. In Experiment 3, we examined how the mode
by which stereotypes are activated (implicitly versus explicitly)
determines whether women versus men are advantaged in negoti-
ations. In Experiment 4, we examined the cognitive processes
involved in stereotype reactance and also how emphasizing shared
identities can lead to greater equality of outcomes at the bargaining
table between men and women. We begin by examining the
literature on gender and negotiations, and then we introduce a
model of stereotype confirmation, derived in part from Steele's
(1997) stereotype threat theory, to test our key hypotheses.
Gender and Negotiations
Examinations of gender effects in negotiations have focused on
skills (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993), strategies (Kaman &
Hartel, 1994), aspirations (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984),
preferences for equity (King & Hinson, 1994), and rewards for
negotiating (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991). Evidence points to blatant
discrimination in offers to male versus female negotiators (Ayres
& Siegelman, 1995), as well as the accumulation of negotiation
differences over the course of one's career (Wood, Corcoran, &
942
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.