Abstract

In this discussion I review John Broome's characterization of normative reasons, consider a problem raised by Jonathan Dancy, and explore possible solutions on Broome's behalf. I conclude that Broome's account faces an internal tension.
D. R. © 2018. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México-Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, núm. 12, enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
México, Ciudad de México, ISSN 2007-4387
Broome on Reasons*

Fernando  
 I. Pro toto reasons. II. Pro tanto reasons. III. Conclusion.
IV. References.
In chapter 4 of   1 John Broome sets

those of ‘ought’ and ‘explanation’. Broome’s arguments in that chap-
ter have drawn a lot of attention, as it’s attested by the fact that three
of the seven chapters on the part devoted to reasoning in Broome’s
have as their central aim to criticize them. Here I will of-
fer, on Broome’s behalf, what I take it to be a plausible response to
one of those criticisms, made by Jonathan Dancy2 in his contribu-
tion to that volume. Dancy claims that Broome fails to capture the
normativity of reasons because the  relation that character-
izes them can’t be understood, as Broome thinks it can, in terms of
 relations to oughts. I will argue that Dancy is wrong: the
normativity of at least one type of reasons —what Broome calls ‘pro
toto’ reasons— can indeed be understood in terms of an explana-
tory relation; more precisely, it can be understood in terms of what I
* Artículo recibido el 8 de agosto de 2017 y aprobado para su publicación el 1o.
de noviembre de 2017.
** 
Broome John,  (Wiley Blackwell 2013).
Dancy Jonathan, “Reasons for Broome,” in Hirose Iwao and Reisner Andrew
(eds),  (Oxford
University Press 2015).
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FERNANDO RUDY HILLER
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 12, enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
6
will call ‘the right-making (or ought-making) relation. The problem,
however, is that this works  for pro toto reasons, that is, reasons
that explain why it’s actually the case that you ought to F;3 it doesn’t
work for pro tanto reasons, that is, reasons that count in favor of Fing
without making it the case that you ought to F. The upshot of my dis-
cussion is that Broome’s account of reasons seems to be internally
inconsistent, since it manages to capture the normativity of pro toto
reasons at the cost of failing to explain why pro tanto reasons are
normative. I close by considering some ways in which Broome might

.

pro toto and pro
tanto. A pro toto reason for N (an agent) to F
by Broome as “an explanation of why you ought to F”.4 In this often-
-
mativity of pro toto reasons:
We slide from ‘X is the reason why you ought to F’ to ‘X is the reason for
you to F’, meaning exactly the same thing. The ‘reason why’ (meaning ex-
planation) bumps into the normative ‘ought’, yielding a normative sense
of ‘a reason’ that combines the meaning of both.5
To exemplify: say you promised to take your friend to the airport

drive. I tell you that you ought to take your friend to the airport nev-
ertheless, and you ask why. “Because you promised to”, is the an-
swer. So the reason why you ought to take your friend to the airport
is your having promised to. Here we are giving an explanation of an
ought. Broome claims that in the case of normative explanations like
this one, the consideration following the ‘because’ plays a dual role:
I follow Broome in employing ‘F’ to stand for an action, a belief, or an attitude
of other sort.
Broome (n 1) 50.
ibid.
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Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
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7
BROOME ON REASONS
it is both an explainer (which by itself is non-normative) and a nor-
mative reason. We can see this by noting that ‘because you promised
to’ not only explains why you ought to take your friend to the airport
but is, at the same time, a reason (or even  reason)  to
take your friend to the airport. So if Broome’s suggestion is right, we
can understand what a normative pro toto reason is in terms of two
more basic notions —those of ought and explanation.
          
we can account for a normative notion such as a pro toto reason in
terms of a non-normative notion such as explanation: “I do not see
how he [Broome] can both say that the notion of an explanation why
you ought to F is not normative, that the notion of the (pro toto) rea-
son for you to F is normative, and that these are the same notion”.6
In a moment I will suggest that Broome has available a response
to this worry, a response based precisely on the distinction Dancy
introduces between the favoring relation and the right-making re-
lation. Before that, however, it’s important to note that the worry


anything that explains why you ought to F is at the same time a pro
toto reason for you to F.7 Rather, the problem concerns whether a
normative reason can be equated with (or understood in terms of)
an explanatory one. Dancy8 claims that it can’t, because the-
ing relation —which characterizes considerations that are norma-
tive reasons— is different from the  —which

Let’s illustrate this distinction with the previous example:
Dancy (n 2) 178.
However, Dancy does sound skeptical about this: “A pro toto reason to F is what
explains why one ought to F, if one ought. Such a reason might be a quite complex
  
any sort to F, Dancy (n 2) 177. Roger Crisp expresses similar doubts, Crisp Roger,
“Keeping Things Simple” in Hirose Iwao and Reisner Andrew (eds), 
     (Oxford University Press
2015) 144.

For Broome (n 1) 48, the explanatory relation is, in general, “the relation of
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2018.12.12441
FERNANDO RUDY HILLER
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 12, enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
8
. Your having promised to take your friend to the air-
port  taking your friend to the airport.
-. Your having promised to take your friend to the
airport  that taking your friend to the airport is right.10, 11
It’s clear from this example that, as Dancy points out, “even though
one and the same feature is capable of standing on the left-hand side
of both of these relations, the right-hand sides are very different”.12
They are very different because in the favoring relation the right-
hand side concerns a way of acting, whereas in the right-making re-
lation the right-hand side concerns a property of the act itself. Dancy
goes on to suggest (correctly, in my view) that the favoring relation
is normative and the right-making relation is metaphysical. Presum-
ably, this means that in the former case what is at stake is the jus-
 of the action whereas in the latter case what is at stake is
the nature   
making so”, so he would say that the right-or ought-making relation, by which a cer-
tain consideration (or set of considerations) makes it so that a certain response has

denies that the ‘making-relation’ is an explanatory relation, although he concedes
that we often offer explanations in terms of what made it so that the explanandum
came to be.
Although a little awkwardly, the same idea can be formulated in terms of
‘ought’: . Your having promised to take your friend to the air-
port   that taking your friend to the airport has the property of
oughtness.
-
ed that the relation denoted in this sentence isn’t the right-making relation but the
making-it-the-case relation. He’s right that the relation denoted here is the making-
it-the-case relation, but he’s wrong in suggesting that it’s different from the right-
making relation: in both cases what is involved is a fact (your having promised to
take your friend to the airport) and a property that an act has in virtue of that fact
(rightness). Moreover, what  in this example why you ought to do the ac-
tion is the same thing that  the action the property of rightness (and thus is
the same thing that stands in the right-making relation to the act), and, as Broome
himself claims, the explanatory relation is “the relation of making so”, Broome (n 1)
48. Thus, I think Broome is committed to the equivalence among the explanatory
relation, the making-it-the-case relation, and the right-making relation.
Dancy (n 2) 178.
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Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 12 enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
9
BROOME ON REASONS
 pro toto reason isn’t merely that explana-
tion is a non-normative notion, but rather that Broome wrongly as-
sumes that the favoring relation and the right-making relation are
at bottom the same, or at least that the former can be understood in
terms of the latter.
What would Broome say in response? I think he would say the fol-
lowing: perhaps the two relations are distinct, but we gain a deeper
understanding of the favoring relation by seeing it in light of the right-
making —or, as Broome would say, ought-making— relation. Here’s
a relevant passage from Broome that suggests this line of response:
The ‘counts in favour’ formula is very commonly offered as a way of ex-
plaining what a reason is [in a footnote Broome mentions Dancy as an
example]. I agree that a reason is a consideration that counts in favour
of something. -
13
The relevant sort of counting in favor is, of course, counting in fa-
vor of some action being the action one ought to do.14 So according
to Broome we gain a deeper understanding of normative reasons
and of the favoring relation by noting what it is that reasons favor:
reasons favor some action being the action one ought to do (or the
action being the right one). In the case of pro toto reasons, a consid-
eration favors an action because that same consideration has made
it the case that one ought to perform it.

What is favoured is acting (or at least responding) in a certain way, not
the rightness of so acting, which cannot be favoured at all. (It cannot be
favoured because the only things that can be favoured are responses,
and the rightness of an act is not a response at all).15
-
nition of a pro tanto
of pro toto reasons, as I go on to argue below.
ibid, Broome says as much in this passage: “there are several ways of counting


Dancy (n 2) 178.
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FERNANDO RUDY HILLER
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 12, enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
10
         -

rightness (or oughtness) of the action. It’s important to be clear that
Dancy isn’t opposed to the conception of reasons as right-makers;
        nor-
mative reasons (and a fortiori the favoring relation) in terms of the
right-making relation, as if the favoring relation could be under-
stood in terms of the right-making one.
As a response to Dancy, let me sketch a proposal about how the
right-making relation can account for the favoring relation that is in
the spirit of Broome’s account. Let’s start by asking: Why does a con-
sideration favor an action? A plausible answer is: because the consid-
eration makes the action the right thing to do or the action one ought
to perform.16 So the two relations are related as follows. The right-
making relation has priority: when a consideration gives the action
a certain property —rightness or oughtness— it also, and because of
, favors the performance of the action.17, 18
Returning to our example: why does your having promised to take
your friend to the airport favor your doing so? The proposed an-
swer is: because your having promised to do so gave the action the
property of rightness or oughtness. And once your promising gave
the action this property, it follows that the fact that you promised to
Talk of rightness or oughtness shouldn’t be restricted to the notion of moral
rightness or oughtness. See Broome (n 1) 4.
Dancy (n 2)182-3 entertains this suggestion concerning pro tanto reasons:
“Broome thinks of the notion of a pro tanto reason as normative only because of the
normativity of what it is used to explain. It has no inherent normativity, one might
say. It gets its normativity from the normativity of an ought”. My argument is that
this lack of inherent normativity isn’t a problem for pro toto reasons, although it is
a problem for pro tanto ones.
The inference from rightness to favoring is made by the philosopher trying
to explain what the ‘counting in favor’ relation comes to, not by ordinary agents
deliberating what to do. As Kearns and Star point out, when we deliberate we typi-
cally start by considering which considerations favor or disfavor an action, not by
taking as a given that certain action is right and then trying to explain why this is
the case. Kearns Stephen and Star Daniel, “Weighing Explanations” in Hirose Iwao
and Reisner Andrew (eds), 
 (Oxford University Press 2015) 237.
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Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
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11
BROOME ON REASONS
do it favors your doing it. So even though Broome might be wrong
in suggesting (if he indeed does so) that the explanatory and right-
making relation on the one hand, and the favoring relation on the
other, are the same, this doesn’t imply that these relations are so dif-
ferent from each other that —as Dancy thinks— it isn’t possible to
understand the one in terms of the other.
is possible: in the case of pro toto reasons, we in fact gain a deeper
understanding of the favoring relation once we realize that its ob-
-
tion being already in place. Again, the deeper understanding comes
to this: a consideration favors an action because that same consider-

applies to considerations that amount to pro toto reasons. I address
pro tanto reasons below).
Now, what about Dancy’s point that the two relations —favoring
and right-making— have different statuses, one being normative
and the other metaphysical? This indeed shows that, as Dancy says,
“it [is] hard to think that one of them might really be the other in
disguise”.20
link between the two relations isn’t to claim that they are at bottom
the same, but rather to note that one of them (the favoring relation)
derives from the other (the right- or ought-making relation). Thus,
according to this proposal, a metaphysical relation gives rise to a

I don’t think so. We could say that normative reasons ‘track’ right-

    
the right one or the one you ought to exhibit. So, to take the case of
This would also rebut Roger Crisp’s contention that introducing the notion
of explanation does nothing to further our understanding of reasons, Crisp (n 7).

hard to think that the favoring relation and the  relation are the same.
However, and as I pointed out in footnote 3 above, for Broome the explanatory re-
lation is in general the same as the relation of making so, so he’s committed to the
view that the right-making relation and the explanatory relation concerning oughts
are also the same. And, of course, Broome’s proposal is to understand the favoring
relation in terms of explanatory relations to oughts.
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FERNANDO RUDY HILLER
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 12, enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
12
actions, when an action in fact has the property of rightness we can
say that there is a pro toto reason for performing it; and there is this
reason precisely because the action is right. Thus, the normative re-
lation between the consideration that is the pro toto reason and the
action it favors derives from the metaphysical relation between that
same consideration and the property of rightness or oughtness (a
relation that in turns grounds an explanation of an ought).
Let me be clear that I’m not fully endorsing this response as my
own; all I have done is to suggest that the foregoing is a plausible
pro toto reasons
offered by Broome fails because we can distinguish the favoring re-
lation from the right-making relation.

-
ising response (at least as pro toto reasons are concerned) to Dan-

response can make sense of the other kind of normative reasons
Broome acknowledges, namely pro tanto reasons. My verdict will be
negative: I will argue that if Broome’s understanding of the norma-
tivity of pro toto reasons is along the lines I suggested above, then his
account can’t make sense of the fact that pro tanto reasons are sup-
posed to be normative entities in their own right. More precisely, it
can’t make sense of the fact that pro tanto reasons on the losing side
of what Broome calls a ‘normative weighing explanation’ are never-
theless normative. This suggests that Broome’s account of pro toto
pro tanto reasons.
Broome starts his discussion of pro tanto reasons in this way:
We often say there is a reason for you to F, when it is not the case that
you ought to F. In these cases, the reason evidently does not explain the
fact that you ought to F, since there is no such fact. It is therefore not a
pro toto reason. Reasons of this sort are often called ‘pro tanto reasons’.21
Broome (n 1 ) 51.
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13
BROOME ON REASONS
So pro tanto reasons don’t explain oughts but, according to
Broome, it doesn’t follow that they cannot be understood in terms
of ought and explanation at all. They can, but the account needed
here is different from the account of pro toto reasons. As we saw
above, pro toto reasons are considerations that explain outright why
one ought to F, whereas pro tanto reasons are considerations that
play a certain role in what Broome calls ‘normative weighing expla-
nations’. The role in question is that of a consideration adding its
‘weight’ to the weight of other considerations so that the normative
balance tips one way rather than the other. The winning side is the
weightier one, and one ought to do the action (or, more generally,
to exhibit the response) that corresponds to it. Thus, Broome de-
pro tanto reason as “whatever plays this role in a normative
weighing explanation”.22
pro tanto reason.23
-
mativity of pro tanto reasons? Dancy claims that it can’t, because
“[an] explanation is not itself normative, even if what is explained
is normative” and adds that Broome “has no independent method of
establishing the normativity of the explainers”.24 However, as we saw
in the previous section, the reply I offered on Broome’s behalf consti-
tutes a denial of Dancy’s claim, at least as pro toto reasons are con-
cerned: Broome can in fact establish the normativity of the explainers
(that is, of the considerations that are pro toto reasons) by appealing
to what grounds the relation of normative explanation, namely, the
right-making relation. If a consideration explains why you ought to
F, this is because the consideration makes it the case that you ought
to F. And, as I have argued, Broome can say that, once a consideration
gives the property of rightness or oughtness to F, that same consid-
eration is automatically a normative reason for you to F.
ibid 53.
pro tanto reason is more complicated, since it in-
corporates what Broome calls the ‘for-F role’, that is, the role of counting in favor of

in the text.
Dancy (n 2) 186.
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FERNANDO RUDY HILLER
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 12, enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
14
But if this is Broome’s response to Dancy’s worry about the nor-
mativity of pro toto reasons (and I do think that it’s the best re-
sponse he has), it ends up working against Broome himself, because
it leaves him unable to explain the normativity of pro tanto reasons.
Here’s why: in order to deal with Dancy’s worry about the relation
of explanation being non-normative, Broome has to appeal to the
right-making relation as what endows the explainers with norma-
tivity. But there is no such endowment in the case of pro tanto rea-
sons, because a pro tanto reason doesn’t explain outright why one
ought to F (otherwise, it would be a pro toto reason), and so a pro
tanto reason doesn’t by itself make it the case that F is the action one
ought to do. Thus, in the case of pro tanto reasons there is no ‘trans-
mission’ of normativity from ought to explainers. So we are bound
to conclude that playing the role Broome describes in a normative
weighing explanation isn’t enough for establishing the normativity
of pro tanto reasons, given that the right-making element (which is
what endowed pro toto reasons with normativity) is absent.
 
fast to the idea that the right- or ought-making relation is what
grounds the normativity of reasons. Then he could say that the nor-
mativity of every pro tanto reason comes from the fact that, for ev-
ery such reason, there is a possible normative explanation in which
this reason could explain an ought. Broome could suggest that this
is why pro tanto reasons are normative after all: they are capable of
explaining oughts, even though they don’t do so in every occasion.
  
pride of place in Broome’s account.
But this putative solution is problematic. For if this is how Broome
is going to explain the normativity of pro tanto reasons, then he
has to give up altogether the notion of a pro tanto reason —i.e., the
notion of a reason that is normative even though on occasion
doesn’t explain an ought.25 More precisely, he has to give up the idea,
Recall that this is precisely the initial characterization Broome offers of pro
tanto reasons: “We often say there is a reason for you to F, when it is not the case
that you ought to F… Reasons of this sort are often called ‘pro tanto reasons’”,
Broome (n 1) 51.
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15
BROOME ON REASONS
to which he is explicitly committed, that pro tanto reasons on the los-
ing side of a normative weighing explanation are nevertheless nor-
mative.26 Thus, Broome’s failure to handle at the same time pro toto
and pro tanto reasons suggests that his account suffers from a criti-
cal internal tension.

accept the conclusion that considerations are normative reasons
only when they  explain an ought. In other words, Broome
could get rid of the notion of pro tanto reasons and stick with pro
toto ones. While this move may be revisionist, it isn’t prima facie
senseless. One way to defend it is this. One could argue that consid-
erations that on a certain occasion seem to be pro tanto reasons in
favor of Fing are revealed to lack normative import or weight once
one realizes that one ought not to F. That is, what initially seemed to
be a pro tanto reason for Fing isn’t, on this occasion, a reason at all,
given that Fing isn’t what one ought to do. On this proposal, then,
real normative reasons are only those considerations that actually
explain an ought, not ones that could have explained it if only others
considerations weren’t in place.
For example, the fact that I’d love to eat this piece of cake seems
to be a pro tanto reason to eat it. Suppose, however, that it’s actu-
ally the case that I ought not to eat it since it belongs to you. Thus,
the fact that I’d love to eat it isn’t, on this occasion, a reason at all.
It isn’t that the consideration is  by the fact that the cake
belongs to you; rather, it lacks normative weight altogether (on this
occasion).
           
Broome’s account is, of course, that Broome would have to ditch
the idea of normative  explanations of oughts. This move
pro tanto reason explicitly states that consider-
ations on the losing side of a normative weighing explanation are pro tanto reasons.
The relevant bit reads as follows: “A pro tanto reason for N to F is something that
plays the for-F role in a weighing explanation of why N ought to F, 
” (ibid 53, italics added). If a consideration favors
Fing in the context of a weighing explanation of why N ought not to F, then it’s clear
that that consideration is on the losing side of the explanation, and yet, according to
pro tanto reason nevertheless.
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16
isn’t without precedent, however. Christine Korsgaard27 advances a
     

Korsgaard’s view, practical deliberation doesn’t consist in marshal-
ing considerations for and against a certain course of action and then
weighing them in order to determine what one ought to do; rather,
it consists in testing one’s ‘maxim’, which incorporates the consider-
ations that  favor the proposed action, against the univer-
salizability test of the categorical imperative. Korsgaard claims that
if a maxim fails this test, then every considerations that seemed to
favor the proposed action “is not merely outweighed —rather, it is
not a reason at all”.28
So at least there is precedent if Broome wanted to argue that
only considerations that actually explain an ought —that is, only
pro toto
the notion of normative weighing explanations. But I take it that he
-

give pride of place to “rigid deontic rules” show that some deon-
tic facts lack normative weighing explanations. Also, and more

calls ‘the central ought’ is determined by the interaction of nor-
mative requirements stemming from morality, prudence, self-in-
terest, etc., each of which constitutes (at least sometimes) norma-
tive pro tanto reasons.30pro tanto
Korsgaard Christine,  (Oxford

pro tanto reason. In
fact, in the previous page she attributes the notions of prima facie or pro tanto rea-
sons to those philosophers who adhere to the weighing model.

Broome writes: “The requirements of normative sources, taken together, de-
termine what you ought to do” (n 1) 128. And “to say a requirement on you to F is
normative is to say that the requirement constitutes a reason for you to F” (27).
It’s true that Broome allows for the possibility that the reason in question isn’t a
pro tanto one; for instance, it might be the case that reasons stemming from moral
requirements ‘dominate’ all others and so aren’t pro tanto, but pro toto. Still, it’s
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BROOME ON REASONS
reason altogether. For, if (apparent) pro tanto reasons weren’t nor-
mative in themselves, then how could it be that a number of them
determined what one ought to do? In other words, how could an
ought resulting from a weighing explanation be normative if its
components —one or more pro tanto reasons— aren’t normative
themselves?31
Therefore, Broome seems to be at the same time unable to shed
the notion of a pro tanto reason and unable to give a satisfactory
account of it. I don’t see how Broome could avoid this tension with-
out adopting a very different model of practical deliberation or
without embracing a primitivist view about reasons.


 is challenged if we accept my argu-
ments and thus accept that his characterization of reasons is inad-
equate. In the introduction to his book, Broome tells us that its over-

-
thing when the starting point is a belief about what one ought to
do. In a nutshell, Broome’s answer is that one can come to form the
intention to F when one believes one ought to F by complying with
a requirement of rationality he calls ‘Enkrasia’ which, roughly, re-
quires one to either form the corresponding intention or abandon
the cited belief. And although it often happens that one automati-
cally complies with this requirement, one can actively come to sat-
isfy it by reasoning one’s way to the required intention starting only
implausible to think that all normative sources issue only dominating reasons, and
this is why Broome seems to be committed to the idea that normative sources issue
(at least sometimes) normative pro tanto reasons, which then interact in weighing
explanations to yield the central ought. I thank professor Broome for his observa-
tions in this regard.
Dancy raises a similar concern: “The question has to be whether pro tanto
reasons, as [Broome] understands them, have the sort of normativity that they need
if they are to be able to generate normative oughts” (n 2) 185.
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18
from a belief about what one ought to do and a belief about the thing
in question being up to one.32
Is Broome’s answer to the motivation question compromised in
some way by the arguments I have offered here? I don’t think so.
Even if I’m correct that pro tanto
of normative weighing explanations, that seems to have nothing to
do with Enkrasia being a genuine requirement of rationality or with
enkratic reasoning being genuine and correct reasoning.
One might think that my arguments are more relevant for the is-
sue of how normative requirements coming from different norma-
tive sources determine what one ought to do on each occasion. But
even here the shortcomings of Broome’s account of reasons produce
limited damage. As I hinted above, in order to preserve his picture
 -
nitely can’t do without pro tanto reasons. So the right thing for him
to do is, I suggest, simply to postulate (as he does) that normative
sources issue normative pro tanto     -
          
of oughts. He can still say that reasons explain oughts, but he has
to give up the ambition of capturing the normativity of pro tanto
reasons in terms of explanation. The suggestion is that Broome can

main themes of his book.
This doesn’t mean, however, that the arguments I have given here
are irrelevant. For if one important attempt to avoid primitivism
about reasons is shown to be unworkable, that provides indirect ev-
idence in favor of the primitivist position.33

Broome J,  (Wiley Blackwell 2013).
Broome calls this type of reasoning ‘Enkratic reasoning’ and describes it in
chapter 16 of 
I thank professor Broome for his comments to a previous version of this
paper.
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BJV, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México-IIJ, 2018
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2018.12.12441
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 12 enero-diciembre de 2018, pp. 5-19
19
BROOME ON REASONS
Crisp R, “Keeping Things Simple” in Hirose Iwao and Reisner An-
drew (eds),  -
 (Oxford University Press 2015).
Dancy J, “Reasons for Broome” in Hirose Iwao and Reisner Andrew
(eds), 
 (Oxford University Press 2015).
Hirose I & Reisner A (eds), 
 (Oxford University Press 2015).
Kearns S and Star D, “Weighing Explanations” in Hirose Iwao and
Reisner Andrew (eds),    
 (Oxford University Press
2015).
Korsgaard C,      (Ox-

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Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM
https://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/bjv
https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/
BJV, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México-IIJ, 2018
https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/issue/archive
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2018.12.12441
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Chapter
This chapter challenges Broome's recent account of the relation between reasons and oughts, in particular his characterization of a pro tanto reason as something that plays a certain role in a weighing explanation of an ought. The chapter suggests that this fails to capture the normativity involved in the relations of 'for' and 'against'.
Article
Amongst other things, John Broome's Rationality Through Reasoning provides an account of normative reasons. Crucial to this account is the idea of a weighing explanation. Pro tanto reasons are facts cited in weighing explanations of what one ought to do; facts that have weights. It is not clear what the idea that pro tanto reasons have weights really amounts to. While recognizing that a simple analogy with putative non-normative weighing explanations involving physical weights (explanations of why a scale might tip one way or the other, for instance) may initially seem helpful, it is argued that the notion of a weighing explanation, especially a normative weighing explanation, does not ultimately stand up to scrutiny. A number of other criticisms of and questions concerning Broome's account of reasons are also provided.
Article
This chapter defends the view that the most important normative notion is that of a reason, against John Broome's claim that ought plays this role. The weight Broome places on the idea of explanation is criticized, as are his views on goodness and his interpretation of Sidgwick on the distinction between objective and subjective oughts.