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J Log Lang Inf (2018) 27:343–385
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-018-9271-9
Strategic Conversations Under Imperfect Information:
Epistemic Message Exchange Games
Nicholas Asher1·Soumya Paul2
Published online: 4 June 2018
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018
Abstract This paper refines the game theoretic analysis of conversations in Asher et al.
(J Philos Logic 46:355–404, 2017) by adding epistemic concepts to make explicit the
intuitive idea that conversationalists typically conceive of conversational strategies in
a situation of imperfect information. This ‘epistemic’ turn has important ramifications
for linguistic analysis, and we illustrate our approach with a detailed treatment of
linguistic examples.
Keywords Strategic conversations ·Epistemic game theory ·Discourse representation
theory
1 Introduction
It has long been a common sense intuition of many philosophical and linguistic theories
of communication that a conversational contribution should be interpreted in light of
the participants’ own beliefs and plans, in particular their beliefs about beliefs and
Thanks to Julie Hunter, Alex Lascarides, David Beaver, Eric McCready, Daisuke Bekki, Chris Barker,
Erich Grädel, Hans Kamp, Benedikt Löwe, Julian Schlöder, Itai Sher, to the participants of the Rutgers
Workshop on Coordination and Content and to reviewers for the Journal of Logic, Language and
Information for their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. This work was supported by
ERC Grant 269427.
BSoumya Paul
soumya.paul@gmail.com
Nicholas Asher
nicholas.asher@irit.fr
1IRIT, CNRS, Université Paul Sabatier, 118 route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse, France
2SnT, Université du Luxembourg, 6 avenue de la Fonte, L-4364 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
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