Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order
Abstract
What are the consequences of retreat and retrenchment in foreign policy? In recent years, America has pulled back from its longtime role of international leadership. In doing so, the Obama administration has sought to conciliate adversaries; shown indifference to allies; called upon the international community to step in; proclaimed and then disavowed “red lines”; and preferred to lead from behind in the face of catastrophic civil war in Syria, ISIS barbarism in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia’s predatory behavior in Eastern Europe, and China’s muscle-flexing in East Asia. The consequences of this “realist” experiment have been costly and painful, and it has caused the United States to lose credibility with friends and foes. America retains the capacity to lead, but unless it resumes a more robust role, the world is likely to become a more dangerous place, with mounting threats not only to regional stability and international order, but to the country’s own national interests.
... This relative decline, alongside draining military conflicts in the Middle East and the recent financial crisis, has seriously eroded both the reality and perception of American primacy. Furthermore, many observers have detected (or at least predicted) a shift toward restraint and retrenchment in US foreign policy (Posen 2014;Lieber 2016;Haynes 2015). ...
... The Obama administration's inauguration marked a shift toward retrenchment in American grand strategy (Lieber 2016). American relative power was clearly declining from its post-Cold War apex (Layne 2012). ...
How will American relative decline impact security cooperation between Russia and China? The conventional wisdom holds that the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” is largely a “marriage of convenience” held together only by shared antipathy toward the US-led international order. From a traditional balance of power perspective, given their lack of a shared vision for global and regional order, we should expect Sino-Russian cooperation to deteriorate as US relative power recedes. I suggest, to the contrary, that Sino-Russian cooperation could remain quite durable throughout a prolonged period of American decline and retrenchment. I apply theories of bureaucratic and legislative “logrolling” to demonstrate how China and Russia each have incentives to support one another’s revisionist actions in their respective home regions. An underlying asymmetry of regional importance—China’s prioritization of East Asia, and Russia’s prioritization of Europe—enables this logrolling dynamic. Thus, I argue that while there are few shared interests between them, Russia and China could well maintain a limited but highly consequential cooperative relationship over the medium to long term. As such, the Sino-Russian threat to US-led order comes not from a coordinated balancing effort, but from reciprocal support of one another’s region-specific revisionist actions.
... This relative decline, alongside draining military conflicts in the Middle East and the recent financial crisis, has seriously eroded both the reality and perception of American primacy. Furthermore, many observers have detected (or at least predicted) a shift toward restraint and retrenchment in US foreign policy (Posen 2014;Lieber 2016;Haynes 2015). ...
... The Obama administration's inauguration marked a shift toward retrenchment in American grand strategy (Lieber 2016). American relative power was clearly declining from its post-Cold War apex (Layne 2012). ...
How will American relative decline impact security cooperation between Russia and China? The conventional wisdom holds that the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” is largely a “marriage of convenience” held together only by shared antipathy toward the US-led international order. From a traditional balance of power perspective, given their lack of a shared vision for global and regional order, we should expect Sino-Russian cooperation to deteriorate as US relative power recedes. I suggest, to the contrary, that Sino-Russian cooperation could remain quite durable throughout a prolonged period of American decline and retrenchment. I apply theories of bureaucratic and legislative “logrolling” to demonstrate how China and Russia each have incentives to support one another’s revisionist actions in their respective home regions. An underlying asymmetry of regional importance—China’s prioritization of East Asia, and Russia’s prioritization of Europe—enables this logrolling dynamic. Thus, I argue that while there are few shared interests between them, Russia and China could well maintain a limited but highly consequential cooperative relationship over the medium to long term. As such, the Sino-Russian threat to US-led order comes not from a coordinated balancing effort, but from reciprocal support of one another’s region-specific revisionist actions.
... 18 Finally, scholars such as Robert Lieber, John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan, Stephen Brooks, William Wohlforth, Michael Mazarr and Hal Brands advocate for US primacy, deep engagement and greater leadership. 19 They counter that the United States should 'lean forward' in its global commitments, rather than 'pull back', and restore multilateralism and the liberal international rules-based order. Given these disagreements about the robustness of the liberal order, we ask whether the LITO is durable in the face of emerging peer and near-peer challengers. ...
There is much debate about the impending collapse of the liberal international order. It is provoked by the shifts in material and military capabilities from emerging peer and near-peer competitors, some of whom were not part of the original grand bargain and others that are in a stronger position to renegotiate the bargain. As one critical element of the liberal international order, we ask, during power shifts: is the liberal international trading order (LITO) durable and resilient? When and why will the LITO collapse? Does the relative decline of the hegemon alone explain these outcomes? In advancing a second-image reversed plus argument, we highlight how a shift in the nature of the foreign commercial orientation of peer and near-peer contenders can alter the domestic balance of power of two broad and logrolled coalitions competing to capture the state and thus affect whether the erstwhile leader defends, renegotiates, or abandons the trading order it created. To better understand these forces, we examine two paradigmatic cases: Britain in the 1930s and the United States in the 2000s.
... Подавляющее большинство её представителей и сегодня убеждены в про грессивности американской гегемонии, а в академической науке заметно стремле ние обосновать важность глобализации с американским лицом, альтернативой ко торой видится глобальная неуправляе мость. Реалисты, или теоретики баланса власти в мировой политике, нередко от стаивают теорию стабильности однопо лярного мира [Ikenberry, Mastanduno, Wohlforth 2011;Monteiro 2014;Lieber 2016]. Либералы настаивают на необходимости глобального распространения американ ских идеалов демократии и рыночной эко номики ]. ...
... Responding to NAto expansion, the Kremlin moved from rhetorical opposition to the u.S.-centered world order to practical actions by ending the u.S. monopoly on the use of force in international affairs, first in Georgia and later in Syria. Although scholars disagree on timing, causes, and implications of American decline for international order (lieber, 2016;Ikenberry, Parmar, and Stokes, 2018), many share the view that the u.S. has retreated from the status of superpower capable of unilaterally setting and enforcing global rules. ...
... Responding to NAto expansion, the Kremlin moved from rhetorical opposition to the u.S.-centered world order to practical actions by ending the u.S. monopoly on the use of force in international affairs, first in Georgia and later in Syria. Although scholars disagree on timing, causes, and implications of American decline for international order (lieber, 2016;Ikenberry, Parmar, and Stokes, 2018), many share the view that the u.S. has retreated from the status of superpower capable of unilaterally setting and enforcing global rules. ...
... 5 The attempt to sideline or discredit the 'isolationist' ideas of the libertarian Cato Institute, the neorealist Stephen Walt or libertarian conservatives like Rand Paul meant that proponents of primacy within the Washington foreign policy establishment viewed domestic critics as considerable threat to US national security. According to many prominent and influential supporters of liberal hegemony, American world leadership and global security were a question of national willpower; unless Americans could be convinced domestically of the virtues of US world leadership, the international order was likely to disintegrate and collapse with devastating consequences for the USA itself (Kagan 2014;Lieber 2016). The external threats of a rising China, a revisionist Russia or international terrorism were treated as significant and controversial issues in the American grand strategy debate under Obama regarding the appropriate nature of US policy responses (White House 2015). ...
This article explores the social construction of American grand strategy as nexus of identity and national security. The article first highlights how the identity construct of American exceptionalism has underwritten a grand strategy of global leadership and military interventionism since the end of the Cold War, constituting liberal hegemony as dominant position within the bipartisan US foreign policy establishment. The article then explores the political impact of counter-hegemonic discourses of restraint and offshore balancing under the Obama presidency. It argues that in ‘leading from behind’ the Obama Doctrine represented a moderate intra-elite challenge to the status quo. Obama’s use of exceptionalist rhetoric to legitimate restraint simultaneously exposed the political limits of this strategic paradigm shift, which oscillated between continuity and change. Finally, the article examines Trump’s ‘America First’ stance, concluding that its combination of nationalism, nativism, and protectionism has resulted in the erosion of the Washington consensus on liberal hegemony.
... At the same time, President Obama faced the moral urgency to restore its standing in the world through resetting relationships with others, rivals and allies alike. Therefore, the administration gave an "extended hand" to adversaries with the expectation that such measures could significantly incentivize their behavioral changes, working through international institutions to multilaterally address the newly emerging threats that were susceptible neither to military solutions nor to the unilateral approach of the US (Lieber, 2016;Nye, 2015). Thus, the US attempted to build a "multipartner world" in which it cooperated with other countries to preserve the global liberal order and leadership while enduring its retrenchment. ...
This paper examines the realist turn of US foreign policy under the Trump administration and how it will reshape the North Korean policies of the United States. As the US grand strategy under the Trump administration has shifted to decline denial under retrenchment, the dynamics of US-China relations of competition and cooperation will further intensify. While the priority of North Korean issues has been elevated with regard to US-China bilateral relations, it has become the issue of opposing interests, due to divergent expectations on the geostrategic landscape in the case of denuclearization on the peninsula. As President Trump’s willingness to resolve the North Korean issue becomes salient, the tension between the US and China is expected to be amplified and a more coercive approach toward denuclearizing the North is anticipated. Also, the Maximum Pressure and Engagement is likely to be adopted as a part of regional balancing strategy vis-à-vis the revisionist rising states in the region to build an architecture of peace through strength in Northeast Asia.
... He "reflected a clear preference for reducing US power and presence abroad, a deep scepticism about the use of force, an emphasis on working in and through international institutions, an 'extended hand' to adversaries in the expectation that this could incentivize significant change in their behaviour, a de-emphasis on relationships with allies, and a desire to focus on domestic priorities." 68 Critically, for Lieber, this strategy incorporated both realist and liberal internationalist assumptions. Obama's foreign policy demonstrated consistency primarily with the realist strategy of "offshore balancing" that emphasised American "command of the commons"-dominance in sea, air, and space-enabling it to pull back from many overseas military commitments without endangering national security. ...
President Barack Obama’s foreign policy has confounded critics from both the left and right in American politics. This analysis argues that this is because Obama’s foreign policy exhibits affinities with the least prominent of the four traditions of American foreign policy identified by Walter Russell Mead: the Jeffersonian tradition. In contrast to the more prominent Wilsonian and Hamiltonian traditions, the Jeffersonian tradition exhibits more introverted tendencies that seek to perfect and protect rather than export the virtues of the Republic. The Jeffersonian understanding of foreign policy is, in Walter Lippman’s phrase, primarily the “shield of the republic.” This analysis tracks the influence and implications of this perspective through examination of the Obama Administration’s approach to two prominent foreign policy challenges after 2008: intervention in Libya and the ongoing Syrian crisis.
This chapter critically examines drones’ role in the Obama administration's grand strategy. It argues that heightened drone usage for targeted killings reflected a dual-edged approach aligning with the administration's hybrid strategy. This strategy aimed at showcasing America's global engagement, yet also exhibited military assertiveness. While drones proved advantageous for counterterrorism, their signature strikes generated a security paradox and a “dronification” effect. This paradox emerged as drones provided security benefits by lowering costs and risks but led to adverse outcomes in targeted states, including anti-American sentiments, retaliations, and suicide attacks. This paradox highlights drones’ efficacy alongside overreliance under Obama, negatively impacting US counterterrorism against both rivals and non-state actors.
2022 could be characterized as crucial for the formation of world order and future world development. Very often we hear that the most important events of 2022 are “the Ukrainian crisis” and XX Convention of the Communist Party of China that declared the beginning of the new period in the Chinese international strategy aimed at reaching global status and influence either equal to American or even greater. Idea of the new bipolar world order has been mentioned, and even acknowledged by certain American and Russian scholars. However, there is no great optimism about such a prospect. It is only a supposition, and a rather unrealistic one. Russia is not interested in this kind of world order. It is also not quite correct to examine everything that is going on in the world in the context of the “Ukrainian crisis”, which is the product of the Western/American policy of social engineering in various countries aimed at their transformation on the basis of Western values. Such policy begun in 1992 has been part of the American global strategy to establish liberal world order with the domineering role of the United States. We suggest taking a new look at international relations. By 2022, the megatrend of the world order formation of the 21st century had entered its decisive phase. The crucial factor that will influence the outcome of this process is developing confrontation between Russia and the West/US/NATO. The result will determine whether we shall live either in a just polycentric world order, or in imperial-hegemonic order (possibly, US-China order). Russia is in a very unfavorable international situation; however, it must continue its efforts in world order formation putting efforts into propaganda of peace and necessity of establishing new institutions not Western-centered reflecting and satisfying interests of the majority of the world community.
For seven decades, the United States functioned as the world’s leading hegemonic power, playing the key role in creating and sustaining an open, liberal rules-based international order. That role was not truly global, however, since it did not encompass the Soviet bloc, nor Mao’s China. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, America’s role became one of unipolarity. That came to an end in the early to mid-years of the 2010s. Revisionist powers, China, Russia, and Iran have increasingly challenged regional and global order. The current configuration of world politics is commonly described as a return to great power competition, but none of the revisionist powers accept the real premises of a rules-based open world order. The U.S. role thus remains unique in sustaining the norms, practices, and institutions of that order. This leads to three key research questions. First, to what extent does the U.S. remain essential for a decent rules-based international order? Second, is the U.S. still capable of playing such a role? Third, what are the likely consequences if the U.S. is unwilling or incapable of doing so? The latter outcome would likely result in a form of a-polarity in which the rules-based system lacks a major power committed to sustaining it. Aspirations for non-hegemonic regime maintenance are a fantasy. The result, instead, would be worsening fragmentation and increasing risk of conflict.
The author pinpoints the relations between geopolitics and globalisation from the angle of the post-Cold War politically turbulent order. Against this background of a clash between two opposing tendencies – revisionism and defence of the status quo – the author determines the dynamics of the deconcentration of forces in the international system, which is increasingly polycentric and less and less monocentric. He devotes much attention to the identity crisis of the West (from the crisis of US leadership to the depreciation of NATO). He characterizes Russia, with its aspirations to rebuild its superpower status and its imperial mission, as the main geopolitical opponent of the West. Pointing to the contemporary discourse on Russia and the risk of escalating a new confrontation reminiscent of the Cold War era, he critically assesses the consequences of Poland's international policy.
Since President Barack Obama’s reelection in 2012, there has been a growing perception in the United States and abroad that American primacy in the international system is under threat from multiple fronts.
Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the 2016 Presidential election represented a watershed moment in the evolution of American grand strategy and foreign policy as it is the first time since the 1940s that the nation has elevated to the White House someone who so overtly questioned the central tenets of the “vindicationist” face of American power. The chapter argues that Trump’s “America First” foreign policy channels contradictory “exemplarist” tendencies encompassed by the Jacksonian political culture of statecraft. In particular, “America First” encapsulates long-standing tendencies toward unilateralism and disengagement which challenge the central primacist argument that American global engagement is necessary for the protection of American national security. The chapter then concludes by providing a synthesis of the book’s major arguments and explores a number of potential lessons for the future of American grand strategy drawn from the “long view” of its development and evolution undertaken in the book’s preceding chapters.
This book explains the grand strategic behavior of the United States from the Founding of the Republic to the Trump administration. To do so, it employs a neoclassical realist framework to argue that, while systemic change explains the broad evolution of US grand strategy, the precise shape and content of the grand strategies pursued has been conditioned by domestic political culture and interests. The book argues that distinct political cultures of statecraft (Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian) have acted as permissive filters through which policy-makers have interpreted and responded to systemic stimuli, making some grand strategy choices more likely than others in the pursuit of national security. In particular, this book demonstrates that the American pursuit of primacy was facilitated by the predominance from the mid-19th century onward of the extroverted and vindicationist Hamiltonian and Wilsonian forms of statecraft, which reached a peak of influence at the end of the Cold War. The grand strategic overreach of the George W. Bush administration, however, stimulated the resurgence of the long dormant, introverted, and exemplarist Jeffersonian and Jacksonian forms of statecraft under the Obama and Trump administrations, respectively resulting in grand strategies of “decline management” and decline "denial." Ultimately, the return of exemplarist sentiment suggests a breakdown in elite consensus about the nature and purpose of American power in the 21st century.
Michael Clarke is Associate Professor at the National Security College of the Crawford School of Public Policy at Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
The previous chapter demonstrated how the US grand strategy of “containment” after 1945 was not simply designed to ensure an indefinite “balance of power” between the United States and the Soviet Union but rather to “win” the Cold War and achieve the full extension of the political and economic Open Door worlds as the best means of ensuring American national security. Under the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s this had resulted in American misadventure and over-commitment in Vietnam. The Nixon administration sought means to extricate the United States from Vietnam without undue damage to both its position in the competition with the Soviet Union and its credibility with allies. The chapter argues that Nixon and his National Security Advisor (and from 1973 Secretary of State), Henry Kissinger, conceived of détente as a means of withdrawing the United States from over-exposed positions geopolitically and militarily and establishing a new equilibrium that protected the country’s international position. As such it shared much with George F. Kennan’s original formulation of “containment” through its preeminent focus on US–Soviet relations, a “strong point” defence of American interests and desire for a stable international order.
How does President Trump see the world and seek to change it? The chapter examines this question in the context of America’s foreign policy traditions—nationalism, realism, conservative internationalism, and liberal internationalism. Trump is more nationalist than recent presidents, believing like George Washington and Andrew Jackson that America should stay out of the affairs of other nations unless there is an imminent threat. On the other hand, he is also a realist like Teddy Roosevelt and Richard Nixon committed to maintain the status quo and compete in the great power struggle with Russia and China. What he is not is an internationalist, either conservative who hopes to change the world through the spread of democracy like Ronald Reagan or liberal who seeks to strengthen international institutions and trade like Bill Clinton. Nevertheless, he is not unraveling the postwar internationalist order but taking a pause to put it on a more sustainable basis for the future.
This chapter reviews the literature on Beijing’s BRI vision—examining Chinese, Western and allied policy-statements, leadership remarks, and academic- and think tank analyses. It summarises the key arguments posited by BRI’s champions and critics to illuminate the nature and roots of anxiety afflicting critical practitioners and their advisers. The chapter also examines contrasting postulates advanced by major Western multilateral/financial organisations, juxtaposing two distinct perspectives—‘strategists’ and ‘bankers’—to establish BRI’s purported geoeconomic and geopolitical pros and cons and, on that basis, expose the widely varied lenses through which the BRI blueprint is viewed at home and abroad.
The aim of this article is to present the most important voices on the role of the US in the international order during Donald Trump’s presidency in the debate held in the Foreign Affairs. The authors assume that Foreign Affairs expresses the opinions of the most crucial organisation bringing together the elites of American foreign affairs – the Council on Foreign Relations. The paper proposes a hypothesis according to which there is a difference of opinion due to the adopted theoretical perspective regarding Trump’s role in the destruction of the liberal international order among the American power elites, even though they agree that the ideological conflict between democratic and authoritarian countries around the world is escalating.
This article identifies divergent views on the nature of the changing order and argues that collaborative rather than hegemonic leadership is necessary to sustain global peace, prosperity and justice. This collaborative leadership would increase the number of actors with effective voice. It calls the evolving order “multiplex” because of the overlapping yet divergent interests of the actors involved and “G‐Plus” signaling the importance of the increasing number and diversity of actors. It does so in the context of two of the many challenges facing this multiplex G‐Plus world: sustaining economic prosperity and coordinating global trade.
Introdução: BRICS e a agenda reformista; 2) A agenda reformista pela vertente econômica para além dos contornos do BRICS: o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento (NDB); 3) A agenda reformista pela vertente política para além dos contornos do BRICS: Diálogos de outreach e BRICS Plus; 4) A XI Cúpula do BRICS e o desafio intra-BRICS; 5) Considerações finais.
What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment–from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decision makers by providing an analytic framework for assessing the utility of retrenchment.
China’s role in the United Nations (UN) is steadily rising at a time the United States is seeking burden-sharing and rethinking its multilateral leadership role. This article highlights that China’s increasing role in three critical areas—(1) UN peacekeeping; (2) the work of the UN on human rights, particularly in the Human Rights Council; and (3) the governance of the digital realm and Internet freedom—has significant implications for U.S. interests and broader global governance efforts. Although China’s transformation into a responsible stakeholder in various areas of the UN’s work could be promising, Beijing’s attempts to alter existing liberal norms bear close examination. Those seeking a larger Chinese role in the UN might best be careful what they wish for. Despite the emergence of populism and some skepticism of multilateral arrangements in their domestic politics, the United States and like-minded nations have an interest in reinforcing liberal norms in these three areas of global governance and beyond.
One the global megatrends in the 21st century is the formation of a contemporary world order. The process has started after 1989 and is going on since. It is relying on efforts of various players including, first of all, leading world powers which are pursuing different often contradicting interests and institutional plans. One of the most acute problems is structural: reaching consensus between great powers especially between the Unites States, China and Russia. Growth of Russia’s and China’s activity, certain degree of cooperation in their efforts to influence world order, their rejection of the liberal project built upon Western values and institutions promoted by the United States cannot be left without answer from Washington. America is not going to retreat or retrench, is not pleased with the coming criticism and with the activities of Russia and China. American political establishment tries to neutralize efforts thwarting its plans and interests. The dilemma is whether America needs to come to any kind of compromise with Russia and China on the issues of international security, trade, global problems; or pursue policy of deterring these countries. There is no full consensus on the issues of world order and American global strategy in the political and expert communities. Most active representatives of decision makers in Washington support continuation of decisive even aggressive policy in the world and towards Russia and China. There are opponents to such strategy, but they do not constitute the majority and hardly have influence. Disagreements on foreign policy issues among policy makers were visible during presidential elections in 2016 though most important were still domestic political issues. Outcome of elections and first years of the Trump administration do not give us clear answers about further development of the political situation, about U.S. foreign policy behavior, and about reaction of the American public. It is very important to monitor political moods and preferences in Washington, to analyze debates on the most acute problems of international relations and world order formation. It is necessary to react to American actions and ideas, to suggest our own comments and vision of the future, to promote our alternative views and conceptions to other international players in order to neutralize negative consequences of American actions. In the article the author continues analyzing debates on the most acute issues of world order formation, American and Russian approaches to them using recent publications and discussions with the leading American specialists on this topic. © 2018 Academic Educational Forum on International Relations. All Rights Reserved.
Historically, civil wars ended in one-sided victory. With the end of the Cold War, however, the very nature of how civil wars end shifted: wars became two times more likely to terminate in negotiated settlement than in victory. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the proportion of victories has increased, especially for civil wars that include a terrorist group; wars are also ending less frequently. Why would civil war termination vary by time period? The literature on civil wars looks to three basic types of causes: domesticstructural factors, bargaining dynamics, and types of international intervention. Current explanations cannot account for why civil wars would end differently in different time periods because, as Kenneth Waltz might say, they are “reductionist” in nature. Material and ideational factors constitute the international political environment, which varies in different time periods. This environment drives outside actors' normative strategies of viewing victory, negotiation, or stabilization as the appropriate solution to civil war. These norms, in turn, directly affect how civil wars end. A novel, three-part methodological approach using quantitative analysis, case studies, and original content analysis demonstrates that civil wars tend to end the way external actors think they ought to end.
Apparu au cours des années 1990 dans le débat universitaire américain, le concept d’offshore balancing a fait l’objet d’un regain d’intérêt durant la présidence Obama. Ce concept propose de maintenir la primauté internationale des États-Unis tout en gardant ces derniers à distance des conflits et des jeux de pouvoir locaux. Partant de ce postulat, nous vérifions la pertinence de cette théorie en étudiant son application au cas du golfe Persique, région dont le système de sécurité dépend grandement de l’activisme américain. Cette mise à l’épreuve empirique dévoile les nombreuses limites de l’approche quant aux aspects pratiques d’un désengagement des États-Unis de la région. En ce sens, si l’offshore balancing reste une approche séduisante à Washington, il demeure un concept superficiel sans réelle considération pour les dynamiques régionales.
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