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Power Resources and Organising Informal Economy Workers

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Akua Opokua Britwum at University of Cape Coast
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Global Labour Journal, 2018, 9(2), Page 249
Global Issues
Power Resources and Organising Informal Economy Workers
Akua O. Britwum, University of Cape Coast, Ghana
An important debate in union renewal has to do with organising in the informal economy and its
potential benefit to the survival of the labour movement. Perceived as a threat to organised labour,
because informal economy workers were deemed unorganisable, studies on union informal economy
activity began with a lament on barriers to organising. Traditional unions, however, expanded coverage
to the informal economy in recognition of their responsibility to working people irrespective of their
labour market location. In addition, informal economy workers, realising that their survival lay in tying
up their struggles with trade unions, pushed for union coverage (Britwum, 2011). As a result, later
studies acknowledge union ability to overcome the barriers, insisting that the problem lay with union
structures and their inflexibility to absorb the emerging worker forms (Munck, 2002; Philip, 2005; Von
Holdt and Webster, 2005; Meagher, 2010; Britwum, 2011).
The informal economy refers to the fusion of survivalist production activities characterising
peripheral economies and insecure employment in private and public enterprises. Its antecedents in
the informal sector were used to designate non-waged work like household work, subsistence
production and self-employment. Arising from the ultra-liberal reforms of the private for-profit and
the public workplaces were employment conditions of waged workers which bore the hallmarks of
work in the survivalist sector (Hussmanns, 2004; Sindzingre, 2008; Chen, 2012). Waged workers – the
section of the employed who sell their labour in return for earnings – have been the predominant
members of trade unions. The evolving forms of work and forces driving workplace changes made
evident the unrepresentativeness of union core membership (Britwum, 2011).
Two concerns, political and conceptual, arise out of union extensions into the informal economy.
The political is related to the liberating function of the working class in the immediate and long term.
The conceptual concern is the analytical framing for capturing the situation of work and workers
globally. A number of issues which come to mind as a result are union ability to frame the challenges
of new members by expanding notions of work, workers, working rights and collective bargaining
(Webster and Ludwig, 2017). Others are the political shape of unions evolving from the transformation
and their ability to address workers’ challenges posed by liberalised capital. No less important is the
future of unions as viable vehicles for workers’ struggles should their transformation alter the existing
production relations. This brings up the need for analytical frames to unpack union and organisational
efforts in the informal economy.
The power resources approach (PRA) has been employed to examine the bargaining potential of
workers’ organisational resources (Kellermann, 2005). The essays in this Special Issue represent
attempts to unravel power resources in workers’ organising. They show that the exercise of various
power resources depends on a number of situations and connections with diverse actors. They provide
a basis for further examination to enhance understanding of the strategies employed and what new
power resources are emerging from union organising. I join these efforts through this paper, where I
Global Labour Journal, 2018, 9(2), Page 250
aim to apply the PRA to highlight organising in the informal economy and the forms of resources
expended in the exercise. I discuss some elements of the PRA in informal economy organising as a
unification in labour organisational resources across the formal–informal work divide. I expect that
this exercise will add to the discussion in this Special Issue on power dimensions of organisational
attempts between unions and informal economy workers.
A few challenges emerge in this exercise. The first is the absence of a defined employer for the
majority of workers in the informal economy. The second is the applicability of labour legislation and
institutional cover where, as in a number of countries, informal economy work has little or no legal
backing. Other challenges are conceptual: unpacking the dimensions of power and making them
applicable to the study setting and contents. The most fundamental is the inability of the PRA to
account for real social change, especially in the production relations that frame the international
economic order. These analytical limitations of the power resources approach notwithstanding, I
believe that applying the PRA to discuss certain union/informal economy organising initiatives might
indicate how such efforts have enhanced the legitimacy and relevance of informal economy workers’
claims. I want to submit that informal economy organising gives new vim and allows even greater
space for the labour movement to tap into hidden sources of power.
Originally used to account for the role of the organisational resources of the labour movement in
securing equality-related distributive benefits in Western industrial countries, the PRA has undergone
revision allowing a focus on union strategies, approaches and capacities within the workplace (Korpi,
1985; Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell, 2012). For some, the PRA is an expansion of the Marxist debate
on class struggle, to account for the specific use of power by workers in mediating interests against the
might of employers and the state. For others it is a continuation of the Weberian conception of power,
accounting for its use among individuals to confront more controlling actors (Korpi, 1985). Its
analytical focus still remains limited, however, to examining the bargaining capacity of workers and
other social movements for collective action (Kellermann, 2005). In deploying the PRA, the central
interest for researchers remains an understanding of workers’ agency to confront capital in its most
hostile shape and the forms of power deployed in this exercise.
What the PRA brings to the analytical table is the dimensions of power – structural, associational,
societal and institutional – and how they facilitate organising. In the specific case of informal economy
organising, the PRA helps us to understand sources of power leveraged by informal economy workers.
Further, it reveals how, in their struggle for their rights, informal economy workers move continuously
into spaces that view them as not belonging, almost an aberration that proper planning and adherence
to rules must be deployed to correct. Its detailed use to understand how workers’ organising leads to
realising their targeted goals can be found in works such as Webster and Ludwig (2017), as well as
Webster, Britwum and Bhowmik (2017). They show how organising informal workers, far from
serving as embryonic class transformation actions, pushes for a convergence of interests among a wider
range of actors to extract concessions from capital in order to enhance living conditions. An
application of the PRA to examine union organising success in the informal economy is imperative for
lessons about expanding the struggle terrain for unions.
A look at the different dimensions of power resources allows us to set the frame for analysing a
selection of trade union/informal economy organising forms. We begin with the first power dimension
outlined, the structural power of the informal economy in national economies. As explained elsewhere
in this Special Issue, structural power of labour is derived from its economic location either at work or
in the marketplace. Neo-liberal market reforms have significantly undermined union structural power,
Global Labour Journal, 2018, 9(2), Page 251
in particular the market and workplace dimensions. This was done mainly through the introduction of
low-security employment and the fragmentation of production across the globe.
Despite its size in some economies, such as West Africa where the proportion of the workforce
that the informal economy engages extends beyond 80 per cent, the formal retains higher levels of
structural power in terms of its strategic location in the international political economy systems. In
struggles for benefits beyond the workplace, unions have come to appreciate how informal economy
workers can bolster their structural power. An example is the case of workers on a Ghanaian oil palm
plantation where casual workers were drafted to strengthen the workplace power of the local union
only to be ditched later (Britwum and Akorsu, 2017). Informal economy workers rely on the logistical
power dimension of structural power to draw attention to their situation.
The second dimension, associational power, is characterised as the collective might of workers,
their organisational ability and form. Unions can strengthen their weak structural power through this
power dimension. Associational power depends on organisational infrastructure: basically, resources
both human and material, bolstered by finances. Its deployment depends on union organisational
efficiency and membership in terms of numbers, their commitment to deploy finances, their level of
participation in union activities and decision-making. Internal cohesion, a requirement for union
associational power, rides on solidarity, the underlying principle of trade unionism. This requires a
continuous process of intermediation to balance the competing interests of diverse union members.
To be effective, organisational strategies of unions have to be flexible and allow the coverage of new
members beyond the union confines.
Informal economy workers have used various strategies to expand their associational power.
These have come in the form of direct types of affiliation with trade unions or as cooperation with
other workplace organisations or community-based movements. As Kumar and Singh in this Special
Issue as well as Gadgil and Samson (2017) show, informal economy workers can be very resourceful
in their attempt to compensate for the absence of certain power dimensions. Gadgil and Samson (2017)
referred to this as hybrid organisations, with links established between non-governmental
organisations, cooperatives and trade unions. In Ghana, for example, informal economy associations
have sometimes predated union formation. They have shown in certain circumstances an ability to
maintain their organisations, sometimes with little union support (Britwum, 2011). Schmalz, Ludwig
and Webster in their introduction to this Special Issue mention the PRA’s origin in new forms of
worker militancy within and outside of unions. This they cite as marking the merger of unions with
interests beyond the workplace, a situation evocative of pre-colonial nationalist struggles in Africa
where unions took a lead role, integrating their workplace struggles with the political fight for self-rule
(Kester, 2007).
Institutional power, the third dimension, is derived from compromises and state regulation. Union
benefits are granted through legislative provisions and supporting institutions, and because it is born
out of compromise with capital, its exercise calls for the containment of certain labour rights (Roper,
2004). Perhaps this is the area where the base of informal economy workers is weak. Most institutional
structures and legislative instruments are largely couched to cover waged workers – that is, working
people with identifiable employers. In countries such as India where legislative provisions exist,
informal economy workers’ capacity to employ them to their own benefit remains a challenge. This
makes the provisions as good as non-existent. But in certain circumstances worker ingenuity has
allowed the use of existing institutions to protect their interests. The South African casual workers’
advice office is a case in point (Webster et al., 2017).
Global Labour Journal, 2018, 9(2), Page 252
Societal power, the fourth dimension, is derived from direct cooperation with social groups or
social support for union action. It is made up of coalition power and discursive power, the potential
to mobilise other communities to support the union cause, and the ability to frame union concerns to
derive legitimacy and support for union actions. Cultural norms and values compensate for
shortcomings in structural power (connection with community). Beyond the community, informal
economy workers’ associations have also tapped into international networks in order to expand their
associational power resources. International informal economy associations like Women in Informal
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) and the Self-Employed Women’s Association of
India (SEWA) that are affiliated to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) have
members across continents. The Domestic Workers’ Association in Ghana, for example, was affiliated
to WIEGO and to a local NGO (Akorsu and Odoi, 2017).
The discussions here in this Special Issue show some synergies between unions and informal
economy workers sources of power. We note how the extension of PRA to worker action in the
informal economy has expanded an understanding of the deployment of power resources. Such
additions include the symbolic and logistical power deployed by waged informal economy workers to
compensate for structural and associational power limitations. Thus, while some power resources are
deployed by trade unions, others have emerged through the efforts of informal economy workers. The
leveraging of power resources for each part has been different. It is, however, from the connections
of associational and societal power that they have derived power to support their work-related
struggles. For the moment the deployment of power resources between unions and informal economy
workers has succeeded in dealing with specific work-related concerns of the workers. What is left to
be seen is how such power resources and the agency displayed by informal economy workers can, in
their identification and deployment, form the basis for a broad worker movement to challenge the
existing economic order.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
AKUA O. BRITWUM is an Associate Professor of Gender and Labour Studies at the Institute for
Development Studies, University of Cape Coast in Ghana. She previously served as Director of the
Centre for Gender, Research, Advocacy and Documentation (CEGRAD). Her research and
publications cover gender-based violence, and gender and economic policy, as well as trade union
democracy and informal economy labour force organising. [Email: aobritwum@ucc.edu.gh]
... A near-consensus view is that subcontracting reduces a workforce's 'marketplace power' (the availability of skilled replacements) and 'workplace power' (militancy's effectiveness in impeding production) (Mwanika and Spooner 2017;Von Holdt and Webster 2005). Linking these structural factors to identity, subcontracting and casualisation also reduces a workforce's 'associational power' (strength gained through unity with one's co-workers) (Britwum 2018). Ongoing employees forge identities through comparison to temporary workers, who they believe threaten their incomes and social standing. ...
... Labour fragmentation, subcontracting and the outsourcing of workers have encouraged some academics to predict the end of traditional labour unionism (Durrenberger 2017;cf Miyamura 2016). Casual workers have been expelled from permanent workers' unions or have left them to form their own associations (Britwum 2018;Von Holdt and Webster 2005). Common stresses include casual workers perceiving the unions to prioritise permanent employees, and workers with secure contracts resenting the difficulties and costs of unionising insecure labour (Britwum 2018;Von Holdt and Webster 2005). ...
... Casual workers have been expelled from permanent workers' unions or have left them to form their own associations (Britwum 2018;Von Holdt and Webster 2005). Common stresses include casual workers perceiving the unions to prioritise permanent employees, and workers with secure contracts resenting the difficulties and costs of unionising insecure labour (Britwum 2018;Von Holdt and Webster 2005). Unions that attempt to meet permanent and subcontracted workers' needs often engage in anti-militant activities. ...
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... Institutional power transcends demands for social compromises and bothers on legitimising claims through institutional arrangements and legislation. For non-standard workers in the informal economy, it is documented that institutional power is limited (Vandaele, 2018), while AP and societal power resources have generated much relevance (Britwum, 2018). Still, allude to references to the fact that the success of any power resource deployed by such workers is dependent on specific capabilities to mobilise individual drive. ...
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Purpose Platform work challenges the traditional modes of workers' organising for interest representation. This paper aims to examine the political potential for voice and representation of the organising efforts by ride-hailing drivers in Ghana. Design/methodology/approach The study design was qualitative and exploratory. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with individual drivers, key persons and leaders of ride-hailing drivers' associations were employed. The total number of participants was 40. Findings The analysis reveals a bottom-up approach to organising, starting with drivers' exercise of associational power (AP) to self-organise with a membership logic. Affected by mundane internal challenges and limited by the non-existent institutional power and the near absence of structural power for right claiming, they affiliate with TUC as the traditional structural power holders for political influence. Research limitations/implications The study has limitations that can be addressed in future research. First, the targeted and small sample size only allows for rich context-specific generalisation. Future studies could target more categories of respondents such as vehicle owners and riders and also seek to include the experiences from other African countries to understand country-specific contextual issues. Second, the allowance for researcher reflexivity inherent in the methodology adopted has the potential for researcher biases. Therefore, a deliberate effort was made to ensure that biases remain only a potential. This was done by participant validation of the data and constant peer-reviewing of the data analysis processes by the authors. Practical implications The empirical findings provide trade unions with a stronger basis for and pointers to represent workers in the platform space. Originality/value Platform work in Ghana is an emerging phenomenon, and organising amongst platform workers remains unexplored.
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... However, in contrast to more recent usages of power resource theory, we are concerned that a too strong emphasis on the 'power to' approach runs the risk of losing the relational understanding of power that is important for retaining the focus on labour and its fundamental antagonism with capital. As Nowak (2022) has argued, a too narrow focus on the resources available to a particular group of workers or a specific trade union easily misses the overall structural and political situation that can make seemingly powerful actors quite unsuccessful (see also Bieler 2018;Britwum 2018). We argue that a generic conception of 'power to' act should be made relational by situation the power resources available to one actor in the broader configuration of power of a given social situation. ...
Power resource theory for contemporary society: A research framework
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... In December 2017 however, the inconceivable happened. After a transnational, informal group of union-related pilots threatened coordinated strikes across Europe, Ryanair reversed its longstanding HR policy and decided to recognize unions (Boewe et al., 2021;De Spiegelaere, 2020;Geary, 2021;Harvey and Turnbull, 2020;Mendonça 2020). But why did this transnational group of union activists succeed where all national trade unions had hitherto failed, including unions who could rely on strong power resources, such as the French laws that force management to engage in collective bargaining or the Danish laws on industrial action that allow secondary picketing? ...
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... Furthermore, social and family ties with employers can restrain collective action at small-to-medium-sized informalised workplaces such as small garment manufacturing units (Phizacklea, 1990). Moreover, an employer may be unknown or may be ill-defined (Britwum, 2018), and finally, some workplaces are dispersed and isolated, for example, in farming, care sectors and meatprocessing. Dispersal limits the emergence of collective action by isolating workers away from those who have developed localised collective dynamics, the media and the wider public (Lever & Milbourne, 2017). ...
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Full-text available
  • Mar 2022
Cross‐national research is key to understanding the global presence of informal and non‐compliant workplaces. This article comparatively examines how informalisation encourages or inhibits collective action led by migrant workers employed in Italian logistics warehouses (LWs) and the British hand car washes (HCWs). The term collective action derives from mobilisation theory and refers to joint resistance initiatives developed by workers and labour organisations to improve work conditions. The article argues that migrant labour does not necessarily lead to informal practices and claims that labour market regulatory agencies and trade unions play an important but dialectical role in responding to labour market non‐compliance and informality. Finally, it notes that sector‐based specificities contribute to and potentially inhibit the emergence of collective dynamics in such workplaces.
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Explaining the Welfare State: Power Resources vs. the Quality of Government
Article
  • Mar 2012
The hitherto most successful theory explaining why similar industrialized market economies have developed such varying systems for social protection is the Power Resource Theory (PRT), according to which the generosity of the welfare state is a function of working class mobilization. In this paper, we argue that there is an under-theorized link in the micro-foundations for PRT, namely why wage earners trying to cope with social risks and demand for redistribution would turn to the state for a solution. Our approach, the Quality of Government (QoG) theory, stresses the importance of trustworthy, impartial, and uncorrupted government institutions as a precondition for citizens’ willingness to support policies for social insurance. Drawing on data on 18 OECD countries during 1984–2000, we find (a) that QoG positively affects the size and generosity of the welfare state, and (b) that the effect of working class mobilization on welfare state generosity increases with the level of QoG.
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The Relevance of the Concepts of Formality and Informality: A Theoretical Appraisal
Article
  • Sep 2006
The concept of informality has encompassed an increasing number of meanings; referred to highly heterogeneous phenomena and measurement methods; and has been explored by development microeconomics (informal contracts) and institutional economics (informal institutions). This plurality of meanings and instruments calls into question the concept's validity. This paper synthesizes the critical issues within both a development economics and an institutional economics perspective. First to be examined are the conceptual problems inherent in the concept of informality, especially its inconsistencies and the heterogeneity of the phenomena and measurement. The concept is then analysed according to an institutionalist perspective. A more relevant distinction than the formal-informal one is proposed, which relies on an alternative theory of institutions and different distinctions, particularly between the forms, contents, and meanings of institutions.
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