Chapter

Autonomous and collective sanctions in the international legal order

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Abstract

The UK government is currently proposing the enactment of a “Sanctions Act” upon the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in 2019, embodying a right to impose “autonomous sanctions” against other states and non-state actors, on the basis that the UK will no longer be able to benefit from the EU’s collective sanctioning competence. The spotlight is again on the nature and purposes of sanctions in international law. The article addresses the legal framework applicable to sanctions by, first of all, showing that the nature of sanctions is different in the international legal order to how it is conceived in domestic legal orders in that sanctions are primarily imposed in response to threats to or breaches of the peace and, in so doing, the analysis will distinguish sanctions from countermeasures and other non-forcible measures. It then proceeds to demonstrate that the values of peace and security that underpin sanctions are essentially normative and should be seen as part of the international legal order and enforceable through sanctions alongside other fundamental norms of international law. Whether viewed as responses to breaches of international law or not, the analysis shows that sanctions are collective measures exclusively within the competence of international organizations. Having established the conceptual and legal frameworks for understanding sanctions, the article considers sanctions imposed against states and non-state actors, and explores whether the move towards targeted sanctions is a form of collective response to violations of international law. The article finishes by considering that, in contrast to countermeasures and other measures of self-help, collective sanctions are inherently lawful, but can only be legally justified as measures adopted out of a necessity to prevent major ruptures to peace and international law.

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Chapter
Conditionality has different meanings in different situations. Conditionality is applied in different policy areas such as lending or investment programmes, trade agreements and development cooperation aid. In international economic relations, for example, it indicates a performance-based aid allocation by international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this financial and economic context, conditionality requires governments seeking aid to agree to economic policy adjustments defined by the donors. Conditionality can also refer to the process of tying aid to a specific use or it can describe projects and programmes aimed at supporting democracy or human rights protection
Chapter
Taking stock of the discussion on the measures to be taken against States not complying with existing obligations in the field of nuclear non-proliferation contained in the Fourth Report on Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes presented by the Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law to the ILA Sydney Conference (2018), this chapter suggests three possible avenues to deal with such States. The first avenue is the UN Charter and the possibility that the recalcitrant Member State’s membership rights be suspended or that its membership be severed permanently (expulsion). The second avenue centres on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and how its provisions might be invoked to address prohibited nuclear proliferation by Contracting Parties. The third avenue concerns the domestic legislation of certain States, which permits the adoption of the so-called ‘autonomous sanctions’, separately and independently of enforcement action ordered by international organisations, and in furtherance of foreign policy objectives.
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