"Truffula Tohumlarının Yükümlülüğü": Çocuk Edebiyatı, Rasyonalite ve Felsefede Çocuk Sesi

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Bu makalede felsefenin çocuklar adına nasıl konuşabileceğini, çocuğun felsefede nasıl bir sese sahip olabileceğini ve felsefe ile nasıl konuşabileceğini araştıracağım. Çocuğu, kendi felse soruşturmalarını yürüten sorumlu rasyonel varlıklar olarak görmemiz gerektiğini iddia edeceğim; ama sadece rasyonel kabiliyetlerinden ötürü değil, fakat aynı zamanda biz onları konuşma ortaklarımız olarak kabul ettiğimiz, onların akıllarını akıl olarak tanıdığımız, hem de onlarla konuştuğumuz ve onların da bizimle ve rasyonel topluluğumuzla iletişim kurmalarına imkân tanıdığımız için. Bunu iddia edebilmek için ilk önce Gareth Matthews’in çocukluk felsefesini tersine çevirdim ve onun bazı kavramlarını Stanley Cavell’in felsefesi çizgisinde yeniden yapılandırdım. İkinci olarak kendi rasyonalite kavramımızı ve çocuk resmimizi daha yakından tecrübe edebilmek için, çocuk kitaplarını, Loraks’ı, Kız Kardeşim Nerede’yi ve Henrik Ibsens’in oyununu, Vahşi Ördek’i, ele aldım.

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In the name of efficiency, the practice of education has come to be dominated by neoliberal ideology andprocedures of standardization and quantification. Such attempts to make all aspects of practice transparent and subject to systematic accounting lack sensitivity to the invisible and the silent, to something in the humancondition that cannot readily be expressed in an either-or form. Seeking alternatives to such trends, Saito readsDewey's idea of progressive education through the lens of Emersonian moral perfectionism (to borrow a term coined by Stanley Cavell). She elucidates a spiritual and aesthetic dimension to Dewey's notion of growth, one considerably richer than what Dewey alone presents in his typically scientific terminology.
I am concerned in this paper with a range of phenomena, which, in the first four sections of the paper, I shall suggest by some examples. In the last three sections, I try to connect the topic thus indicated with the thought of Stanley Cavell. First example: a poem of Ted Hughes's, from the mid-50s, called "Six Young Men." The speaker in the poem looks at a photo of six smiling young men, seated in a familiar spot. He knows the bank covered with bilberries, the tree and the old wall in the photo; the six men in the picture would have heard the valley below them sounding with rushing water, just as it still does. Four decades have faded the photo; it comes from 1914. The men are profoundly, fully alive, one bashfully lowering his eyes, one chewing a piece of grass, one "is ridiculous with cocky pride" (1. 6). Within six months of the picture's having been taken, all six were dead. In the photograph, then, there is thinkable, there is seeable, the death of the men. See it, and see the worst "flash and rending" (1. 35) of war falling onto these smiles now forty years rotted and gone. Here is the last stanza: That man's not more alive whom you confront And shake by the hand, see hale, hear speak loud, Than any of these six celluloid smiles are, Nor prehistoric or fabulous beast more dead; No thought so vivid as their smoking blood: To regard this photograph might well dement, Such contradictory permanent horrors here Smile from the single exposure and shoulder out One's own body from its instant and heat. What interests me there is the experience of the mind's not being able to encompass something which it encounters. It is capable of making one go mad to try, to bring together in thought what cannot be thought: the impossibility of anyone's being more alive than these smiling men, nothing's being more dead. (No one is more alive than is the person looking at the photo; no one is more alive than you are, reading the poem. In Part VI, I turn back to the "contradictory permanent horrors" (1. 43) of the imagination of death.) Now it is plainly possible to describe the photo so it does not seem boggling at all. It is a photo of men who died young, not long after the picture was taken. Where is the contradiction? —Taking the picture that way, there is no problem about our concepts being adequate to describe it. Again, one might think of how one would teach a child who had been shown a photo and told it was a photo of her grandfather, whom she knows to be dead. If she asks "Why is he smiling if he's dead?", she might be told that he was smiling when the picture was taken, because he was not dead then, and that he died later. The child is being taught the language-game, being shown how her problem disappears as she comes to see how things are spoken of in the game. The point of view from which she sees a problem is not yet in the game; while that from which the horrible contradiction impresses itself on the poet-speaker is that of someone who can no longer speak within the game. Language is shouldered out from the game, as the body from its instant and heat. What Hughes gives us is a case of what I want to call the difficulty of reality. That is a phrase of John Updike's,1 which I want to pick up for the phenomena with which I am concerned, experiences in which we take something in reality to be resistant to our thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult in that way, or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability. We take things so. And the things we take so may simply not, to others, present the kind of difficulty —of being hard or impossible or agonizing to get one's mind round.
That what we ordinarily say and mean may have a direct and deep control over what we can philosophically say and mean is an idea which many philosophers find oppressive. It might be argued that in part the oppression results from misunderstanding; that the new philosophy which proceeds from ordinary language is not that different from traditional methods of philosophising, and that the frequent attacks upon it are misdirected. But I shall not attempt to be conciliatory, both because I think the new philosophy at Oxford is critically different from traditional philosophy, and because I think it is worth trying to bring out their differences as fully as possible. There is, after all, something oppressive about a philosophy which seems to have uncanny information about our most personal philosophical assumptions (those, for example, about whether we can ever know for certain of the existence of the external world, or of other minds; and those we make about favourite distinctions between the descriptive and the normative’, or between matters of fact and matters of language) and which inveterately nags us about them. Particularly oppressive when that philosophy seems so often merely to nag and to try no special answers to the questions which possess us — unless it be to suggest that we sit quietly in a room. Eventually, I suppose, we will have to look at that sense of oppression itself: such feelings can come from a truth about ourselves which we are holding off.
I want to argue for the importance of the notion human being in ethics. Part I of the paper presents two different sorts of argument against treating that notion as important in ethics. A. Here is an example of the first sort of argument. What makes us human beings is that we have certain properties, but these properties, making us members of a certain biological species, have no moral relevance. If, on the other hand, we define being human in terms which are not tied to biological classification, if (for example) we treat as the properties which make us human the capacities for reasoning or for self-consciousness, then indeed those capacities may be morally relevant, but if they are morally significant at all, they are significant whether they are the properties of a being who is a member of our species or not. And so it would be better to use a word like ‘person’ to mean a being that has these properties , to bring out the fact that not all human beings have them and that non-human beings conceivably might have them.
Education is often understood as a process whereby children come to conform to the norms teachers believe should govern our practices. This picture problematically presumes that educators know in advance what it means for children to go on the way that is expected of them. In this essay Viktor Johansson suggests a revision of education, through the philosophy of Stanley Cavell, that can account for both the attunement in our practices and the possible dissonance that follows when the teacher and child do not go on together. There is an anxiety generated by the threat of disharmony in our educational undertakings that may drive teachers toward philosophy in educational contexts. Here Johansson offers a philosophical treatment of this intellectual anxiety that teachers may experience when they, upon meeting dissonant children, search for epistemic justifications of their practices—a treatment whereby dissonant children can support teachers in dissolving their intellectual frustrations.
This autobiography in the form of a philosophical diary narrates the events of a life that have produced the distinctive kind of writing associated with Stanley Cavell's name. Cavell reflects on his journey from early childhood in Atlanta, through his musical studies at UC Berkeley and Julliard, to his subsequent veering off into philosophy at UCLA, his Ph.D. studies at Harvard, and his half century of teaching. While Cavell's academic work has often incorporated autobiographical elements, Little Did I Know speaks to the American experience in general. It has much to say about the particularities of growing up in an immigrant family and offers glimpses of lesser known aspects of university life in the second half of the twentieth century. At the same time, Cavell's interests and career have brought him into contact with a range of influential and unusual people. A number of friends, colleagues, and acquaintances figure prominently or in passing over the course of this book, occasioning engaging portraits. J.L. Austin, Ernest Bloch, Roger Sessions, Thomas Kuhn, Robert Lowell, Rogers Albritton, Seymour Shifrin, John Rawls, Bernard Williams, W. V. O. Quine, and Jacques Derrida are no longer with us; but Cavell also pays homage to the living: Michael Fried, John Harbison, Marc Shell, Milton Babbitt, Barry Stroud, John Hollander, Hilary Putnam, and Terrence Malick. In keeping with Cavell's philosophical style, the drift of the narrative registers the decisiveness of the relatively unknown and the purely accidental as well. Cavell has produced a trail of some eighteen published books that range from treatments of individual writers (Wittgenstein, Austin, Emerson, Thoreau, Heidegger, Shakespeare and Beckett) to studies in aesthetics, epistemology, moral and political philosophy, cinema, opera, and religion. Here he accounts for the discovery and scope of his intellectual passions and shares them with his readers.
In these three lectures, Cavell situates Emerson at an intersection of three crossroads: a place where both philosophy and literature pass; where the two traditions of English and German philosophy shun one another; where the cultures of America and Europe unsettle one another. "Cavell's 'readings' of Wittgenstein and Heidegger and Emerson and other thinkers surely deepen our understanding of them, but they do much more: they offer a vision of what life can be and what culture can mean. . . . These profound lectures are a wonderful place to make [Cavell's] acquaintance."—Hilary Putnam
Onlar, insan olarak hem ortak geleceğimize, rasyonel varlığımıza tabii hem de sorumludurlar. Zira felsefi olarak gördüğümüz sorular (bilgi sorunu, ahlak sorunu, adalet sorunu, varlık ve anlam sorunu) nasıl yaşayacağımız ve topluluğumuzu nasıl biçimlendireceğimiz konularında önemlidir
  • Bir Girişim Olarak Özetleyebilir
için bir girişim olarak özetleyebilir. Onlar, insan olarak hem ortak geleceğimize, rasyonel varlığımıza tabii hem de sorumludurlar. Zira felsefi olarak gördüğümüz sorular (bilgi sorunu, ahlak sorunu, adalet sorunu, varlık ve anlam sorunu) nasıl yaşayacağımız ve topluluğumuzu nasıl biçimlendireceğimiz konularında önemlidir. Çocuklar için felsefe programları çocukları hayatımızın hem katılımcıları hem de hayatımızdan ve toplumumuzdan sorumlu kişiler olarak tanımanın yolu olabilir. 7