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More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18 European countries
Abstract
This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of appointments to increase political control over public bureaucracies with often substantial managerial and policy autonomy. Using data from a large-scale executive survey from central government ministries and agencies in 18 European countries, the article provides a comprehensive cross-national and cross-organizational analysis of the autonomy-politicization conundrum and the drivers of the politicization of senior-level appointments. We find that national patterns of politicization correspond fairly well to country families as defined by administrative traditions, with some traditions being more coherent than others. At the organizational level, we find no evidence of efforts by politicians to compensate for extended autonomy by politicizing senior-level appointments, yet we provide evidence of differential effects of both formal and informal organizational characteristics on patterns of politicization. Our analyses show that politicization of senior appointments is lower in organizations with agency status, higher organizational social capital, higher financial autonomy and more extensive use of management tools. The article thereby not only offers comprehensive evidence of cross-country differences in politicization; it also adds to the literature on sub-national variation, by fleshing out an organizational perspective to the study of politicized appointments in the European context.
... Profissionais 10 Política e burocracia no Brasil contemporâneo: o necessário equilíbrio entre técnica e política para a produção das políticas públicas A literatura especializada sobre diferenças transnacionais nas nomeações politizadas tem buscado entender as variações nacionais em relação ao grau de indicações políticas a cargos públicos (Bach et al., 2020;Meyer-Sahling, 2008;Page;Wright, 1999 A forma de recrutamento não define, a priori, a capacidade dos nomeados, tampouco a natureza discricionária da nomeação a torna necessariamente um instrumento de apropriação político-partidária. Entretanto, essa associação entre nomeações e patrimonialismo (no sentido de uso privado de recursos públicos) levou a um questionamento acerca da "legitimidade da esfera política como instância de controle e definição dos rumos das políticas públicas e, portanto, seu direito de definir os nomes que exercerão o comando político dos órgãos" (Lopez, 2015:13). ...
... ). Essa literatura reconhece os desafios e o esforço que o Estado (ou melhor, que políticos eleitos do Executivo) necessita exercer para manter o controle sobre um aparelho ou administração pública especializada com centenas ou milhares de servidores permanentes e temporários. Uma estratégia comum, reconhecida e explorada pela literatura recente, é a seleção de funcionários por motivos político-partidários e não exclusivamente meritocráticos(Bach et al., 2020). Para se referir a esses motivos políticopartidários, usa-se o termo politização que faz referências à influência política sobre nomeações para altos cargos (Page;Wright, 1999). ...
... No âmbito deste trabalho, entendemos politização como um fenômeno e um conceito bastante amplo que abrange diversos mecanismos pelos quais atores políticos buscam influenciar a administração pública e o comportamento da burocracia(Panizza;Larraburu, 2019), que incluem a "seleção de nomeados para cargos no governo por motivos políticos -o clientelismo em si -mas também a outras formas mais subtis através das quais os atores políticos tentam moldar o comportamento dos funcionários públicos (Bach;Hammerschmid;Löffler, 2020)" (Panizza;Peters;Larraburu, 2019, p.5).De uma maneira mais abrangente, essa literatura sobre a política (politics) do Executivo se dividiu em estudos sobre a politização formal (influência política na seleção e promoção de burocratas), politização funcional (relação de burocratas de alto escalão com realidade política no desempenho de suas funções) e, mais recentemente, politização administrativa (quando servidores ultrapassam a função pública profissional e imparcial)(Bach et al., 2020).Uma vertente americana foca especificamente em entender os possíveis efeitos negativos de recrutamento partidário no desempenho burocrático (em oposição ao recrutamento baseado na competência) (Moynihan; Roberts, 2010).Na literatura, existem diversas tipologias para caracterizar as abordagens de indicações políticas para cargos públicos. Uma das vertentes (Page;Wright, 1999) identificou três sistemas ou modelos principais que traduzem abordagens distintas quanto à busca por garantir a capacidade de resposta política da burocracia(Bach et al., 2020) -aquela na qual a função pública é neutra (nomeações raramente são politizadas), como Reino Unido e Dinamarca; outra em que as nomeações para cargos de alto escalão são politizadas (por exemplo, França, Suécia, Alemanha); e, por fim, país nos quais a filiação partidária está no centro das indicações para recrutamento, mesmo em níveis hierárquicos mais baixos (como Áustria, Bélgica, Espanha, Grécia).JáMeyer-Sahling (2008) propõe uma abordagem alternativa ao analisar se servidores de alto escalão são substituídos rotineiramente e as diferenças por tipos de recrutamento mais típicos chegando às categorias de: politização partidária, onde há a troca dos cargos se dá em termos político-partidários (como na Hungria e outros países pós-comunistas); a politização limitada, na qual funcionários são recrutados dentro da burocracia ministerial (tanto para níveis hierárquicos superiores quanto para os mais baixos), caso da Alemanha; a não politização, em que não hásubstituição de alto escalão mesmo após mudanças de governo e predomina o recrutamento interno (exemplo típico do Reino Unido); e politização aberta, onde há a nomeação para cargos por candidatos externos à burocracia governamental (como nos EUA) (Bach et al., 2020; Bach e administrativas. Para os autores, por resposta política entende-se o poder do governo eleito em formular e implementar suas propostas de políticas públicas. ...
... Another perspective on tracking changes in the population of departments shifts the focus from a macro-level to a micro-level analysis of the internal structure of departments. Lichtmannegger and Bach (2020) acknowledge the impact of administrative 'reform' as a driver of structural change. However, they observe that structural reform pitched at a government-wide level is often articulated as a general set of aims designed to enhance the collective performance of the state's entire organisational apparatus. ...
... Notwithstanding this, Overman (2016) points to two studies that show that delegation is positively associated with improved performance, although the evidence is limited and case-specific (Overman 2016(Overman :1250(Overman ,1253. Bach et al. (2020) examine the claim that the delegation of autonomy to public sector bodies in 18 countries leads to a higher degree of political control through the politicisation of senior-level appointments. ...
This article analyses China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of 2013–2023,
which serves as its economic diplomacy tool in the 21st century. The BRI
reflects China’s soft power, which targets redefining the international eco
nomic order to serve its interests both economically and strategically. This
article aims to identify the core motivations behind China’s BRI, its impact,
challenges, and policy implications. To explain the rationale behind the
BRI’s emergence, the article uses the Hegemonic Stability and Neoliberal
theories as an analytical framework. The content analysis method was
used, and data was obtained from secondary sources. The analysis shows
that the BRI is a manifestation of China’s global aspirations and strategic
maneuvers. The initiative serves as a geopolitical tool to increase China’s
global influence while enhancing economic cooperation. The BRI has led
to both positive and negative outcomes. This article predicts that the Glob
This article examines the complex balancing of political loyalty and meritocratic competence in the appointment of top civil servants—a pivotal aspect of public administration that is particularly relevant in developing contexts. Focusing on the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq, this study aims to unravel how merit and patronage converge in the appointment processes of director generals (DGs). To this end, the article develops an analytical framework that conceptualizes “hybrid appointments” as a process in which merit‐based and patronage considerations are intricately interwoven. The article uses a mixed‐method research design, combining elite interviews with senior politicians and a quantitative analysis of original biographical data on top civil servants. It shows how politicians weigh merit‐based qualifications alongside political considerations in the appointment process, rather than substituting loyalty for competence. This finding challenges the traditional dichotomous understanding of merit versus patronage appointments, advancing our understanding of how top civil service appointments function in developing contexts.
This paper examines the administrative dimension of digital health policy in Germany, focusing on the transformation of the Gematik and the capacity-building initiatives within the Ministry of Health. It highlights the shift from a public governance model to digital era governance and discusses the challenges of both vertical and horizontal integration. The study underscores the political nature of administrative reforms by distinguishing between various governance models and between governance as a structure and governance as a process. The findings emphasize the need for integrating public administration research into policy analysis to better understand the complexities of digital health governance.
The politicization of the civil service is not a new phenomenon but it is highly contested and contingent on the environmental and institutional contexts in which it operates. The global environment has changed radically and has become more turbulent witnessed by, inter alia, the rise of populism and democratic backsliding. Institutional contexts have also changed as politicians demand greater accountability from officials in implementing their (mandated) policies. What is new is the various forms that politicization takes. This review paper takes relations between politicians, political staff and bureaucracy and offers a multi-dimensional analysis of the politicization concept: politicized appointments; politicized recruitment; behavioural politicization; and, structural politicization. We analyse politicization in different regimes: the UK as liberal democracy; Georgia as electoral democracy; and Turkey as electoral autocracy.
This study examines how top leader turnover in the public sector affects organizational strategic decision-making processes in the post-succession phase. Survey responses of managers were combined with a novel database on CEO turnover in the U.S. Federal Government. Drawing on threat-rigidity theory, we hypothesize that as CEO turnover is perceived as a threatening event for both managers and CEOs themselves, organizations as a whole respond by becoming more rigid, centralizing strategic decision-making and restricting the flow of information. This has knock-on effects on the quality of strategic decisions and their implementation, with detrimental effects on the delivery of public services.
La création d’agences gouvernementales en dehors des ministères est souvent justifiée par la nécessité de préserver l’autonomie des agences. En plus d’une « agencification formelle », c’est-à-dire l’érection de barrières formelles entre les agences et les ministères, les agences sont souvent (ré) installées physiquement à l’écart des ministères pour mettre en avant et renforcer leur autonomie. Cependant, on sait peu de choses sur les effets de la localisation physique et de la distance sur l’autonomie de l’agence. À l’aide de deux grandes enquêtes de 2006 et 2016, cette étude examine comment la situation géographique et la distance influencent l’autonomie des agences. Notre étude établit que l’autonomie des agences n’est que faiblement associée à la localisation physique et à la distance, et que ces facteurs sont beaucoup moins importants que l’importance politique. Alors que l’on estime généralement que l’autonomie des agences peut être renforcée par leur (re) positionnement physique à une distance suffisamment éloignée de l’exécutif, notre étude suggère que le (re) positionnement physique représente un outil de conception de politique administrative in efficace lorsqu’il est appliqué à l’autonomie de l’agence. Remarques à l’intention des praticiens La distance physique entre les agences et les ministères parents n’est associée que de loin à l’autonomie des agences. La localisation physique représente donc un outil de conception inefficace si l’objectif est d’accroître l’autonomie des agences
The article aims to analyze the level of politicization of civil service in Romania, its goals, and consequences. We adopted a rather narrow perspective on politicization and we concentrated mainly on analyzing the recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of civil servants based on political criteria. The research findings were used to discuss the consequences of politicization on the governance of public institutions during turbulent times. In this regard, we conducted an email-based survey of the civil servants. The majority of the sample was composed of graduates of public administration programs at four major universities in Romania, who work in public institutions. We collected the data between May and November 2023 and we obtained 211 valid questionnaires. We found that appointments based on political criteria lower the work motivation of public employees, and increase the level of incompetence and instability of public institutions. The most affected are public employees in management positions, those who have longer work experience in the public sector, and those who work in public institutions that are part of central administration. Therefore, frequent changes based on political criteria lower the capacity of public institutions to respond to disruptive events by generating a loss of expertise, instability, and discontinuity in policy implementation. However, turbulent times require flexibility and adaptation to unexpected and unpredictable events, and political appointees might be more responsive and cooperative.
This Research Note presents a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five regions. The data was collected based on the same methodology to compare patterns of patronage within countries, across countries and across world regions that are usually studied separately. The Note addresses three research questions that are at the center of debates on party patronage, which is understood as the power of political parties to make appointments to the public and semi-public sector: the scope of patronage, the underlying motivations, and the criteria on the basis of which appointees are selected. The exploration of the dataset shows that party patronage is, to a different degree, widespread across all regions. The data further shows differences between policy areas, types of institutions such as government ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises, and higher, middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy. It is demonstrated that the political control of policy-making and implementation is the most common motivation for making political appointments. However, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve the purpose of both political control and rewarding supporters in exchange for votes and services. Finally, the data shows that parties prefer to select appointees who are characterized by political and personal loyalty as well as professional competence.
This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’ chief executives in four countries with a Rechtsstaat tradition and tests theoretical expectations about potential tensions between managerial reforms and administrative values using survey data (N = 453). All countries combine old and new forms of accountability requirements, while legal and financial accountability have not been replaced with results accountability. Switzerland and the Netherlands score highest on results accountability, though in combination with legal and financial accountability, which are dominant in Germany and Austria. Nation-specific characteristics seem more important for core values of public administration than generic characteristics of the Rechtsstaat model.
Based on a survey of more than 6700 top civil servants in 17 European countries, this book explores the impacts of New Public Management (NPM)-style reforms in Europe from a uniquely comparative perspective. It examines and analyses empirical findings regarding the dynamics, major trends and tools of administrative reforms, with special focus on the diversity of top executives’ perceptions about the effects of those reforms.Resulting from research funded by the European Commission, this book is an ambitious, comprehensive portrait of public administration in the central European bureaucracies after more than three decades of NPM reforms and in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The chapters present extensive data on single countries but invaluably take a comparative approach, presenting a broad, explorational perspective.Public Administration Reforms in Europe is an indispensable resource for researchers, practitioners and students in a variety of social science areas, especially public administration, public policy and public management. (Résumé éditeur)
The politicization of bureaucracy is a widespread strategy to increase the political control of ministerial departments in parliamentary democracies. It is, however, largely unknown why executive politicians promote some officials rather than others to high public office. Based on a unique dataset of all senior officials in German federal ministries and agencies that held office in the period 1997-2015, this article investigates whether partisan loyalty, political craft, and managerial competencies influence the chance of promotion to the highest civil service position in Germany (state secretary). We apply event history modelling to draw inferences on the relative importance of different selection criteria used by ministers when recruiting state secretaries from a candidate pool of senior officials. A key finding is that ministers consistently prefer politically loyal to non-loyal candidates. Although ministers also consider candidates’ political craft and selected managerial competencies, they are likely to trade-off partisan loyalty against those qualifications. The article contributes to the literature on politicization in the public sector by comparing potential and actual office holders and by including a broad set of selection criteria, moving beyond the literature’s dominating focus on partisan loyalty. The methodological approach developed in this article may well be transferred to other institutional contexts and used for comparative studies in this area.
This Research Note explores the political dynamics of bureaucratic turnover. It argues that changes in a government’s policy objectives can shift both political screening strategies and bureaucratic selection strategies, which produces turnover of agency personnel. To buttress this conjecture, it analyzes a unique dataset tracing the careers of all agency heads in the Swedish executive bureaucracy between 1960 and 2014. It shows that, despite serving on fixed terms and with constitutionally protected decision-making powers, Swedish agency heads are considerably more likely to leave their posts following partisan shifts in government. The note concludes that, even in institutional systems seemingly designed to insulate bureaucratic expertise from political control, partisan politics can shape the composition of agency personnel.
Organizations * Armies, Prisons, Schools * Organization Matters Operators * Circumstances * Beliefs * Interests * Culture Managers * Constraints * People * Compliance Executives * Turf * Strategies * Innovation Context * Congress * Presidents * Courts * National Differences Change * Problems * Rules * Markets * Bureaucracy and the Public Interest
The administrative apparatus of the modern state exists in an uncomfortable position in democratic governance. For democratic government to be accountable it must be responsive to elected politicians. For it to be effective, however, the bureaucracy should often be insulated from political intervention. Democratic governments worldwide have chosen to insulate some administrative activity from politics in a number of ways, from designing independent central banks to enacting detailed civil service statutes. For example, government workers in most modern developed democracies are protected by law, regulation and norms from politically motivated work changes, demotions or firing. Democratic governments provide this insularity to induce government workers to make a career of government work and invest their time and resources in acquiring costly expertise that will lead to more effective administration of government.