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forthcoming in Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 2018
How Do Small Island States Maximize Influence? Creole Diplomacy and the Smart
State Foreign Policy of the Seychelles
Christian Bueger, Cardiff University & University of Seychelles (BuegerCM@cardiff.ac.uk)
Anders Wivel, University of Copenhagen (aw@ifs.ku.dk)
Abstract: A lack of capabilities is most often taken to imply a lack of influence. The foreign policy
of the Seychelles provides a surprising case of successful small state diplomacy that counters this
claim. With a population of less than 100,000 and a diplomatic service of 100 staff, Seychelles is
recognized as a broker in international organizations and as an agenda setter in ocean governance.
This article explores this success in four steps. First, we unpack why the current diplomatic success
of Seychelles is a surprise. Second, drawing on literature on small state diplomacy, we identify four
sources of small state influence: capability, political culture, institutional design and political strategy.
Third, we analyze recent Seychellois diplomacy in light of the four factors as well as the limitations
of Creole small state diplomacy. We conclude by discussing what other small states may learn from
the success of the Seychelles.
Keywords: Small States; Islands; Creole Diplomacy; Seychelles; Blue Economy; Maritime
Security; Ocean governance
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the support from a range of interlocutors from the Seychelles which have given
up their precious time to talk with us about the foreign policy of the country. For comments and
suggestions we also like to thank Rupert Alcock, Tim Edmunds, Barry Faure, Dennis Hardy, and
Robert McCabe and two anonymous reviewers. Research for this article has benefitted from support
by the British Academy’s Sustainable Development Programme [grant: GF16007], the University
of Seychelles and Cardiff University.
1. Introduction
The Seychelles is an archipelagic state in the middle of the Western Indian Ocean. With a population
of less than 100,000 living on three main islands, the country is popularly known as one of the tropical
paradises, famous for its beaches, sunsets and marine ecosystem. Yet, the country is not only
recognized as a travel destination. Within the world of diplomacy and global governance, Seychelles
has achieved significant reputation as a noticeable player on the diplomatic stages of international
politics. As one of the few studies of the island nation concluded, Seychelles has acquired ‘a voice in
international affairs incommensurate with its minute population and limited resources’ (Sellstrom
2015: 262).
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It is in the global field of ocean governance1 in particular that the country is recognized as a major
facilitator as well as policy entrepreneur and advocate for maritime security and the sustainable
development of the oceans. Two initial examples indicate this role.
In 2015 Seychelles was handed the chairpersonship of one of the most important maritime security
governance organizations: the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. In this global
governance mechanism over 60 states and international organizations coordinate their maritime
security work, such as naval operations, information sharing and capacity building, in the Western
Indian Ocean region (Tardy 2014). Seychelles acted as the chair of the overall group for two years
and organized two plenary meetings. It was the first time that the international community trusted a
regional country to take over that major responsibility; hitherto the group had been chaired by the
major international maritime actors and industrial nations, such as the US, Japan, Norway and
Singapore.
Seychelles has also been widely recognized as one of the leaders in the debate on sustainable
development of ocean resources, in particular by advocating for the concept of blue economy. The
prominence of this concept (Silver et al. 2015, Voyer et al. 2018) can be seen as linked to the country’s
successful campaigning. Seychelles is recognized as an innovator in ocean governance, through
initiatives such as a debt for nature swap, or a marine spatial planning initiative. When the United
Nations held a global conference on the role of the oceans in achieving the sustainable development
goals in 2017, the conference was informally called ‘the Seychelles conference’ given the degree that
ideas and proposals from the country dominated the debate.2
These are but two examples of an influence that appears surprising for such a small country. In the
study of international relations, a lack of capabilities is most often taken to imply a lack of influence.
In this context, the foreign policy of the Seychelles presents an astonishing case of successful small
state diplomacy that calls for further investigation. How can it be that a country with such limited
human and financial resources becomes recognized as a major diplomatic facilitator and as one of the
agenda setters in ocean governance? What explains that success story and what are the lessons for
diplomacy and the role of small states in global governance?
This article addresses these questions in four steps. First, we unpack why the current diplomatic
success of a small island Indian Ocean state such as the Seychelles is a surprise. In reviewing the
literature we discuss the severe constraints that a microstate such as Seychelles operates within and
why we might expect it to be largely irrelevant to world politics. Second, drawing on the
contemporary, primarily European literature on successful small state diplomacy, we identify three
sources of small state influence in international diplomacy: 1) capability, 2) political culture and
institutional design and 3) political strategy. Third, we provide a short introduction to Seychelles as
an international actor and then analyze Seychellois diplomacy, assessing the importance of each of
the sources of influence for the diplomatic success of the Seychelles. The article documents how
Seychelles has profited from its geostrategic location and the general interest in maritime security
and sustainable development of the oceans, and how the country’s diplomats have cultivated a
genuine form of diplomacy – Creole diplomacy – and have advanced a smart strategy. We identify
the strengths and limitations of Creole small state diplomacy and conclude by discussing the extent
to which other small states may learn from the success of the Seychelles.
Our study of Seychellois diplomacy hence contributes to a number of current debates: firstly, the
more theoretical questions about the relation between capability and influence in world politics, and
secondly, the debate about the role of small and microstates in global governance. For both of these
debates the article elaborates a new conceptual framework for the study of microstate influence but
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also adds an exciting new case that has not been studied so far. The discussion will also be of interest
to those primarily concerned about contemporary ocean governance or the recent political dynamics
in the Indian Ocean region. In this context the article provides one of the first analyses of a key actor
whose role has not been understood sufficiently.
2. Microstate influence in world politics: Why is the Seychelles an unlikely success story?
The foreign policy of the Seychelles presents a surprising case of successful small state diplomacy
that has not yet been studied in detail.3 There are good reasons for paying more attention to what the
small island state does and how it does it. Despite its small size, whether measured in terms of its
population (93,920),4 landmass (455 km2), GDP ($1.4 billion), or the size of its diplomatic service
(ca. 100 staff),5 the microstate has become recognized as a major player on global political stages.
Three sources of surprise
There are at least three reasons why the success of the Seychelles is surprising. First, as noted by
Jesse and Dreyer, ‘the great powers establish not only the norms and structures of the international
system, but also the regional security hierarchies’ (Jesse and Dreyer 2016: 3). Small states are the
‘pawns’ of international relations, finding it ‘hard to come to grips with a process [related to the major
issues of international relations] which takes place, so to speak above their heads’ (Holbraad 1971:
78). Microstates may be viewed as a particularly acute form of the small state, which is ‘always the
weak state in an asymmetric relationship when interacting with another state at the global, regional
or sub-regional levels, unless dealing with other microstates’ (Oest and Wivel 2010: 434). A
population of less than one million inhabitants ‘is widely accepted in the literature’ as the defining
characteristic of microstates (Anckar 2004: 208), although the bar is occasionally set at e.g. 300,000
(Plischke 1977: 21) or as high as 1.5 million inhabitants (Mohamed 2002: 1).
Second, for small states and microstates, one important consequence of their limited influence over
international affairs is a narrow margin of time and error in times of change and crisis (Jervis 1976:
172–173). As a consequence of their limited resources, small states typically lack a buffer allowing
them to adjust to new conditions during times of change. They are vulnerable when it comes to
shielding themselves against external shocks, e.g. in times of crisis, whether economically, politically
or militarily. For this reason, small states tend to seek shelter either in the form of bilateral alliances
with great powers or through multilateral institutions (Bailes, Thayer and Thorhalsson 2016). The
opportunities for seeking shelter vary significantly across the international system, with the highly
institutionalized Euro-Atlantic area and institutions such as NATO standing at one end of the
continuum, and the weakly institutionalized relations in Africa and the Indian Ocean region – and
institutions such as the African Union or the Indian Ocean Rim Association – at the other end.
Seychelles’ quadruple predicament
The combination of the size, location and development of the Seychelles has produced some
particularly severe vulnerabilities for the country. The Seychelles is the victim of a quadruple
predicament. It is a microstate and therefore ‘permanently stuck as the weak party in asymmetric
relationships internationally’ (Oest and Wivel 2010: 434). Most states have relations where they enjoy
the benefits of being stronger than other states, and relations where they suffer from the costs of being
weaker than other states. In the Baltic Sea, for example, Denmark and Sweden are the weaker states
when bargaining with Russia, but both Scandinavian states may have significant influence when
negotiating with the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In contrast, microstates such as
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the Seychelles are likely to be the weaker party in any diplomatic relationship and therefore unlikely
to exercise much influence over international affairs.
Moreover, although Seychelles has recently been listed as a high income state by the OECD, it
remains in many ways a developing state, and this exacerbates the weaknesses associated with
smallness (cf. the discussions in Sutton 2011: 146-150; Thorhallsson 2012: 148; Vital 1967: 8).
Developing states tend to suffer from weaker networks, more limited funds for diplomatic work and
a smaller pool of university graduates when recruiting for government positions. One consequence
of their relatively small number of diplomats is the inability to be present in all relevant (formal and
informal) forums and meetings, leaving them with less information on the position of other
governments and less likely to be able to pen drafts of proposals or chair committees, thereby further
reducing their bargaining power and influence.
With only 455 km2 of land mass spread over 155 islands, but with the second largest Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) in Africa stretching across 1.4 million km2, the Seychelles is highly dependent
upon ocean and maritime resources for economic and societal development. With a small
administration and a negligible military budget, however, positioning the country as 109th among the
military powers of the world,6 the Seychelles is seemingly unable to defend its most vital interests.
As an African island microstate located in the Indian Ocean and confronted with a number of security
challenges ranging from piracy to climate change, the Seychelles has limited opportunities for seeking
institutional shelter. There is no Indian Ocean equivalent of NATO or the EU to provide institutional,
economic and military shelters against outside threats, no arena for voicing concerns or platform for
influencing regional or global affairs. While Seychelles is member of a range of regional
organizations, including the Indian Ocean Commission, the Southern African Development
Community, the African Union, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association, these institutional
arrangements remain weak and do not provide security guarantees.
To the extent that microstates have been able to shape international agenda setting, this has typically
happened in highly institutionalized contexts, most importantly the EU (Grimaud 2018; Panke 2011).
Small island states have often opted to forego international influence, however, seeking to secure
military survival and economic growth through extraordinary measures instead, such as by creating
tax havens and duty free zones, accepting the location of foreign military bases, weapons testing,
dump sites or high security prisons, or by allocating large parts of their territory for special
conservation and heritage parks (Baldacchino 2014: 243). As with any microstate, the Seychelles
needs to navigate diplomatically in a manner that seeks to limit the consequences of inherent
vulnerabilities in order to maximize influence. The next section unpacks contemporary knowledge
about small state diplomacy and uses it as a point of departure for identifying the sources of microstate
influence.
3. Sources of microstate influence: Towards an analytical framework
The classical literature of small state diplomacy depicts small states as weak, vulnerable and willing
to accommodate to almost any international order in search of security shelter (Commonwealth
Secretariat 1997; Handel 1990). Smallness, usually defined in terms of material capabilities, was
viewed ‘as a handicap to state action, and even state survival’ (Browning 2006: 669). Consequently,
the mere existence of these states in an anarchic world dominated by power politics was seen as a
puzzle, not least in the context of developments in military technology during the first half of the
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twentieth century (Fox 1959: 1; Wivel et al. 2014: 3-4). According to this perspective, small states
are trapped between their search for a security shelter, typically provided by one or more strong
military powers, and the risk of dependency on these powers that might exercise considerable
leverage in exchange for protection (Bailes, Thayer and Thorhallsson 2016). From such a perspective,
the diplomacy of small states is little more than a corollary of their security predicament. The most
they can aim for is to defensively ‘bind’ the great powers by strengthening the rules and procedures
of international organizations, thereby limiting the action space of the strong and creating a more
level playing ground in international relations (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006: 20; Vital 1967: 129-131).
In recent decades, this perspective on the small state has been challenged by a number of scholars
pointing to the opportunities for small states to offensively take advantage of their smallness.
Typically rooted in the study of small state diplomacy within the European Union,7 but recently
exploring conditions for small state influence outside the heavily institutionalized interstate relations
of Europe,8 this literature argues that being small entails a number of opportunities that may offset
vulnerability and limited capabilities when certain conditions are fulfilled. In particular, the literature
emphasizes three sources of small state influence rooted in the domestic societies of small states:
capability, institutional design and culture, and political strategy.
While acknowledging that small states suffer from limited material capabilities in both absolute and
relative terms, the literature makes three points that challenge conventional understandings of
capability in international relations. First, the location of the small state is an important source of its
strengths and weaknesses (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012: 33-35). Historically, small states were mainly
concerned with their geopolitical vicinity, since it was the great powers next door that could project
power into the small state’s territory and ultimately decide the state’s continued survival as an
independent political entity. As witnessed by the return of Finlandization – “making the best out of
political and strategic dependence” in a world divided into the great powers’ spheres of interest
(Mouritzen 2017: 67) – geopolitical location continues to condition the diplomatic action space of
small states. As exemplified by the cases of Iceland during the Cold War or contemporary Taiwan,
location may also be used as a tool for securing political, economic and military support. To
understand Seychelles we hence have to scrutinize its particular position as an island state in the
Western Indian Ocean.
In addition to location, studies of small states also point to the importance of issue-specific capacity
and capabilities (Long 2017: 148). Small states are small because of their limited combined
capabilities, but they often have issue-specific capabilities that may be used as a tool for niche
influence. These issue-specific capabilities are typically non-material. Thus, small states may have
technical expertise or knowledge within specific sectors that they use to advise other states or feed
into international negotiations (see e.g. Grimaud 2018; Jakobsen 2009; Rickli 2008). For the case of
Seychelles, this implies scrutinizing the resources they have developed in relation to ocean
governance.
How small states feed their knowledge and expertise into international negotiations depends on both
political culture and institutional design. We understand political culture as “the ‘meaning’ of political
life, or the meaningful aspect of politics” (Welch 1993: 5). Thus, a country’s political culture
expresses the shared meanings and understandings of what is legitimate political action and is closely
linked to national identity construction. A political culture that emphasizes the active role of the state
when working with non-state actors to secure societal development is likely to spill-over into the
international sphere in the form of an activist foreign policy as exemplified by the Nordic states
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(Nedergaard and Wivel 2018; Thorhallsson 2012). Furthermore, activist policies are likely to be
emphasized if domestic elites and populations perceive international activism as making a real
difference to the world, and to the position of the small state within it (Björkdahl 2013; de Cavalho
and Neumann 2015; Goetschel 2013; Ingebritsen 2002). The institutional design of the small state
mediates the effects of a particular political culture on small state diplomacy (Elman 1995; Mouritzen
1997). Small states that have successfully established communication lines between domestic
governments and diplomats posted abroad and are willing to allow these diplomats a flexible action
space for influencing negotiations are likely to be the most successful when it comes to the
maximization of influence (see e.g. Panke 2010).
Finally, the political strategy of the small state is important. Small states need to be ‘smart’, i.e. to set
the agenda, to frame international issues, propose rules and norms, and to provide expertise and
problem-solving knowledge (Arter 2000; Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013; Grøn and Wivel 2011). A
smart state strategy has three key elements. First, regarding the political substance of the strategy, the
small state needs to present (part of) the solution to a problem recognized by all or most relevant
political actors. A small state is unlikely to succeed in setting a political course that challenges the
vital interests of more powerful states, but it can successfully affect the content of international
negotiations by focusing on specific solutions that may in turn serve its own interests. Second,
regarding the form of the strategy, the small state needs to focus resources and signal willingness to
negotiate and compromise on issues that are not deemed to be of vital importance. Playing the role
of the pragmatic insider is likely to serve small states better than the principled outsider. Finally, the
small state needs to position itself as an ‘honest broker’. Small states have opportunities to maximize
influence because they are not considered a threat to anyone, i.e. they play outside the security
dilemma, because their gains and losses from international cooperation and conflict are
inconsequential for the great powers. Through multiplying diplomatic and informal networks, and
using regional organizations as a tool to make their voice and concerns heard, they are able to exercise
significant influence. In that way the small state may be able to turn its weakness into an asset and
replace a defensive international posture with an offensive smart state strategy.
In summary, three dimensions can be distilled from the literature that provide a framework for
interpreting Seychellois foreign policy: 1) capabilities, 2) institutional culture, and 3) smartness. In
the next step of analysis, we investigate how each of these dimensions plays out in the case of
Seychelles and how when taken together they provide an explanatory account for the influence that
Seychelles has had in the past decade. We start with a brief reconstruction of the political history of
the country.
4. The Seychelles: A Creole smart state
Seychelles is a young country. The islands were first spotted by Vasco da Gama in 1502, and the
pirates of the early 18th century allegedly used them as a hide out. In the late 18th century the French
recognized their strategic value in the colonial rivalry with the British Empire, annexed the islands
and started settlements. For centuries Seychelles was a minor plantation site colonized by the French;
the main island Mahe was used as occasional port of call for refuelling and supplies. After the
Napoleonic wars, Britain assumed full control by 1810. Relatively unaffected by the colonial
struggles and the two world wars, Seychelles became independent as a republic in 1976. The first
democratically elected president was ousted within a year through a coup d’état; from then onwards
the islands were governed as a one-party state under the rule of Albert René. The political system was
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democratized in the 1990s, and a victory by the opposition party in the 2016 parliamentary elections
brought Seychelles de facto on course for a richer democratic system.
Depending on agricultural production for much of its history, a major turning point for the country’s
economy was the opening of the airport in 1971. The country became accessible and the tourism
industry started to become a main pillar of the economy. With the adoption of the UN Convention of
the Law of the Sea in 1982 and the related UN Fish Stock Agreement in 1995 giving substantial
fishery rights to the Seychelles, the second largest tuna canning factory in the world was opened in
the country. Fisheries became the second main pillar of the country’s economy.
In the 2000s the Seychelles economy was hit hard from two directions. The international financial
crises of 2008 brought Seychelles close to bankruptcy, requiring a major IMF bailout, while in the
same year the increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia not only started to threaten supply lines to
the country, but led to significant losses of income from both tourism and the fishing industry.
Seychelles’ dependency on these two economic sectors demonstrated how vulnerable the country was
not only to global economic developments, but also to a regional security problem. Yet, the economy
saw a full recovery and by 2016 Seychelles not only officially became Africa’s second richest
country, but also was included in the World Bank’s list of high income countries.9
This sketchy portrait of the history, political system and economy of the Seychelles documents the
core features and vulnerabilities of a microstate. Against this backdrop, in what way has the country
successfully turned vulnerability into diplomatic strength? What are the main sources of Seychellois
diplomatic influence? In the following we explore the congruence between the three sources of small
state influence identified in the academic literature on small states, and the conduct of the diplomatic
affairs of the Seychelles.
Capability: Maximizing niche influence from a unique location
Let us first investigate capabilities. As emphasized, the notion of capabilities should not be reduced
to material resources, such as people, land, energy resources or money. The Seychelles is poor in
these regards, yet has another valuable capability: its geostrategic position. Located at the center of
the Western Indian Ocean, the islands have been an important port of call for international blue water
navies throughout history. As Scarr (1999) describes it, Seychelles was a ‘key’ to the Indian Ocean
in colonial times, positioned strategically between the Indian west coast and the African continent.
Once the Suez Canal was opened the country was located along the main shipping route from Asia
to Europe, serving not only as a service and refuel station but also as a way to project power.
When the British navy withdrew its strategic presence in the Western Indian Ocean and Seychelles
gained independence in the 1970s, strategic interest in the region by the Cold War superpowers was
relatively low.10 Seychelles joined the non-alignment movement and developed special relationships
with countries such as Tanzania, Cuba and a range of Caribbean states.11 Yet, the newly independent
country worked closely with both the Soviet Union and the US, as well as the former colonial powers,
France and the UK. The Soviet Union frequently used the naval facilities at port Victoria and had
personnel stationed, while the U.S. operated a satellite tracking station in close vicinity. The U.S.
opened the tracking station in 1963, when Seychelles was still under colonial rule. After independence
the René government opted for a pragmatic approach and offered the US a contract with a substantial
annual rent (Sellstrom 2015:280). With 130 US personnel and about 200 Seychellois working at the
station, it was a significant economic asset (Sellstrom 2015:280). Seychelles hence provided services
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to both rivals of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also saw a declining interest in Seychelles’
strategic position and the US closed the tracking station in 1996.
Seychelles, maritime security and the fight against Somali piracy
If in the 1990 the country was not able to use its physical location as a diplomatic tool, this situation
fundamentally changed in the late 2000s. Concerns over (maritime) terrorism and the smuggling of
WMD in the early 2000s brought strategic attention back to the region. The US increased its strategic
naval presence and created a multilateral task force in the region – the Combined Maritime Forces –
operating out of Bahrain. Yet, it was the outbreak of Somali-based piracy from 2008 that brought
Seychelles back on the geopolitical map.
Incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia substantially increased from 2008 and pirates widened
their operational area from the Horn of Africa deep into the Western Indian Ocean. The first attack
in Seychelles’ Exclusive Economic Zone occurred in 2009 and in the same year the first two major
incidents in which Seychellois crew was taken hostages by Somali pirates took place (Seychelles
Government 2010). Also, pirate gangs attempted to operate from the outer islands of the country
(Seychelles Government 2010).
Piracy not only posed significant economic and security challenges, however, it also presented an
opportunity. Seychelles was able to use its strategic position to gather significant support and
investments from the international community.
From 2008 the international community began to deploy substantial naval forces to patrol the piracy-
infested waters and also to provide protection to convoys in the area. The US, NATO, the EU, India,
Pakistan and Russia employed naval assets, but also countries such as China, Singapore, South Korea
and Japan, which had previously never been engaged in the region. For these counter-piracy
operations, the port of Victoria and the island of Mahe became major bases for maintenance, but most
importantly for the recreation of crew. Once again, Victoria had become a major port of call.
Seychelles’ airstrip also started to be used by foreign militaries, this time to employ reconnaissance
planes to monitor the regional waters for pirate skiffs. The outcome was frequent strategic and
diplomatic engagements between the Seychelles and the major international powers. Counter-piracy
also generated new economic revenues.
With the first successes of the counter-piracy campaigns, a new problem arose that Seychelles was
ready to assist with. Navies faced the challenge of what to do with arrested piracy suspects. Given
the lack of willingness to prosecute pirates in the major navies’ home countries and the operational
constraints this would imply, navies faced what became known as the ‘catch and release’ problem:
pirates were intercepted and stopped but then released (Guilfoyle 2010). To address this, the
international community worked towards a solution whereby international navies would arrest
suspects, but then hand them over to regional countries for prosecution. While Kenya was the main
country to take suspects initially, Seychelles soon declared its willingness to engage in piracy
prosecutions; it signed transfer agreements with several countries and quickly became the main
prosecuting state (Larssen 2015). By 2015 Seychelles had received and prosecuted 142 pirates
(Larssen 2015, 55).
To put Seychelles in a position to handle that number of suspects while ensuring that human rights
standards were fully met, the country benefitted from a substantial capacity building program in its
criminal justice sector. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Union’s civilian
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mission EUCAP Nestor, two of the main capacity building providers in the field, provided substantial
assistance through trainings, the provision of mentors as well as equipment. The main prison in Mahe
was fully refurbished to provide facilities for the detention of pirates, a dedicated court-room for
piracy prosecutions was built, and forensic equipment and computers were provided to the judges,
police and coast guard.
The government coordinated and organized this capacity building work pro-actively and indeed, it
was not only in the criminal justice sector, but also in the security sector more broadly that the country
received substantial assistance. In 2010 the government drafted “The Seychelles Comprehensive
Maritime Security Plan of Action Rolling Plan (2010-2040)”. Written in preparation for a major
multilateral meeting on piracy held in Seychelles in July 2010, the plan contained a needs assessment
and provided a detailed investment plan for how the international community could assist the country
in strengthening its capacity to fight piracy. The document laid out in detail which capacities and
equipment the country would need to be in a better position to handle piracy, with a particular focus
on the defense and surveillance sectors as they pertain to the coast guard, the air force, as well as
maritime domain awareness. In consequence, the country received substantial donations from across
the world.
India donated an offshore patrol vessel, two maritime reconnaissance aircrafts and also gave a 5
million US dollar defense grant to Seychelles. The UAE donated a new coast guard facility worth 15
million US dollar as well as two coast guard vessels. The US provided a coastal surveillance system
that included situational awareness functionality through multiple sensor fusion, target detection and
classification capabilities. The UK provided substantial funding for opening an intelligence sharing
center in the country. Denmark donated three patrol boats to the Seychelles Police Force. By 2015
Seychelles had the most advanced coast guard and maritime police in the Eastern African region.
Counter-piracy brought a significant number of naval forces to the Western Indian Ocean region.
With campaigns lasting for several years, it became clear that the piracy operations were there to stay.
For Seychelles this newly militarized and indeed also increasingly competitive environment provided
a new opportunity. The country invited the naval actors to open naval bases. In 2011 Seychelles
invited China to consider setting up a base and military presence on Mahe and in 2012 it was reported
that the Russian navy was considering opening a naval facility in Seychelles (DefenceWeb 2012).12
While none of these projects came to fruition, not least because piracy became increasingly contained
from the end of 2012, the country also started negotiations with India. A strong security partner of
Seychelles, India signed an agreement in March 2015 to build military infrastructures on the remote
island of Assumption. Construction commenced in 2017 and has since gained in importance in light
of the emerging Chinese-Indian naval rivalry, particularly since China announced the opening of a
base in Djibouti.
Piracy, and the broader strategic dynamics developing from it, meant that Seychelles was able to use
its strategic location to garner significant international support and strengthen its ties to key regional
and international actors. Once piracy was substantially contained from 2012, Seychelles had emerged
as one of the leading countries in the field of counter-piracy from the Western Indian Ocean, as a
reliable partner to international actors and as a significant voice in the broader maritime security
debate.
This status became evident when the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)
was in the process of identifying a chair for the group from the region, following the chairmanship of
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the European Union from 2012 to 2014. Seychelles volunteered for the position and its candidacy
was endorsed by consensus at the 17th plenary of the CGPCS. At this main multilateral mechanism
for steering and coordinating the global response to Somali piracy, Seychelles was trusted to chair
the upcoming plenaries, lead the international community in its efforts and ensure that a consensual
position was found among the over 80 participants in the group, including states and international
organizations. In its two years’ chairmanship Seychelles successfully negotiated the reform of the
group as well as the response to a spike of piracy incidents in early 2017.13 The chairmanship of the
CGPCS further enhanced Seychelles’ status as an important voice in maritime security affairs, and in
turn country representatives were invited to speak as experts on the subject at core international
diplomatic events, such as the 2015 and 2017 G7 High Level Meetings on Maritime Security, and the
2017 international Our Oceans conference organized by the EU.
Seychelles and Ocean Diplomacy
Maritime security is only one issue domain in which Seychelles has come to use its strategic location
as a core resource. In the discussion on the protection of ocean resources and their sustainable use,
Seychelles has achieved similar recognition and is recognized in particular as a leading advocate of
the concept of blue economy.
In the field of environmental diplomacy, Seychelles already had a significant track record. One
example is the country’s work in the International Whaling Commission. Soon after independence in
1979 Seychelles proposed turning the entire Indian Ocean into a sanctuary for whales, a proposal that
continues to be known among environmental policy experts as “the Seychelles proposal” (Holt 2009).
While ultimately not successful due to the resistance of major global powers, the proposal set the
foundation stone for the country’s diplomatic reputation in ocean governance.
In 2011 the Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to work on a blue economy campaign,
making it the core concept around which the country organized its foreign (ocean) policy. Blue
economy had started to feature as a core concept referring to the developmental and environmental
challenges linked to the oceans during the Rio+20 conference.14 The government made major efforts
to clarify the concept and advocated for its use internationally. A series of presentations on the blue
economy agenda were given at events, such as the 21st African Union Summit (May 2013), the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (June 2013), the 1st Indian Ocean Rim Association
for Regional Cooperation Economic and Business Conference (July 2013) and a meeting on the
African Integrated Maritime Strategy in the Seychelles (July 2013). The Seychelles organized a Blue
Economy Summit as part of the Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week in January 2014, the University of
Seychelles launched a Blue Economy Research Institute in March 2014, the government formed a
Ministry of Finance, Trade and the Blue Economy, and the country presented at an advocacy event
at Chatham House in London in June 2014. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a larger study on
the blue economy and made it available as a book, titled “The Blue Economy. Seychelles’ vision for
a blue horizon” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014), and the then president published an extended
book titled “Rethinking the Oceans. Towards the Blue Economy” (Michel 2016).
The Seychelles government used the concept as a tool to access the world political stages. As the
president phrased it:
“We have taken every opportunity to meet and to make representations to larger countries and
international bodies. Just as the Green Economy was previously introduced to the world agenda, we have
set ourselves the parallel task of bringing forward the Blue Economy. We are being remarkably successful
in doing so. As a result of our advocacy of the Blue Economy, Seychelles is being invited, more and
11
more, to share our thoughts at international conferences and political meetings. The rest of the world
wants to know more about the Blue Economy” (Michel 2016:xix).
As an outcome of the Seychelles agenda setting work, the blue economy was included as a core
concept in the African Union’s African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AU 2014) and by 2015 a
series of international reports affirmed the policy importance of the blue economy concept and also
referred to the Seychelles as a leading advocate and innovator in implementing blue economy
thinking.15 The concept and Seychelles’ advocacy work were also vital in organizing the coalition for
including an ocean goal in the Sustainable Development Goals, although that campaign was primarily
lead by the Pacific Islands (Quirk and Hanich 2016).
In summary, the country has built considerable expertise in ocean affairs and acted as a core
protagonist for new, blue economy thinking on the global political stages. Developing this concept
took place in parallel with a range of national projects, including the establishment of a Blue Economy
Research Institute, which launched the first massive open online course on the topic, as well as a
national Blue Economy Strategy organizing the government’s ocean and development policies and a
major Marine Spatial Planning Initiative re-organizing the Seychellois waters. These projects were
internationally recognized as important templates for blue economy policy and for realizing the
Sustainable Development Goal on the oceans. In consequence, Seychelles was seen as a major
international role model when the UN convened a major oceans conference in summer 2017 to discuss
the instruments required to realize the Sustainable Development Goal on the oceans (United Nations
2017).
Political culture: Creole policy-making
In what ways were diplomatic successes in the issue domains of maritime security and ocean
governance enabled by a particular political culture? Analyses of foreign policy and diplomacy often
tend to forget that diplomacy is not only dependent on resources and skills, but also on people and is
thus shaped by their country’s culture, experience and history.
Seychelles is a creole country. Before the French arrived the islands did not have inhabitants. The
French initially brought slave workers from the Eastern African coast. Slaves were traded as
individuals and not as groups and families, and hence they did not preserve their culture of origin.
With the abandonment of slavery, workers from across Asia also moved to the islands. While in other
creole islands, such as Mauritius, this led to distinct and separated (Indian) ethnicities, the small size
of Seychelles prevented such a development. In consequence, Seychelles culture is a mix of various
sources: French and British, African and Arab, Indian and other cultures form a unique creole mix.
This is most directly reflected in the Seychellois creole language, cuisine and music. Why and how
this matters for foreign policy is perhaps best highlighted by the following poem by former president
James Mancham:
‘This unique blend of races
Ambassador of all cultures
Mirror resplendent of all colours
The melting pot of ethnical prejudices
The fusion-spot of every civilization
You are a sample of the world to come…’16
As the poem indicates, for Seychellois, race, heritage, traditions and religions are not hindrances for
cooperation, but the sources of crafting innovative ways of working together. Creole identity has so
far primarily been analyzed by linguists and anthropologists, and has not yet featured as a factor in
12
diplomacy, despite the influence of culture and identity on diplomacy being well documented. We
take from the literature on creole culture the following two principles, which visibly shape foreign
policy:17
Firstly, a genuine openness to and appreciation of difference. Cultural differences and heterogeneity
are not seen as limitations, but as opportunities to combine and mix in order to create new ways of
thinking and moving forward. Secondly, as is particularly visible in the creole language, a thorough
pragmatist thinking style, which does not start from foundational principles and beliefs, but from
ideas of what works and what can be achieved. Considering these two principles, it is first of all not
surprising that the Seychelles has become a leader in the fields of maritime security and blue
economy, given that both policy fields are considered complex and heterogeneous, thus demanding
thinking outside the box (Bueger and Edmunds 2017). It is a creole attitude that allows for the
successful blending of the heterogeneous elements of both policy domains. The principles of
appreciating heterogeneity and pragmatism are moreover important and productive approaches to
multilateral diplomacy, where both can be tools to achieve consensus.
While the small capacity of the government of the Seychelles and the size of its foreign service might
be interpreted as weaknesses, they can also be understood as strengths. A small government advances
whole of government policies. In contrast to large state governments, for a country the size of
Seychelles it is easy to coordinate between ministries. With the ministries in close proximity and staff
moving regularly between ministries, more efficient means of communication can be achieved.
Administrative stovepipes and an overly bureaucratic culture can be avoided, and a quick flow of
information between ministries and departments is ensured. This is of particular importance when it
concerns cross-cutting issues such as poverty, sustainable development, maritime security or the blue
economy, which demand whole of government approaches.
Political strategy: Small and smart
The above analysis shows how Seychelles has acted ‘smart’ to maximize the benefits from its limited
resources. The government has successfully presented itself as part of the solution to problems such
as piracy or ocean development, as an advocate for compromises and an honest broker. While its
location as a microstate in the Indian Ocean with a strategic position between Africa and India makes
it highly vulnerable to great power meddling, the Seychelles has turned this location into a strength
by using its location as a starting point for presenting itself as a legitimate actor with regard to anti-
piracy and the blue economy. These were not agendas invented by the Seychelles, but agendas the
Seychelles has used to further its own policies by taking on a mediator role and proposing solutions
well within the discourses of stronger states. The pluralist and pragmatic Seychellois culture of
policy-making helped to underpin this diplomatic role.
The country has multiplied its diplomatic and informal networks through various international fora.
Like no other country in the region, the Seychelles is an active member of multiple international
organizations. In the region, it is notably part of the COMESA, SADC, IOC, AU and IORA. It also
plays a leading role in the more informal Small Island Developing States (SIDS) networks. This
multi-membership position combined with the creole identity of its diplomatic service allows the
country to act efficiently as a knowledge broker, and translate between discussions in these
international organizations and other multilateral settings.
13
Instead of entering any formal security alliances, Seychelles aims at maximizing the number of
partnerships with other countries, embracing a willingness to work with everyone. This guiding
principle is emphasized by the then minister of foreign affairs:
“The Seychelles government, since the time of the Cold War, has adopted the principle that all partners
willing to cooperate with Seychelles on an equal basis in terms of maritime security is welcome to do so.
Our maritime security is by definition one which is based on shared responsibility with neighboring
countries and on partnerships with countries that are able to deploy their maritime security capability in
our region. While Seychelles geostrategic position may make it a country that many wish to influence in
terms of maritime security – its openness and its principle of not favoring the interests of one partner
above another means that despite its small size, Seychelles is able to leverage support for wide-ranging
maritime security initiatives” (Adam 2014: 2).
In essence, this amounts to a hedging strategy, where the Seychelles seeks to increase its
independence and diplomatic action space by strengthening diplomatic, economic and even military
ties with a number of states rather than allying with one of them. As discussed above, Seychelles has
been quite successful in this strategy and has received strategic support from all major powers active
in the region without becoming reliant on any of them.
Breaking the glass ceiling? The limitations of Creole smart state policy
While its successes are remarkable and indeed surprising, the Creole smart policies of the Seychelles
also have limitations. One limitation is certainly administrative capacity. There is simply a limit to
how much you can do and how many negotiations you can be part of, let alone influence, with a
diplomatic staff of only 100 people. A second limitation is expertise. While the country has built
world-leading expertise in at least two major international fields (maritime security and blue
economy), this specialist knowledge is in the hands of few individuals, which prevents further sub-
specialization, and in many fields the country has to rely on external consultants and experts. Thirdly,
if the country pursues overt interest-driven policies rather than aiming at a brokering role, its position
can easily be ignored or sidelined. Finally, the success of Seychellois diplomacy depends on playing
within the confines of great power discourses and taking advantage of these in its own policy
proposals. Thus, the failure of the proposal to turn the entire Indian Ocean into a sanctuary for whales
was due to great power resistance, while the success of the anti-piracy and blue economy agendas
was a result of the Seychelles taking advantage of existing agendas and actively seeking to contribute
solutions to problems recognized by major powers.
5. Conclusion
The diplomatic work of Seychelles is a surprising success story. It clearly shows how and why
resources and capacity do not imply influence. Instead factors such as location, expertise, culture and
smart strategies make a major difference. A number of strategic ideas follow from our discussion.
These are of general relevance for small and microstates and hence, there is much to be learned from
the case of Seychelles.
Firstly, creole foreign policy allows for going beyond traditional divisions, emphasizing holistic
thinking as well as pragmatic problem solving. This is much needed in today’s diplomacy and global
governance. The creole tradition and way of thinking as well as Seychelles’ extra-ordinary status as
a member in a vast array of international organizations, provide ample opportunities for the country
to act as a mediator, facilitator and honest broker. Secondly, Seychelles became an important and
14
reliable partner of the international community. By being able to offer problem solutions and expertise
in its focal areas, the country could garner significant support, further networking opportunities and
achieve a unique status. Thirdly, by acting as an innovator and experimenting with new ways of
thinking, as exemplified in the story of the blue economy, the country could maximize its reputation,
but also influence the international debate on ocean governance.
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Endnotes
1 With the term ocean governance we refer to those institutions and fora in which international maritime policies
concerning security, economy, development, and environment are discussed. For a more extended discussion see
Bueger and Alcock (2018).
2 The term ”the Seychelles conference” was frequently mentioned in conversations one of the authors had with
diplomats that attended the event.
3 A detailed literature review revealed a number of studies in which Seychelles are one case among others including
Brewster (2014), Houbert (1992), Hastings (2011), Sellstrom (2015) and McDougall (2016). The colonial history and
early years of independence are analyzed in Scarr (1999).
4 CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/se.html (accessed April 13,
2018).
5 Data provided by The World Bank (2017), the number of diplomatic staff has been indicated in interviews with
Seychelles diplomats.
6 CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/se.html (accessed April 13,
2018).
7 See, e.g. Arter 2000; Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013; Björkdahl 2008; Bunse 2009; Grimaud 2018; Jakobsen 2009;
Panke 2015; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010.
8 Almezaini and Rickli 2017; Smed and Wivel 2017; Thorhallsson 2012; Veenendaal 2017.
9 Compare Seychelles News Agency. 2015.
http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/3263/Seychelles+moves+to+World+Banks+rich+list+as+income+per+
capita+increases
10 This was not least because the Chagos Islands were selected as the strategic site for a US presence (see Houbert
1992). For a history of naval presence in the Indian Ocean see Russell (2016).
11 Tanzania provided military assistance in setting up the Seychelles People Defense Forces, while Cuba continues to
provide particular assistance in the health sector today. The relation to Caribbean island states was primarily based on
cultural relations.
12 For a discussion of the relations between Russia and Seychelles see Muraviev (2011).
13 Compare the documentation on the CGPCS website at www.lessonsfrompiracy.net
14 Compare the summary in Seychelles Government 2014b.
15 See in particular EIU 2015, UNECA 2015, UNEP 2015, WWF 2015.
16 Cited after Scarr (1999:1).
17 E.g. Lionnet 2011.
