Content uploaded by Georges Romme
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Georges Romme on May 20, 2018
Content may be subject to copyright.
152
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
UNITED PEOPLE: DESIGNING A NEW MODEL OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
A. Georges L.
Romme1+
Christopher Ansell2
John Buck3
Younghoon Choi4
Rob van der Eyden5
Verónica Figueroa
Huencho6
Edwin John7
Tracy Kunkler8
Johanna Mair9
Albert Meijer10
Renate Meyer11
Karen Stephenson12
Liisa Välikangas13
Nathaniel
Whitestone14
Cordelia Yu15
1Professor of Entrepreneurship & Innovation, Eindhoven University of
Technology, Netherlands.
2Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, USA.
3GovernanceAlive & Center for Dynamic Community Governance, USA.
4Professor of Public Administration, Kwangwoon University, South-Korea.
5The Sociocracy Group, Netherlands.
6Professor & director of University of Chile’s School of Government &
Public Management, Chile.
7Neighborhood Community Network; initiator of Neighborhood Parliaments
project (India).
8Circle Forward Partners & Healthy Power Alliance, USA.
9Professor of Organization, Strategy & Leadership, Hertie School of
Governance, Germany.
10Professor of Public Innovation, Utrecht University, Netherlands.
11Professor of Organization Studies, WU Vienna, Austria.
12Cultural anthropologist, NetForm International, USA.
13Professor in Innovation Management, Aalto University and Hanken School
of Economics, Finland.
14Genius Engine & Healthy Power Alliance, UK.
15Content & Editorial Strategist, Taiwan/USA.
(+ Corresponding author)
ABSTRACT
Article History
Received: 25 April 2018
Revised: 14 May 2018
Accepted: 16 May 2018
Published: 18 May 2018
Keywords
Global governance
Idealized design
Circularity
Collaborative decision-making
Resilience
Informed consent
Human-driven changes on this planet have been giving rise to global warming, social
instability, civil wars, and acts of terrorism. The existing system of global governance
is not equipped to effectively address these enormous challenges. It is slow where one
must move quickly, favors bureaucracy and politics over authentic deliberations and
effective interventions, and caters to power-brokers and mega-corporations. The world
therefore needs a model of global governance that serves to make and implement
collectively binding decisions that acknowledge the interests of all those affected,
including future generations. This governance model must coordinate the work of great
(e.g. national) powers, and at the same time enable billions of people to bring their
intelligence and creativity to bear on these challenges. In many ways, the quest for a
Journal of Asian Scientific Research
ISSN(e): 2223-1331
ISSN(p): 2226-5724
DOI: 10.18488/journal.2.2018.84.152.170
Vol. 8, No. 4, 152-170
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
URL: www.aessweb.com
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
153
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
Grand challenge
United Nations
JEL Classification
O50; P40; P45.
new system of global governance is a grand societal challenge in itself. In this paper, we
draw on idealized design to develop an ideal model of global governance and explore
the collective search and experimentation efforts it implies. This so-called United
People (UP) model involves a circular hierarchy in which power and communication
flow in ways that help the global community to effectively address transnational
challenges and problems. It involves several, relatively small, governance bodies—
rather than a large parliamentary assembly that tends to cripple responsive decision-
making. The UP model also serves to effectively uncover and address power abuse,
simplify the financial household of global governance, and support systemic forms of
collaboration with NGOs and other organizations.
Contribution/ Originality: The paper‘s primary contribution is to develop a blueprint for one of the most
critical challenges the world is facing today: the current system of global governance (incl. United Nations) is not
equipped to handle major problems such as global warming, social instability, civil wars, and acts of terrorism.
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine
the rise of global collaborative governance networks that tap the wisdom of all the people on earth and
enable global cooperative solutions needed to address grand challenges. Also imagine these global networks being
connected to a small global governance body, rather than a large assembly that tends to cripple responsiveness and
decision-making. Each member of this body would be selected and appointed based on a track record of moral
leadership —guided by the good of all humankind rather than personal or national interests: think of people like Al
Gore, Angela Merkel, Fazle Hasan Abed, Juan Manuel Santos and Malala Yousafzai. This governance body would
make collectively binding decisions on global challenges such as climate change and civil wars. It would be
accountable to every person on earth, by means of communication channels that flow from the local to the global
level. And it would be able to activate knowledge distributed across the world to prepare decisions. What model of
global governance makes this possible? The United People (UP) model addresses this question. Human-driven
change transforms our lives and biosphere faster every year, bringing us tremendous wealth (in some parts of the
world), extended lifespans, and technological capabilities — but also giving rise to global warming, rapid
population growth, social instability, civil wars, and acts of terrorism. The existing system of global governance is
not equipped to effectively address these enormous challenges. It is slow where we must move quickly, favors
bureaucracy and politics over authentic deliberations and effective interventions, and caters to power-brokers and
mega-corporations. As a result, the current system for global governance system
fails
to live up to its own
standards and values (e.g. those expressed in UN Sustainable Development Goals).
We therefore need a model of global governance and collaborative problem solving, which serves to make and
implement collectively binding decisions that acknowledge the interests of all those affected, including future
generations. This governance model must coordinate the work of great (e.g. national) powers, and at the same time
enable billions of people to bring their intelligence and creativity to bear on these challenges.
In many ways, the quest for a new system of global governance is a grand challenge itself, requiring a collective
response of many actors interacting constructively over prolonged timespans. We address this challenge in this
paper by developing a blueprint of the ―ideal‖ target solution and outlining the collective search and
experimentation efforts it calls for. The method adopted to develop this proposal is also known as idealized design,
which implies one imagines what the ideal solution can be and then works backward to the situation today [1].
This is a way of thinking about complex problems that ensures one does not erect imaginary obstacles, before even
knowing what the ideal target solution is Romme [2]. The United People
(UP)
model draws on principles of value-
based and collaborative governance, authentic deliberation, informed consent, circularity of power, hierarchy,
heterarchy, transparency, and resilience. These principles serve to design a model that supports the learning cycle
of developing and implementing broad policy frameworks, within which local units meet goals by using their
discretion. The UP model involves a circular hierarchy in which power and communication flow in ways that help
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
154
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
the global community to effectively address transnational challenges and problems. It involves several, relatively
small, governance bodies—rather than a large parliamentary assembly that tends to cripple responsive decision-
making. A key element of the UP model is that decision-making bodies are double linked by way of both an
executive and a delegate connection. In this respect, the UP model serves to drastically simplify the infrastructure
for global governance, by creating a circular hierarchy that provides a maximum level of resilience and adaptability
in both policy making and executive processes. It provides a network of interlinked, relatively small bodies in which
authentic deliberation and value-based governance can take place without crippling delays and without key actors
secretly pursuing their own interests. The team of authors proposing the UP model in this article involves leading
professors as well as practitioners in the area of global governance, humanitarian aid, peace missions, innovation
management, leadership, systemic transformation, facilitation skills, and organization design.
2. DESCRIPTION OF MODEL
The prospects of life on our planet are not good, due to global warming, rapid population growth, civil wars
and acts of terrorism, growing inequalities between people, and extreme poverty in many parts of the world [3-5].
We therefore need new forms of governance which serve to make and implement collectively binding decisions that
acknowledge the interests of all those affected, including future generations [5]. The existing system for global
governance is not up to the task. As a result, grand challenges such as global warming are addressed via
multilateral negotiations, largely driven by the interests of powerful nations and/or multinational companies that
have become effectively stateless [6-9]. As a consequence, necessary interventions and actions are often taken too
late or not at all. Overall, the current global governance system fails to live up to its own values.
2.1. Key Principles Informing the Model
The UP model draws on the following set of principles:
- value-based governance: governance that serves the good of all humankind [10];
- collaborative governance: ways of collaborating (often enabled by digitalization) that allow for a high level of
autonomy, heterogeneity and geographical distribution [11-13];
- authentic deliberation: dialogue among (equivalent) decision-makers, who give one another reasons that are
mutually acceptable and generally accessible, to take decisions that are binding but open to be challenged in the
future [14, 15];
- informed consent: policy decisions are taken when there are no remaining paramount objections to the proposal;
‗paramount‘ here refers to a risk, danger or cost which the decision-makers cannot afford [16-20]; as such,
informed consent is fundamentally different from consensus and majority rule [21];
- circularity of power: collective responsibility to make policy decisions, implement them, and measure the outcomes
in ways that sustain effective policies and adapt (or eliminate) the ineffective ones [22-24];
- hierarchy and heterarchy: hierarchy is a cascading sequence of levels of accountability, involving different degrees of
abstraction, through which knowledge and information are filtered, transformed and communicated [25, 26];
when multiple hierarchies closely collaborate with each other, a heterarchy consisting of a network of at least
three (or more) separate hierarchies arises, each with its own raison d‘être; a heterarchy can accomplish a
collective good that is too complex for any hierarchy to effectively achieve on its own [27, 28];
- transparency: all citizens have full access to, and can actually digest, the documents and proceedings of governance
bodies, and they can predict the actions taken by public administrators accordingly [29, 30];
- resilience: the organizational capacity, rooted in a culture of awareness, to grasp and handle (early signals
regarding potential) crisis dynamics [31, 32].
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
155
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
These principles also reflect the complex challenges arising from transnational problems, involving many
different stakeholders and various sensitivities around representation and sovereignty. In this respect, an
experimentalist governance
perspective has been developed, involving the following cycle [33]:
Broad framework goals and provisional metrics. This step is about developing broad policy framework goals by a
central unit/body.
Local units use discretion to meet goals. Local units have the discretion to devise context-specific strategies to meet
the broad goals.
Information pooling - monitoring, evaluation and data tracking. The pooling of information from lower-level units.
Framework revision. Iterative learning, based on lessons learned at the local level, is critical.
This circular process, visualized in Figure 1, has been a critical success factor in addressing transnational problems
in the area of AIDS, ozone, fishing, and human rights [33-35]. Notably, the iterative nature of this process
enhances the adaptiveness and resilience of local units, whereas it maintains a basic hierarchy between bodies
deciding on broad (policy) frameworks and local units acting on and further shaping these frameworks. Moreover,
this governance process thrives on deliberation and reasoning, informed by provisional metrics and information
pooling, to revise and improve the framework over time.
Figure-1. The circular process of experimentalist governance
In the remainder of this proposal, we describe the UP model for making and implementing collectively binding
decisions on policy frameworks. This model is designed to fully exploit the circular process of experimentalist
governance.
2.2. The UP Model
In the UP model, various coalitions work together to address risks and opportunities of global significance.
These coalitions help shape, and are also coordinated through, broad (policy) frameworks for global action. These
frameworks are developed in a circular hierarchy orchestrated by a small group of moral leaders (in the so-called
UP Council), who are chosen by (up to) ten constituent councils created from self-organized networks of people and
nations. The UP Council and its Executive Board are the hub of a resilient system for setting and accomplishing
framework goals. Figure 2 provides an overview of the model.
Notably, the UP model differs fundamentally from models of world governance previously developed [36]
which all involve large assemblies made up of representatives from each nation, similar to the current UN General
Assembly. Instead, the UP model reflects the need for relatively small, mandated governance bodies, with the UP
Council as final authority in case of disputes and indecisiveness of other international bodies. To a large extent, the
model serves to merge the authority and functionality of the UN Security Council with those of the UN General
Assembly as well as high-level platforms like the NATO, G7 and G20.
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
156
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
A key element of the model is how decision-making bodies are connected by way of both an executive leader
(e.g. secretary-general, president) and a delegate link. Whereas the leaders have an executive responsibility in
managing a team and/or administrative organization, the chosen delegates and representatives have a pivotal role
in enabling and sustaining the cycle of iterative learning (described earlier).
Each arrow represents a person that is a member of both bodies connected by the arrow. Information and power thus flow in
both directions, safeguarded by two “linking pins” (e.g. between UP Council and each SC or TC). The UPC also includes the
Secretary-General and a representative from Executive Board. The UPC determines the total number of Frameworks as well
as the provisional goals and metrics for each Framework.
Figure-2. Overview of United People (UP) model
2.2.1. Policy-Making Bodies
The UP Council (UPC) is the final decision authority regarding all policy frameworks for transnational
problems and challenges which cannot be effectively handled at other (inter)national levels. The UPC has a
maximum of 22 members: 10 delegates and 10 presidents of constituent councils, as well as the secretary-general
and a representative from the Executive Board (explained later). The UPC makes policy decisions by informed
consent and delegates the execution of these decisions.
The UPC is created from up to 10 constituent councils. There are three requirements
that any qualifying body,
or group of bodies, must satisfy in order to form such a council:
1) Representing and/or Serving: the qualifying bodies forming a council must represent and/or serve a major part
of the world population (e.g. at least 500 million people).
2) Purpose and Scope: the council has the explicit purpose of promoting the good of humanity (incl. future
generations) and protecting and sustaining our biosphere.
3) Including Everyone and Everything: the entire set of councils connected to the UPC should together represent
the entire world population and cover the scope of all key global problems and challenges (cf. the current 17
UN Sustainable Development Goals).
The UP model assumes a maximum of 10 constituent councils, to prevent fragmentation, avoid the need for a
large assembly, and motivate nations and other stakeholders to develop critical mass in collaborative ties. The third
requirement implies these councils together need to represent the entire world and cover all key transnational
problems and challenges.
The primary responsibility of these councils is to identify and monitor global risks and opportunities which their
members assess as important or urgent. These councils have secondary responsibilities in raising funds from
members and providing a forum through which members may develop agreements on matters that do not require
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
157
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
global engagement. The deliberative function of these councils is guided by the good and equivalence of all human
beings associated with them. A council connected to the UPC can be supranational or thematic in nature.
A Supranational Council (SC) is the main general deliberative forum of a group of nations (such as European
Parliament) or a committee created by that forum (cf. European Commission). The EU is likely to constitute such
an SC, as is China with several partner countries, and so forth. Depending on the exact threshold defined in the first
requirement, 5 to 7 SCs will thus together be able to represent all nations.
The UP model avoids an exclusive focus on the nation-state as core mechanism. Therefore, other qualifying
organizations or networks can also be connected to the UPC, in the form of a Thematic Council (TC). Any TC
connected to the UPC must have a global thematic orientation.
For example, one TC can be created in the area of poverty, hunger, health and well-being (covering a
substantial number of the current UN Sustainable Development Goals). This TC would include representatives of
the largest NGOs in the area of medical and humanitarian aid, such as Red Cross, World Vision, and Doctors
Without Borders, as well as leading experts in this area (e.g. chosen by a qualifying body of academic institutions),
governmental agencies, and businesses. This TC may help coordinate humanitarian activities, similar to what the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs already does; in the UP model, this TC would also be able
to prepare and contribute to framework development via its president and delegate in the UPC.
Another TC would be in the area of Peace and Justice. This TC is likely to be formed by security-related
partnerships and military alliances, such as NATO, Islamic Military Alliance (IMA), and Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). Moreover, representatives of global networks focused on mediation, negotiation, and
restorative justice can also join this TC. Forming such a TC would be the first step toward well-coordinated
investments in military and peace forces across the globe. Moreover, this TC is connected via its president and
delegate to the UPC, and thus the latter can more easily and effectively make and implement decisions on policy
framework: for example, any UPC decision regarding a peace mission can be more effectively implemented, when
the president and delegate of the Peace & Justice TC were able to raise practical and other concerns in the
deliberations preceding this decision. Notably, some qualifying bodies, such as the EU, may have their own policy
development processes as well as executive bodies, to address international problems within their own domains.
This is beyond the scope of the UP model, which focuses on transnational problems and challenges that cannot be
exclusively addressed by other entities (e.g. climate change, civil wars, nuclear threats). Notably, the UP model
ensures the structural alignment of policy frameworks of supranational and thematic councils and those of the UPC.
It also fully respects the principle of subsidiarity [37] that is, the UPC only takes up and decides on a particular
framework or immediate crisis situation, if it cannot be handled by one of the TCs or SCs.
Overall, this part of the UP model invites and promotes global collaboration and alliance formation, in which any
established or newly formed collaborative entity can form an SC or TC. This process of creating collaborative
councils is open and context-specific, in the sense that each of these councils can be shaped in unique ways—as long
as it conforms to the three requirements defined earlier.
2.2.2. Executive Bodies
We now turn to the executive side of the model. This side of the model involves a highly adaptive structure,
including a single
Executive Board (EB)
led by the Secretary-General. The UPC will delegate most executive and
operational tasks to the EB, but it can also decide otherwise; for example, it can assign the implementation of a
particular policy decision to (the executive body of) one or more supranational or thematic councils.
The UPC appoints the Secretary-General (SG) to lead the Executive Board, and as such, the SG also joins the
UPC as the functional leader of UP‘s operations. The SG is selected and appointed from an external pool of
candidates; to avoid major conflicts of interest, this pool of candidates excludes all current members of UPC,
supranational councils and national governments. The UPC gives the SG the mandate to manage UP‘s executive
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
158
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
bodies by setting up administrative systems and processes that enable work within the frameworks authorized by
the UPC. As such, the SG is a key link between the UPC and the Executive Board. The UPC monitors all activities
conducted within the various frameworks (based on regular reports from the executive board) and, where needed, it
adapts frameworks or creates entirely new ones. The Executive Board helps set the agenda of UPC meetings and
supervises the work conducted within each framework established by the UPC. The EB also monitors the
operations within each framework and regularly submits framework reports to UPC. A key responsibility is to
maintain the broad and enabling role of each framework. The ‗circularity of power‘ principle implies that the
Executive Board also includes the coordinators of policy frameworks and representatives chosen by the
management teams (MTs) of these frameworks. The Framework Coordinators are appointed by the UPC and each
Framework MT chooses its representative in the executive board. Evidently, the position of representative (in
short: rep) cannot be combined with that of Coordinator.
The size of the EB thus depends on the number of policy frameworks established by the UPC: for example, if 6
frameworks and their management teams are created, the EB is composed of 13 people, including the SG. In this
respect, the EB may assign more than one top-level goal to a framework MT; for example, several of the 17 UN
Sustainable Development Goals, defined in 2016, might be combined and assigned to a single framework and its
MT. The main task of each Framework MT is to sustain broad framework goals that provide sufficient levels of
discretion in local units, pool information from various sources, and sustain iterative learning to improve the initial
framework. Proposed changes in framework goals and metrics are first discussed by the EB, and then submitted to
the UPC. In addition, anyone outside these executive bodies can raise ideas and develop proposals for revising
frameworks or developing entirely new ones.
2.2.3. Overview of Model
In term of the trias politica, the UP model outlined thus far focuses on the legislative and executive powers at
the global level. The third branch of the trias politica is the judiciary one. In the current system, this is the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), informally also known as the World Court. The UP model does not imply any
major changes for the position of the ICJ.
Overall, the UP model provides a system for making collectively binding decisions that take into account the
interests of all those affected, by systematically engaging the intelligence and creativity distributed over the large
number of human beings and their organizations on this planet [4]. Moreover, this governance system also serves
to signal and address problems at the level where they arise and/or are most pressing. By consequence, more local
problems are addressed at other levels ─ within the boundaries of any relevant laws and policies set at the UP level.
Only truly global challenges like climate change, extreme poverty and terrorism are addressed by the UPC.
Figure 2 provides a visual image of the entire model. The UP model drastically simplifies the infrastructure for
global governance, in the form of a circular hierarchy that provides a maximum level of resilience and adaptability
in both policy making and executive processes. It provides a network of interlinked, relatively small bodies in which
authentic deliberation and value-based governance can take place without crippling delays and without key actors
being able to secretly pursue national interests.
2.3. Financial and Other Resources
The UP model does, initially, not imply any substantial changes in the way the United Nations is currently
funded. Any country that wants to operate under the protection of the UP and have access to its resources, makes a
financial contribution based on its capacity to pay (largely determined by GNP). Once 5 to 7 Supranational Councils
are formed, the funding of the UPC and its executive and support staff can shift to these SCs, and to a lesser extent
the TCs: for example, assuming the EU would constitute an SC, the EU then contributes an annual fee to the UP.
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
159
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
In any case, the UP Council decides how much money each nation (in first scenario) or each SC (in second
scenario) must pay. The double links between the UPC and each SC safeguard a sufficient level of commitment to
these financial arrangements.
Of course, the second scenario is strongly preferred: the SCs fund all UP‘s operations, in addition to these SCs
(possibly) also developing and funding their own framework activities. In addition, TCs offer complementary
resources and capabilities that extend many local activities initiated by UP. This approach is also likely to motivate
problem solving at more local levels, involving pilot projects set up around particular issues such as community
finance, education, and regional water management, with local funds invested in local initiatives. Activities funded
by UP then complement local initiatives or focus on those areas where funds and other resources are absent.
In addition, the UP can draw on various kinds of other (incl. human) resources, for example, those made
available by international medical and/or humanitarian organizations and other NGOs; these organizations clearly
have a substantial capacity in voluntarily pledging resources, which lessens the need to fund activities via
contributions from the SCs. Therefore, the UP model serves to substantially improve the access to, and alignment
with, these resources: this is, for example, the case when all globally operating humanitarian and medical NGOs
participate in a Thematic Council connected to the UP Council.
In a similar way, the access to and coordination of military and related resources will be greatly improved if an
inclusive Thematic Council is formed by all security-related partnerships and alliances (NATO, IMA, CSTO, and so
forth). Evidently, inclusiveness is a key requirement for connecting this SC to the UP Council. Such a world -wide
collaboration on the military front might substantially reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict escalation, and
over time help to put an end to the arms race.
2.4. E-Democracy and Civil Participation
The UP model serves to downsize the global governance system to a substantially smaller number of people
and bodies, responsible for developing and implementing broad enabling frameworks. This opens up many
opportunities to tap into the distributed intelligence and expertise available in various national and regional
contexts as well as the numerous pluricentric governance networks that have emerged in the US, Asia, Europe and
elsewhere [13, 38-40]. Especially the rise of the internet now enables many people around the world to
communicate ideas and observations to other people as well as governance bodies.
The rise of digital networks and, subsequently, networked organizations raises enormous challenges for
established public governance systems based on the principle of formal representation. While a few movements,
such as the Pirate Party in Germany, Podemos in Spain, and the Net Party of Argentina have been experimenting
with tools like ―liquid democracy‖, and reformers in Iceland crowdsourced ideas for their new Constitution, few of
these movements have managed to convert digitally-enabled forms of mass engagement into structural changes
[41]. These new forms of participation have typically been restricted ―to the digital equivalent of suggestion boxes
(...), or to the management of small crumbs of public expenditures‖ [41].
An exceptional case is Taiwan, where about 2000 citizens collaborated to write new legislation via a well-
structured process involving crowd-sourcing of ideas, public surveys and online and in-person meetings [42]. This
example demonstrates that it is possible to redesign how large numbers of people give input on complex policy
challenges, how democratic bodies listen to this input, and then produce high-quality policy decisions [41]. So-
called facilitators, who provide information to citizens and actively seek broad engagement and input, have been
essential to Taiwan‘s success in e-democracy. For the UP model, the implication is that anyone in the world should
be able to identify a transnational problem and/or initiate the process of developing collaborative policy proposals.
This requires an online platform (incl. facilitators), to be set up and maintained by the UP. On this platform, UP‘s
key role is to facilitate the discourse around ideas and proposals, and connect the outcomes (regarding entirely new
issues or problems within existing frameworks) to the agenda of the appropriate body.
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
160
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
Figure 3 shows that the participatory process of generating ideas and proposals is a two-way process. Bodies
such as the UNC and Executive Board can call for a global online discourse on any particular problem. But, any
group of individuals, collaborative network or other actor can also initiate such a process, based on their own initial
definition of the problem [43].
Figure-3. Overview of process of framework development & revision
Notably, Figure 3 also visualizes how the circular governance model enables information flows and thereby the
process of iterative learning. In this respect, the model is designed to facilitate information flows regarding
framework goals and metrics as well as various implementation issues. A similar approach to circular management
has been tested in hundreds of companies and other organizations [18, 24, 44].
2.5. Functions, Responsibilities and Mandates
The current landscape of global governance includes the UN General Assembly, Security Council, Economic
and Social Council, (defunct) Trustee Council, International Court of Justice, as well as many other bodies and
platforms such as the G20, G7 and NATO [9]. The UP model serves to simplify this complex landscape of global
institutions and platforms, by creating a circular flow of power and information. More specifically, the model
involves several, relatively small, bodies for policy making at the supranational and global levels. The central body
at the global level is the UP Council, composed of (max) 22 people. The UPC also directly monitors UP‘s executive
branch, designed as a resilient corporate structure. The remainder of this section outlines the functions,
responsibilities and mandates of each key body in UP model.
UP Council (UPC)
● Function: main deliberative council of United People (UP) at global level. Its deliberative function is guided
by the good of all humankind and by respect for the equivalence of all human beings. The UPC meets
every two weeks, but emergency sessions can be called; the UPC can make decisions asynchronously (vi a a
digital platform), if needed. Decisions are taken by informed consent of each member. In the unlikely case
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
161
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
of a fundamental dispute inside the UPC, it draws on an arbitration committee (consisting of two former
UPC members and two outsiders) to resolve the issue. The UPC appoints the four members of this
committee, each for a term of 6 years.
● Responsibility: promote global co-operation, create and maintain the international order, and address
transnational problems that cannot be addressed elsewhere. A key responsibility of UPC is to develop
frameworks that are broad and enabling. The rep from the EB has a critical role here, one that
complements the executive role of the secretary-general.
● Mandate: final decisions on broad (enabling) policy frameworks. In addition, the UPC monitors the work
conducted within each framework and decides on proposed changes in any deficient framework. A key
framework is in the area of Peace & Justice, in which the EB (and MT of this framework) gets a mandate to
intervene in settings where peace, justice and security are at stake. In addition, the UPC also has the
mandate regarding any incidental missions or interventions, in cases not foreseen in this particular
framework.
Supranational Council (SC) and Thematic Council (TC)
● Function: main deliberative council of a group of people, nations or organizations. In order to be entitled to
be connected to the UPC, the SC or TC has to represent or affect a major part of the world population (the
UPC determines the exact threshold). Its deliberative function is guided by the good and equivalence of all
human beings represented or served by the council. The council meets at least six times per year, but
emergency sessions can also be called.
● Responsibility: promote international cooperation, create and maintain peace and order, and address and
solve transnational problems. At the global level, a TC or SC has a key responsibility in identifying and
monitoring global risks and opportunities. SCs and TCs also enable and sustain the cycle of iterative
learning about policy frameworks, including the alignment with UPC frameworks; here, the council‘s
president and delegate have a critical role as linking pins to the UPC.
● Mandate: the SC or TC can develop and implement its own policy frameworks, within any UPC
frameworks in the same policy domain. An SC typically establishes its own executive body (this is outside
scope of this proposal); a TC typically coordinates the activities of member organizations that run their
own operations. If an SC or TC fails to address a particular transnational problem, the mandate to decide
on this problem shifts to the UPC.
Executive Board (EB)
● Function: UP‘s key executive body, led by the secretary-general (SG). The EB meets on a weekly basis, but
additional (e.g. emergency) meetings can be arranged almost immediately. The EB can also decide
asynchronously (via a digital platform), for example on issues that require minimal discussion.
Responsibility: the EB helps set the agenda of UPC and supervises the work conducted within each
Framework established by UPC. The EB also monitors the operations within each framework and
regularly submits framework reports to UPC. A key responsibility is to maintain the broad and enabling
role of the frameworks; this is a responsibility shared by the entire EB, but the reps from the MTs have a
pivotal role here.
● Mandate: publish the decisions/frameworks established by UPC. Decide on provisional metrics for each
framework. Nominate candidates (to UPC) for Framework Coordinator vacancies. Appoint the heads of
peacekeeping operations and other missions. Supervise activities within each framework. In addition,
implement any incidental (e.g. peace) missions or interventions.
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
162
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
Framework Management Team (MT)
● Function: operational management of a framework established by the UPC.
● Responsibility: guide and support the work conducted within the framework by local units. Maintain the
broad and enabling role of the framework; this is a responsibility of the entire MT, but the role of the rep
(who is also a member of EB) is especially critical here.
● Mandate: develop proposals for (changing) the provisional metrics with which the framework is monitored.
Allocate resources to local units. Specifically, the MT of the Peace & Justice framework supports the work
conducted by peace missions and other local units operating within this framework; this MT can also
support any incidental peace missions or similar interventions that are authorized by UPC and then
implemented by EB.
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
● Function: primary judicial organ at the global level, composed of 15 judges. The UP Council appoints these
judges, with informed consent of all its members.
● Responsibility: the ICJ's primary responsibility is to adjudicate disputes among states (e.g. regarding war
crimes, illegal state interference, ethnic cleansing) as well as complaints filed against the UNC (e.g. by
individual citizens or national governments). Other bodies can call upon the ICJ to provide advisory
opinions.
● Mandate: ICJ‘s mandate largely remains as it is (http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage) also in view of Trias
Politica.
The democratic legitimacy of the UP model depends, to a large extent, on how people get elected to join the UP
Council, as the key body at the global level, or are appointed at any of the executive positions. The key decision rule
here is informed consent. The roles of the reps are complementary to the executive roles of the SG and framework
coordinator, as explained earlier: the reps have a pivotal role in enabling and sustaining the cycle of iterative
learning. Notably, all appointments are for a term of (maximum) two years, with the opportunity to re-appoint
someone in the same position twice. All people are appointed as member of a particular body (incl. any specific roles
such as SG) by way of an open discussion, resulting in a decision by informed consent. Some general rules and
procedures for appointing people are:
● Members of all bodies are appointed by way of an open discussion in the body authorized to appoint
these members, resulting in a decision by informed consent; starting point of this discussion is an
online pool of candidates, to which anyone in the world can contribute by nominating and/or endorsing
candidates.
● Each body appoints its own chairperson and secretary, by informed consent of all its members; the
chair has a key role in facilitating meetings and needs to have proper skills in decision-making based
on informed consent.
● Members of all bodies are appointed for a term of two years, with up to two opportunities for re-
appointment; thus, anyone can fulfill a particular position for maximum period of six years; only
members of the arbitration committee (see UPC‘s function above) are appointed for a term of six
years.
● The roles of president and delegate of an SC or TC cannot be combined in a single person, be fulfilled
by citizens from the same country, or combined with any other political or executive position at the
national or international level.
● The roles of secretary-general and EB representative (in UPC) are incompatible, as are the roles of
Framework Coordinator and MT‘s representative in EB.
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
163
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
2.6. Creating Momentum
The UP model involves an idealized design that invites and enables learning and evolution over time [45]. In
this respect, many attempts to renew public governance practices fail, due to the short-term realism prevailing in
most political settings [46-48]. Ansell [16] thus recommends a pragmatic and experimentalist approach to consent-
based dialogue and collaboration, involving a long-term effort of all stakeholders to build awareness, skills and
knowledge. This approach calls for many distributed experiments and pilot projects in which solutions are tested,
improved and adapted to local customs and cultures. These experiments and pilots serve to create momentum
toward the UP model —probably also redefining it along the way.
The portfolio of effective governance practices, within the envelope of a newly emerging global order, would
thus consist of practices at the local, regional, national and supranational levels. To codify these practices and
promote learning in this area, an open-source (wikipedia-like) system is needed. This open source-system will include
studies of governance practices (at all levels) and manuals and guidelines for decision-making, public accountability,
circularity of power, and so forth.
Several additional strategies help to create momentum. First, storytelling is pivotal in digital as well as face-to-
face settings, and therefore critical to any effort to create momentum and transformation. That is, all
communication about the UP model needs to be honest, personalized and visionary, expressing the ‗heart and soul‘
of the endeavor. This is best achieved by delivering clear, concise and relevant stories. Second, social media efforts
will enhance the collective intelligence emerging from collaborative efforts and the various partnerships to be
developed.
Moreover, there are various ways to try out and demonstrate key elements of the model. Any existing body of
the United Nations, or one of its stakeholders, can seek to pilot test (elements of) the UP model. For example, one
can:
● try out the decision rule of informed consent in various policy committees and/or executive bodies, to
explore how this decision approach creates inclusiveness and commitment, and thus enhances
decision-making capacity and effectiveness;
● experiment with the ‗double linking‘ between the UN and other international bodies (as potential
Supranational Councils), such as the EU; for example, the European Commission could be linked to
the UN via the EU President (who would join meetings at the UN as an advisor) and the UN would
appoint an ―UN Emissary‖ to the European Parliament (acting as an advisor there);
● apply the proposed mechanisms of experimentalist governance and public consultation (similar to the
Taiwan case) in developing a new framework regarding, for example, the challenges arising from
migration and refugee movements in several parts of the world; as such, a well-structured process
involving crowd-sourcing of ideas, public surveys, and online as well as face-to-face meetings will
serve to develop ideas and, ultimately, a proposal for a new framework in this area;
● use a similar approach in redesigning the UN system, by rewriting the UN Charter in a new UP
Charter; this big challenge is also best addressed by means of globally crowd-sourcing of ideas, public
surveys, and online as well as face-to-face meetings; the UN Assembly can initiate this process, but it
can also be designed and carried by any self-organized group of world citizens.
The UP model focuses on global governance. To mobilize the full potential of the model, global and local
governance need to be systemically connected. This can be done by introducing similar structures and approaches
in neighborhoods, cities, regions and nations.
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
164
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
3. ASSESSMENT OF THE UP MODEL
This section assesses how the UP model meets various criteria in the area of: core values, decision-making
capacity, effectiveness, resources and financing, trust and insight, flexibility, protection against abuse of power, and
accountability.
3.1. Core Values
Value-based governance is at the heart of the model that is firmly grounded on human dignity and equivalence; in
this model, linkages between relatively small councils and other bodies as well as decision-making by informed
consent serve to avoid the win-lose dynamics of large-scale elections and parliamentary bodies [18, 24, 49].
The model is also designed to suppress the widespread tendency (among politicians) to act in self-serving ways,
rather than in the interest of all humankind. Notably, the UP model serves to contain any national or regional
interests at their own level. That is, the SC‘s delegate and president joining the UP Council may seek to pursue the
interests of their SC‘s stakeholders, but in doing so are constrained by the decision rule of informed consent, which
enables other members of the UP Council to correct any self-serving initiatives.
As such, the UP model transforms the United Nations into a role model and benchmark for value-based
governance, which may inspire stakeholders at for example municipal, regional and national levels to adopt similar
governance practices.
3.2. Decision-Making Capacity
The model involves a circular hierarchy made up of relatively small decision-making bodies, double linked to
each other. The broad experience with a similar system in the corporate world suggests that delays and veto power
are not inhibiting any decisions, because authentic deliberation, circularity, and policy decision-making by informed
consent effectively enable each unit to make, implement and monitor decisions that are binding and consistent with
higher-level rules and policies [18, 24, 44].
Notably, only decisions on policy frameworks are made by informed consent, especially in the UP Council.
These frameworks entail broad goals and provisional metrics, to provide sufficient discretion for Framework
coordinators as well as leaders of operational units to decide on various implementation issues. As such, the
decision-making speed and responsiveness of local units is high, because they operate within broad frameworks that
are designed to enable flexibility and improvisation at the local level.
The risk that decisions on necessary interventions and actions are not taken, or are taken too late, can be
substantially reduced by establishing additional rules, such as: if a body does not take a decision by consent, after
deliberating up to a maximum of x (e.g. three) meetings on a particular proposal, then the authority to decide on it
moves to the next higher body. These rules appear to enhance the decisiveness of a decision-making body, because
participants strongly prefer that the authority to decide on a particular topic does not move elsewhere; that is, these
additional rules do not motivate participants to shift the responsibility upward [23, 50, 51]. In our model, only the
UP Council is not connected to a ―higher‖ body, which makes it so important that the UPC is composed of a
relatively small number of moral leaders that take decisions — even when the problem at hand is politically highly
sensitive. In the unlikely case of a fundamental dispute within the UPC, the decision authority on that particular
issue shifts to an arbitration committee (consisting of two former UPC members and two external people). This is
another safeguard of the decision-making capacity of the UP governance model.
3.3. Effectiveness
The capability to handle global challenges and risks is maximized, due to the circular flow of power,
communication and expertise. Moreover, the circular nature of the governance model implies that policy
frameworks are democratically legitimate as well as collectively binding. These broad, enabling frameworks are in
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
165
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
line with recent insights arising from studies of experimentalist governance [33-35]. That is, these frameworks enable
provisional metrics, afford discretion to local units, and enhance iterative learning and framework revision. We
illustrate the effectiveness of our model by exploring two current examples of the dysfunctionality of the existing
UN system: the Syrian civil war and the global challenges arising from climate change; the former is a ―local‖ issue
that ideally needs to be resolved locally, whereas the latter is a global problem requiring a global framework.
In case of the Syrian civil war, the UN Security Council has thus far been unable to intervene, which has shifted
the problem to various coalitions acting without any legal legitimacy. In the UP model, the Syrian civil war would
initially have to be addressed at the level of the most relevant Supranational Council. That is, this SC can decide on
an intervention in the armed conflict in Syria, and implement these actions accordingly. If this SC fails to agree on
such an intervention, the decision authority shifts to the UP Council. The UPC can then take action, by using either
the existing Peace & Justice framework (and the resources this framework coordinator has access to) or agree on a
set of interventions if such a framework does not exist. In any case, the resulting intervention in Syria would then
be completely legitimate in terms of international law, and is also likely to be effective if the leadership of the
mission is given sufficient discretion to take the necessary actions and improvise where needed.
The other example is UN‘s ongoing struggle to come to a global, collectively binding agreement on policies
addressing climate change; the preliminary result is the Paris Agreement in which 195 countries in 2015 agreed to a
global action plan. The ratification process is currently ongoing, and still far from complete; moreover, the US
recently chose to withdraw from their initial signature. In the UP model, any (continued) program addressing
climate change will very likely benefit from the new top structure at the global level. The UP Council is not directly
coupled to any national interests; that is, the entire membership of the UPC involves delegates and presidents of
SCs or TCs that are not directly coupled to any national or industrial interests. Thus, each SC/TC draws on its
collective wisdom, safeguarded in the process of decision-making by consent, to choose a president and a delegate
who are guided by the good of all humankind. Moreover, the distributed structure of global policy making,
visualized in Figure 2, also explicitly allows for different (sub)continental climate agreements, embedded in a
broader agreement at the global level. The UPC would then decide on a framework similar to the Paris Agreement
(collectively binding for all nations) but also enable, for example, the EU to agree on an additional framework. The
latter framework may be much more ambitious in terms of targets for mitigation, adaptation and finance of
greenhouse gas emissions.
3.4. Resources and Financing
As explained earlier, the UP model does not imply any direct changes in the way the United Nations is
currently funded: nations pay a financial contribution based on their capacity to pay. But, once SCs have been
formed, the funding of the UP can shift to the SCs. This obviously would enormously simplify the financial
household of the United Nations. We have also argued that these financial arrangements will enhance problem
solving at more local levels. That is, UPC‘s frameworks need to focus on complementing local initiatives, or on
areas and problems where funds and other resources are absent.
In addition, the UP model implies that global governance bodies have better access to various kinds of other
resources. For example, the resources of globally operating NGOs in the area of medical and humanitarian aid, or
those of security-related partnerships and military alliances. As we have explained in the Model section, the UP
model promotes and enables a global process of collaboration and alliance formation and demotivates competition
and collusion between national governments, corporations, NGOs and other stakeholders.
3.5. Trust and Insight
A global governance institution that seeks to be transparent and trustworthy must enable all citizens of the
world to fully access, and actually digest, its documents and proceedings. Moreover, based on this information, they
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
166
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
should be able to predict the actions taken by public administrators. Rather than merely (rhetorically) subscribing
to the principle of transparency, the UP model creates internal conditions and roles (e.g. of delegates and
representatives) that enhance authentic deliberation and open governance as well as promote whistleblowing [16,
24]. In this respect, power and information flow in a circular manner, which safeguards the transparency and
accountability of one body toward another. Notably, if this internal transparency is not present, it is impossible to
be trustworthy and transparent for more distant stakeholders. For example, the city council in a Dutch municipality
first improved the internal transparency of its policy development processes, before it opened and transformed these
processes by continually engaging and consulting a large number of citizens [52].
In this respect, the model draws on deep insight into power structures, arising from the sociocratic governance
model [18, 24, 44]. It also benefits from the available expertise in creating consent-based organizations that are
fully transparent as well as experiences in developing local and regional collaborative entities, based on the
principles outlined earlier.
3.6. Flexibility
Linkages between national, supranational and global governance bodies tend to be highly inflexible and
complex [9]. Instead, the model we propose is rather straightforward, highly resilient, and adaptive. Large
parliamentary bodies are absent from the model. Instead, the model entails a set of decision-making bodies that are
systemically connected by way of executive and representative linkages, with each body having a clearly defined
function and mandate.
In this respect, the UP model is highly flexible, because each of its components can be eliminated, redesigned or
adapted without substantial impact on the rest of the system [26]. This flexibility arises from each body being
linked to another level via only two connections: the executive and representative/delegate link (see also Figure 2).
For example, the UP Council and Executive Board can thus respond quickly to any crisis situation, enabled by one
of the current Frameworks (established by the UPC) or by taking a new initiative. A Supranational or Thematic
Council can signal any new global risks, and have its delegate in the UPC put it on UPC‘s agenda. All these agenda
setting and decision-making processes involve very short cycles; in the case of an emergency situation, as short as a
few days (or even hours).
Finally, regarding policy development, the UPC only has a mandate to establish frameworks in terms of broad
(enabling) goals and provisional metrics. This enables local units to use their discretion and devise context-specific
strategies and measures. The flexibility of local units is thus maximized, to be able to respond to unexpected
situations and improvise where necessary.
3.7. Protection against Abuse of Power
The UP model involves a circular hierarchy with the structural reflexivity that is missing in many public
governance settings. In the absence of circularity of power, people at key political and executive positions easily
become ‗prisoners‘ of their positions. By creating a system of double-linked councils and executive units, the
communication flow cannot be monopolized by anyone, such as the secretary-general or presidents of Supranational
or Thematic Councils: they are all embedded in a continual process of checks and balances. Evidently, if this new model
of global governance has been embraced and tested, it also needs to be safeguarded in a new UP Charter or major
changes in the current UN Charter.
Although no governance model can fully eradicate the abuse of power, the UP model does provide conditions in
which (early signals of) such an abuse are quickly picked up and addressed. In this respect, studies of circularity of
power provide various examples of how whistleblowing in corporate as well as public governance settings become an
entirely legitimate component of the dialogical processes informing policy decisions taken by informed consent [23,
24, 52]. In this respect, the power of argument prevails over the power of rank and position. Consequently,
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
167
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
opposition and counter-argumentation are key mechanisms in improving the quality of policy decisions and thereby
the effectiveness and resilience of the entire governance system.
3.8. Accountability
The UP model embraces the experimentalist governance perspective, so that the plurality of stakeholders at
local levels and the various sensitivities around representation and sovereignty can be addressed in ways that fit the
local institutional and cultural setting. Individual people, civic movements and national governments can hold the
UP Council (indirectly) accountable via the Supranational or Thematic Councils they are associated with. These
councils more directly hold the UP Council accountable, via their delegates in the UPC. In a more formal manner,
legal complaints against decisions of the UPC can be filed at the International Court of Justice.
But most importantly, the direct engagement of various stakeholders in UP governance enables both
transparency and accountability. In this respect, the UP model involves an online platform (incl. facilitators), to be
set up and maintained by the Executive Board. This platform enables a global discourse around current and
emerging challenges and risks, and connects it to the agenda of the appropriate body; Figure 3 provides an
overview.
Moreover, the UP model is characterized by subsidiarity [37] that is, challenges and issues are handled at the
level that is consistent with their resolution. Therefore, the UP Council only takes up and decides on a particular
policy framework or immediate crisis situation, if it cannot be handled at a more local level (e.g. region, nation, or
supranational/thematic council. In the former case, the UP Council provides support to actors at all levels, through
the measures and resources implied by the framework.
4. CONCLUSION
The existing system of global governance is not equipped to effectively address challenges such as global
warming, rapid population growth, social instability, civil wars, and acts of terrorism. We therefore need a new
model of global governance and collaborative problem solving. The United People model developed in this paper
provides a blueprint of an ideal target solution. The UP
model draws on principles such as value-based governance,
authentic deliberation, informed consent, circularity of power, transparency, and resilience. These principles served
to design a model that supports the learning cycle of developing and implementing broad policy frameworks, within
which local units meet goals by using their discretion. The UP model involves a circular hierarchy in which power
and communication flow in ways that help the global community to effectively address transnational challenges and
problems. It involves several, relatively small, governance bodies—rather than a large parliamentary assembly that
tends to cripple responsive decision-making.
The key body at the global level is the United People Council (UPC), composed of 22 people. The UPC directly
monitors its executive operations, designed as a resilient corporate structure (led by UP's secretary-general). The
members of the UPC are elected by supranational and thematic councils that are formed by nations, civic
movements, or networks of organizations. Up to 10 of these supranational and thematic councils are connected to
the UPC. The primary responsibility of these councils is to identify and monitor global risks and opportunities. As
such, the UP model invites and promotes a global process of collaboration and alliance formation in which any
established or newly formed entity (incl. nations, NGOs, civic movements) can build collaborative ties and form a
council. This process of creating collaborative councils is open and context-specific, in the sense that each of these
councils can be shaped in unique ways.
A key element of the UP model is that decision-making bodies are double linked by way of both an executive
and a delegate connection. Executives
have a key responsibility in initiating and supporting operational activities
within the policy frameworks established by the UP Council. By contrast, delegates
and representatives have a
pivotal role in enabling and monitoring the learning cycle of global governance. In this respect, the UP model
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
168
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
drastically simplifies the infrastructure for global governance, by creating a circular hierarchy that provides a
maximum level of resilience and adaptability in both policy making and executive processes. It provides a network
of interlinked, relatively small bodies in which authentic deliberation and value-based governance can take place
without crippling delays and without key actors secretly pursuing their own interests.
All appointments are for a maximum term of two years, with the opportunity to re-appoint someone in the
same position twice. All people are appointed via an open discussion, resulting in a decision by
informed consent,
rather than consensus or majority rule. Overall, the UP model appears to provide decision-making capacity without
crippling delays; ensures effective implementation of decisions; involves a circular hierarchy in which power abuse is
quickly uncovered and addressed; includes the power to hold decision-makers accountable; enormously simplifies
the financial household of global governance; and enables more systemic forms of collaboration with NGOs and
other organizations that have substantial resources.
Most attempts to renew public governance practices fail due to short-term realism and opportunism. Any
attempt to re-design global governance therefore requires a
long-term effort in building awareness, skills and
knowledge, as well as many distributed experiments and pilot projects in which new governance approaches are
tested, improved and adapted. This collective effort allows stakeholders to interact and engage in multiple
experiments, inspired by the UP model. Moreover, this approach serves to create momentum toward a new
governance system that can redefine itself along the way. An open-source system that reports findings from pilot
projects and studies of changes in governance practices can be a key driver of this collective effort.
Funding: This study received no specific financial support.
Competing Interests: The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Contributors/Acknowledgement: All authors contributed to this study. More background information on the UP
model is available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324747314_Appendix_to_United_People
REFERENCES
[1] R. L. Ackoff, J. Magidson, and H. J. Addison, Idealized design: How to dissolve tomorrow’s crisis today. San Francisco, CA:
Wharton School Publishing, 2006.
[2] A. G. L. Romme, "Action research, emancipation and design thinking," Journal of Community and Applied Social
Psychology, vol. 14, pp. 495-499, 2004. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[3] OECD, Bridging the gap: Inclusive growth 2017 update report. Paris: OECD, 2017.
[4] G. Shkliarevsky, "Rethinking democracy: A systems perspective on the global unrest," Systems Research and Behavioral
Science, vol. 33, pp. 452–470, 2016. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[5] L. Szombatfalvy, The greatest challenges of our time. Stockholm: Ekerlids, 2010.
[6] M. Barnett, Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
[7] P. Khanna and D. Francis, "These 25 companies are more powerful than many countries," Foreign Policy, vol. 15, 2016.
View at Google Scholar
[8] M. Lipson, "Peacekeeping: Organized hypocrisy?," European Journal of International Relations, vol. 13, pp. 5-34, 2007.
View at Google Scholar
[9] M. Jiborn and F. Tersman, The current shape of global governance – a look inside the UN structure. In: Leyre, J. (ed.),
Remodelling global cooperation: Global challenges quarterly risk report. Stockholm: Global Challenges Foundation, 2016.
[10] D. Gauthier, Morals by agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
[11] C. Ansell and A. Gash, "Collaborative governance in theory and practice," Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, vol. 18, pp. 543-571, 2008. View at Google Scholar
[12] K. Emerson, T. Nabatchi, and S. Balogh, "An integrative framework for collaborative governance," Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, vol. 22, pp. 1-29, 2011. View at Publisher
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
169
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
[13] K. Stephenson, Rethinking governance: Conceptualizing networks and their implications for new mechanisms of governance
based on reciprocity. In: T. Williamson (ed.), The handbook of knowledge-based policing: Current conceptions and future
directions. San Francisco, CA: Wiley, 2008.
[14] J. Bessette, The mild voice of reason: Deliberative democracy & american national government. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994.
[15] A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Why deliberative democracy? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
[16] C. K. Ansell, Pragmatist democracy: Evolutionary learning as public philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
[17] J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962.
[18] J. Buck and S. Villines, We the people: Consenting to a deeper democracy. Washington, DC: Perfect Paperback, 2007.
[19] R. Likert, The human organization. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.
[20] A. Sen, "Rationality and social choice," American Economic Review, vol. 85, pp. 1-24, 1995. View at Google Scholar
[21] Appalachian, "Appalachian foodshed project," A Regional Report on Community Food Security: West Virginia,
Appalachian North Carolina and Virginia, 2016.
[22] R. L. Ackoff, The democratic corporation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
[23] A. G. L. Romme, "Domination, self-determination and circular organizing," Organization Studies, vol. 20, pp. 801-832,
1999. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[24] G. Romme, The quest for professionalism: The case of management and entrepreneurship. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016.
[25] E. Jaques, "In praise of hierarchy," Harvard Business Review, vol. 68, pp. 127-133, 1990.
[26] H. A. Simon, The organization of complex systems. In: H.H. Pattee (ed.), Hierarchy theory: The challenge of complex systems.
New York: George Braziller, 1973.
[27] J. E. Innes and D. E. Booher, Collaborative policymaking: Governance through dialogue. In: Hajer, M.A. & Wagenaar, H.
(eds.), Deliberative policy analysis: Understanding governance in the network society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003.
[28] K. Stephenson, Heterarchy. In: C. Ansell & J. Torfing (eds.), Handbook on theories of governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 2016.
[29] M. Kornberger, R. E. Meyer, C. Brandtner, and M. A. Höllerer, "When bureaucracy meets the crowd: Studying ‗open
government‘ in the Vienna city administration," Organization Studies, vol. 38, pp. 179-200, 2017. View at Google S cholar |
View at Publisher
[30] A. J. Meijer, D. Curtin, and M. Hillebrandt, "Open government: Connecting vision and voice," International Review of
Administrative Sciences, vol. 78, pp. 10–29, 2012. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[31] G. Hamel and L. Välikangas, "The quest for resilience," Harvard Business Review, vol. 81, pp. 52-63, 2003.
[32] L. Välikangas, The resilient organization: How adaptive cultures thrive even when strategy fails. New York: McGraw-Hill,
2010.
[33] C. Ansell and G. Goldstein, "Experimentalist governance in global public health: The case of UNAIDS," Unpublished
Working Paper, 2017.
[34] G. De Burca, R. O. Keohane, and C. F. Sabel, "New modes of pluralist global governance," New York University Journal
of International Law and Politics, vol. 45, pp. 723-786, 2013. View at Google Scholar
[35] C. F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, Experimentalist governance. In: D. Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford handbook of governance. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
[36] GCF, Global governance models in history. Stockholm: Global Challenges Foundation (GCF), 2017.
[37] UNDP, "Decentralization: A sampling of definitions." Retrieved from
http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/decentralization_working_report.PDF, 1999.
[38] E. Ferlie, L. Fitzgerald, G. McGivern, S. Dopson, and C. Bennett, "Public policy networks and 'wicked problems': A
nascent solution?," Public Administration, vol. 89, pp. 307–324, 2011. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 2018, 8(4): 152-170
170
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
[39] MSI, "The multi-stakeholder Initiative (MSI) database." Retrieved http://www.msi-integrity.org, 2017.
[40] S. Waddell, Global action networks: Creating our future together. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
[41] L. Barry, "VTaiwan: Public participation methods on the cyberpunk frontier of democracy. Retrieved from
https://civichall.org/civicist/vtaiwan-democracy-frontier/," 2016.
[42] E. Tang, "Uber responds to vTaiwan‘s coherent blended volition." Retrieved from https://blog.pol.is/uber-responds-
to-vtaiwans-coherent-blended-volition-3e9b75102b9b, 2016.
[43] O. Berthod, G. Müller-Seitz, and J. Sydow, "Out of nowhere? Interorganizational assemblage as the answer to a food-
borne disease outbreak," Schmalenbach Business Review, vol. 66, pp. 385-414, 2014. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[44] A. G. L. Romme and G. Endenburg, "Construction principles and design rules in the case of circular design,"
Organization Science, vol. 17, pp. 287-297, 2006. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[45] S. L. Jarvenpaa and L. Välikangas, "From governance void to interactive governing behaviors in new research
networks," Academy of Management Discoveries, vol. 2, pp. 226-246, 2016. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[46] A. Meijer, R. van der Veer, A. Faber, and J. Penning de Vries, "Political innovation as ideal and strategy: The case of
aleatoric democracy in the City of Utrecht," Public Management Review, vol. 19, pp. 20-36, 2017. View at Google Scholar |
View at Publisher
[47] R. E. Meyer and G. Hammerschmid, "Changing institutional logics and executive identities: A managerial challenge to
public administration in Austria," American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 49, pp. 1000-1014, 2006. View at Google Scholar | View at
Publisher
[48] A. Michels, "Innovations in democratic governance: How does citizen participation contribute to a better democracy?,"
International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 77, pp. 275–293, 2011. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[49] G. Endenburg, Sociocracy: The organization of decision-making. Delft: Eburon, 1998.
[50] A. G. L. Romme and A. van Witteloostuijn, "Circular organizing and triple loop learning," Journal of Organizational
Change Management, vol. 12, pp. 439-453, 1999. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
[51] P. van der Meché, J. Coldewey, and H. Esser, "Decision making systems matter AgileAlliance.org." Retrieved from
https://www.agilealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/DecisionMakingSystems.pdf, 2016.
[52] A. G. L. Romme, J. Broekgaarden, C. Huijzer, A. Reijmer, and R. A. I. van der Eyden, "From competition and collusion
to consent-based collaboration: A case study of local democracy," International Journal of Public Administration, vol. 41,
pp. 246-255, 2018. View at Google Scholar | View at Publisher
Views and opinions expressed in this article are the views and opinions of the author(s), Journal of Asian Scientific Research shall not be responsible or
answerable for any loss, damage or liability etc. caused in relation to/arising out of the use of the content.
