How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace
... Ancak Konfederasyon içerisinde yer alma düşüncesinin Gambiyalı halk, yönetici elitler ve özel sektör arasında pek destek bulmaması Konfederasyonun hayatta kalmasının önündeki fiili engel olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu fiili engel daha çok egemenliğin, bağımsızlığın kaybıyla neticelenecek ve Senegal'in hegemonyası altında varlığını sürdürecek olmanın endişesinden kaynaklanmaktadır (Kupchan, 2010;359-360). Senegal ve Gambiya post kolonyal dönemin akabinde pan-Afrikanizm fikrini somut hale getirirken, etnik, dini ve dil ilişkiselliklerini göz önünde tutarak birlik oluşturulmaya çalışılmış olsa da, yukarıda sayılan nedenlerin ötesinde iki ülke arasında gücün asimetrik dağılımı 1989'da birliğin dağılmasında etkili olmuştur (Kupchan, 2010;365). ...
... Bu fiili engel daha çok egemenliğin, bağımsızlığın kaybıyla neticelenecek ve Senegal'in hegemonyası altında varlığını sürdürecek olmanın endişesinden kaynaklanmaktadır (Kupchan, 2010;359-360). Senegal ve Gambiya post kolonyal dönemin akabinde pan-Afrikanizm fikrini somut hale getirirken, etnik, dini ve dil ilişkiselliklerini göz önünde tutarak birlik oluşturulmaya çalışılmış olsa da, yukarıda sayılan nedenlerin ötesinde iki ülke arasında gücün asimetrik dağılımı 1989'da birliğin dağılmasında etkili olmuştur (Kupchan, 2010;365). ...
DAVETLE MÜDAHALENİN GEÇERLİLİĞİ AÇISINDAN AFRİKA KITA-SINDAKİ İKİ ZIT ÖRNEK: MALİ VE GAMBİYA
Özet
Uluslararası hukukta bir devlete karşı kuvvet kullanma ve o devletin iç işlerine karışma yasak olmasına rağmen, bir devletin, yabancı askeri gücü daveti bu yasağı ortadan kaldırabilir. Tarihte pek çok kez, yapılan müdahalelerin ilgili devletin da-veti üzerine yapıldığı belirtilmiştir. Fakat davetle müdahalenin uluslararası hukuka uygunluğu sağlayabilmesi için maddi ve şekli bazı şartları yerine getirmesi gerekir. 2013 yılında Fransa'nın Mali'ye ve 2016 yılında ECOWAS'ın Gambiya'ya müda-halesinin meşru olabilmesi için bu şartları sağlaması gerekmektedir. Maddi ve şekli şartlar incelendikten sonra Fransa'nın ve ECOWAS'ın söz konusu müdahalelerinin uluslararası hukuka uygun olup olmadığı tartışılacaktır.
Abstract
Although there is a prohibition on the use of force by states to another states and of interference in domestic affairs of sovereigns in international law, the consent of a state to the foreign armed forces has the potential to lift this ban. Many examples of interventions based on the consent of the related states exist in world history.
... The definitional problem of peace is critical here. Is there something about deep peace (Boulding 1978;Miller 2007;Ripsman 2016;Kupchan 2010;Diehl 2016) that is different from ordinary peace or stability? Or is the absence of war or nonexistence of militarized disputes sufficient for peace? ...
... Though the premium is on stability, the classical realist admonition is that states need to pursue their genuine security interests and not abstract religious or ideological goals. By recognizing the vital 1 For historical perspectives on instances of peaceful power transitions, see and Kupchan (2010). ...
Much of mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship considers war to be a precondition for significant changes at the systemic level. Peaceful change as a subject has received limited attention in Realism, except by E. H. Carr and Robert Gilpin, although several strategies for stability are present in the paradigm. Mechanisms inherent in Liberalism have offered the most insights on obtaining change without war. Constructivism also focuses on change, caused largely by norms and inter-subjective ideational forces. Yet concrete strategies for peaceful change at the international level remain elusive in much of IR theory. The traditional grand strategy literature has focused most attention on obtaining national objectives through war while ignoring peaceful mechanisms of change and transformation. This article, based on my presidential address at the 57th ISA Convention in Atlanta in March 2016, calls for a reorientation in the grand strategy literature by incorporating strategies of peaceful change. It examines the contributions for peaceful change made by Europe, the United States, and rising and resurgent powers Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, in addition to ASEAN as a regional grouping. The article concludes by asking why some of these countries pursued peaceful strategies of change at various points in time only to abandon them subsequently. The article calls on the IR discipline to think more clearly about strategies for peaceful change and foreign policymakers to adapt and reorient succeeding generations to seek change without violence as a subject matter of serious study. © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. All rights reserved.
... The definitional problem of peace is critical here. Is there something about deep peace (Boulding 1978;Miller 2007;Ripsman 2016;Kupchan 2010;Diehl 2016) that is different from ordinary peace or stability? Or is the absence of war or nonexistence of militarized disputes sufficient for peace? ...
... Though the premium is on stability, the classical realist admonition is that states need to pursue their genuine security interests and not abstract religious or ideological goals. By recognizing the vital 1 For historical perspectives on instances of peaceful power transitions, see and Kupchan (2010). ...
Much of mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship considers war to be a precondition for significant changes at the systemic level. Peaceful change as a subject has received limited attention in Realism, except by E. H. Carr and Robert Gilpin, although several strategies for stability are present in the paradigm. Mechanisms inherent in Liberalism have of- fered the most insights on obtaining change without war. Constructivism also focuses on change, caused largely by norms and inter-subjective ideational forces. Yet concrete strategies for peaceful change at the international level remain elusive in much of IR theory. The traditional grand strategy literature has focused most attention on obtaining national objectives through war while ignoring peaceful mechanisms of change and transformation. This article, based on my presidential ad- dress at the 57th ISA Convention in Atlanta in March 2016, calls for a reorientation in the grand strategy literature by incor- porating strategies of peaceful change. It examines the contributions for peaceful change made by Europe, the United States, and rising and resurgent powers Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, in addition to ASEAN as a regional grouping. The article concludes by asking why some of these countries pursued peaceful strategies of change at various points in time only to abandon them subsequently. The article calls on the IR discipline to think more clearly about strate- gies for peaceful change and foreign policymakers to adapt and reorient succeeding generations to seek change without vi- olence as a subject matter of serious study.
... Until recently, the field of IR did not offer much in this regard. Scholars have long been satisfied with a rather loose conception of friendship subsumed under the notion of "security community" (Adler and Barnett 1998) or "union" (Kupchan 2010), whose main feature is the expectation of peaceful relations among members. Alexander Wendt (1999, 299) also points to the "rule of mutual aid," effectively a commitment to solidarity, as a unique aspect of such relationships. ...
This article explores the nature of the contemporary “special relationship” between Germany and Israel. Having emerged out of the ashes of the Second World War and the Holocaust, political relations between these two states are widely seen as having successfully undergone a process of reconciliation. A key feature is German support for Israel, usually understood as a constant attempt to pay off a historical debt in exchange for rehabilitation and recognition of Germany as a “good state.” The article probes another interpretation by asking whether contemporary German–Israeli relations have reached the stage of friendship, a relationship structured by care rather than guilt. To this end, it presents an original conceptual framework of interstate friendship as a bond of shared memories and visions that enable a common orientation toward the past and the future both sides are committed to invest in. Applied to an interpretive analysis of the “sharedness” of the memory of the Holocaust and the vision of a secure Israel, the paper finds strong evidence for the former yet significant gaps in the latter, concluding that relations between the states of Germany and Israel still fall short of friendship.
... How is it possible for relationships to turn into an institutional and functional framework? Kupchan's (2010) approach to "stable peace" between sovereign states is guiding in this sense. Achieving a consensus in crises in Turkey-USA relations, in other words, determining the strategies to be followed to bring bilateral relations to a normative level, will be possible by correctly identifying the risks and opportunities. ...
Factors such as regional-international developments, political, economic, social conditions and security understanding separate the foreign policies of the states from each other and differentiate the expectations of the countries in mutual relations. Turkish-American relations, which have a history of nearly seventy years, have seen a fluctuating course with sometimes cooperation and sometimes crises. Therefore, identifying the root causes of crises that arise from different reasons and damage bilateral relations gains importance in terms of collaboration between the two countries. In this context, this study argues that the reproduction of Turkey’s state identity in the changing international system after the Cold War caused crises in bilateral relations by differentiating foreign policy visions, threat perceptions and international goals with the United States. Based on this, the four crises, in the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States, starting with the Syrian Civil War and continuing to the present day, will be examined in the dimensions of perception, discourse and politics. Then, possible policies are discussed through risks and opportunities to eliminate the tense atmosphere in Turkey-US relations. In the study, in addition to the literature review, the content and discourse analysis method is used methodologically by making use of the statements of policy makers.
... This can be seen in the fragmented international human rights treaty ratification behavior and reservations put on these instruments which coalesce around sovereignty and cultural arguments (Jones 2014). Kupchan (2010) has stated, rather deftly, that "a consensus does exist among scholars that ASEAN constitutes a security community" (Kupchan 2010: 231). This could not be further from the truth; debate especially from early 1990's to present is lively as to which theoretical tools are best suited towards analyzing ASEAN. 1 Constructivism takes a social theoretical view towards international relations and its attendant phenomenon. ...
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights set up in 2009 signaled a path breaking achievement for human rights. It was the first of its kind, in the last region of the world to adopt a mechanism for human rights protection. However, with the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration of 2012 hopes of a robust and effective regional mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights in Southeast Asia were essentially dashed. The perplexing question to which an increasing number of academics and scholars are asking is why establish a mechanism that only promotes and offers little or no human rights protection? This paper seeks to provide a theoretical framework for future research and analytical conceptualization of regional human rights and its attendant mechanisms in ASEAN. Beginning with a critique of mainstream theories realism and constructivism, this paper will move on to offer a blended version of regime analysis for studying AICHR. Hopefully this will provide clarity and a theoretical pathway for future substantive research on the absence of human rights protection in the newly established regional human rights mechanism.
... In his book entitled "How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace", Kupchan (2010) has managed to bring together the untidy arguments relating stable peace and reintegrate them within an coherent analytical framework. According to the author, stable peace between two nations may see a linear development starting from rapprochement to security community and even a union ( Figure 1). ...
In liberal view diplomatic openings between states are considered advancing in parallel with a process at the course of which societies gradually forgive each other for the past faults and forget them all. However, although shared most of liberals' optimism , students of the discipline of conflict resolution in general maintain that reconciliation is a special treatment for special conflicts that cannot be solved through diplomatic means. This study aims at analysing prospect of reconciliation in the Western Balkans where a stable peace process has already taken its start with the external urgings from powerful third parties like European Union and US.
... Autocratic states, in turn, are capable of establishing lasting partnership with each other and with other democratic states. For example, the United States should build its external relations according to the behavior of other countries' foreign policies, not according to the nature of their policies (Kupchan, 2010). ...
The importance of the study of crisis management diplomacy stems from the fact that it is a tool to prevent and avoid all confrontations and its disastrous consequences. In particular, regional and international issues and crisis has become complex and multiple. In addition, the units of both regional and international environments have been increased. These developments further complicated the phenomenon of making and implementing foreign policy according to the mechanism of crises management diplomacy. As a result, making and implementing foreign policy in its traditional official framework has become insufficient to understand the nature of international relations. Rather, it has to be expanded outside of this framework to understand the role of crises management diplomacy in making foreign policy. Therefore, there have been some attempts to provide academic scientific frameworks to explain the process of making and implementing foreign policy according to the variables of this development. The study has monitored this matter and concluded that foreign policy, diplomacy and crises management diplomacy have significantly evolved from a simple and traditional phenomenon related to the issue of security and formal promotion of relations to multidimensional phenomenon closely related to the various economic, political, social and cultural areas of societies. This technique has been based on traditional methods such as negotiations. In recent decades, it has adopted accurate and effective technical methods. These methods include political methods such as good offices, mediation and compromise. Also, there are legal methods such as international arbitration and the presentation of disputes to international and regional organizations. There are also deterrent ones such as economic embargo, boycotting and freezing funds. It means that developed countries control over international relations, and developing countries participate effectively in order to preserve the rights of nations and interact fruitfully through dialogue and peaceful coexistence.
... Internally, leaders must change what Herrmann (2003) and others have called "enemy images" into positive stereotypes and schemata. And both countries must, at least to a certain extent, "harmonize" their narratives (He 2009;Kupchan 2010). As they do so, they need to adopt a narrative that offers not "my story" or "your story" but a "third story" acceptable to both sides (Korman 2006). ...
In relations between Japan and South Korea, as well as between other former adversaries, observers frequently argue that “history stands in the way” of better relations. They expect that hostile historical narratives will prevent leaders from pursuing potentially advantageous cooperation. To evaluate this claim, in this article I define narratives and their elements, noting that they range from more hostile to more friendly. I outline and theoretically develop two perspectives: the view of history as an obstacle, and a view more optimistic about the potential for cooperation and narrative transformation. Evidence from Franco-German relations after World War II, as well as other cases across time and space, supports the latter, more optimistic, view. Finally, I hypothesize different strategic and domestic conditions that make cooperation and narrative change more or less likely. Ultimately, I argue that observers have exaggerated the constraining power of narratives and thus underestimated the potential for cooperation between former enemies. This has important implications for relations between longtime rivals all over the world, and particularly in East Asia, where a conventional wisdom expects historical memories to impede balancing against China's rise.
... The relational continuum of otherness is determined by the relevant social distance between the two states. This social distance does not merely arise through differences in state identity but also through varying perceptions of association and/or dissociation (Rumelili 2004: 38-39;Neumann 1999) with regard to ideational issues that are relevant for state identity, such as regime ideology (Doyle 2011), shared traumatic experiences (He 2009;Miller 2013), religion (Huntington 2011) or historical heritage (Kupchan 2010). While between any two states there may be more than one ideational issue or 'web of identities' (Hansen 2006: 40) that affect social distance, and consequently the bilateral relationship, in the interests of parsimony, we focus on the distance in the relationship as set by a dominant ideational issue. ...
Why do some bilateral relationships have the ability to become strong, stable and amicable but others do not even when they have incentive to develop higher resilience? This article proposes that perceived relational identity differences between two states, or otherness, shapes and limits resilience in their relationship. Drawing on the existing IR identity literature, the article develops a conceptual and operational definition of otherness and proposes a useful and replicable framework that can be used to capture the complexity of bilateral ties. The article illustrates this framework with two types of cases. First, two historical “least-likely” cases (Germany–Israel, 1949–1973; India–USSR, 1947–1970) of higher resilience, in which one would not expect the resilient relationships that developed. Second, a most likely contemporary mini-case (India–Israel 1992–2012), which uncovers lower than expected resilience. The article then concludes with the implications of this framework for further academic research and policy analysis.
... Kupchan´s analysis has shown that political reconciliation precedes and clears the way for growing economic interdependence, not vice versa. 20 Lastly, democratic peace theory (DPT) has also been questioned numerous times. According to DPT, democratic states are unlikely to wage war against other democracies for institutional and normative reasons. ...
This article analyses a qualitative transformation of relations between the Balkan states since the dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia in the 90´s until 2008. It argues that military presence and interventions of external powers were enough to make the belligerents fold weapons and thus spread the negative peace but did not substantially aid the qualitative transformation of their relations. Evolving cooperation, mutual restraint, and resolution of conflicts by non-military means that we have perceived in the Balkans since 2003 are results of liberal strategies. It argues for the usefulness of eclectic explanations.
... There are three broad interpretations of the sources of regional transformation during these critical periods. Some scholars emphasize the prominence of external factors, particularly the increasing pressures from the US on the military regimes, the lack of US support for Argentina's position in the Malvinas/Falklands War (Monis Bandeira 2004), Argentina's need to reduce tensions with Brazil due to the existence of territorial conflicts with Chile (Madrid 2011), or the changing power distribution of the regional system in favor of Brazil which weakened Argentina's position (Kupchan 2010). ...
... Kupchan cree que los países con larga tradición democrática deben guiar a las autocracias en proceso de transición en el cumplimiento de desafíos globales. Dicha colaboración será exitosa, Kupchan escribe, cuando se den tres condiciones en la nueva estructura política y social del país en transición: la restricción del poder institucional, un orden social compatible y la cohesión cultural (Kupchan 2010). Para Kupchan, el compromiso (más que el ataque frontal) de la Administración del presidente Obama con Rusia, China, Siria, Irán y Cuba responde a una política de "neo-aplacamiento", que surge como resultado de un análisis coste-beneficio realizado por el gabinete del presidente. ...
... Culturally and historically embedded identity and community politicsincluding hegemonic identity narration and constructions of narratives about a transnational identityare tools in the authoritarian regimes' strategies that are used to guarantee regime survival, 5 and are not the result of "a deeper, underlying change in self-understanding" (Checkel 2016, 559). Authors of the literature on zones of peace in the Third World (Kacowicz 1998;Kacowicz et al. 2000) or on stable peace in general (Kupchan 2012;Miller 2005Miller , 2007Oelsner 2007) are more open to the factor identity. However, congruent values, norms or cultural convergence are rather conceptualised as conducive conditions for community-building among non-democracies to emerge, than independent drivers. ...
This article shows how identity shapes the pathway of Eurasian economic integration. Applying a "flat ontology", the article traces the enabling and constraining effects of regime identities in Russia and Kazakhstan on the integration process within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The empirical results show that Russia and Kazakhstan were able to reconcile the EAEU project with their very divergent regime identities during its institutionalisation. The Ukraine crisis changed this equilibrium as it amplified the differences in constructions of the post-Soviet regional order. This triggered a negative chain reaction, resulting in a fading of the shallow consensus on the EAEU.
... A trajetória da relação entre Brasil e Argentina já foi abordada a partir dos mais variados focos: a construção histórica da rivalidade (WINAND, 2015), a ótica das relações de poder no Cone Sul (MELLO, 1996), a aproximação na área nuclear (KUPCHAN, 2010) e a busca pela autonomia (GIACCAGLIA, 2009). No entanto, uma abordagem que pode ser mais explorada refere-se a um tipo de análise de política externa que Doty (1993) denomina "perguntas-como" ("how-questions", no original). ...
O presente artigo busca analisar como as relações com a Argentina foram tratadas na política externa brasileira, dos governos FHC e Lula da Silva, a partir das respectivas estratégias de inserção internacional. Conclui-se que as diferenças de ambas as estratégias foram acompanhadas de diferenças da importância da Argentina na política externa Brasileira. Contudo, nos dois casos, o país vizinho não se constituiu como uma das prioridades, ocupando um lugar instrumental em relação aos principais interesses de cada governo.
... Structural forces have indeterminate effects; leaders choose whether to react to crises with escalation or de-escalation, and their domestic and personal concerns influence those choices (Lebow 1997, 158, 163-74). Skillful leaders interested in negotiated conflict resolution have several communicative tools, from exploiting personal relationships to creatively framing grand bargains (or, conversely, fractionating issues), to sending costly signals and making symbolic gestures that demonstrate their cooperative objectives (Armstrong 1993;Long and Brecke 2003;Kydd 2005;Kupchan 2010). Paradigmatic examples include Richard Nixon's visit to China, Anwar Sadat's to Israel, and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. ...
Can public diplomacy help resolve protracted international conflicts? Both rationalist and constructivist traditions identify significant domestic obstacles to international peacemaking. However, Robert Putnam's concept of “reverberation” implies that diplomats can expand their adversaries’ win-sets for cooperation by engaging foreign publics. This paper analyzes a most-likely case, with archival evidence: Argentine Ambassador Oscar Camilión's unsuccessful quest for Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement in 1976–77. Although the two countries later overcame rivalry, public diplomacy contributed negligibly to this success: internal Argentine divisions created mixed messages toward Brazil, Brazilian leaders launched a competing public relations operation, and these two currents obstructed and nearly terminated Camilión's mission. This case illuminates the paradoxes of Argentine foreign policymaking under military rule and offers a cautionary tale for scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy and conflict resolution.
Video Abstract
... First, scholars of international relations and international water politics have for a long time conceived environmental cooperation as a dependent variable whose occurrence (Giordano et al. 2014;Young 2016) and effectiveness (Garrick and De Stefano 2016;Mitchell and Zawahri 2015) have to be explained. Conversely, scholars of rivalry termination and international peacemaking have so far hardly paid attention to environmental issues in general and to water cooperation in particular as relevant explanatory factors (e.g., Goertz et al. 2016;Kupchan 2010;Rasler et al. 2013). The findings of our study highlight that environmental and especially water cooperation can also be conceived of as independent variables that potentially have a transformative effect on international politics by catalyzing shifts toward more peaceful relations. ...
Proponents of the environmental peacemaking approach argue that environmental cooperation has the potential to improve relations between states. This is because such cooperation facilitates common problem solving, cultivates interdependence, and helps to build trust and understanding. But as of now, very few cross-case studies on environmental peacemaking exist. Furthermore, much of the available literature understands peace in negative terms as the mere absence of acute conflict. This article addresses both shortcomings by studying the impact of international water cooperation on transitions toward more peaceful interstate relations. To do so, we combine information on positive water-related interactions between states with the peace scale, a recent data set measuring the degree of positive and negative peace between states. For the period 1956–2006, we find that a higher number of positive, water-related interactions in the previous ten years makes a shift toward more peaceful interstate relations more likely. This is particularly the case for state pairs that are not in acute conflict with each other.
... Also, other scholars have observed how, in the late 1800s, US and British policy-makers, journalists and academics increasingly began to publicly portray the other state as a partner, friend, ally and kin. Charles Kupchan (2010) finds that this change first took place first in Britain and subsequently in the United States. At first, he argues, this change prompted by 'strategic necessity'. ...
... The policy we depict pursues cooperative relations in a noncrisis setting rather than under the threat of war. It is the initial step, or "opening gambit," in an effort to achieve rapprochement (Kupchan 2010). See the supporting information for further discussion. ...
An old adage holds that “only Nixon could go to China”; that is, hawkish leaders face fewer domestic barriers than doves when it comes to pursuing reconciliation with foreign enemies. However, empirical evidence for this proposition is mixed. In this article, we clarify competing theories, elucidate their implications for public opinion, and describe the results of a series of survey experiments designed to evaluate whether and why there is a hawk's advantage. We find that hawks are indeed better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement than doves. We also find support for two key causal mechanisms: Voters are more confident in rapprochement when it is pursued by a hawk and are more likely to view hawks who initiate conciliation as moderates. Further, the hawk's advantage persists whether conciliatory efforts end in success or failure. Our microfoundational evidence thus suggests a pronounced domestic advantage for hawks who deliver the olive branch.
... Any discussion of the sources of change generates questions for an important dimension of change in international politics: whether it is preceded by violent or nonviolent processes. Power transitions and great power accommodations have occurred without war and conflict, although a majority of them were preceded by violence (Kupchan 2010;Paul 2016). Similarly, regional transformations from conflict to peace and the reverse to conflict have happened (Miller 2007;Paul 2012), although nonviolent resistance has been successful in changing outcomes more than acknowledged (Chenoweth and Stephen 2011). ...
This introductory paper of the presidential issue examines IR theory's problems and prospects in understanding when and how change happens, especially peaceful transformations in world politics. The ISA 2017 Baltimore conference was aimed at taking an assessment of our understanding of change, its different manifestations as well as implications. The papers in this special issue deal with important questions on different markers and manifestations of change in world politics. The implications might range from epochal transformations to limited changes in the international system, especially within and between regions to incremental changes in how international treaties and global governance initiatives are promulgated, which in turn produce long-term and/or short-term changes in the architecture of world politics. It also addresses the following questions: How do different IR paradigms address change? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Can we understand change sequentially or cumulatively or combining their insights? How do material and ideational factors link together in generating change?
... Realia w strefie euroatlantyckiej powinny zdecydowanie skłaniać do preferowania rozwiązań szerokich i opartych na dialogu międzynarodowym, a OBWE jest najszerszą instytucją gromadzącą przy jednym stole 57 państw całej strefy od Vancouver do Władywostoku. To właśnie parafrazując ideę książki znanego amerykańskiego politologa powinno nas uczyć, jak czynić wrogów przyjaciółmi i budować trwały pokój (Kupchan, 2010). OBWE -jak wskazują eksperci zaangażowani w projekt IDEAS -ma szansę stworzyć szeroką euroatlantyckąi eurazjatycką wspólnotę bezpieczeństwa. ...
Abstrakt
The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.
... In his book How Enemies Become Friends, Charles A. Kupchan explores the mechanics of conflict resolution as he examines how endemic competition and limited cooperation among a group of states can be transformed into a stable peace. 16 He does this by formulating a conceptual bridge that links realism and liberalism/constructivism into what he called "realistconstructivist synthesis." 17 Accordingly, the main challenge in effecting a stable peace is to be able to transform the mediating role of states' intent, motivation, political character, and identity in shaping how they can react to the material elements of power. ...
Using Professor Charles A. Kupchan’s concept of stable peace, this article explores the possibility of defusing the tension in the South China Sea through conflict resolution. At the present, the precarious situation in the contested territory is stabilized by a balance of power system. This system springs from the littoral states’ (the Philippines and Vietnam) policies of drawing other maritime powers such as the United States (US) and Japan into the issue to constrain an assertive China. Apprehensive of China’s growing power in East Asia, the US and Japan have increased their strategic presence in the South China Sea. These developments have transformed the dispute into a case of conflict irresolution. This article concludes that the imperative variable to jumpstart the process of resolving the South China Sea imbroglio is China’s willingness to accommodate unilaterally the territorial entitlements of the small claimant states.
In den Jahren zwischen 2010 und 2019 wird die Entwicklung zur Globalisierung vermehrt in Zweifel gezogen. Europa gerät unter ungeahnten Druck, weil es nicht länger Stabilität exportiert, sondern Instabilität importiert. Zugleich wird der Fortgang der europäischen Integration im Innern der Europäischen Union mehr als je zuvor angefochten.
Against the backdrop of China’s rise and the erosion of US unipolarity, relations between Washington and Beijing are increasingly being framed as a new Cold War struggle even if a defining characteristic of the original Cold War is still missing, namely system-wide ideological competition. Meanwhile, the dominant IR theory on great power conflict, structural realism, seems ill-equipped to deal with any such ideational component given the theory’s rather narrow materialist conception of systemic structure. Taking its point of departure in Social Identity Theory, this chapter develops a new structural logic of identity that enables us to theorize systemic ideological competition as the relative distribution of mutually incompatible universalistic identities in the state system. Further, it is suggested how to combine the structural logic of identity with that of power (polarity) in order to devise a new framework for explaining the overall security practices of states. The potential utility of the framework is demonstrated by using the US-China great power rivalry as an illustrative case.
When, how, and why do regional organizatiosns provide democracy, human rights, and rule of law institutions? The chapter introduces the reader to the repertoire of regional institutions to promote and protect fundamental governance standards in member states of regional organizations. It argues that demands and diffusion explain the adoption and design of regional institutions. Demands and diffusion occur at the same time, but their combinations play out differently across the type of adopter (pioneers, early followers, late adopters) and the instance of designing institutions (adoption, first institutional design, subsequent institutional designs). Because of the interplay of demands and diffusion, demands can be considered both enabling factors for and constraining factors of diffusion: demand-following pioneers set the path for diffusion, but demands of affected early followers and late adopters constrain diffusion processes.
Unlike many topics in international relations, a large number of models characterize interstate rivalry termination processes. But many of these models tend to focus on different parts of the rivalry termination puzzle. It is possible, however, to create a general model built around a core of shocks, expectation changes, reciprocity and reinforcement. Twenty additional elements can be linked as alternative forms of catalysts/shocks and, perceptual shifts, or as facilitators of the core processes. All 24 constituent elements can be encompassed by the general model which allows for a fair amount of flexibility in delineating alternative pathways to rivalry de-escalation and termination at different times and in different places. The utility of the unified model is then applied in an illustrative fashion to the Anglo-American rivalry which ended early in the twentieth century.
Territorial disputes constitute an important root of interstate conflict. Yet these disputes do not always lead to war or even militarized conflict. Sometimes, one side yields to the other side by withdrawing its claims. Focusing on rival dyads whose territorial claims should be more intractable than is the case in non-rival dyads, we suggest that it is challengers, as opposed to the side that already controls the disputed territory in question, that are more likely to make concessions. Moreover, it is threats external to the spatial rivalry that encourage challengers to surrender their claims so that they may deal with more pressing threats. The empirical evidence supports these contentions. Territorial dispute challengers are more likely to engages in negotiations over the disputed space if they are also participants in other rivalries that, presumably, become associated with threats that are more worrisome than other, older spatial disagreements. One of several implications is that it is debatable whether we should assume that it is primarily boundary negotiations that end spatial disputes and therefore rivalries. On the contrary, the linkages between boundaries and rivalry are apt to be more complicated. Not only are all rivalries not spatial in nature, the way they end need not be due to the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes either.
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. On the one hand, it reflects at an empirical level the first layer of the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, the systemic level. This is the geopolitical context within which both Obama and Trump have had to lead US foreign policy. On the other hand, it provides an empirical analysis of how the post-Cold War order has evolved into a less US-friendly order. This chapter reviews debates on the crisis of the Liberal International Order and it develops an analysis of the changing balance of economic power between the United States and China. Then, it explores geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, the Eurasian supercontinent, and the Indo-Pacific. It argues that the geopolitical world order has become post-American because of the uneven geographical development of capitalism and the rise of China is a highly strategic region of the world, the Western Pacific.
This article assesses the creation of an enemy image of France and the French in the United States in two separate historical contexts. Although France and the United States have usually enjoyed rather positive relations throughout history after the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1778, the French were widely depicted as America’s enemy during the late 1790s Quasi-War, and more recently after France refused to support U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003-2004. In the first instance, an undeclared naval war opposed the two countries as the French government allowed for seizure of American ships in the wake of the 1795 Jay Treaty the US had signed with Great Britain, a conflict which escalated when U.S. navy later began to fight the French in the Caribbean. In 2003-2004, an acute diplomatic crisis induced a confrontation between the two nations when France suggested it would use its veto power to block passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing a U.S.- led military operation against Iraq. The aim of this study is to provide an understanding of the process through which the image of France was transformed, in both historical contexts, from that of ally and friend into that of a threatening other. Particular attention is paid to the creation and use of cultural stereotypes in statements by American officials, as well as in the media campaigns that characterized both diplomatic crises. Although the enemy image of France underwent significant changes between 1797 and 2003, our research shows that a number of cultural stereotypes that were created during the Quasi-War were revived during the 2003 diplomatic crisis. Chief amongst those is the association of France with terror and tyranny. This article also examines the deep political divisions that pitted Federalists against Republicans in the 1790s, and Neo-Conservative “hawks” against anti-war “doves” in 2003. These disputes shed light on the creation of enemy images of France in the United States. In both cases, the French antagonist was as mirror and a scapegoat that provides as much information on American identity and U.S. political debates as it does about American views on France and the French.
En el actual panorama de seguridad latinoamericano adquiere particular relevancia la criminalidad organizada, con un nítido correlato de violencia. Para enfrentar con eficacia esta situación, las naciones de la región han realizado importantes esfuerzos, que hasta hoy no ha arrojado los resultados esperados, de acuerdo a la propia Organización de Estados Americanos.
El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en plantear la utilidad que puede reportar un moderno enfoque de seguridad nacional, amplio y abarcativo, para realizar un abordaje integral al flagelo de la criminalidad en la región. Ese enfoque debe trascender las perspectivas tradicionales de seguridad pública, que enfatizan en la prevención y represión del delito, para incluir además lecturas multicausales más amplias, propias de la seguridad ciudadana. El punto de vista de la seguridad ciudadana permite detectar tres factores de clara incidencia directa en la difusión y profundización de la criminalidad organizada en América Latina: la corrupción, la impunidad y la fragilidad estatal con insuficiente gobernabilidad.
Nuestro análisis sostiene que en América Latina es posible adoptar una concepción de seguridad nacional moderna y dinámica, lejos de la controvertida Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional de la Guerra Fría. Esa concepción debe reconocer la heterogeneidad de amenazas y riesgos contemporáneos, y que combine seguridad pública y seguridad ciudadana en la lucha contra el crimen organizado. Argentina, Guatemala y México son ejemplos de la adopción de modernos enfoques de este tipo, perfectamente compatibles con la vigencia del sistema democrático y el respeto a los derechos humanos.
El artículo se estructura en una introducción, un desarrollo dividido en tres partes, y unas breves conclusiones. En el desarrollo, primero se revisarán algunas cuestiones atinentes a la criminalidad latinoamericana, identificando tres elementos que inciden en su crecimiento y expansión, y que son abordables desde una perspectiva de seguridad ciudadana. Luego se describirán los límites y contenidos del moderno concepto seguridad nacional, señalando que sus alcances pueden incluir el combate al crimen organizado. En tercer lugar, identificaremos y describiremos someramente tres casos de aplicación en América Latina de una concepción moderna de seguridad nacional que incluyen, dentro de sus áreas de incumbencia, a la criminalidad organizada.
This book explains cooperative and confrontational regional orders in the post-Cold War era. Applying a push-and-pull framework to the evolution of regional orders, the book's theoretical section compares regional dynamics and studies the transformation and authority of governing arrangements among key regional actors who manage security and institutional cooperation. This presents a novel approach to comparing non-Western regional orders, and helps forge a better integration between International Relations disciplinary approaches and area studies. The empirical section analyzes Central Eurasia and South America within the period 1989-2017, using case studies and interviews with decision-makers, practitioners and experts. The volume demonstrates that soft engagement strategies from extra-regional great powers and internationalist domestic coalitions framed in a stable democratic polity are forces for peaceful interaction , while hard engagement strategies from great external powers plus nationalist coalitions within democratic backsliding in key regional powers present negative outlooks for regional cooperation. This book will be of much interest to students of regional security, comparative politics, area studies and International Relations.
This article is concerned with groups of states that do not fight each other and, moreover, hold stable expectations that war between them is unlikely to occur in the future. Such no-war communities can be seen as a particular, minimalist form of the concept of international security communities as coined by Karl Deutsch and further developed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The security community literature has identified several potential communities across the globe but failed to offer a conclusive explanation for how these emerged because, as I shall argue, insufficient attention has been paid to the domestic conditions of state capacity. This article proposes an alternative path to community in which a lack of state capacity forms the common knowledge foundation between states. Under certain conditions, a low level of capacity to fight can assure states of their common desire to avoid war and gives rise to mutual recognition and toleration. I demonstrate the argument based on two cases that have commonly been seen as the most likely candidates for security communities beyond Europe, the regions of South America and Southeast Asia.
This chapter shows the importance of the USA for Poland’s security and Warsaw’s attempts to establish the closest possible bilateral relations with Washington. Since 1989, these efforts were meant to bring about a strategic partnership, but in practice, they have led to Poland’s asymmetric dependence on its powerful transatlantic partner. This was the result of Poland’s efforts to join NATO, and after this aim was achieved in 1999 with Washington’s support, the country proceeded to turn itself into a vassal of the USA. In the years 2007–2015, the Polish government attempted to rationalize Polish–American relations, above all by actively working for EU integration. After the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in Poland in 2015, the country openly adopted a policy of clientelism in regard to the USA. The chapter analyses specific traits of Polish–American relations in the years 1989–2019.
What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment–from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decision makers by providing an analytic framework for assessing the utility of retrenchment.
Some scholars have claimed that democratic regime type needs to be treated as a necessary precondition for the formation of a pluralistic security community. This essay argues that one should not overestimate the explanatory power of linking the democratic peace proposition to the study of security communities. Democratic values, norms, institutions, and practices may certainly facilitate the formation of a security community, but it is by no means the only or even most plausible path to assure dependable expectations of peaceful change. While a number of authors have of late made similar claims, what is not settled is why non-democracies can form security communities. The findings in this essay advance scholarship on this issue by showing that the same causal logics commonly attributed exclusively to democratic security community formation are also present in the formation of non-democratic security communities. The study adds empirical evidence to this argument by developing a historical case study of the Sino-Soviet relationship. In sum, the findings demonstrate that (1) democracy is not a necessary (though facilitating) precondition for the development of a pluralistic security community and (2) a pluralistic security community may form between autocratic regimes based on the causal logical nexus of non-democratic norm externalization, ideological coherence, a common Other (normative logic) and autocratic domestic institutional constraints (institutional logic).
This chapter provides a philosophical and historical context towards the understanding of how Japan has always strove to remain a nation-state par excellence in the tempestuous international relations of the region. Illustrating how the contradictory values of egalitarianism and quest for excellence are deeply engrained in Japanese thinking since late fifteenth century, the chapter outlines how these norms influence the strategy Japan has used in her historical international relations, particularly through her cultivation of the dominant hegemon of the day and her adaptive learning to fuel her consummate quest for exceptionalism. The chapter then maps out the central tenants of Japanese post war Conservatism that drives Japan’s normalization and rejuvenation today, and unpacks the principal mechanisms the neo-Conservatives had put in place to use this goals: (1) constitution; (2) Managing the US-Japan Alliance and (3) eroding the pervasive pacifism that is found in Japanese society. The chapter concludes by examining the ironical linkage on how Japanese democracy and historical revisionism may co-exist, and on how neo-Conservatism drives the paradoxes in Japanese politics and society today.
In this article, I address two salient issues in IR trust research: first, I introduce a longitudinal, content analysis to measure foreign policy trust. Second, I provide an in-depth analysis of how recent crises affected German political elites’ trust of the United States. I begin with a brief conceptual sketch of foreign policy trust and argue that treating it as a trusting discourse is a useful way to bridge the micro–macro gap. Next, I introduce a content analysis to measure trust, present coding rules and discuss advantages and problems of the approach. The empirical section consists of data generated from coding German Bundestag speeches and newspaper op-eds from 2000 through 2014. By disaggregating the data to specify who trusts whom and regarding which issues, I propose the following: First, there is a significant decline in trust among the traditionally pro-American German center-right politicians. Second, there is a steady decline in trust in the United States as a state entity, as opposed to strongly fluctuating trust in different U.S. presidents. Third, the NSA crisis directly affected German elites’ trust in the bilateral security partnership, an area where trust was stable even during the Bush presidency.
Can natural resources facilitate regional cooperation? Recent discoveries of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have led many to ask whether natural resources can bring peace and prosperity to the region. This article draws upon the contrast between liberal and realist perspectives on interdependence to explicate the extent to which shared economic interests can facilitate political cooperation in a conflict-ridden region. The analysis of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy corroborates the proposition that when states prioritize security over prosperity, they will likely continue to escalate political tensions even if this jeopardizes economic gains from cooperation.
In the post-Cold War international society, third-party intervention has become increasingly common across various spheres. What were previously assumed to be domestic or bilateral issues have become of great interest to foreign governments and international organizations. Disputes over history, whose intensification in many parts of the world is also a recent political phenomenon, are no exception. Regarding past atrocities by one country upon another, the “victim” side seeks recognition and redress from third parties, while the “perpetrator” side tries to prevent such interference. This paper investigates the causes of such intervention and the consequences of it for bilateral relations between the intervenor and the “perpetrator” country, using the conflict between Armenia and Turkey over the recognition of the 1915–1916 Armenian Massacre as genocide as a case study. The results reveal that countries with a Christian majority and a large Armenian population typically conduct such intervention, and that although third-party intervention affects bilateral relations negatively, the effect is only temporary.
There have been many “end of affair” comments on the Anglo-American special relationship (AASR) in the post-Cold War era. Notwithstanding this, the AASR has managed to persist without losing its vitality up to the present. This article seeks to explain the persistence of the AASR from the perspective of collective identity. It argues that a strong Anglo-American collective identity has been an indispensable positive contributor to the persistence of the AASR after the end of the Cold War. The strong Anglo-American collective identity facilitates Anglo-American common threat perceptions, solidifies embedded trust between the UK and the USA, and prescribes norms of appropriate behaviour for these two countries.
Bu çalışmanın temel amacı siyasi ekonomik fay hatlarıyla örülü yakın coğrafyasında Türkiye’nin çeşitli bölgeselleşme arayışlarındaki başarı ihtimallerini niteliksel ölçebilmek ve hangi aşamalara kadar ulaşabileceğini öngörmektir. Bunun için farklı bölgeselleşmeleri karşılaştırmaya imkân veren etkileşim halindeki iki ayaklı – siyasi ayakta (istikrarlı barış ortamının tesisi) ekonomik ayakta ise (karşılıklı bağımlılık) - bir bölgeselleşme/bütünleşme modeli benimsenmiştir. İlgili model yoluyla Türkiye’nin bölgeselleşme ve bölgeselleşmeye yönelik işbirliği hamleleri – AB, Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü (EİÖ) ve Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü (KEİÖ) - karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmiştir. Sonuçta ise bölgede “kalıcı barışın” sağlayacağı siyasi zemin olmadan Türkiye’nin girişeceği hiçbir bölgeselleşme çabasının ileri aşamalara ulaşma imkânın olmadığı kanaatine varılmıştır.
Im vorausgehenden Kapitel wurden die gewaltsamen Ursprünge des zunächst europäischen Staatensystems angesprochen. Der von der historischen Soziologie herausgearbeitete Zusammenhang zwischen Staatsentwicklung und zwischenstaatlichem Krieg wurde angeführt und die Formulierung des Soziologen Norbert Elias von den frühneuzeitlichen europäischen „Ausscheidungswettkämpfen“ zitiert. Aus dieser gewaltsamen Herausbildung des europäischen Staatensystems wurden zwei gedankliche Entwicklungen hergeleitet: die Dominanz realistischen Denkens, das das internationale Verhältnis im Sinne von Thomas Hobbes als permanenten Kriegs- und Bedrohungszustand interpretiert, im Fachjargon: als anarchisches Staatensystem; und die Herausbildung und schließlich, nach zwei Weltkriegen, auch Durchsetzung eines diesen Zustand überwindenden Denkens und dann auch diesem entsprechender Institutionen zwischenstaatlicher Kooperation und, in Gestalt der heutigen EU, auch Integration.
Concern about war and large-scale violence has long dominated the study of international security. To the extent that peace receives any scholarly attention, it primarily does so under the rubric of “negative peace:” the absence of war. This article calls for a focus on peace in international studies that begins with a reconceptualization of the term. I examine the limitations of negative peace as a concept, discuss “positive peace,” and demonstrate empirically that Nobel Peace Prize winners have increasingly been those recognized for contributions to positive peace. Nevertheless, scholarly emphasis remains on war, violence, and negative peace—as demonstrated by references to articles appearing in a leading peace-studies journal and to papers presented at International Studies Association meetings. Peace is not the inverse or mirror image of war and therefore requires different theoretical orientations and explanatory variables. The article concludes with a series of guidelines on how to study peace.
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