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The revolving door between politics and dirty energy in Poland: a governmental-industrial complex

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REVOLVING DOORS: POLAND
Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conicts of interest in climate policy-making
The revolving door
between politics and
dirty energy in Poland:
a governmental-
industrial complex
AUTHOR
DR. KACPER SZULECKI
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Revolving doors and conicts of interest
in Poland
With regards to conflicts of interest in Poland, the-
re are rules which prevent elected politicians such as
Members of the Polish Parliament’s lower chamber,
the Sejm, from combining their function with busi-
ness sector positions. High level political figures in
government administrations – Ministers and Deputy
Ministers – are forbidden from sitting on supervisory
boards. In the private sector, energy companies often
have contractual clauses which prescribe a period du-
ring which a former manager cannot move to a com-
peting energy company.
When it comes to revolving doors, the scale of the
problem in Poland is unknown – the public authorities
do not gather data on this, and NGOs have reported di-
fculties in measuring it, although it is assumed that the
scale is large. Poland does have legal restrictions on pas-
sing through the revolving door – currently the ‘cooling
off’ period for civil servants, Ministers, local and regional
level politicians entering the private sector is 1 year. A
2017 draft bill on Transparency in Public Life proposes to
increase that period to 3 years. However, for an analysis
of revolving doors in the energy sector, two points need
to be highlighted.
Firstly, under the existing law, all public sector em-
ployees and politicians that are subject to restrictions
can actually apply for a shortening of the ‘cooling off’
period, and the decision is taken by a special Commission
operating under the Prime Minister’s Chancellery. Litt-
le is known about the functioning of this Commission,
but transparency watchdogs have managed to establish
that most applicants do get permission to shorten their
‘cooling off’ period.1
Secondly, and more importantly, the ownership
structure of the Polish energy sector blurs the clearness
of the revolving door problem2 in fact, in many of the
cases described below, public administrators, experts
and the public opinion might not see a problem at all.
However, Poland is also one of the EU countries with
the least ambitious climate protection policies, having
achieved a “low” ranking in the 2018 Climate Change
Performance Index3. In October 2017, the Polish govern-
ment even launched a legal action against the European
Commission – as did Bulgaria in order to overturn the
recently adopted new EU pollution standards for Euro-
pean power stations4. Although these relate to air pollu-
tion standards, it still shows a complete unwillingness to
impinge on the coal industry in any way, and ts with
both countries’ opposition to ambitious climate policy at
EU level. Poland is also home to the EU’s most polluting
coal plant in terms of CO2 emissions, the world’s largest
lignite plant “Bełchatów”5.
Poland’s State-energy nexus
Poland’s major energy companies are all State Treasury
companies, which means that although they are all joint
stock companies whose stock is traded on the exchan-
ge, the State owns a majority of their shares or is legally
controlling them in some way. Currently (as of 20 March
2018), State Treasury holds 70.83% of the shares of the
national gas giant PGNiG, and a large part of the sha-
res in the national oil companies Grupa Lotos (53.19%)
Poland is also one of the
EU countries with the least
ambitious climate protection
policies, having achieved a
“low” ranking in the 2018
Climate Change Performance
Index
POLAND 99
REVOLVING DOORS: POLAND
Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament
and PKN Orlen (27.52%). Among the major utilities in
the power sector, PGE (58.39%), Energa (51.52%), Enea
(51.5%), Tauron (30.06%) and Bedzin (5%) are all ‘State
companies’ and together they control over 75% of the
market, which leads even the most moderate mains-
tream energy analysts to call this setup an oligopoly.6
The State also owns 55% of the shares in one of the lar-
gest coal mining companies.
The status of these companies is permanently con-
tested. Formally market actors, they are under the ar-
bitrary control of the government, and often have to
operate according to logics which are contrary to prot
maximisation for shareholders and to economic ef-
ciency. One example is the way the Tusk government
charged Krzysztof Kiljan, upon his nomination as Head
of PGE, with the task of steering three energy me-
ga-projects at the same time: the building of Poland’s
rst nuclear power plant, shale gas exploration and the
nalisation of the construction of the Opole hard coal
plant expansion (he was dismissed when he decided to
stand by the economic logic of the company and the
shareholders’ good).7
Since 2016, the PiS government has attempted to
change the statutes of the four major (and partly Sta-
te-owned) energy companies, introducing a point saying
that they constitute an ‘instrument of national energy
security’. This change implied that they would no longer
be subject to economic, market-logic but might be for-
ced to follow decisions made according to the ‘national
energy security’ interest, left undened. Changes were
introduced by the PiS-loyal company leadership in the
statutes of three of the four companies, but when the
issue became more public, the move was not accepted
by the board of the last company, Tauron.8
State ownership is also the cause of very unclear
boundaries between the public administration, politics
and the energy sector. During the transition from com-
munism, Poland has seen only a gradual development
towards a professional civil service as most public insti-
tutions remain politicised and each election brings sig-
nicant staff changes on all levels. The political system
is also poorly institutionalised, with professional politi-
cians constituting only a small group. Public opinion is
somewhat sceptical of the idea of ‘professional’ politics
conducted by politicians whose career starts in a par-
ty youth organisation and then proceeds to Parliament
and government – as this is associated with communist
era careerism. Calls for technocratic ‘governments of ex-
perts’ are often popular, which also means that Minis-
ters do not have to have a parliamentary mandate (they
are often not elected politicians) but it is seen as a good
thing if they have experience from the issue area that
they are to govern. Hence, doctors often become Health
Ministers, and experience in the energy sector is seen
as valuable in the Ministries dealing with energy (for
example the Energy, Economy, Treasury or Environment
Ministries).
Since State companies are under the control of the
government, they are also used for different gratica-
tion practices which in other contexts could be interpre-
ted as nepotistic or corrupt. Firstly, while Ministers and
their deputies cannot sit on State company supervisory
boards, Directors of ministerial departments and other
civil servants can. Their formal role there is to safeguard
the interests of the State Treasury, and Stanislaw Kazi-
mierz Habda, a professional civil servant currently in the
Energy Ministry is an example of such oversight, sitting
on several boards over the last decade. However, board
membership is also lucrative and is used as a premium
for loyalty within Ministries. Furthermore, as we shall
see, sitting on boards is also often an anchor for future
positions in the company itself.
Since State companies are
under the control of the
government, they are also
used for different gratication
practices which in other
contexts could be interpreted
as nepotistic or corrupt
POLAND
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REVOLVING DOORS: POLAND
Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conicts of interest in climate policy-making
While the revolving door problem often goes unno-
ticed in Poland, and might be denied given the ‘public
function of State energy companies, what does cause
media outrage is the common practice of post-election
‘sweeping’ of all management and supervisory boards
to repopulate them with politicians, trusted associates,
clients and family members. This problem is signaled in
the cases described below, but only in passing, since it is
not directly related to the revolving doors problem.
The following analysis is based on a desktop survey
of all major power, oil, gas and mining sector companies
in Poland, as well as of the Ministries of Energy, Finance,
Development and Innovation (Ministries of Treasury and
Economy were disbanded in 2016) and also the regula-
tor’s ofce for cases of revolving door passages in both
directions. They are divided into categories according to
the way the door has turned. The focus is on appoint-
ments in the last 10 years, especially under the previous
and current government. Some of the cases described are
not ideal-typical instances of the revolving door problem
– e.g. the ‘private sector’ is not really ‘private’, or someti-
mes there is a longer lag between shifting roles. Howe-
ver, they have been selected to illustrate various systemic
problems in Poland’s energy governance and they all in-
volve a transgression of roles between the legislative/
regulatory side and the company/for-prot side.
Conclusions and implications for climate
policy and UN transparency guidelines
The analysis conrmed that switching roles between
public administration and/or politics and managerial po-
sitions in the coal/oil/gas sector in Poland is a fairly com-
mon phenomenon. Interestingly, private energy sector
companies (e.g. Innogy Poland, Bogdanka SA) do not
seem to attract employees with public administration or
political backgrounds, and are managed by energy/busi-
ness professionals. It is also striking that although Po-
land ranks highly above the OECD average in the share
of women in managerial positions, there are no women
in the revolving door cases found.
The implications of the situation for Poland’s clima-
te policy ambitions are profound. Most importantly the
total lack of a clear border between the State (gover-
nment) and the energy sector means that regulatory
capture is a default position for Polish energy policy.
The government is designing energy policy in the name
and in the interest of the largest utilities, simply becau-
se their interest is seen as the national interest, equa-
ted with the ‘public good’. There are no incentives for
challenging this setup, e.g. by liberalising the energy
market, since State companies and their boards play
an important role in Poland’s government and admi-
nistrative practices, and their prots translate to direct
transfers to the State budget.
As Poland’s energy sector is based on fossil fuels,
mostly coal in electricity generation, ambitious climate
policy and emissions reductions are seen as a threat to
the incumbents. The degree of overlap between politics,
administration and the energy business illustrated be-
low clearly explains Poland’s low ambitions in EU energy
and international climate negotiations. The constant cir-
culation of managers, many of whom are politicians wi-
thout knowledge and experience in energy, makes them
focus on corporate management, rather than on strate-
gic energy policy (which Poland visibly lacks). When top
managers are politically designated and lack a vision and
idea for the future of the companies they steer, lower-le-
vel energy sector experts, often used to ‘the way things
are normally done’ can overwrite any political initiatives
for change. Sectoral inertia plays a very important role
(see the case of Mr. Woszczyk).
More transparency is certainly needed, and Poland’s
own domestic legislation is moving in that direction. Howe-
ver, the problem here is most importantly the political eco-
nomy of the energy sector – the symbiosis between the
State, those currently in power, a growing circle of elites
which includes former government members and opposi-
tion politicians, and State-run energy companies – a deeply
entrenched coalition which is very difcult to move. //
Board membership is also
lucrative and is used as a
premium for loyalty within
Ministries. Furthermore, as we
shall see, sitting on boards is
also often an anchor for future
positions in the company itself
101
TOP CASES OF REVOLVING DOORS IN POLAND
Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament
7 revolving door cases POLAND
Piotr Wożniak is a geologist and has served in different
political and administrative roles, while in 2015 he retur-
ned to the Polish national gas champion, PGNiG (Polskie
Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo – Polish Petroleum Mi-
ning and Gas Industry).9 A member of the Law and Justice
Party, he was Minister of Economy in the cabinets of Pri-
me Ministers Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and Jarosław Kac-
zyński. In the cabinet of Donald Tusk he became Deputy
Minister of Environment and National Head Geologist – an
administrative function which plays a key role in (shale)
gas regulation and exploration regimes.10 After PiS took
power in 2015, he entered the supervisory board of PG-
NiG as a representative of the State Treasury and only one
week later took over as acting President, to be installed as
President two months later. //
THE GREAT REVOLVERS
Individuals who have passed through
the revolving door more than
once, switching between politics,
administration & business
PIOTR WOŹNIAK
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
LAW AND JUSTICE (PIS)
PUBLIC OR POLITICAL ROLE/S
1990-91 – Advisor to Minister of Agriculture & Minister of Industry
1992-1996 – Trade advisor in the Polish Embassy in Canada
1992-1996 – Advisor to the Minister of Infrastructure
2002-2006 – Warsaw Municipal Council Member
2005-2007 – Minister of Economy
2009-2014 – Chair, Administrative Board of the Agency for Cooperation
Energy Regulators (ACER)
2011-2013 – Deputy Minister of Environment, National Head Geologist
2014 – Vice-chair, Administrative Board of ACER
ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
1999-2000 – Member of the supervisory board, PGNiG
2000-2001 – Vice-president, PGNiG
2015 – Member of the supervisory board, acting President and President,
PGNiG
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TOP CASES OF REVOLVING DOORS IN POLAND
Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conicts of interest in climate policy-making
POLAND
THERE AND BACK AGAIN
Individuals who worked for energy
companies and returned there
after working in government
administration
HENRYK BARANOWSKI
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
FORMER MEMBER OF LAW AND JUSTICE GOVERNMENT
PUBLIC AND/OR POLITICAL ROLES
2015-2016 – Deputy Minister of Treasury
ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
1990-2001 – National Transmission System Operator – PSE
2001-2006 – President of the board, PSE-Info
2006-2008 – Vice-President at PGE
2013-2015 – Alstom Energy
2006-2015 – Member of the supervisory boards of PGE Energia, PSE-
Operator and Tel-Energo, member of the management board of the Polish
Electrical Energy Commitee
2016 – Member of the management board, PGE
Baranowski is an electrical engineer, his career began in
PSE – Poland’s national and fully State owned Transmission
System Operator (TSO). Though the company is formally
a joint-stock company, the state holds 100% of its shares,
and it performs important administrative functions and
services which make it a hybrid between the energy sector
and public administration. Baranowski later moved on to
other energy companies, and in 2015-2016 was appointed
deputy Minister of Treasury, charged with supervising Sta-
te-owned energy companies. He resigned from the ofce
on 2 March 2016 and on 22 March was appointed member
of the management board of PGE.14 //
FROM FROM THE REGULATOR
TO ENERGY
MAREK WOSZCZYK
PUBLIC AND/OR POLITICAL ROLES
1998-2011 – Different positions, last – Vice-President, Energy Regulation
Ofce
2011-2013 – President of the Energy Regulation Ofce
ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
2013-2016 – President of the management board, PGE
2016 – President, PGNiG Upstream
Woszczyk’s case is unusual in the Polish context, though it
is a clear example of the revolving door problem between
public administration and the energy sector. Woszczyk was
a professional civil servant and throughout his career he
worked for the national regulator (which in the Polish ener-
gy governance system is the only institution formally char-
ged with representing individual consumers’ interests and
using societal welfare as a benchmark). He won a compe-
titive appointment procedure and became the President of
the Energy Regulation Ofce, URE. As the head of the na-
tional regulator, he was “a strong proponent of innovation,
prosumerism, smart grids”. He regretted the cumbersome
process for connecting small installations to the grid. “I be-
lieve the obstacle is a particular mental barrier – resistance
from the incumbent companies who keep functioning ac-
cording to the same traditional model of centralised energy
production for years” – he said in an interview.11
In 2016 he moved directly from the ofce regulating the
energy sector to the largest energy sector company, PGE.
Asked if he does not see this as a conict of interests, the
then Treasury Minister Karpinski stated that “if professio-
nals run companies, I have nothing against it”.12 However,
when Woszczyk took charge, it turned out that the insti-
tutional inertia was too difcult to overcome. He stepped
down in March 2016, mostly due to the post-electoral pres-
sure on State-owned company positions from the PiS go-
vernment. After just one day he became president of PG-
NiG Upstream International, the part of PGNiG group that
is responsible for international petroleum exploration.13 //
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TOP CASES OF REVOLVING DOORS IN POLAND
Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament
POLAND
FROM POLITICS TO ENERGY
ALEKSANDER GRAD
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
CIVIC PLATFORM (PO)
PUBLIC AND/OR POLITICAL ROLES
2001-2007 – Member of Sejm, PO
2007-2011 – Minister of Treasury
2011-2012 – Member of Sejm, PO
ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
2012- President of PGE Nuclear Energy and PGE EJ1 (Nuclear Plant 1),
TAURON
2014-2015 – Supervisory board member, Warsaw Energy Exchange
2014 – 2015 – Deputy President, TAURON
2016 (February to June) – President of the board Pątnów-Adamów-Konin
power plants
A member of Civic Platform (PO) and associate of Donald
Tusk, Grad became the Minister of Treasury and directly
supervised State and partly State owned energy com-
panies. It was not seen as a problem for the ruling party
to watch him switch from democratically elected legisla-
ture and a regulatory function in the Executive straight
to the sector he was previously tasked with regulating –
after the 2011 elections he did not return to the Ministry,
resigned from his mandate and became Director of the
sub-company of PGE responsible for building Poland’s
first nuclear power plant.
Tusk suggested that “the involvement of State and
strict political supervision on the nuclear project is absolu-
tely necessary”17. Grad’s position was meant to create a kind
of personal union between the State and the energy sector,
which was also expressed in his own words: “Building Ener-
FILIP GRZEGORCZYK
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
FORMER MEMBER OF LAW AND JUSTICE GOVERNMENT
PUBLIC AND/OR POLITICAL ROLES
2006-2007 – Advisor to the Minister of State Treasury
2015-2016 – Undersecretary of State, Ministry of State Treasury
ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
2007-2008 – Deputy President of the management board, TAURON
2011-2014 – Board plenipotentiary for energy policy, Kompania Weglowa
(Coal Company)
2011-2014 – Director for corporate management, Weglokoks
2016- President, TAURON
A lawyer and political scientist, attorney and professor of
the Jagiellonian University and later the Krakow Unversity
of Economics (he maintains this afliation since ca. 2007),
Grzegorczyk holds a doctorate in European Law and a ha-
bilitation in trade law. Apart from his academic career, he
was involved with the fossil energy sector since 2007, rst
at one of the “big four” energy companies – TAURON, and
later with the national hard coal sector giant, Kompania
Weglowa. He served a brief stint in 2006 as advisor to the
Minister of Treasury, after which he went back to the pri-
vate sector. He again had a short episode in the Ministry
of Treasury in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Beata Szydlo
in 2015, after which he became the President of TAURON.15
Linked to the Law and Justice Party for many years, his ca-
reer in State energy companies has been described as an
element of the faction wars within the party, with Grze-
gorczyk linked to the dismissed Treasury Minister Dariusz
Jackiewicz.16 //
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TOP CASES OF REVOLVING DOORS IN POLAND
Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conicts of interest in climate policy-making
POLAND
WOJCIECH JASIŃSKI
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
LAW AND JUSTICE (PIS)
PREVIOUS PUBLIC AND/OR POLITICAL ROLES
1973-80 – Civil servant, Plock City Council
1992-1997 – Civil servant at the Supreme Audit Ofce (NIK)
2000-2001 – Deputy Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice
2001-2007 – Member of Sejm, PiS
2006-2007 – Minister of State Treasury
2007 (September) – Secretary of State, Ministry of State Treasury
2007-2015 - Member of Sejm, PiS
ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
2015-2018 – President of PKN Orlen
A lawyer and administrator by training, Jasiński was invol-
ved in local level politics since the 1970s when he entered
the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR – communist). After
the transition, he became involved in the conservative-ri-
ght political current around Lech and Jaroslaw Karzynski,
serving in the Supreme Audit Ofce and the Ministry of
Justice under Lech Kaczynski, and later as Minister of State
Treasury under Prime Ministers K. Marcinkiewicz and J. Kac-
zynski. In the meantime, he was head of a private company
which has nanced the development of Law and Justice.
He was elected to the Sejm in 4 elections. In 2006 as Mi-
nister of Treasury he supported a contract between PGNiG
and RosUkrEnergo for gas deliveries to Poland until 2022,
which was heavily criticised by the opposition and by some
energy analysts.21
Soon after getting elected to the Sejm again in 2015,
he resigned from his MP mandate and was nominated the
President of the national oil company PKN Orlen – the su-
pervisory board removed him from this position in February
2018, most likely due to the proposed merger of Orlen with
the other national oil champion, Lotos.22 His nomination to
the function without any prior experience in the oil sector
coupled with the high salary have stirred up controversy in
the mainstream media. Described as a “friend of Kaczyns-
ki’s”, he is often portrayed as an illustration for PiS nepo-
tism in State owned companies.23 //
gy security is costly and the role of the State is to design
market regulations in a way that minimise market risks [for
the Energy companies]”18.
It soon became obvious that this unclear amalgam of
public and private sector incentives was not giving the ri-
ght results, and Grad was unable to create a consortium
which could handle the nuclear project. In January 2014
he resigned from his seat at PGE and already in February
got a position at the competitor company – TAURON.19 He
managed to negotiate a very benecial non-competition
clause, which allowed him to switch to another energy
company in 2016, only 6 months after stepping down from
his position at TAURON, and also obliged the latter to pay
him some 560,000 PLN (roughly €120,000) compensa-
tion. In 2018 he led a lawsuit against TAURON for failing
to pay the agreed sum.20 //
105
TOP CASES OF REVOLVING DOORS IN POLAND
Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament
POLAND
JACEK KOŚCIELNIAK
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
LAW AND JUSTICE (PIS) (UNTIL 2007)
PUBLIC AND/OR POLITICAL ROLES
1998-2002 – Director, nancial department, Silesian Voivodship Ofce
2005-2007 – Member of Sejm, Law and Justice
2007 (January to November) – Secretary of State, Chancellery of the Prime
Minister
2007-2011 – Vice-President of the Supreme Audit Ofce (NIK)
2011-2016 – Supreme Audit Ofce (NIK)
ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
December 2016-January 2017 – Member of supervisory board, acting
President Energa
January 2017 – Vice-President in charge of nances, Energa
Kościelniak is an accountant, and after a career in both the
private and public sectors, he entered politics with a PiS
membership and soon secured a Sejm mandate in the na-
tional elections. After a period in the administration of the
Prime Minister J. Kaczynski's Chancellory, he was appointed
Vice-President of the Supreme Audit Ofce (SAO) shortly
before PiS had to hand over power following snap elections
(Kościelniak was not reelected and had to resign from PiS
membership to get the Supreme Audit Ofce appointment).
After four years he stepped down from the leadership posi-
tion but remained in the SAO.24
After PiS returned to power, he was appointed to the
supervisory board of Energa, and a month later beca-
me acting President and soon after that, Vice-President.25
Known for his ultra-conservative views, Kościelniak made
the headlines when he initiated a Holy Mass in which the
employees of Energa entrusted the company to the Vir-
gin Mary.26 His example is given as an illustration of the
post-electoral ‘storm’ on State-owned companies, in which
political loyalty is the only selection criterion.27 //
PHOTO SOURCES AND CREDITS
Piotr Woźniak: Photo source: Wikipedia - https://
pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piotr_Woźniak_(polityk)#/
media/File:Piotr_Woźniak.JPG
Aleksander Grad: Photo: Wikipedia - https://pl.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/Aleksander_Grad#/media/File:Ale-
ksander_Grad_2010.jpg
Tauron by Mateusz Giełczyński, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tauron_Pols-
ka_Energia_Krak%C3%B3w_II.JPG
POLAND
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REVOLVING DOORS: POLAND
Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conicts of interest in climate policy-making
END NOTES
1 Czubkowska, Sylwia. ‘’Ustawa o jawności blokuje urzędnikom
pracę w rmach, na rzecz których działali w administracji.’’ Gazeta
Prawna. October 31, 2017, http://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/pra-
ca-i-kariera/artykuly/1081860,jawnosc-zycie-publicznego-zakaz-pra-
cy-w-rmach-na-rzecz-ktorych-urzednicy-dzialali-w-administracji.html
2 Szulecki, K., ‘Poland’s renewable energy policy mix - European inuence
and domestic soap opera’, CICERO Working Paper 1/2017, CICERO Cen-
ter for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, April
2017, 28 pp.
3 Jan Burck, Franziska Marten, Christoph Bals, Niklas Höhne, 2018,
Climate Change Performance Index: http://germanwatch.org/en/down-
load/20503.pdf
4 See press release by ClientEarth on 27 October 2017: https://www.
clientearth.org/polands-move-derail-landmark-pollution-law-uncons-
cionable-environmental-lawyers/
5 Kathrin Gutmann from Climate Action Network Europe (CAN), Julia
Huscher from Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL), Darek Urbaniak
and Adam White from WWF European Policy Ofce, Christian Schaible
from the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Mona Bricke,
Climate Alliance Germany, July 2014, Europe’s Dirty 30: How the EU’s
Coal-Fired Power Plants are Undermining its Climate Efforts
6 Ciepila, Dariusz. ‘’Krajowy rynek energii zamieniony w oligopol?’’ WNP.
pl, October 05, 2017, http://energetyka.wnp.pl/krajowy-rynek-ener-
gii-zamieniony-w-oligopol,307737_1_0_0.html
7 Wróblewski, M., Historia spięcia w pewnej przyjaźni: Dlaczego Krzysz-
tof Kilian zrezygnował z szefowania PGE?, „Polska”, 22. 11. 2013.
8 Szulecki, Kacper and Julia Kusznir, 2017. Energy Security and Energy
Transition: Securitisation in the Electricity Sector. In: Kacper Szulecki
(ed.) Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions and Policy Cha-
llenges, Chapter: 5, London: Palgrave; also: BiznesAlert. 2017. “Tauron
jednak bez odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo energetyczne kraju.“
BiznesAlert, 30 May 2017.
9 PGNiG. ‘’Zarząd.’’ http://pgnig.pl/pgnig/o-nas/zarzad/-/asset_publisher/
apZlRfWvTq9g/content/piotr-wozniak-p-o-pezesa-zarzadu
10 CIRE.pl. ‘’SERWIS INFORMACYJNY CIRE 24.’’ December 13, 2011. http://
www.cire.pl/item,58903,1,0,0,0,0,0,piotr-wozniak-nowym-wiceminis-
trem-srodowiska-i-glownym-geologiem-kraju.html
11 Zasuń, Rafał (2016): Prezes PGE odchodzi. In Wysokie Napięcie, 2016 (3 March)
12 Newsweek. ‘’Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki Marek Woszczyk
zrezygnował ze stanowiska.’’ Newsweek, December 11, 2013. http://
www.newsweek.pl/polska/prezes-ure-marek-woszczyk-zrezygnowal-
ze-stanowiska-newsweek-pl,artykuly,276707,1.html
13 CIRE.pl. ‘’Marek Woszczyk Dyrektorem Generalnym spółki PGNiG
Upstream International AS.’’ CIRE.pl, April 01, 2016. http://www.cire.
pl/item,127262,1,0,0,0,0,0,marek-woszczyk-dyrektorem-generaln-
ym-spolki-pgnig-upstream-international-as.html
14 PGE. ‘’Władze.’’ https://www.gkpge.pl/Relacje-inwestorskie/Grupa/
Wladze/Henryk-Baranowski
15 Tauron. ‘’Filip Grzegorczyk.’’ https://www.tauron.pl/tauron/o-tauronie/
wladze-spolki/lip-grzegorczyk
16 http://gospodarka.dziennik.pl/news/artykuly/541918,frakcje-pis-spol-
ki-skarbu-panstwa-kghm.html
17 Tusk: Grad prezesem spółki? Ta nominacja ma charakter poli-
tyczny, „Wprost”, 18. 07. 2012, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/334451/
Tusk-Grad-prezesem-spolki-Ta-nominacja-ma-charakter-polityczny
18 Państwo musi ingerować w energetykę, „Forbes”, 5. 09. 2013,
http://www.forbes.pl/panstwo-musi-ingerowac-w-energetyke,ar-
tykuly,161320,1,1.html
19 Nowy zarząd energetycznego giganta. Były minister wiceprezes-
em, „Dziennik”, 17. 03. 2014, http://gospodarka.dziennik.pl/news/
artykuly/453634,nowy-zarzad-tauronu-aleksander-grad-wice-
prezesem-spolki.html. Also: Mizołek, J., Aleksander Grad nie zbuduje elek-
trowni atomowej. Dla Tuska stał się nieprzydatny, „Polska”, 31. 01. 2014.
20 PAP/RS. ‘’Aleksander Grad żąda od Tauronu 75 tys. zł.’’ WNP.pl. March
16, 2018, http://energetyka.wnp.pl/aleksander-grad-zada-od-tauronu-
75-tys-zl,319653_1_0_0.html
21 Money.pl. ‘’Przez ministra z PiS stracimy 17 mld zł?.’’ May 12, 2011.
https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wojciech_Jasiński_(polityk)
22 Money.pl ‘’PKN Orlen ma nowego prezesa. Jacek Krawiec odwołany,
stery przejmuje Wojciech Jasiński.’’ https://www.money.pl/gospo-
darka/wiadomosci/artykul/pkn-orlen-ma-nowego-prezesa-jacek-
krawiec,44,0,1980460.html
23 Newsweek. ‘’Wojciech Jasiński zarabia w Orlenie miliony. Dzięki
nominacji PiS.’’ March 15, 2017. http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/zarob-
ki-wojciecha-jasinskiego-w-orlenie-ile-zarabia-przyjaciel-prezesa-,ar-
tykuly,406946,1.html
24 SuperBiz. ‘’Były poseł PiS Jacek Kościelniak został p.o. prezesa spółki
Energa.’’ January 17, 2017. https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacek_Kościelniak
25 Wawryszuk, Bartosz. ‘’Błyskawiczna kariera byłego posła PiS. Po nie-
całym miesiącu już p.o. prezesa Energi.’’ January 17, 2017. https://www.
money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/jacek-koscielniak-p-o-preze-
sa-energi-byly,104,0,2237288.html
26 Katka, Krzysztof. ‘’Prezesi Energi zawierzyli spółkę opatrzności Bożej.’’
Wyborcza. February 03, 2017. http://trojmiasto.wyborcza.pl/trojmias-
to/7,35612,21330989,prezes-energi-zawierzyli-spolke-opatrznos-
ci-bozej.html
27 Although post-electoral sweeps in public sector companies have been
common practice in Poland, the scale of this phenomenon under the
current PiS government is unprecedented, as documented in a recent
report by the watchdog Batory Foundation: Grażyna Kopińska, 2018,
Stanowiska publiczne jako łup polityczny: Polityka personalna w okresie
od 16 listopada 2015 do 31 października 2017 roku, Warszawa: Funcadja
Batorego.
Article
Full-text available
Poland is the largest hard coal and second largest lignite producer in the EU, generating around 80 percent of its electricity from coal. Resistance to a reduction in coal production and consumption comes from various actors, namely, coal corporations, unions, parts of civil society and the government – as well as their coalitions. Their opposition centres around the prospect of losing their business, past negative experiences with structural change, fears of rising energy prices and energy security concerns, as well as potential unemployment in regions almost entirely dependent on coal. This paper identifies key political and economic drivers and barriers of a reduction in coal production and consumption in Poland using the Triple Embeddedness Framework. Uneconomic coal mining, unavoidable energy infrastructure investments, rising air pollution levels and pressure from the European Union might provide new political momentum for a shift away from coal in line with international climate targets. However, results show that to achieve political feasibility, policies targeting a reduction in coal production and use need to be implemented jointly with social and structural policy measures, addressing a just transition for the affected regions in line with the vision of a ‘European Green Deal’.
Ustawa o jawności blokuje urzędnikom pracę w firmach, na rzecz których działali w administracji
  • Sylwia Czubkowska
Czubkowska, Sylwia. ''Ustawa o jawności blokuje urzędnikom pracę w firmach, na rzecz których działali w administracji.'' Gazeta Prawna. October 31, 2017, http://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/praca-i-kariera/artykuly/1081860,jawnosc-zycie-publicznego-zakaz-pracy-w-firmach-na-rzecz-ktorych-urzednicy-dzialali-w-administracji.html
Poland's renewable energy policy mix -European influence and domestic soap opera', CICERO Working Paper 1/2017, CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research
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Szulecki, K., 'Poland's renewable energy policy mix -European influence and domestic soap opera', CICERO Working Paper 1/2017, CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, April 2017, 28 pp.
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Jan Burck, Franziska Marten, Christoph Bals, Niklas Höhne, 2018, Climate Change Performance Index: http://germanwatch.org/en/download/20503.pdf
Krajowy rynek energii zamieniony w oligopol?'' WNP. pl
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Ciepila, Dariusz. ''Krajowy rynek energii zamieniony w oligopol?'' WNP. pl, October 05, 2017, http://energetyka.wnp.pl/krajowy-rynek-energii-zamieniony-w-oligopol,307737_1_0_0.html
Historia spięcia w pewnej przyjaźni: Dlaczego Krzysztof Kilian zrezygnował z szefowania PGE?
  • M Wróblewski
Wróblewski, M., Historia spięcia w pewnej przyjaźni: Dlaczego Krzysztof Kilian zrezygnował z szefowania PGE?, "Polska", 22. 11. 2013.
Energy Security and Energy Transition: Securitisation in the Electricity Sector
  • Kacper Szulecki
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Szulecki, Kacper and Julia Kusznir, 2017. Energy Security and Energy Transition: Securitisation in the Electricity Sector. In: Kacper Szulecki (ed.) Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions and Policy Challenges, Chapter: 5, London: Palgrave; also: BiznesAlert. 2017. "Tauron jednak bez odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo energetyczne kraju." BiznesAlert, 30 May 2017.
Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki Marek Woszczyk zrezygnował ze stanowiska
Newsweek. ''Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki Marek Woszczyk zrezygnował ze stanowiska.'' Newsweek, December 11, 2013. http:// www.newsweek.pl/polska/prezes-ure-marek-woszczyk-zrezygnowalze-stanowiska-newsweek-pl,artykuly,276707,1.html
  • Państwo Musi Ingerować W Energetykę
Państwo musi ingerować w energetykę, "Forbes", 5. 09. 2013, http://www.forbes.pl/panstwo-musi-ingerowac-w-energetyke,artykuly,161320,1,1.html
Also: Mizołek, J., Aleksander Grad nie zbuduje elektrowni atomowej. Dla Tuska stał się nieprzydatny
  • Nowy
Nowy zarząd energetycznego giganta. Były minister wiceprezesem, "Dziennik", 17. 03. 2014, http://gospodarka.dziennik.pl/news/ artykuly/453634,nowy-zarzad-tauronu-aleksander-grad-wiceprezesem-spolki.html. Also: Mizołek, J., Aleksander Grad nie zbuduje elektrowni atomowej. Dla Tuska stał się nieprzydatny, "Polska", 31. 01. 2014.
Przez ministra z PiS stracimy 17 mld zł
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Money.pl. ''Przez ministra z PiS stracimy 17 mld zł?.'' May 12, 2011. https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wojciech_Jasiński_(polityk)