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China's Strategic Partnership Diplomacy
... Distinct labels are used to establish priorities, announce official positions, or set long-term political goals. In official policy and academic research, they describe, categorise, or rank a wide range of things, from domestic policies or international partnerships (Feng and Huang, 2014;Strüver, 2017) to geographical regions (Grant, 2018), or even raw materials (Andersson, 2020). To better understand China's Arctic interests, we need to study how such labels are applied to the region, and the domestic narratives surrounding them. ...
... In the 1990s, a system of different categories of foreign "partnerships" (伙伴关系, huoban guanxi) emerged in China. In this system, which has become known as China's "partnership diplomacy," labels such as "strategic," "comprehensive," "co-operation," and "co-ordination" are used not only to describe the different character of partnerships but also to create a hierarchy of China's foreign relations (Feng and Huang, 2014;Strüver, 2017). While a specific "partnership" is an indicator of the form and importance attached to a bilateral relationship, it is obviously not the only indicator. ...
... While a specific "partnership" is an indicator of the form and importance attached to a bilateral relationship, it is obviously not the only indicator. As Feng and Huang (2014) point out, a "strategic" partnership with one country may be valued higher than an identically labelled partnership with another, and for relations with China's "closest friends" (North Korea, Pakistan), it may be considered unnecessary to enter a formal "partnership." While in some cases, the creation of new categories of "partnerships" may be designed to elevate and distinguish China's relations with a specific country, they are perhaps best understood as diplomatic tools for advancing Chinese interests that are applied when it is deemed advantageous to do so. ...
Research confirms that China is becoming more engaged in the Arctic. However, international relations scholarship often extrapolates from relatively few instances of activity to wide-ranging claims about Chinese priorities. Fortunately, Chinese political discourse is organised by labels that allow us to study how the Arctic is classified and ranked along China's other foreign policy priorities. This article analyses two such classifications-"important maritime interest" and "strategic new frontier," exploring how they have come about, what they mean, and how they add political priority to the Arctic. It argues that hierarchies are constructed in two ways: by adding gradients and by including/excluding categories of priority. It views categories as performative: they not only convey information about character and relative importance of interests but are also used for achieving different objectives. By focusing on foreign policy classifications, the article contributes to a more nuanced and precise understanding of China's Arctic interests.
... upgraded, as mentioned above, to the level of "Strategic Partnership in global responsibility" (Zhongping & Jing, 2014), and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder battled, unsuccessfully, to lift the European Union's arms embargo against China (Kamiński, 2015, p. 137;Malzahn, 2005). In the same year, two new links between provinces and as many as 20 new partnerships at the local level (between cities) were established (in comparison, in 2003 there was only one). ...
... When Charles de Gaulle established official diplomatic ties with China in 1964, France was ahead of many other western countries (Seaman & Ekman, 2015). Moreover, France was the first Western European country to sign a joint statement, thus agreeing to establish a "comprehensive partnership" in 1997 (Zhongping & Jing, 2014). That was during the presidency of Jacques Chirac (1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007). ...
... Spain and China have had a strategic partnership since 2005 (Zhongping & Jing, 2014). There has been an increase in the two countries' economic ties in recent years. ...
More and more regions are cooperating with their Chinese counterparts in many different areas: economy, environment, culture, academic exchange. Although the subnational dimension has started to be a visibly important element of EU-China relations, this trend is not reflected in the academic literature on EU-China relations. Until now, we have not known what the network of contacts with China at the regional level looks like and what the determinants and institutional forms of inter-regional partnerships there are.
The present book maps Sino-European relations at the regional level and presents a detailed analysis of subnational contacts in the six analysed EU member states, illustrated by case studies of interesting regions from each country. It shows the rising role of non-state actors in international relations, the growing importance of paradiplomacy, as well as the necessity to look at the EU-China relations as a multi-layer phenomenon, engaging different types of actors on different levels.
... "Strategic partnership" is a contested and ill-defined concept (Wilkins, 2008;Huang & Feng, 2014). The term has been mostly used by Russian and Chinese leaders (Wilkins, 2008) in the post-Cold War age. ...
... The term has been mostly used by Russian and Chinese leaders (Wilkins, 2008) in the post-Cold War age. Huang and Feng (2014) have listed 50 strategic partnerships that involve China and reflect a variety of agreements and types of relations. Which are strategic partnerships' more notable features? ...
... 2. Strategic partnerships appeared in the 1990s as a tool in the relations among developing and rising countries. China valued a partnership with Brazil, established in 1993, and one with Russia in 1996 (Huang & Feng, 2014). The United States does not use this term, and the European Union (EU), despite establishing several strategic partnerships with several countries, seems to lack a well-defined strategy and clarity of purpose (Ferreira-Pereira & Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, 2016). ...
This article examines the current China-Russia partnership in the energy sector, focusing on natural gas and other Eurasian Economic Union countries’ role in this relationship. It argues that the foundation of China-Russia cooperation is strategic, despite the existence of several long-term issues, which make it fragile. Russia’s “pivot to China” in the energy field relies on practical considerations, such as export diversification and problems with Western countries. However, China has fast-growing demand and many choices of gas import. Moreover, China negotiates bilaterally with its partners, which secures Beijing an upper hand in gas talks, including those with Russia. The economic significance of energy interdependence in the Eurasian region allows a monopsonist China to leverage over the region’s regimes, including Putin’s Russia.
... There exists a plethora of research on Chinese foreign policy. Apart from several comprehensive works (e.g., Lanteigne, 2019;Harris, 2014;Robinson and Shambaugh, 1995;Ning, 1997;Rozman, 2013), a large number of articles and papers have dealt with specific aspects of Chinese foreign policy, including how it is made (Jakobson, 2016;Zhao, 2016;Jakobson and Manuel, 2016;Bachman, 1998); its objectives, priorities, and strategies (e.g., Leverett and Wu, 2017;Kastner and Saunders, 2012); diplomatic tools (Strüver, 2017;Feng and Huang, 2014); domestic drivers (e.g., Nathan, 2016;Zhao, 1992;Brittingham, 2007;Zhao, 2013); and Chinese academic debates (e.g., Feng et al., 2019;Zhu, 2010;Swaine, 2013). This section will focus on three distinct but interrelated academic debates to which this thesis contributes: 1) how are China's foreign policy priorities formulated and what actors are involved in this process; 2) what are China's foreign policy priorities, and in particular, what do official labels and categories reveal about them, including how the Arctic is ranked and contextualized as a foreign policy issue; and 3) how do Chinese companies respond to incentives from the foreign policy sector. ...
... In the last decade, research on categorization in Chinese foreign policy has focused on two topics -China's "partnership diplomacy" and the concept of "core interest" ( 核心利益). The term "partnership diplomacy" has been used by scholars to describe the different categories of bilateral partnerships (伙伴关系) that China has entered with other countries (e.g., Shambaugh, 2013;Medeiros, 2009;Strüver, 2017;Feng and Huang, 2014). In this system, which emerged in the mid-1990s, labels are used to distinguish between different types of "partnerships" but also to establish a hierarchy of China's foreign relations. ...
This compilation thesis is the result of a public sector industrial PhD project made in collaboration between the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) and Aalborg University. Part of GEUS’ task is to produce knowledge about China’s mineral interests and its effects on the Danish realm for the use of Denmark’s central administration. The foundation for this task includes understanding the machinations behind Chinese decisions on what and where to mine. Prior to this PhD project, GEUS had a solid understanding of potential economic and strategic incentives for China’s engagement in mining and mineral exploration projects. This thesis adds to this understanding by studying how political framing in the Chinese state system plays out and how this framing along with a number of already well-known factors affect the decisions of state and semi-state-owned enterprises to engage in projects outside China, especially in the Arctic.
Chinese interest in minerals overseas has raised concerns, not least in Western countries. Fears have ranged from state-backed Chinese companies taking control over overseas mining operations to Chinese demand driving up commodity prices globally. There have also been concerns that Chinese state and private firms act not only as profit-seeking businesses but also to accomplish the long-term geopolitical goals of the Chinese Communist Party. This is especially the case in the Arctic, where Chinese companies’ engagement in Arctic mining operations are often viewed through the prism of Arctic geopolitics and China’s growing Arctic ambitions.
However, while scholars tend to agree that China has both a strategy for securing supply of mineral raw materials and a regional foreign policy strategy for the Arctic, there is a lack of qualified knowledge about the precise relationship between Chinese state policies and priorities and on-the-ground activities of Chinese companies in the Arctic. This compilation thesis, which consists of four freestanding papers, contributes to filling this research gap, specifically departing from Arctic mining and mineral exploration projects. Hence, the overarching research aim is to improve the understanding of the complex relations between, on the one hand, the Chinese central state’s foreign policy and industrial development priorities and, on the other hand, the decisions and approaches of state and semi-state enterprises and other actors.
Drawing extensively on Chinese-language policy and planning documents and academic articles, as well as field research in China and Greenland, the four papers explore this problématique through a focus on hierarchies of territories – defined and bargained as part of China foreign policy – and of minerals – defined and bargained as part of China’s mineral policy. They take a view of categorization and hierarchies as “performative,” meaning that actors construct and use them to achieve things. In the fragmented authoritarian context, companies, academics, and bureaucratic bodies, who all compete over political attention and limited state resources, not only interpret and adjust to official categories and hierarchies – they also participate in their construction and use them strategically to elevate the political priority of issues in which they have a vested interest or stake.
Based on the approach of fragmented authoritarianism (FA), the thesis viewed Chinese mining companies, mineral resource experts, and foreign policy scholars as part of a state bureaucracy and thus capable of acting as what Andrew Mertha calls “policy entrepreneurs” – or at least as sufficiently close to a bureaucracy to take on such a role. Unlike what is usually found when applying an FA approach, it argues that these policy entrepreneurs not only frame their activities in ways that address the policy frameworks or classification schemes most useful for them, but they also contribute to constructing or at least shaping some of the political language that becomes part of their framing. They do this, not only as FA has told us, by using categorization strategically to add political priority to issues and areas in which they are engaged or seek to engage, but they might also, earlier in the policy process, shape the labelling and content of political categories. In this way, they not only shape policies made at the center, as FA has found, but also to some degree contribute to shaping the state agenda. The thesis thereby also challenges the often-held assumption among China scholars that political language in China is produced by a narrow political elite and used as a tool for discourse control over lower-level cadres, intellectuals, and the masses.
... China has forged strategic partnerships based on mutual goals that are not reliant on ideational similarity (although that can also exist in parallel in some cases). These partnerships tend to develop from existing relationships and are often reserved for 'closer friends' with the notable exception of North Korea (Zhongping and Jing 2014). The aim of these partnerships is generally to provide a structure for enhanced communication in the areas of trade and finance, and also in matters related to security and mutual interests such as regional stability (Zhongping and Jing 2014). ...
... These partnerships tend to develop from existing relationships and are often reserved for 'closer friends' with the notable exception of North Korea (Zhongping and Jing 2014). The aim of these partnerships is generally to provide a structure for enhanced communication in the areas of trade and finance, and also in matters related to security and mutual interests such as regional stability (Zhongping and Jing 2014). There is overlap in these bilateral partnerships with the normative dimension. ...
Friendship is an important aspect of a state’s ability to succeed in great power politics, especially with regards to international order reshaping or building. Through engaging with the extant literature on friendship in International Relations, it is posited that while friendships tend to arise along strategic or normative dimensions, the most important (and enduring) friendships are bilateral relationships which are also culturally and historically aligned—what this article terms a bona fide international friendship. With China’s rise continuing apace, the importance for it to have friends, especially powerful ones, is self-evident. This article examines the concept of friendship in the scope of China’s foreign policymaking, identifying an increased effort to cultivate friendships. However, this article argues that as it currently stands, China does not appear to have any significant bona fide friends. Russia may yet emerge as a serious contender as a bona fide friend for China, but substantial issues may arise in that friendship in the coming decades. Thus, for China, and other aspiring international powers, building bona fide international friendships with prominent international powers is a critical task ahead because international orders underpinned by bona fide friendships will likely be more resilient than those orders that are not.
... A step forward indicating solid record of mutual cooperation was accomplished in 2014 during a presidential visit to China, the Egyptian president signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the Chinese counterpart to cover all dimensions of economic cooperation including trade and investment and multiple levels of interactions encompassing people-topeople exchanges, in this partnership One China policy was mentioned, which is not a frequent case in most signed CSPs (Zhongping and Jing, 2014). Interesting to know that partnerships signed between China and world countries do not follow same mechanisms or one identified institutional framework, for example the CSP signed with EU includes dialogue over human rights issues while this was not the case in CSPs with developing world (Zhongping and Jing, 2014). ...
... A step forward indicating solid record of mutual cooperation was accomplished in 2014 during a presidential visit to China, the Egyptian president signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the Chinese counterpart to cover all dimensions of economic cooperation including trade and investment and multiple levels of interactions encompassing people-topeople exchanges, in this partnership One China policy was mentioned, which is not a frequent case in most signed CSPs (Zhongping and Jing, 2014). Interesting to know that partnerships signed between China and world countries do not follow same mechanisms or one identified institutional framework, for example the CSP signed with EU includes dialogue over human rights issues while this was not the case in CSPs with developing world (Zhongping and Jing, 2014). Strategic partnership that is used by the Chinese government is used as an institutionalized diplomatic instrument that serves China's peaceful rise in the global unipolar system. ...
Purpose
The main purpose of the paper is to examine the truth behind allegations of neo-colonialism performed by China toward Africa, which was raised due to the growing relationship between China and Africa that enhanced the debate between supporters of the notion of neo-colonialism or mutual beneficial relationship. In addition to the growing number of arguments are on the dominance of PRC in Africa over the western powers as European Union or United States in the Continent.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper investigates the claims of neo-colonialism practiced by China toward Africa through the lenses of international political economy using the Interdependence theory of neoliberalists. Egypt was selected as a case study due to the emphases that Egypt gives to China as a strategic partner and as rising economic power as well as representing a way of diversifying Egypt's foreign policy and an additional economic partner beside the western ones. The research relied on two interwoven indicators to investigate the main argument: Trade and Development Aid.
Findings
The two pillars of analysis indicate that the growing relationship between Egypt and China is a form of interdependent relationship that is expected to get further complex in the future, which is relatively indicated among other things in the synergy Egypt has made between its Vision 2030 and China's Belt and Road Initiative. In reference to development aid, China uses different techniques that is not commonly used by the donors of Official Development Assistance (“ODA”), and due to unpublished actual data on China's aid figures, any indication of dominance is hard to attain regardless a solo incident of debt trap in Africa, the model of China's aid is provided through low-interest loans for development projects that is highly important for developing countries.
Originality/value
The paper tried to engage in the ongoing debate and examine the truth behind the neo-colonial allegations from the perspective of international political economy, which is an added value to the literature in this regard as the data provided are prepared for the present research purpose.
... The term strategic partnership first appeared in Chinese foreign policy shortly after the end of the Cold War, when China and Brazil established the first SP in 1993 (Zhongping and Jing, 2014). This was followed in 1996 by the establishment of a SP between Russia and China (Wilkins, 2008). ...
As discussions of a ‘new cold war’ between China and the West intensify, it has never been more important to understand how China engages internationally. Crucially, as of 2022, China has established 110 ‘strategic partnerships’, without stipulating any formal treaty of alliance, but we know little about strategic partnerships and how China uses them, despite their centrality as a foreign policy tool. Departing from the assumption of the state as a unitary and monolithic actor in international affairs, this article proposes a new framework of strategic partnerships which incorporates sub-state entities as well as an ideational component, highlighting the image-building purpose that these partnerships serve. Empirically, the analysis focuses on the evolution of the Sino-Italian strategic partnership, drawing on a critical discourse analysis of 1294 news articles published as part of the agreement between the Chinese and Italian news agencies Xinhua and ANSA.
... The partnership diplomacy helps Beijing realize its new Silk Road grand strategy, achieve effective management and control of its energy, goods, or product needs, and open new markets and trade routes. 28 The BRI is the most recent topic of China's diplomacy, designed to better match its increasing resources with growing ambitions. In this sense, the BRI is recognized as an instrument to achieve China's grand strategic objectives. ...
... The first and last serious blowback will be to (Mastro, 2021). China's strategic partnerships with the European Union, ASEAN countries, Mexico, Brazil and dozens of other countries since the 1990s and the institutional frameworks, high-level meetings, long-term agreements, crisis management which can, "be leveraged to help shape a more favorable political environment for China" (Zhongping & Jing, 2014). In more easier words, most of China's top trading partners have already sent indications that the issue of Taiwan will not affect their relationship with China. ...
China has pursued economic development and military modernization for three decades. It has resultantly achieved parity with U.S in many areas including military. Consequently, this has led to an erosion of the deterrence of an ambiguous security guarantee which the U.S had given to Taiwan in case it should come under attack. Uncertain times are upon us. On one hand, precursors to great power rivalries between the U.S and China are being given. On the other, we have unprecedented economic interconnectivity between the aforementioned great powers. Alongside these trends, the increase in Chinese power has led to an increased chance of a Chinese military attack on Taiwan at a time during when the U.S is drawing down its forever wars. What will follow will be the most important challenges to a system which has relatively remained unchanged since the Berlin Wall came down. This research paper will endeavor to understand the possibility of whether China can use the military option on Taiwan as well as the possible options for the U.S if China does do so. This paper will help to understand the contemporary situation if we are brave the storm which is coming.
... China's approach to One Belt One Road (OBOR) also strongly characterizes this strategy(Cox et al. 2018;Li et al. 2020).Furthermore, the second approach of 'Harmonious Asia' is to build strategic partnerships for peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries. China always strives to strengthen bilateral relations with countries through this strategic partnership(Tow 2011;Feng and Huang 2014). However, there is much pessimism, especially in China's claims in the South China Sea case. ...
Currently, China is growing into a new maritime power in the world. This country is listed with the largest number of commercial vessels with over 1,000 gross tons. The port of Shanghai has also transformed into one of the busiest ports globally, rivaling the Port of Amsterdam in terms of total cargo volume. China's shipping industry currently occupies the third position in the world. The maritime industry is increasingly competitive to ensure stable economic performance, but on the other hand, it is still highly dependent on secure access to markets and resources, particularly iron and fossil fuels. Taking into account the condition of the Chinese Navy and the government's Chinese Efforts to become a new maritime power in the world, China is currently trying to establish itself to realize its dream, namely the ability to become a force in blue water navy order to seize the United States' Hegemony in the Asia Pacific Region.
... This process reflects China's efforts to shape a favorable world order to guarantee a benign environment for its rise. 1 Li and Ye outlined twenty-four types of partnerships used by China, ranging from regular partnership to comprehensive strategic partnership 2 -the highest level of China's strategic partnership diplomacy. 3 This variety of partnerships suggests differing degrees of closeness between China and its partners. ...
This article investigates the strategic partnership between China and the UAE. It begins with an analysis of the concept of strategic partnership, based on the existing literature on the topic in international relations. Since there is no consensus as to the meaning of the term strategic partnership, the paper applies Thomas Wilkins’s model or framework to explain the UAE’s partnership with China. Wilkins is among the few to develop a conceptual framework or analytical model of the term. The paper then focuses on the foundation of the strategic partnership between the two countries, and goes on to analyze the prospects for the future of this partnership. The paper argues that although this partnership is strong, its future depends on two important factors. The first is UAE’s alliance with the United States, and the second, China’s relations with Iran. Driven as it is by economic considerations and a mutual desire for closer security and political cooperation, the partnership cannot, however, ignore these two important aspects.
... Partnership status served as a proxy for the political salience of each country to the MFA. The concept of partnership emerged within Chinese diplomacy after the end of the Cold War, and the first strategic partnership was with Brazil in 1993 (Feng and Huang, 2014;Serrano Moreno et al., 2020). Partnerships are a structured framework for collaboration, yet organised in a loose and non-binding way that aims to enable the pursuit of shared interests and the addressing of common challenges in different issue areas and facilitate (future) co-operation (Strüver, 2017: 36). ...
This study investigates a novel dataset comprised of a universe of 537 donations in 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, between 11 February and 20 June 2020, which provides a high level of detail on China’s and Taiwan’s mask diplomacy. We describe who the main donors were, who the main recipients were, what was donated to each country, and which variables explain why some countries received more aid than others. Drawing on previous literature, the article advances understanding about the political determinants of these donations. Our findings revealed that, although seemingly uncoordinated, donations made by China’s central government, Chinese companies, cities, and foundations were strongly affected by two political determinants, namely the recipient’s partnership status with China and the One China Policy. Furthermore, aid provided by China’s Central Government was larger in autocracies than in democracies.
... Nevertheless, the proliferation of strategic partnerships since the 1990s has created a broad range of functionalities, and it has become unsatisfactory to regard such a partnership as a power-based alignment. 5 For example, states do not always form partnerships with like-minded regional major powers, but sometimes align with significantly smaller powers that do not share similar political principles or contribute to capability aggregation, creating asymmetric strategic partnerships. In order to explain these variances in strategic partnerships, some scholars argue that many types of such partnerships exist, ranging from reassurance-based cooperation to "goal-based" cooperation to security practice. ...
I argue that the asymmetric strategic partnership (ASP) between a regional great power and a small power is not necessarily based on their shared goals, but such a partnership would help them achieve their own strategic objectives. For a regional great power, an ASP helps prevent a weak partner from excessively depending on a rival state for its economy and security. For a small power, the partnership increases the legitimacy of domestic political regime while offering a strategic option to hedge against the risk of over-dependence on a particular state by diversifying political and economic assistance. In short, ASPs serve as a wedge strategy for a regional great power, while it functions as a hedging strategy for a smaller power. I apply this conceptual framework to analyze two cases, the Japan-Cambodia and Japan-Laos strategic partnerships.
... According to foreign ministry officials in Beijing, there is no formal list of China's SPs in order to avoid offending countries that have yet to be invited. Feng and Huang (2014) surmise that 'Strategic' means cooperation is long-term and it transcends ideology and individual events; 'Partner' suggests that the bond between China and a given country is mutually beneficial and win-win. As for the place of politics in these SPs, 'In nearly every Strategic Partner document, concepts such as non-interference in domestic affairs, different understandings of democracy and human rights, or different development paths have been asserted' (Feng and Huang 2014, p. 13). ...
Since the launching of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Chinese leaders have sought to diffuse this ambitious overseas infrastructure drive into the Central and Eastern European bloc. From the literature on policy diffusion, we refer here to a process whereby a dominant actor (China) has vigorously promoted a particular strand of its own domestic development policy in other emerging economies. Our focus is on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, all EU members since 2004. We draw on Etel Solingen's (2012. Of dominoes and firewalls: the domestic, regional, and global politics of international diffusion. International Studies Quarterly, 56 (4), 631-644) seminal framework on policy diffusion, which considers the stimulus, the medium, political agents, and outcomes. It is the dearth of BRI loans and China-backed infrastructure projects in this sub-region that we seek to explain. Our main finding is that China has been its own biggest firewall in the diffusion of BRI into Central Europe. China needs to formulate policies that surpass the pursuit of its own economic interests and devise approaches that resonate with the more developed status of these three Central European countries.
... Maritime economic diplomacy places the use of marine potential as part of diplomacy with other countries (Lee, 2013). This diplomatic effort can not only increase investment in Indonesia, but also strengthen cooperative relations with other countries, especially those in the Southeast Asia region (Zhongping & Jing, 2014). If a country consists of a group of islands, its interconnected waters and other natural features can be considered as an island nation if the elements satisfy one of the two conditions. ...
Jokowi focus their governments to make Indonesia as the pivot of the maritime world greeted well considering Indonesia is a country that is two-thirds of the area consists of resource-rich waters and kelautan. Indonesia consists of 92 outer islands and 31 of them inhabited. As stated by Sukarno, in one of his speeches, Indonesia will become a strong nation if it has the ability or marine waters were strong, maritime shaft also have the same goal. This thesis discusses discusses the strategies and policies that have been planned by the government to make Indonesia as a maritime shaft. Jokowi as the pivot of the world's maritime evidenced by forming ministries coordinate their work and concentrated in maritime terms. Creating a strong quality of human resources in the field of maritime pariisata both capabilities in innovation and adaptation in the face of change, work culture and concepts to be implemented.
... China-India also increased its strategic relations by enhancing mutual interdependence and cooperation. As compared to the past now, both countries better understand the strategic concerns (Zhongping & Jing, 2014). ...
China and India are rising powers of Asia. Both Asian giants have to adopt the policy of interdependence by growing economic ties; on the other side, they have a strict stance on border disputes. This article describes in detail the bilateral relationship between China-India, especially under the Modi doctrine, during his first term. Secondly, it also discusses the limitation of these growing ties and growing concerns for Pakistan. The basic argument of this article is that the growing economic interdependence will affect Pakistan, especially if this interdependence transfer from the economic to military dimension. The whole data is based on exploratory in nature. A qualitative research method has been used to achieve the research goals. Tools used for data collection include oral interviews and content analysis of the existing literature on the subject in the form of books, official reports and research articles. The relevant literature has been objectively analyzed to reach a meaningful conclusion.
... Chen (2014) explains that China strove to achieve progressive and proactive diplomacy: Beijing has encouraged its overseas diplomats to actively participate in shaping the external environment and to consciously resolve or hedge external challenges at source. To this end, the new gov-ernment has strengthened its emphasis on "partnership diplomacy" (Feng & Huang 2014) and developed a new diplomatic discourse around themes such as the "Chinese dream, " great power diplomacy, and cooperation mechanisms with other emerging powers. This is all framed by Xi's trademark notion of a "common destiny of mankind, " and by the more tangible frameworks of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). ...
China has become the primary trade partner of Mercosur. The expansion of trade with the East Asian country has created new external dependencies and replicated traditional north-south relationships, something that has been assessed critically in recent studies. Moreover, competition between the Mercosur countries has increased insofar as they export similar commodities to China. Bilateral relations with the Mercosur states are hierarchized according to their international political and economic weight, as reflected both in the frequency of high-level Chinese diplomatic visits and in terms of the status of the strategic partnerships. Changes of government in the Mercosur countries that were associated with a shift in ideology have had no major impact on bilateral relations with China. Economic interests dominate on both sides, and the Chinese are strong believers in pragmatism. But China also takes advantage of conflicts of interest within the Mercosur countries, and furthermore strives to exercise influence through domestic stakeholders with economic interests in trade with the East Asian country.
... Chen (2014) explains that China strove to achieve progressive and proactive diplomacy: Beijing has encouraged its overseas diplomats to actively participate in shaping the external environment and to consciously resolve or hedge external challenges at source. To this end, the new gov-ernment has strengthened its emphasis on "partnership diplomacy" (Feng & Huang 2014) and developed a new diplomatic discourse around themes such as the "Chinese dream," great power diplomacy, and cooperation mechanisms with other emerging powers. This is all framed by Xi's trademark notion of a "common destiny of mankind," and by the more tangible frameworks of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). ...
Despite the evident geopolitical and economic coincidences, the disturbances in the Venezuelan political system, the diversification of support from other great powers, and the tensions with the US did not go unnoticed by the Chinese leadership. While Beijing showed dynamism and renewal among its elites in a domestic context of institutional complexity, Caracas saw the stagnation of its hegemonic party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), highly dependent on profitable oil income and charismatic and personalistic leadership. It was thus that in 2013 accidental conditions made for a natural experiment: a twin alternation of incumbents in China and Venezuela, with two incoming leaders very different in terms of the origins of their mandates, their powers, and their immediate needs. In this chapter we consequently analyze the situation surrounding the parallel ascents of Xi Jinping and Nicolás Maduro, and how their particular circumstances in recent years have changed the relationship between their respective countries from one of strategic coordination to one of cautious engagement, in the process opening opportunities for greater Russian influence in Latin America.
... 36 Building strategic partnerships worldwide have become one of the most important dimensions and instruments of Chinese diplomacy. 37 The concept of 'partnership' emerged within Chinese diplomacy after the end of the Cold War. Since then, the number of partnerships has steadily increased to partnerships with 78 countries and five regional organizations (African Union, Arab Union, ASEAN, CELAC, and EU), so that 45 percent of the 174 countries have formal diplomatic ties with China. ...
This article examines aspects behind the China-Tunisia friendly cooperative relations. It looks at the synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and Tunisia’s economy and geographically strategic location to understand the extent of economic dimension and bilateral relations between the two nations. The main argument is that the PRC’s relationship with Tunisia is based on shared or mutually complementary commercial interests and a strategic geographical location, which especially support Tunisia’s economic growth, industrialization, and social development through integration in the BRI framework.
... We select Cambodia and Myanmar as case countries because both have close trade, investment and aid relationships with China, and at the same time are much smaller than China in terms of geographic and demographic size, political and economic power. As countries located in China's neighbourhood, a priority area for the BRI (Cai, 2017), both Cambodia and Myanmar have forged strategic alliances with China, and are members of the ASEAN, itself in a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity with China since 2003 (Feng & Huang, 2014). ...
Discussions on Chinese-financed and Chinese-built infrastructure projects, and more recently about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), are often focused on China and fail to consider the role of the countries hosting these projects. Yet, host countries' dynamics are crucial to shaping the outcomes of BRI projects. This study investigates how the governments of developing countries in Southeast Asia leverage the BRI to achieve their own objectives. Through episode analysis based on literature and interviews conducted in Cambodia and Myanmar, we study the strategies deployed by these governments to influence the development of the BRI. We show that Cambodia uses strategies based on the principle of diversification, spreading infrastructure financing and implementation among a growing number of partners. We then show that the Myanmar government relies on impartiality to implement the proposed infrastructure projects and mitigate their risks. We link these strategies to the domestic contexts of Cambodia and Myanmar, discussing how these respond to the political setup of each country. This has important implications in terms of the narrative on the BRI, as it highlights the role of host country governments and of the domestic context in shaping outcomes. Our study fills a gap in the literature by providing a cross-country framework to understand how agency is deployed to achieve the desired outcomes in the context of the BRI, and more in general of infrastructure planning and implementation.
... The strategies used to establish the partnership involve the central role of the agent and this touches on two discourses. One is the literature on how important networks are to build partnerships in China (Ai 2006) and the other is the role played by diplomatic strategies in relation to the significance given to engagement with the outside world that has been a driving force for China in the pursuance of partnerships (Feng and Huang 2014) since the 'Open Door Policy' of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 (Hutchins andWeir 2006). In the story of this partnership the two overlap. ...
Similar to the research in Chap. 5, which explored educator’s perspectives of children’s learning in the infant/toddler years, this study investigated the perspective of early childhood educators in Australia and China on children’s learning and optimal conditions for learning for preschool children. The same structured questionnaire used for the infant/toddler study was also conducted in both countries and four main questions were investigated; what situations can be characterized as learning? What activities are important for learning? What are the best conditions for children’s learning? How do early childhood educators understand participation in relation to children’s learning? Internationalization of education has seen relationships develop between countries and an exploration of educator’ theories on children and learning can provide a nuanced approach to comparative research. The findings suggest there is significant sharing of ideas as well as important differences across the contexts of Australia and China.
... In contrast to the existing hub-and-spokes network of allies and partners that the US has sought to build its version of regional order around however, 'China hardly has a single reliable ally to promote its vision and values for the region' (Heydarian, 2020, p. 12). Nevertheless, it has assiduously worked to cultivate influence through the organisations just listed and build up more informal constellation of 'strategic partners' around the region, using economic means to gain strategic leverage (such as the 'string of pearls' range of port access in the Indian Ocean) (Feng & Huang, 2014). On these bases, Beijing's ability to shape the regional order should not be underestimated. ...
This article examines the new prominence accorded to the “Indo-Pacific” (IP) concept in the strategic narratives championed by the US and its closest allies, (Japan and Australia), and then juxtaposes this with the responses of other key regional powers. To this purpose, Part I distils a concise conceptual model encompassing three interlocking facets – mental maps, political/ideological drivers, and visions of regional order – designed to structure the following empirical analyses. Part II then accesses this model to reveal how these facets are reflected in the discursive and policy-making practices of the US and its close allies, as embodied in their (combined) regional strategies. Next, Part III considers how a cross-section of major states in the region – India, South Korea, and China - have responded to this enterprise, to determine the degree to which they have adopted, accommodated or opposed the IP concept, or otherwise propose national alternatives to the US-centered project. It concludes that the IP concept is not simply an objective geopolitical descriptor, but rather a controversial and contested discursive field, subject to multiple interpretations. Such a polarizing concept will likely contribute to further sharpening of strategic mistrust and geopolitical competition amongst the region’s major powers.
... 56 Through strategic partnerships, China creates a favourable environment for its rise by encouraging multipolarity and anti-hegemonism. 57 Strategic partnerships are intended to convey the message that relations between states should not be influenced by differences in values, institutions, form of government, or social system. Each state should be allowed to determine its own developmental path and social-political system, free from outside interference. ...
Yan Xuetong’s Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers argues that China should follow moral values in its foreign policy in order to attain international leadership. Drawing on ancient Chinese thought, Yan makes the case that China should strive for humane authority, influencing other states by leading through moral example and attracting supporters through providing benefits rather than using coercion. This essay evaluates the feasibility of China’s attainment of humane authority, which is related to status. Humane authority follows norms consistently toward rivals as well as friendly states whereas a hegemon uses a double standard. But double standards may not be so easily avoided because they derive from inherent psychological bias. The option of acquiring followers by providing them with security guarantees is not available to China in East Asia because of the prior existence of the US alliance system. Yan predicts that China’s growth will lead to a bipolar structure but points out that the conditions for a Cold War are absent. Nevertheless, technological competition between the US and China could lead to a ‘new Cold War’, which would hamper China’s efforts to widen its circle of followers. To be a humane authority, China should also avoid a war with the USA. There is a risk that naval competition could lead to local conflicts as a result of security dilemma dynamics. The two states should control status rivalry through a division of labour, by accepting the other’s pre-eminence in different areas through social cooperation.
... According to estimates published by the European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, China has forged at least 47 strategic partnerships with countries and three international organisations across the world in the post-Cold War era, with Brazil being the first in 1993 (Zhongping and Jing 2014). The establishment of strategic partnership is, from the Chinese perspective, an upgrade to previously established 'friendly relationships', 'cooperative relationships' or 'partnerships' (Feng and Huang 2014). ...
China’s increased economic engagement with post-communist countries in the Western Balkans in the last decade has added to the complexity of democratic consolidation in the region, with possible negative impacts on the established process of European integration of these countries, foremost Serbia and Albania. This article addresses the impacts of the increased economic and to some extent political presence of China in the Western Balkan states over the past decade which has been exerted through both economic investment and trade incentives as well as a more sophisticated use of China’s soft power. The latter is exemplified in the greater number of cultural, educational and scientific exchanges between these states and China within the 16 + 1 (17 + 1 after 2018) cooperation framework and bilaterally. The article discusses China’s engagement with the Western Balkan countries on a case-by-case basis. The cases of Croatia, as an EU member, and of Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia, as official candidates for EU membership, are examined to show the impact of the relationship with China on these states’ adherence to the European integration process.
... Partnership status served as a proxy for the political salience of each country to the MFA. The concept of partnership emerged within Chinese diplomacy after the end of the Cold War, and the first strategic partnership was with Brazil in 1993 (Feng andHuang, 2014;Serrano Moreno et al., 2020). Partnerships are a structured framework for collaboration, yet organized in a loose and non-binding way that aims to enable the pursuit of shared interests and the addressing of common challenges in different issue areas and facilitate (future) cooperation (Strüver, 2017: 36). ...
This study investigates a novel dataset comprised of a universe of 537 donations in 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, between February 11 and June 20, 2020, which provides a high level of detail on China’s and Taiwan’s mask diplomacy. We describe who the main donors were, who the main recipients were, what was donated to each country, and which variables explain why some countries received more aid than the others. Drawing on previous literature, the article advances understanding about the political determinants of these donations. Our findings revealed that, although seemingly uncoordinated, donations made by China's central government, Chinese companies, cities, and foundations were strongly affected by two political determinants, namely the recipient’s partnership status with China and the One China Policy. Furthermore, aid provided by China’s Central Government was larger in autocracies than in democracies.
... China (Fulton, 2019;Strüver, 2016;Yue, 2019;Zhongping & Jing, 2014) and Germany (German Federal Government, 2012, p. 6;Heiduk, 2015, p. 132;Narlikar & Plagemann, 2016;Quitzow et al., 2019) are building up new bilateral partnerships, which is in the literature referred to as partnership diplomacy. Strüver argues that strategic partnerships are characterised by a structured framework, flexibility, goal-drivenness, and process orientation (2016, pp. ...
This thesis is about the energy relations between China and Germany. The study analyses the Sino-German energy cooperation with a focus on the expansion of renewable energy and outlines the domestic and external implications of this relationship. Hereby, concepts of critical geopolitics and geopolitics of renewable energy form the theoretical framework. China and Germany have structural similarities and share common interests. Due to their energy transition , with which they both aim to address the issues of energy security and environmental degradation, they have established bilateral energy relations. The Sino-German cooperation on energy transition is allocated at the governmental level, between specialised institutions and academia, and the business level. The study shows that investment and research evolved into a field of cooperation between China and Germany. While Germany seeks market access and investment, China aims for technological know-how and expertise. Although the Sino-German cooperation shows positive economic as well as political outcomes and implications on energy security, their relations face tensions resulting from differing normative structures and roles of the state power. Additionally, the Sino-German relationship has an external dimension by supporting an interconnection of Eurasia and challenging the United States.
... China has established nearly fifty strategic partnerships. China has pursued strategic partnerships as a diplomatic tool to both secure its core national interests and to generate a benign environment for its rise (Zhongping & Jing, 2014). Japan has nearly ten strategic partnerships with various counterparts in the Indo-Pacific region. ...
There is an increasing proliferation of bilateral strategic partnerships in and beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Yet such a partnership between Japan and New Zealand is underexplored. The central aim of this article is to fill the gap. This article first clarifies the definition of, and then provides an analytical framework for, a ‘strategic partnership’. The article then analyses how these countries laid the foundation of their strategic partnership and how they have since built upon that foundation. In the implementation process of the strategic partnership, this article examines three elements: 1) the consolidation of their strategic partnership in official documents; 2) the institutionalisation of regular meetings; and 3) participation in defence and security exercises. Although the Japan-New Zealand strategic partnership is still in the early stages, this article argues that it has the potential to grow further given bipartisan support and positive perceptions in civil society in both countries. This article also analyses three factors that exert an impact on the development of their strategic partnership: China’s continued assertive maritime presence, the rejuvenation of the US-New Zealand bilateral relationship, and Japan and New Zealand’s ongoing commitment to the South Pacific region.
... The two countries are not long-term allies like the USA and Germany, but they are not geostrategic rivals like the USA and China either. In 2004, the two countries formed a "partnership of global responsibility within the framework of Sino-European comprehensive strategic partnership" that was upgraded in 2014 to an "all-dimensional strategic partnership" [19]. In accordance with this official description of their relationship, the two sides have established some 80 dialogue mechanisms, many of them at senior-government level. ...
Soft balancing has recently been framed as a general foreign policy strategy that is basically open to any state. However, what coalitions can actually engage in joint soft-balancing behavior? To date, the literature has focused on more traditional foe-foe constellations and less traditional friend-friend constellations. In the former, all the soft-balancing partners are foes of the opponent; in the latter, all the soft-balancing partners are friends/allies of the opponent. But what about mixed soft-balancing coalitions in which one partner is a foe of the opponent whereas another partner is an ally/friend of the opponent? This article sets out to argue that such mixed soft-balancing coalitions are not possible. It moreover contends that the reason for this is the fact that the execution of soft-balancing behavior is more demanding and more consequential than one might think upon hearing the term “soft.” The hurdles for the ally/friend of the opponent in such a (theoretical) mixed soft-balancing coalition are therefore too high to actually follow through with such a strategy. To support its arguments, the article analyzes a crucial case study based on a most-likely-case design. More precisely, it looks into Sino-German reactions to US president Donald Trump’s “America First” approach. The article indeed finds that while both China and Germany have lamented Trump’s “America First” approach, the leap for Germany as a US ally and friend to translating the complaints about Trump into tangible soft-balancing activities together with China has simply been too big. Even though Germany and China are themselves close partners, Germany ultimately remains too close to the USA, and US positions on China, for Sino-German soft balancing against the USA to be a workable option.
The race to rapidly decarbonise and digitalise the global economy by 2030 to avoid temperatures rising above 1.5C has been subsumed by geopolitics that remains anchored in realist power struggles, now revolving around Sino-American hyper- competition. The Russian invasion of Ukraine further undermined interdependence and prompted unprecedented levels of economic statecraft. Access to indispensable minerals for a net zero future has thus become more securitised. The European Union (EU) has pushed back against bipolar geopolitics by utilising its normative, economic and regulatory power and strong networks of global institutional relations to maintain a competitive but working relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Such an approach may help broker broader global institutional collaboration to ensure that decarbonisation is for all, not just for the few.
In recent years China has forged an increasing number of strategic partnerships with other countries while maintaining its ‘non-alignment policy’. However, these partnerships are mainly bilateral rather than minilateral, and they thus have less potential to influence the Indo–Pacific regional order. This article examines how China has responded to the US-led security network, in which minilateralism features prominently, and argues that China has implemented a coercion strategy against India and Australia, who are two of the main regional hubs for minilateral security cooperation within that network. It also illustrates how China began to articulate the concept of ‘natural alliance forces’ (tianran tongmeng jun) in 2018, and that Beijing has subsequently expanded its own minilateral security cooperation and Chinese-style multilateralism. These initiatives share some of the characteristics of minilateralism and are seen by China as alternatives to non-alignment, even though they are not necessarily direct responses or reactions to US-led minilateral security cooperation. Instead, they indicate that China hopes to exert some influence on the regional order through the alignment of like-minded countries vis-à-vis the US-led network. The article concludes by identifying the limitations China faces in leading both minilateral and multilateral security cooperation.
This thesis analyses the cooperation between China and the United Arab Emirates in the solar energy sector in the Belt and Road Initiative frame. It relies on a theoretical framework composed of the theory of geopolitical economy, which includes the concepts of state market/state-society complex, resource scarcity, and overcapacity. These concepts allow for the identification of the causes and effects of this energy cooperation against the backdrop of the political economy of both countries. Indeed, this concept allows China's development strategy to be conceived as state-led and allows the UAE to be conceived as a patrimonial rentier state. It justifies its need to develop its renewable energy sector and aligns with its goal of energy security and economic diversification. It will be argued that China transcends its capital and political power beyond its borders to support its energy security and commercial interests, which the UAE welcomes to support its energy security and diversify its economy. This cooperation will be highlighted through three major projects in which China is involved. Finally, it will be shown how the economic effects will be mitigated due to institutional factors in the UAE and that these investments have both positive and negative impacts on the geopolitical dynamics of the Persian Gulf region such as a growing rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as with Iran; a potential for appeasement with Qatar and an enhancement of China-US rivalry in the region. This thesis takes the form of a qualitative case study, although the visualization of statistics and the use of datasets have been employed. It is based on content analysis and collected peer-reviewed articles, press articles, institutional reports, official documents, databases, and semi-structured interviews.
After 2013, the UAE multiplied the international aid tenfold to the African continent. From this year onwards, the aid has never dropped below $1 billion, three times the amount allocated prior to 2013. What are the main drivers of this change? This article postulates that three main factors triggered a heightened international aid in the African continent: economic considerations (trade and investments), security issues and a new approach to international cooperation. Official data allows the comparison of the evolution of the Emirati economic interests (mainly trade) with the aid. The statistics show that there are connections between trade and aid but no direct correlations. Over the last two decades, the nexus formed with economics, security and humanitarianism has become more visible. The best way to analyze the bilateral relations between the UAE and African states is probably to pay more attention to the depth of the relations rather than to the sectors that they cover.
The post-Cold War unipolar world order is being challenged in both North East Asia and the broader Eurasian Arctic not by the emergence of multilateral political institutions, but rather by what I conceptualise as a geo-economic process of Polycentric Regionalism. The rising great power ambitions of Russia and China - with substantial economic spheres of overlapping regional interests (i.e. their neighbouring Dongbei / Russian Far East and Arctic territories), has led to their adoption of a geo-economic strategy to begin to alter the present international system by creating two new physical and geopolitically relevant, regional "spaces" in the Arctic: the terrestrial Pacific Arctic, and via the instrumentalization of technology, the fourth dimension of (celestial) Space. Both activities (the Pacific Arctic/Space) now strategically link North East Asia with Europe, physically and virtually, via combination of Russia’s North East Arctic corridor maritime access, Sino-Russian joint Space /cyberspace activities, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative platform. Through original case studies of the natural gas/ Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry, situated in Russia’s Arctic, as well as joint Sino-Russian technology Research and Development initiatives, I argue that the gas/LNG industry's geo-economic power - transmitted through capital, infrastructure build-out capabilities, and economic influence over institutions - is the key determinant in facilitating the physical connectivity and virtual linkage aspects of Polycentric Regionalism. By generating new economic dynamism in the shared space(s) and thereby building trust for bilateral commitments, Russia and China can create the Pacific Arctic region as an experimental step in establishing a viable alternative to the economic and security order in Asia, shaped largely to date by the U.S. The significant Sino-Russian trust gained via the Sino-Russian gas play acts as a strategic Confidence Building Measure for more sensitive collaboration in dual-use technologies, that may in turn progress the relationship from one of geo-economic partnership (gas/LNG) in the Pacific Arctic space, to possible geostrategic alliance (via technology-based activities) in the Arctic’s fourth dimensional arena – the domain of Space and Cyberspace. It is by these means that China and Russia can convert geo-economic, geostrategic, and associated econo-governance processes, into the crucial underpinnings of their geopolitical aim; a new, multiregional-based international order for the 21st century.
Given recent trends over the 2000–2018 period, this chapter proposes that newly democratized or electorally competitive African states are more responsive to domestic economic imperatives and thus have proven more likely to form relations with the economically larger People’s Republic of China than the Republic of China due to the prospective trade, aid, and investment gains to be made once such a switch is affected. Seven case studies conducted over the 2001–2018 period yield results which are in line with this hypothesis. In effect, the entire universe of cases of new democracies on the African continent in the twenty-first century have all switched recognition soon after becoming politically open, but no evidence has been found demonstrating the opposite (i.e., the effect of relations with either China or Taiwan on a country’s democracy).
The first two decades of the twenty-first century saw the rapid rise of China in the global stage. During this period, China acquired valuable knowledge and expertise in International Economic Law (IEL), and expanded its trade and investments across the globe. The emergence of China has benefitted many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in terms of trade and investment; however, it is unclear whether IEL has contributed with the expansion of China's economic relations with LAC. This article aims to address this question by reviewing the strategies and mechanisms employed by China to promote trade, investment and development finance in the region. Its central argument is that China has opted to engage with LAC using an eclectic platform that combines hard law instruments and institutions as well as other soft law mechanisms.
The relationship between BrazilBrazil and the People’s Republic of ChinaPeople’s Republic of China (PRC) began in the 1970s as a Global South dialogueDialogue in search of a multilateral world. However, the BrazilianBrazilian military regime was suspicious of the Mao Zedong’sMao Zedong administration and was slow to develop bilateralBilateral actions. Only with Brazil’s return to democracy in the 1980s, there was the start of high-level visits and cooperation projects such as the joint satellite program. In the 1990s, they created the innovative concept of “strategic partnership” and then a new idea in the foreign policy of both countries. But it was only fully implemented 10 years later, with the global commodities boom.
El impresionante crecimiento económico de China en las últimas décadas y su relevancia en la escena mundial ha generado un amplio debate sobre su rol en el sistema internacional. Uno de los temas recurrentes en la literatura de relaciones internacionales ha sido el desafío que podría implicar el desarrollo de China para el orden liberal. Así, este capítulo analiza en profundidad la denominada crisis del orden internacional liberal, los cuestionamientos a las distintas dimensiones de este orden, cómo se ha posicionado China ante ellas y cuáles son las repercusiones para América Latina.
Mediante un repaso de las principales iniciativas globales de Xi Jinping, del debate sobre el rol de China en la recesión democrática y de un análisis sobre los intereses centrales del gobierno de Beijing, este capítulo plantea que las predicciones de China como un desafiante al orden internacional existente son exageradas, al menos en ciertas dimensiones de este orden. Considerando la creciente competencia entre China y Estados Unidos, los cruces de acusaciones y la narrativa de guerra fría, los países de América Latina tendrán en los próximos años la difícil tarea de desarrollar políticas exteriores inteligentes para evitar quedar entrampados en esta disputa y a su vez colaborar en la construcción de un orden internacional más justo.
Este estudio analiza participación desde 2018 de los países de América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) en la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China (BRI) iniciada en 2013. Adoptando una perspectiva constructivista, el análisis crítico de la literatura y de documentos oficiales muestran cómo la movilización de la retórica de la conectividad por parte del gobierno chino ha creado unas expectativas exageradas en los gobiernos de ALC cuyas economías están afectadas por un déficit estructural de infraestructuras. En realidad, el BRI no ha modificado substancial- mente las dinámicas anteriores presentes en las relaciones entre ALC y China, ni ha remediado los problemas relacionados con la dependencia de las economías de la región con la economía China. El examen de los mecanismos de participación en el BRI —memorándums de entendimiento y participación en foros oficiales— y de los factores que explican los diferentes grados de participación de los gobiernos LAC señalan que la iniciativa es en realidad una estrategia discursiva que da cobertura a una concepción de las relaciones internacionales no legalista y cuya esencia es el pragmatismo y la flexibilidad.
La cooperación en seguridad ha sido un área secundaria en la relación entre China y América Latina, después de los temas económicos y financieros. Sin embargo, las distintas formas de cooperación en seguridad se han ido desarrollando y expandiendo entre las dos partes. Estos desarrollos, si bien graduales y cautelosos, generaron disgusto en Estados Unidos, país que tradicionalmente mantuvo una posición de supremacía en lo que durante mucho tiempo consideraba su ‘patio trasero’. Considerando distintas formas de cooperación en seguridad —cooperación funcional, diplomacia de defensa, iniciativas de cooperación a largo plazo y la venta de armas— este capítulo proyecta una rivalidad entre Estados Unidos y China en el área en consideración. Al mismo tiempo, debido a la poca relevancia estratégica de la región, se argumentará que la probabilidad es baja que esta rivalidad se transforme en un conflicto donde los países sudamericanos se vieran presionados a elegir entre un lado y el otro. En este escenario, los países sudamericanos se verán beneficiados por la competencia entre las grandes potencias que cada una buscará tener el mayor número de socios internacionales siempre que los países regionales procuran tener una diplomacia hábil y proactiva, y no se vuelvan demasiado dependiente ni de Estados Unidos ni de China.
China’s rising potential as a great industrial power has generated widespread interest; however, there has been little attention to the role of its extensive network of strategic partnerships in its power projection. This study investigates the role of China’s strategic partnerships in its global rise by borrowing elements of the network model from business studies and by drawing on similarities with a firms’ internationalization process.
China was always a very important civilization for humankind with its innovations, socio-cultural effect, and tremendous natural resources. It had good relations with the Gulf countries from ancient history. After Communism, the Gulf countries and China took aside in different pacts and relations de-escalated and deteriorated. In the first decade in the post-cold war era, China's strives to remedy relations with the gulf was not successful; but after the shale oil effect, in the last decade, china gradually subrogated the hegemon power economically in the region. China now is the main purchaser of the Gulf oil and has pretty much more good relations with the regional countries. It has long term (at least economic) plans for the region and the Gulf; which by launching the Belt Road initiative (BRI), China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) building Gwadar (Pakistan) and Duqm (Oman) Ports and establishing five military bases in the Indian Ocean region. Oman as a geostrategic guard of Hurmuz Strait and as a country that has the longest Gulf maritime seashore line in the Indian Ocean is in those economic plans. Oman critically needs economic diversification and Duqm Port can open a horizon for it and in addition to that, China is the main customer of Oman today. Because of those facts, Oman should rebalance its foreign and economic policies between the west and east in accordance with the new circumstances in the region now.
This paper identifies a gap between expectation and reality in South Korea-China relations. It applies the theory of “Autonomy-Security Trade-off” and analyzes incidents such as North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan, its bombardment of the Yeonpyeong Island, and the deployment of the U.S. THAAD system in South Korea.
As a result, this paper concludes that South Korea expected more from China than it merited. Contrary to South Korean expectations, China was not ready to help South Korea on security issues. The Strategic Cooperative Partnership, which was signed in 2008 between the two countries, appeared to be just a friendly gesture, although South Korea expected cooperation in security sector.
South Korea should recognize that its partnership with China cannot replace its alliance with the U.S. It should settle for economic, social, and cultural cooperation with China and maintain security cooperation with the U.S. If South Korea reminds China of this limitation in its mutual relationship, China could also settle for its cooperation with South Korea on sectors other than security. China would therefore not intervene into South Korean security decisions as we witnessed over the deployment of the U.S. THAAD system.
In recent years, one of the major problems that Kyrgyzstan witnesses is rising Sinophobia among the local people due to problems related with increasing Chinese economic presence in the country. While Sinophobia surfaces as anti-Chinese public demonstrations and violent assaults against Chinese citizens residing in Kyrgyzstan, political corruption scandals around China’s economic activities shape perceptions of the Kyrgyz people negatively toward their government officials and Chinese companies operating in Kyrgyzstan. This thesis explores political corruption in Kyrgyzstan and reasons of Sinophobia among the Kyrgyz people specifically referring to the impact of political corruption in anti-Chinese public demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan.
Keywords: Sinophobia, Political Corruption, Kyrgyzstan, China, Central Asia
This paper examines China-Latin America relations through the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in the 2011-2018 period. In this context, the main perspectives on integration and regionalism are discussed, and CELAC is shown to possess the characteristics of a regional body. It is proposed that the relationship China seeks through this body can be explained by its interest in institutionalising a mechanism for rapprochement with Latin America and the Caribbean. It is noted that CELAC is seen by China as a strategic vehicle that allows it to engage bilaterally with various countries and develop an economic strategy under structurally asymmetric conditions. However, its institutional nature has prevented it from serving these interests. As per the methodology, documentary and qualitative data analysis is made using the systematisation of an unpublished database.
The Asian Century will commence in 2020 when Asia will produce more than half of the global wealth. Latin America and the Caribbean do not seem adequately prepared to navigate in this new global reality. This article aims to contribute with a better understanding of the role played by Asia as promoter of economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean by conducting a comparative analysis of the approaches used by Japan and China to engage with the region. The study is conducted using an analytical framework borrowed from International Economic Law. The main argument develops in this paper is that Japan has used formal or hard law instruments to engage with the region. In contrast, China has employed an eclectic platform that combines hard law instruments as well as soft law mechanisms, that allow the Asian giant to interact with its Latin American and Caribbean partners in more direct ways and without the interference of other global powers.
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