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COBI cobi13113 Dispatch: March 30, 2018 CE:
Journal MSP No. No. of pages: 3PE: Sean Yaftali
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UNCORRECTED PROOF
Comment
Social license as an emergent property of political
interactions: response to Kendal and Ford 2017
Stephen T. Garnett,1Kerstin K. Zander ,2and Catherine J. Robinson3
Q1
Q2 1Research Institute for the Environment and Livelihoods, Charles Darwin University, Ellengowan Drive, Darwin, NT 0909, Australia
2Northern Institute, Charles Darwin University, Ellengowan Drive, Darwin, NT 0909, Australia
3CSIRO Land and Water, CSIRO Ecosciences Precinct, 41 Boggo Rd, Dutton Park, QLD 4102, Australia
We are delighted that Kendal and Ford (2017) were
moved to comment on the use of the term social license
with respect to conservation as we (Zander et al. 2014;
Garnett et al. 2016; 2017) and others (Spies et al. 2010;
Hobday et al. 2015; Buckley 2016; Latham et al. 2017)
have used it. We of course agree that social license may
not always be a useful concept with which to describe the
relationship between conservation and the community
and that there is a need for “trusting, ongoing relation-
ships with the . . . community.” However, we question
their suggestion that social acceptance might be more
appropriate than social license when seeking community
support for conservation programs. We maintain there is
a role for both terms—indeed there may be a sequence
in which they are applied.
Use of social license in the mining industry has been
criticized for its ambiguity, the lack of a process to obtain
it, the way in which it is employed to maintain exist-
ing power imbalances, and its binary nature (Parsons &
Moffat 2014). The converse of these arguments is that
the term is flexible and that its adoption by companies
represents explicit acknowledgment that civil society
possesses the power to challenge a company’s right to
operate. The principal message of the report from which
the term gained its current popularity (International In-
stitute for Environment and Development 2002) was that
a failure to acknowledge and accommodate the concerns
of civil society constitutes a real threat to the industry’s
state-sanctioned licenses to operate.
We argue that social license is most useful when con-
ceptualized as binary and that its metaphorical similar-
ity to a formal state-sanctioned license is far closer than
email kerstin.zander@cdu.edu.au
Article impact statement: Recognition that conservation, like mining, needs a social license to operate can help avoid dangerous assumptions
of approval.
Paper submitted October 15, 2017; revised manuscript accepted December 30, 2017.
suggested by Gunningham et al. (2004) and adopted by
Kendal and Ford (2017). This definition, “The demands
on and expectations on a business enterprise that emerge
from neighbourhoods, environmental groups, commu-
nity members, and other member of the surrounding
civil society” (Gunningham et al. 2004), does not actu- Q3
ally capture the way in which it is being used by min-
ing companies or forestry operations. However vague,
social license can be considered a precursor and a nec-
essary condition to existing and ongoing legal licenses.
Although the thresholds for noncompliance may be ill-
defined, the consequences of failure can be extremely
expensive, as Rio Tinto discovered in Bougainville (Pike
2012).
We believe our definition of social license captures a
more realistic application of the term: the tacit permis-
sion of civil society for an activity to occur or continue
so that the state has the political confidence to grant
legal rights. The key difference between this definition
and that of Ford and Williams (2016) is that the license
is not explicitly granted by local communities or the en-
terprises concerned, which is why Parsons and Moffat
(2014) found it difficult to identify process in its grant-
ing. Rather, the license in our definition can be seen as
an emergent property of political interactions before and
during the operations of an enterprise. The license is
granted when an enterprise satisfies enough of the inter-
ests of civil society that the state believes that legislative
conditions are met and that there is political gain, or at
least no risk. Occasionally, enterprise advocates preempt
state processes if they conclude they lack social license
and risk reputational damage (e.g., Petrobas withdrew
1
Conservation Biology, Volume 0, No. 0, 1–3
C
2018 Society for Conservation Biology
DOI: 10.1111/cobi.13113
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UNCORRECTED PROOF
2Social License
an application for deep-sea drilling off New Zealand in
the face of Maori opposition [Ruckstuhl et al. 2014]).
Q4
Gradually, many of the actions undertaken to alleviate
social impact that are granted social license are codi-
fied into legal conditions. However, as noted by Dare
et al. (2014), new social expectations arise so that social-
license requirements evolve over time, usually becoming
more stringent as communities learn to exercise power
at multiple scales.
In a conservation context, obtaining and maintaining
a social license requires governance models in which
priority conservation values are negotiated rather than
mandated and that embrace diverse sites of authority
through formal (e.g., comanagement) or informal regimes
(Berkes 2007). Often existing conservation governance
regimes are a product of the historical legacy of earlier
political contest, which has had a patchy history around
the globe. Mining and other sectors repeatedly test and
target social-licence mandates and approaches (Dare et al.
2014), which contrasts with the many perpetual conser-
vation arrangements that exist. The lack of review of the
social license afforded to conservation can lead to the
original mandates being eroded and contested.
If, as we believe, a binary definition of social license is
actually being applied by enterprises, then many of the
criticisms of the term and its application to the conser-
vation sector fall away. It is unsurprising that companies
talk more of maintaining their social license than of ac-
quiring it (Parsons & Moffat 2014) because the granting
of their existing legal license will be predicated on the
political judgment that they already have a social license,
even if that was granted under a different set of social
norms. As civil society continues to apply pressure on
enterprises to provide more to local communities or do
less damage to the environment, the more a future legal
license to operate requires investment in actions not yet
legally required. Such voluntary contributions are often
portrayed as altruistic, but such investment must have
commercial benefit if obligations to shareholders are to
be met.
We therefore think social license is conceptually dif-
ferent from the broader term social acceptance.Inmany
ways, social acceptance can be seen as a precursor to
obtaining a social license—it is through seeking social
acceptance that a social license is created. We do not
agree that multiple social licenses are needed; rather,
social license can be seen as the outcome from multiple
conversations about social acceptance. These conversa-
tions about social acceptance are held not just with lo-
cal communities wishing to emphasize environmental or
social outcomes or advocacy groups lobbying on their
behalf, but also with communities that rely on mines for
employment and the many influential players who stand
to make material profit from development.
The reason we argue that conservation also needs a
social license is that there are winners and losers in con-
servation interventions; that is, there are political trade-
offs for those authorizing the activity, whether they are
representatives of the state or the community, and rep-
utational risks to conservation advocates. This trade-off
is complex. Many countries have committed to the Aichi
targets (CBD 2010) of preventing extinction and secur-
ing 17% of terrestrial land for conservation. But in some
places,itwillbepossibletomeetsuchtargetsonlyifin-
digenous peoples and other minority groups collaborate
(i.e., allow their lands to be used to pursue a conservation
agenda) (United Nations Human Rights 2015; Robinson
et al. 2016). As another example, governments need to be
confident they have a social license before they authorize
assisted colonization of species outside their historical
range to address the effects of climate change (Garnett
et al. 2017; Latham et al. 2017). Just as with mining, a
license to initiate or maintain a conservation interven-
tion entails not only agreement with the communities
in places directly affected, but also agreement from the
broader group of players with an interest in the process.
Significant resistance from any group to a conservation
initiative is likely to lead to a denial of social license,
given the combination of outcome uncertainty and lim-
ited political benefit. Only after social license is perceived
to have been granted is the state likely to invest in the
necessary policy, legislation, and public funding needed
to make the idea for a conservation initiative a reality.
Other ways of describing government actions in relation
to society, such as public interest, public benefit, public
value, social acceptance and legitimacy, have a role in
describing the nuances of governance but do not capture
the binary nature of social license in terms of whether
support is provided or not.
Conservation advocates are particularly in need of so-
cial license when dealing with groups who have histori-
cally had little power, such as indigenous peoples. In the
past, mining companies extracted minerals indiscrimi-
nately. In the same way, conservation advocates could
persuade politicians to secure lands for nature regardless
of indigenous rights. That is no longer the case. Although
conservation advocates may be able to match the eco-
nomic power of extractive industries with moral suasion,
such arguments do not always work with indigenous
peoples. Instead, they are increasingly exercising their
right to grant social license when faced with conserva-
tion actions proposed for biodiversity hotspots on their
lands. And, conservation advocates cannot and should
not assume indigenous peoples share their world view
and aspirations for nature (Kohler & Brondizio 2017).
Although developing trusting relationships with the com-
munity to engender social acceptance may be a precursor
to gaining a social license, there are other means to do so,
such as market transactions and fees for service, that may
be more honest than proselytizing conservation under
the guise of partnership and collaboration. It is no more
or less honest than a mineral company buying the right
Conservation Biology
Volume 0, No. 0, 2018
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UNCORRECTED PROOF
Garnett et al. 3
to mine through granting of royalties or supporting local
football teams.
In the same way, we believe use of the term social
license to describe the relationship conservation advo-
cates are seeking to have with the broader polity is also
more honest than one that pretends to make conservation
socially acceptable to the whole community.
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Conservation Biology
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