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Table 2 Insiders and Corporate Liberalisation
Country Power Resources Investment Strategy State-Insiders
Preferences
Powerful
Actors
Outcome Anglo-American Practices Continental Practices
SPAIN -Financial Resources
-Capacity to Coordinate
their Action
-Protection from the
State
Mixed
-Inward:
Acquisition of
industrial holdings
in domestic firms
-Outward: Foreign
Expansion in Latin
America
Agreement Collusion
(State & Banks
and Utilites)
State-
influenced
Marketized
Blockholding
- High Stock Market
Capitalisation
- Low State Ownership
- Concentrated Ownership
- Rare Hostile Takeovers
- Marginal Institutional
Investors
FRANCE -Financial Resources
-Capacity to Coordinate
their Action
-Protection from the
State
Outward
-Sell-off of
domestic holdings
-Foreign expansion
Disagreement Managers Managerism -High Stock Market
Capitalisation
-Institutional Investors
Involvement
-Increased Ownership
Diffusion
- Rare Hostile Takeovers
- Widespread State
Ownership
ITALY -Financial Resources
-Capacity to Coordinate
their Action
Inward
-Acquisition of
Domestic
Privatised Firms
Disagreement Family
Blockholders
Family
Blockholding
None - Concentrated Ownership
- Widespread State
Ownership
- Rare Hostile Takeovers
- Marginal Institutional
Investors
- Low Stock Market Cap.