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ILLEGAL IVORY TRADE AS TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED
CRIME? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY INTO IVORY TRADERS IN
UGANDA
KT *
This article examines illegal ivory trade in Uganda, which constitutes a major transport route
through which ivory exits Africa. The analysis is based on empirical data collected among illegal
ivory traders between 2012 and 2017. The ndings unpack the notion of illegal ivory trade as
‘transnational organized crime’, by showing its reliance on local and regional connections, in
which ‘nodes’ are crucial. These nodes can be both traders (such as middlemen), and locations
(such as border towns), connecting these various levels. In doing so, it shows how this trade func-
tions in a decentralized and loose fashion. There are clear power differences between the traders,
which is explained through the kind of connections with government ofcials.
Key words: illegal ivory trade, transnational organized crime, wildlife crime, Uganda
Introduction
From 2007 onwards, illegal ivory trade became a global and urgent problem, largely
fuelled by increasing demand and consumption in East and South East Asia (Milliken
etal. 2016a: 11, 24; Underwood et al. 2013: 6). Particularly since 2010, the illicit ivory
trade has been at record high levels (Milliken etal. 2016b: 3). Similar trends can be seen
when looking at other indicators, such as poaching and ivory prices: there have been
increasing levels of poaching since 2006, with a peak in 2011 (UNEP etal. 2013: 11,
33). It is estimated that between 2010 and 2012, 100,000 elephants were killed in Africa
(Wittmeyer etal. 2 014).
How is this booming trade organized? Academic, policy- and media-reports
dominantly explain this trade through the involvement of transnational crime—
reports refer, respectively, to ‘ballooning criminal networks that allow this transna-
tional crime to operate’ (Wasser etal. 2015: 87), ‘international crime syndicates’ (EIA
2014: 9, 15)or the ‘undeniable’ fact that ‘commercial poaching and trafcking are run
by multi-national criminal gangs’ (Mc Can n 2 017). These results strongly resonate with
international policy: new CITES regulations—the UN Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species—now consider poaching and wildlife trafcking as a
form of transnational organized crime (Biegus and Bueger 2017:29).
These statements are largely based on conscation data, which feature prominently in
CITES reports and other policy studies, academic studies and press articles. Concretely,
these data show how large raw ivory shipments of over 100kg are the driving force behind
*Instit ute of Development Policy, Univer sity of A ntwer p, Lange Sint Annast raat 22, 2000 Ant werp, Belgium; kristof.t iteca@
uant werp.be.
doi:10.1093/b jc/azy0 09 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL
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the increased illegal ivory trade (Milliken etal. 2016a: 8; Milliken etal. 2016b). For exam-
ple, in 2009, 2010 and 2011, there, respectively, were 8, 9 and 17 seizures over 800kg, for a
total of almost 61 tonnes of ivory (UNEP etal. 2013: 46). These kind of large ivory seizures
are unprecedented. Based on these data, analyses are quasi-unanimous: seizures of large
movement of ‘ivory represent(s) the involvement of international criminal syndicates in
the trade operating through sophisticated networks that link Africa with Asia’ (UNEP
etal. 2013: 46). In other words, international organized crime, and existing networks in
the trade in drugs, arms and humans, have come to inltrate and dominate the ivory
trade (Clarke and Babic 2016: 57). Other research, based on DNA analysis of conscated
ivory, presents similar results highlighting how ‘crime syndicates were targeting specic
populations for intense exploitation, hitting them hard and fast to satisfy the demands of
a particular consignment’ (Wasser etal. 2008:1070).
Yet, how is this transnational organized crime organized? The above dominantstate-
ments on ‘ballooning criminal networks’, ‘crime syndicates’ and ‘gangs’ remain only
that: statements, without an explanation or empirical analysis on what these look like
or how this trade is organized. Amajor gap in the academic literature is therefore in-
depth research on the organization of illegal ivory trade, particularly on the recently
increased trade within Africa: little is known on how illegal ivory is traded through the
continent, i.e. up to the moment it exits Africa.
This gap is acknowledged and highlighted in the policy literature. The UN ofce on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013: 48), for example, argues how ‘A major research gap
is the groups, routes and methodology used to move ivory within Africa, between the
poaching sites and the ports of exit’. Milliken (2014: 13)argues for more understand-
ing of the structure of the ivory trade, and in particular understanding on how ‘crimi-
nal operations are collecting, consolidating and shipping ivory between regions’, while
other studies specically argue to target traders (Somerville 2016).
This article engages with these research gaps: by analysing the organization of ille-
gal ivory trade through Uganda, it aims to better understand the role of transnational
organized crime in the illegal ivory trade. In doing so, and in line with Runhovde
(2017; 2), this article aims to deconstruct the ‘over-homogenized discourse surround-
ing transnational organized crime’, in order to actually ‘understand the complexity of
the trade and to respond to it efciently, more precision about local actors, activities
and context is needed’.
Uganda is chosen as a case study. Since 2007, Uganda has increasingly established
itself as a major transit point for ivory. CI T E S (2016) calls Uganda a country of ‘pri-
mary concern’ in the illicit ivory trade: it is listed as one of the ten countries world-
wide ‘linked to the greatest illegal ivory trade ows since 2012’ (CITES 2016: 25)and
serves as ‘an important entrepôt/export centre in East Africa with clear links to Central
African ivory trade ows’ (CITES 2016:15).
Methodology
Crucial in understanding this organization was in-depth research among illegal ivory
traders in Uganda (and, to a lesser extent, in the Democratic Republic of Congo
[DRC]), with whom were semi-structured interviews conducted between 2012 and2017.
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First, this research was part of a long-term research engagement with a group of
illegal cross-border traders in the Uganda–DRC border region, with whom Ihave been
interacting since 2005 (e.g. Titeca 2006). This research initially paid no attention to
illegal ivory trade, until this started becoming more and more present in their trading
activities. As will be shown in the text, from around 2009 onwards, ivory was becom-
ing an increasingly important commodity in the Uganda–DRC borderlands and in the
traders’ activities.
Second, between 2012 and 2017, specic interviews with ivory traders were conducted
on two specic locations, which are key-nodes in the illegal ivory trade: the Ugandan–
DRC borderlands (in particular the border towns Arua in Uganda and Aru in DRC)
and the Ugandan capital Kampala. More specically, 11 ivory traders were followed
throughout these years. Trust was crucial in this process (and more generally in con-
ducting research on illegal trade, Ellis and MacGaffey 1996). Given that Ihave been
conducting research on illegal trade since 2005, this meant that Ihad built up a reputa-
tion as being ‘reliable’—particularly among traders in the Uganda–DRC borderlands.
This facilitated introduction to illegalivory traders, as well as the interviews themselves.
In addition, interviews were conducted with law enforcement ofcials, journalists,
NGOs and analysts who are working on this issue. Seventy-six interviews were con-
ducted in total, and forty-nine interviews were conducted with 11 ivory traders. At the
time of writing (2017–18), this is the rst study primarily based on empirical research
with illegal ivory traders.
The article is structured in the following way: the next section discusses the literature
on transnational (dis)organized crime and how these ndings apply to the illegal wild-
life trade, in particular the ivory trade. The third section discusses the activities of the
ivory traders in Uganda and the power differentials among these traders. The fourth
section concludes.
Transnational (dis)organized crime and illegal wildlifetrade
(Dis)organizedcrime
Denitions of organized crime differ considerably in their conceptualizations and are
often vague or overly broad (Finckenauer 2005: 68). Central to understanding organ-
ized crime is the extent to which it is ‘organized’ (Finckenauer 2005: 60; Hagan 2006:
133)and the different structures through which it organizes itself. Generally, there is a
consensus that organisations with well-structured hierarchies—the ‘maa model’—have
become an exception and have been replaced by crime which is much more ‘disorgan-
ized’ (Reuter 1985) consisting of ‘loosely afliated networks of criminals who coalesce
around certain criminal opportunities’ and which is ‘much more amorphous, free oat-
ing, and atter, and thus lacking in a rigid hierarchy’ (Finckenauer 2005: 65–6). For
example, the literature on organized crime in Europe shows how large hierarchical
structures are no longer common, but how these groups are instead characterized by
loose afliations and less obvious chains of command, such as exible and changeable
networks, or small and ephemeral enterprises (Paoli and Fijnaut 2004: 607–10).
Why is this the case? Similar to legal, legitimate businesses, the kind of structure uti-
lized in organized crime is inuenced by contextual factors such as the dynamic char-
acter of the environment or the competitors in this particular market (Southerland
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and Potter 1993). For example, the organization of human smuggling and heroin traf-
cking is inuenced by market conditions and operational requirements (Zhang and
Chin, 2003: 478). They are organized into ‘small-sized groups’ that are able to ‘adapt
well to ever-changing market constraints and uncertainties. They have little vertical
bureaucratic structure, even though their operations may involve highly specialized
tasks. They ally with only those with valuable resources to contribute to their objective
of making a prot’ (Zhang and Chin 2003: 478).
The latter point (i.e. the objective of making a prot) illustrates how the structure
of organized crime is also related to the kind of criminal activities these actors are
engaged in: organizations with a primary interest in rule enforcement and dispute set-
tlement will have a different structure from organizations who primarily want to make
money. The latter is exible and uid by nature, rather than vertically and horizontally
integrated organizations. Instead, they ‘exibly cooperate in changing combinations of
individuals and small groups within larger transnational networks of criminally exploit-
able ties’ (Von Lampe 2014: 86). Moreover, the high demands on communication, and
the risks associated with it, constitute an important downside of strongly hierarchical
organizations (Zaitch 2002). This has been shown in other elds, such as drug trafck-
ing: research shows how this is primarily organized by ‘small groups of loosely linked
entrepreneurs rather than large, highly structured criminal syndicates’ (Zaitch 2002;
Natarajan 2006: 171), allowing these loose networks to ‘quickly react to shifting market
conditions’ (Bichler et al. 2017: 2). How does this apply to environmental crimeand
more specically illegal wildlife trade? This is discussed in the next section.
Illegal wildlifetrade
The term ‘transnational environmental crime’ is used to study the transnational char-
acter of environmental crimes. Transnational environmental crime is mostly dened
as a crime with cross-border transference and an international or global dimension.
Specically, these are crimes related to pollution or crimes against wildlife, such as
illegal wildlife trade (White 2011). The value chain of the latter category is very often
transnational, involving, for example, supply from Africa (such as ivory) and demand
from other parts in the world (such as Asia or Europe). Much of the ndings on the
organization of illegal wildlife trade, therefore, analyse its transnational character.
The concepts of ‘transnational crime’ and ‘organized crime’, to a large degree, over-
lap, but are not always the same. Organized crime that does not cross a border is an
example of this (White 2011). This section aims to understand the organization of a
specic transnational environmental crime, illegal wildlife trade. More specically, it
aims to understand the extent to which the above insights into organized (transna-
tional) crime apply to illegal wildlifetrade.
A rst strand of research on illegal wildlife trade shows the strong involvement of ‘tra-
ditional’ organized crime, i.e. the interest of vertically organized ‘maa-style groups’
and ‘major international smuggling rings’ (Zimmerman 2003: 1668). This has also
been shown for transnational ivory trade. Aresearch report (Vira and Ewing 2014: 9),
for example, argues how a ‘global criminal enterprise’ is controlling ivory trade from
poaching up to the nal consumer. Subsistence and artisanal poaching has been ‘co-
opted or crowded out by an illicit commercial trade that is monopolized by organized
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crime’ (Vira and Ewing 2014: 10). Milliken (2014: 23, 18)argues how ‘transnational
criminal organized organizations’, which are ‘typically led by African-based Asian
nationals, are directly involved in the procurement and illegal movement of rhino horn
out of Africa to markets in Asia’. Bergenas and Knight (2015: 124)describe ivory poach-
ing as ‘methodic and militarized’, while ivory trade is considered to be controlled by
sophisticated networks of ‘Asian-based criminal syndicates’. Specically on Tanzania, a
research report argues how ivory trade is dominated by ‘international criminal syndi-
cates’ and ‘sophisticated criminal networks’ (EI A 2014: 9,15).
A second stream of research shows the dominance of loosely organized networks
instead of ‘traditional’ vertically organized syndicates. It is shown how most environ-
mental crime is committed by ‘loosely organized networks of individuals’ (Hayman
and Brack 2011: 7), or small groups organized for a short period of time (Wright 2011:
33 8). Wyatt (2013: 87–9) shows how illegal wildlife traders are not part of hierarchical
networks, but operate more in informal networks, while Van Uhm (2016b) shows how
the illegal trade in Barbara Macaques is based on semi-structured, exible, yet sophis-
ticated trading networks.
A third stream argues that the focus on organized crime is misguided and is ‘not
the dominant picture as some journalists and researchers would like to believe’ (Pires
and Moreto 2011: 105). Rather than organized crime as such, it is the participation of
corrupt ofcials that fuels this trade. Naylor (2004: 263)calls the involvement of organ-
ized crime a ‘recurrent fable’ and a ‘tale’, in reality run by ‘complicit politicians and
corrupt functionaries’. However, empirical data on this are rare and thin. Hübschle
(2016) is helpful: she argues how the label of ‘transnational organized crime’ is of
limited use, as the illegal wildlife trade is driven by ‘insider trading’, i.e. corruption
and collusion between state ofcials and wildlife trafckers: it is a ‘business enterprise
facilitated by a multitude of diverse actors with close, limited or no links to “organized
crime”’ (Hübschle 2016: 195). Ru n ho vde (2017 ) looks at Uganda. Based on interviews
with law enforcement ofcers, she does not nd indications of organized crime in the
illegal ivory trade, but of a range of individuals with various organizational capaci-
ties. However, little analysis or data are presented on these individuals. Moreover, it is
unclear to which extent this conclusion is the outcome of methodological bias, rather
than an analysis of the illegal trade: the study is based on interviewswith law enforce-
ment ofcers and not on illegal ivory traders.1
Yet, are all these viewpoints mutually exclusive? Van Uhm (2016a), for example, shows
how the degree of organization and structure of the illegal wildlife trade widely varies,
ranging from opportunistic poachers and traders to highly organized poaching and
trading networks (Van Uhm 2016a: 263). Others argue how ‘depending on the species
and region of the world, “organized” can simply mean anything from three individuals
who are loosely organized together to a vast criminal enterprise that compromises all
stages of the wildlife trade (i.e. vertically integrated organizations)’ (Pires and Moreto
2011: 104). A central element is that illegal wildlife involves different steps: a multi-
level chain typically involving poachers, middlemen and markets (Pires and Moreto
2011: 104). It is perfectly possible that each step in the chain has different actors who
1Moreover, the stu dy is based on one -off inter views wit h law enforcement ofcer s, which may expla in the ‘conict ing accounts’
(Runhovde 2017: 15)given by t he respondents: tr ust is essential in t his kind of sensitive research on illega l commod ities, par-
ticul arly given the st rong involvement of law enforcement ofcer sin this trade (Ellis and MacGaffey 1996).
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are involved with different levels of organization. For example, Pires and Clarke (2011:
315)argue that while poaching might be a largely opportunistic activity with little links
with organized crime, this becomes different after the initial act of poaching, when
‘greater organization becomes apparent in subsequent stages that involve a variety of
middlemen, processing centres and markets’. Specic research on ivory trade suggest
similar dynamics, in which local actors are responsible up to the point when ‘ivory is
consolidated and hidden inside a container, while Asian and other organized crime
groups control the supply chain from containerization all the way through the shipping
and transport systems to market’ (Vira and Ewing 2014: 14). The relationship between
‘local’ and ‘transnational’ trade helps to further unpack thisdifferentation, which is
discussed in the next section.
Connectivity, nodes and transnationaltrade
Much research on organized crime has shown how this no longer xed to one loca-
tion or limited to having a strictly regional character, but instead has ‘evolved into an
international or transnational character complete with regional and global alliances’
(Hill 2005: 47). Transnational crime can be dened as ‘the illicit procurement, trans-
portation, and distribution of commodities across international borders’ (Warchol
etal. 2003: 1). In other words, organized crime has expanded its scope of operation
on a global level, partnering with actors located in other countries or regions to gain
access to new markets. The discussion on the organization of transnational organized
crime largely mirrors the debate on organized crime. While some reference is made
towards the involvement of ‘traditional’ mob -style organizations (UNODC 2002), most
of the literature emphasizes the loose character of transnational organized crime: at
the heart of transnational crime are temporary arrangements of ever-changing actors,
in which particular groups or individuals act as hubs, allowing social networks organiz-
ing crime allowing to operate in ‘innite variety of deviant collaborations’ (Hobbs and
Dunnighan 1998: 299, 296). Transnational crime is therefore organized through ‘con-
stant mediations and re-negotiations that are duplicated as perpetually mutating social
systems’ (Hobbs 1998: 417; Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998: 298)It is the connectedness,
created through the degree of connectivity between groups and individuals, which con-
stitutes the structural in ‘organized crime’, operating on a transnationalscale.
In other words, connectivity is key in this debate: it are particular connectionsbetween
different levels of crime that make a particular crime transnational. Writing on the
Mediterranean, Horden and Purcell (2000) use connectivity to describe the ways in
which micro-regions cohere, ‘both internally and also one with another—in aggre-
gates that may range in size from small clusters to something approaching the entire
Mediterranean’ (Horden and Purcell 2000: 123). The Mediterranean can, therefore,
be considered as a zone of ‘intense topographical fragmentation, overlaid by a kaleido-
scope of human micro-ecologies, which are in turn densely interconnected’ (Horden
2012: 28). In this way, connectivity refers to the way in which micro-regions are both
internally connected and externally related to eachother.
The literature on inter- and trans-Saharan trade is specically useful in understand-
ing these connections. When discussing Saharan trade, the focus has particularly been
on transnational trade, with little attention to the importance of intra-regional and
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local trade in its history. Inter-Saharan trade has always been considered less important
than trans-Saharan trade: the Sahara itself was considered a ‘blank, ready to be washed
by cultural “tides” from elsewhere’ (Horden 2012: 26). However, as particularly the work
of Judith Scheele has shown, the dominance of long-distance trade in the Sahara is an
‘illusion’, but depends on local exchange and inter-Saharan trade. (Scheele 2010: 282;
Scheele 2 011: 145). Concretely, transnational trade largely relies on regional and local
infrastructure, for access to transport, manpower and networks of protection. Trans-
Saharan trade external to the Sahara was therefore rare, as it remained dependent on
local alliances and pre-established social networks, in which regional traders, for exam-
ple, act as intermediaries (Scheele 2010: 298; Scheele 2011: 145, 160). Transnational and
local trade are therefore very much embedded in each other: the difference between
these categories is one of ‘scale rather than of kind, as the one is already and necessar-
ily contained in the other: places appear as nodes of particular density in overlapping
networks of connectivity’ (Scheele 2010: 283). Saharan trade should in this context be
considered as a ‘network of interdependent sub-systems, of short-, medium- and long-
distance exchange’, of which ‘trans-Saharan trafc was only one part of this network’
(Wi lson 2012: 409). The local, regional and transnationallevels are in this way closely
connected with eachother.
Nodes play a central role in these connections: they are the points in which these var-
ious scales come together and in which connections take place. In nodes, the ‘local’ has
to be understood with references to wider scales: the local and/or regional is connected
with the transnational, and vice-versa nodes often act as entrepôt points: points were
goods are stored, sold, traders meet, break up and reform, connecting local, regional
and transnational economies (Wilson 2012: 414). Border towns are a good example of
nodes. Connections and nodes do not only manifest itself in localities, but also through
persons: it particularly are middlemen who play a central role in connecting various
networks and scales. They are the ‘critical nodes that intermediate ows in a directed
networks’ (Sims and Gilles 2016). Similar to border towns, middlemen are therefore
able to connect different scales: the local, regional and transnationaltrade.
This article builds further on these insights: in order to understand transnational
crime, it argues howa number of issues are crucial. First, the article argues how, simi-
lar to the trans-Saharan trade, the understanding of transnational crime (and in par-
ticular transnational illegal ivory trade) needs an understanding of local and regional
illegal ivory trade: transnational ivory trade relies on regional trade. Second, connec-
tions are crucial in linking these various levels. This principally happens in nodes,
and in particular by traders acting as middlemen: it are these traders that connect the
various scales of this illegal trade. However, the article adds a third and crucial ele-
ment: it argues how the power of these connections is crucial. In order to do so, specic
attention needs to be given to the leverage of the traders’ various connections. For
example, it will be shown some traders limit their activities to the ‘micro-region’ of the
Uganda–DRC borderlands, whereas other trades operating from Kampala are able to
work directly with foreign exporters and are able to charge higher prices. They are able
to do so because of their more powerful connections with state operatives. In other
words, a better understanding of the connections in place allows a better understand-
ing of the nature of transnational crime: these connections not only integrate different
scales, but also allow to understand the various degrees of power.
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Ivory traders inUganda
Individual ivory traders are the central actors in the illegal ivory trade in Uganda. They
are the ones smuggling the goods across borders, looking for a market or for supply. In
this article, the term ‘trader’, rather than the terms ‘middlemen’, ‘broker’, ‘trafcker’
or ‘smuggler’, will be used, as all traders involved perform a variety of functions: on
occasions, they smuggle goods across the borders; on other occasions, they arrange
physical transport within a particular country (i.e. not crossing borders or smuggling).
On certain occasions, they simply link up people and do not touch the ivory; on other
occasions, they are only responsible for the storage of ivory. Sometimes, they buy ivory
themselves and look for buyers; on other occasions, they are simply taking a commis-
sion on ivory delivered from one actor to another.
This section follows the line of argument(s) as outlined earlier: rst, the article shows
the importance of regional trade for transnational illegal ivory trade. Second, it shows
how traders and their connections are central. Third, and importantly, it shows the vari-
ous degrees of power of the traders’ connections, which is particularly related to access
to government ofcials. In order to do so, the article looks in detail at how these connec-
tions develop themselves in key-nodes of the trade: we start by looking at the Ugandan
border townof Arua, which is a central entry-point for the ivory trade, and then look at
the Ugandan capitalKampala, which is a central exit-point out of the country.
The Ugandan border town of Arua as a nodalpoint
The rst nodal point this article focuses on is the Ugandan border town of Arua, bor-
dering the DRC and South Sudan. This area is a key nodal point in the regional trade:
much ivory originating from North-Eastern DRC, South Sudan or the Central African
Republic (CAR) passes through this border town and its twin (border) town Aru on the
Congolese side of the border. In the next subsections, the ivory supply, smuggling and
sale of the local traders are discussed (Figure1).
Ivorysupply
Historically, the border town Arua has been aregional smuggle centre, facilitated by
the presence of three borders (Uganda, DRC, South Sudan), weak border infrastruc-
ture, close connections between ethnic groups on various sides of the border, refugee
streams and different tax regimes (Meagher 1990; Titeca 2009). Starting in the late
70s and early 80s, this trade has led to the establishment of a range of what are locally
called ‘tycoons’ or ‘Arua boys’ in Uganda: Ugandan traders active in the illegal cross-
border trade, dealing in a wide portfolio of illegal goods such as petrol, minerals, sugar,
clothes, batteries and so on (Titeca 2012). Historically, traders in the border town have
acted as middlemen, largely between the transnational, regional and local levels: goods
such as petrol and cigarettes were smuggled in from neighbouring countries, such as
the DRC or South Sudan, and sold to local traders at a cheaper price. Minerals were
also sold to international traders, who came to the border town. Ivory was present as a
commodity, but rare: very few Ugandan traders had access to this commodity and were
trading in it. This changed from around 2009–10 onwards, when large quantities of
ivory reached thearea.
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This ivory came from all neighbouring countries in the region: South Sudan, Central
African Republic, but particularly from the DRC. During those years, the Garamba
National Park—which is near the Ugandan and South Sudanese borders—became
increasingly militarized and led to increased levels of poaching. While this park tradi-
tionally has been a site of poaching, the impact on the ivory trade and elephant levels
remained limited (Titeca 2013). This changed in the late 2000s (particularly 2008–10)
when a whole range of armed actors started poaching elephants in the park: the rebel
group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), South Sudanese and Sudanese poachers,
individual Congolese soldiers and individual Ugandan soldiers (as shown below).
F.1 Uganda and Arua. Source: Map reprinted from Titeca and De Herdt (2011). Ref. ‘Figure1
Map of Uganda, showing the border regions’.
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Suddenly, the border region had a major supply of ivory. As a Ugandan trader sum-
marized: ‘before 2008, Ididn’t know of ivory. Iwas trading in other things across the
border. But from this time onwards, there was plenty of it’.2
A variety of actors were supplying this ivory: rst, Congolese traders, who buy ivory
from Congolese poachers, mostly from in or around Garamba National Park. They
bring this ivory to various locations on the border, but particularly to one of the two
border towns (mostly on the Congolese side), where they sell it to the Ugandan traders.
In doing so, this supply was largely relying on this historical trading network. Second,
some of this ivory originating from Garamba (which is poached by South Sudanese
or Congolese poachers) rst passes through South Sudan, in which South Sudanese
traders are the ones offering the ivory to the Ugandan traders. Athird possibility is a
collaboration between Ugandan truck drivers and Ugandan soldiers. Since late 2008,
the Ugandan army was involved in a military operation against the LRA on this ter-
ritory, rst in the DRC, but also in South Sudan, and later on in CAR. The Ugandan
military have a history of smuggling natural resources from neighbouring countries, in
particular Congo (Titeca 2011). The anti-LRA operations did not lead to the structural
involvement of the Ugandan army, but individual Ugandan soldiers tried to prot from
their exposure to natural resources, and particularly ivory. Civilian trucks, supplying
the military with, for example, food or medicines, played an important role in this:
after having supplied the military with these goods, the truck drivers in collaboration
with individual soldiers, return with other goods such as timber or ivory, which were
smuggled across the border.3
As one of these truck drivers summarized:
We were civilian trucks hired by the military. What we did: we hid the ivory in the trucks. We were
not being controlled, because we were working for the military. (…) The number of kilograms var-
ied: sometimes 100 kilograms, sometimes less. We didn’t always nd ivory. Sometimes we did nd,
sometimes we did not. (…) It was up to 2011 we went to Garamba. (…) How ivory was bought: soldiers
collaborated with locals, who were selling it. And these locals delivered it to their—how do you call
this?—their barracks there.4
Not all traders were able to collaborate with the military: instead, they smuggled the
ivory themselves across the border.
How is it smuggled across the border?
Historically, the illegal trading networks of the border region have been smuggling
goods across the border in two main ways: rst, through smuggling routes that avoid
border posts altogether. In this ‘ant-trade’, these goods are smuggled in small quanti-
ties, largely on bicycles, and then stored until a sufciently large quantity is achieved.
For example, an estimated 40,000kg of sugar passed daily through these smuggling
2Interview Uga ndan t rader, border region, 18 May 2012.
3The timber trade was, for example, conrmed by an internal U N report (MONUSC O Itur i Brigade Militar y Daily Sitrep
Period Covered: 31800B JAN 10 to 011800B FE B 10, p.11). The ivor y trade is mentioned in a more recent policy report (Cakaj
and Lezhnev 2017).
4Interview trader, Ar ua, 12 Novemb er 2015. Simi lar stories are reported in recent reports, i.e. how army truck s are smuggling
in a var iety of goods, including t imber and ivory, and how government of cials are not allowed to check their t rucks (Cakaj and
Le zhn ev 2017).
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routes in the second half of the 2000s (Titeca 2012). Asecond possibility is that
goods are smuggled through the border points, by hidingand/or under-declaring
them (i.e. not paying tax on a substantial amount of the goods crossing the border).
Alarge percentage of goods pass through Uganda’s customs points in this way. For
example, research of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics and the Bank of Uganda (who
had placed surveyors at the border points) shows how, in 2008, informal exports
out of Uganda were worth US$1.35 billion, while formal exports were worth US$1.7
billion (UBOS 2009). In other words: more goods were leaving Uganda untaxed or
smuggled, than taxed—showing the uidity of these ofcial border points (Titeca
and Flynn 2014).
Ivory is smuggled across the border in the same two ways: a rst option is that smug-
gling roads are used (given the bad state of these roads, mainly on bicycles, but also with
cars) and stored in storage locations, such as shops, small warehouses or traders’homes.
As a trader summarized
We take it [ivory, KT] through the porous borders. You hire a team; they are based a border post.
These are not the ofcial border; but through panya roads [smuggling road, KT]. This can be on
foot, on a bicycle, and so on. All of it in a small quantity. It is then loaded in a car.5
A second possibility is that ivory is smuggled through border points, either through hid-
ing the ivory in various ways or by bribing the customs ofcials. For example, sometimes
ivory is hidden in busses, as the following trader explains:
I have an arrangement with the ‘turnboy’, the boy who opens and closes the booth of the busses. (…)
They create a hidden space in the booth, which cannot be seen. When the bus goes to the washing
bay upon arrival, they take the ivory. Sometimes the owner is not aware of this.6
Other traders rely on their relations with customs ofcials to smuggle the goods: trad-
ers have developed personal relations with these ofcials, facilitating thistrade.
Getting ivory from Congo is the easiest! Iknow all the border people. Al the Congolese at the border,
they are friends. If it’s necessary, Igive them 50 or 100 USD. (…)In all these things, personality is the
most important! People know me at the border. Isucceed in this because Ihave an easy personality.7
In total, seven of these traders were followed throughout the course of the research.
For all of these traders, ivory is only one of the commodities that is traded in these
networks. In other words, the traders have the infrastructure to move a variety of com-
modities, of which ivory is only one. As mentioned earlier, for these interviewed trad-
ers, ivory is a fairly ‘new’ commodity, which recently became part of their portfolio of
goods, but became integrated into the historically embedded trading networks.
How do traders sellit?
The involved traders not only smuggle goods across the borders but also stock the ivory:
similar to their other commodities, they store the ivory in and around the border town.
This allows them to store the ivory in case of increased security controls, collect bigger
5Interview ivor y trader, Arua, 21 May 2012.
6Interview ivor y trade, Kampala, 29 Janua ry 2014.
7Interview ivory tr ader, border region, 14 November 2015.
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quantities upon demands of buyers, wait for more favourable prices and so on. They
also sell the ivory to traders who come to the border town of Arua. These outside trad-
ers mainly originate from the capital Kampala. Some of the interviewed traders are in
regular contact with a number of these Kampala traders and call them when they have
sufcient supply of ivory. Other outside traders ‘show up’ in Arua and start looking for
ivory. Before ivory started arriving on a large scale in a border region, these buyers were
absent in the region. During the interviews, a wide range of nationalities were men-
tioned as ivory buyers, such as Chinese, Korean, Pakistani, Turkish and South Africans.8
Connections and theirlimits
The Uganda–DRC border region can be considered a ‘micro-region’ (Horden and
Purcell 2000), which is connected to external regions by the above-mentioned traders:
they play an important role as middlemen, connecting various scales of the illegal ivory
trade. The border town of Arua acts as a central node connecting traders within the
micro-region (i.e. across the Uganda–DRC border), but also towards outside actors: the
traders connect the historically embedded regional trading networks and the trans-
national level. By selling the ivory to outside actors, and particularly to international
actors, the ivory is fed into the international market.
The traders perform a range of functions that are necessary for the ivory to be moved:
buying, smuggling and selling on. Rather than being characterized by a hierarchical
structure of an organized crime group, these local ivory traders operate in loose and
exible networks. Within these networks, the traders’ connections are crucial, and par-
ticularly the power of these connections. On the one hand, their illegal trade is mainly
based on connections with lower-level government ofcials: custom ofcials who allow
their goods to be passed, local security ofcials who inform them about checkpoints
and so on. Second, they know the local context very well: they know whom to hire as
transporters and whom to sell to—including outside traders. These connections allow
goods to cross the border, allows them to stock their goods and allows them to sell
the ivory. However, the nature of these connections has its limits: transport and trade
outside of this ‘micro-region’ is particularly difcult. For example, transporting ivory
to Kampala involves a number of risks, for which the traders do not have sufciently
powerful connections: connections are needed more, and particularly higher-level of-
cials, to avoid conscation on the way to Kampala—which involves bypassing several
police checkpoints. Moreover, selling in Kampala also involves knowledge of the mar-
ket there, which basically involves knowing reliable buyers: throughout the course of
the research, many traders had been cheated in one way or the other, in which they, for
example, sold ivory to another trader, but never received the money. The quote from
the following trader is an illustration of this dynamic:
In my ivory dealings I’ve been cheated before. Igave ivory to a man, and he told me: when Ireached
Pakwatch, the army conscated everything: they opened the booth, and conscated everything. He
had only given me 1000 USD, and he still owed me 15,000 USD! (…) After this, Ieven lost interest in
8For example, a trader in t he border region ar gued how ‘there are Chinese who come here; they k now have someone looking
for market. A lso S outh A fric ans are here, looking. (…) It is us, Arua b oys, who a re the ones selling to them’ (inter view ivory
trader, Arua, 2 November 2015).
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the business, and Ilost hope. (….) Q: Did you believe him—that everything was conscated? A: No, he was
lying. Because he knew that there are certain things, if you take them, you can’t go to the police.9
Selling ivory requires knowledge of the Kampala ivory market: throughout the course
of the research, a number of the local traders tried to expand their reach to Kampala,
but encountered major problems in doing so. For example, one trader in this border
region, from the town of Arua, summarized the situation as the following:
For you as a local to go to K ampala, it is risky. And you don’t know your way there. So we don’t do
this. (…) These traders [from the capital K ampala, KT] had created the image that it’s very difcult
to sell ivory there, that there is no market! It are these traders who know the market in Kampala. The
locals from here don’t know the market there. And the government had started conscating ivory. So
the Arua boys here [the local traders, KT] had enough ofit. They did not want anything to do with
this [trading in Kampala, KT]. And the traders who know the market in Kampala, they don’t want to
share the market with their colleagues: they do not want to tell us where we can sell this.10
Similar examples were given by other traders, who encountered problems either in
transporting ivory (such as conscation) or in nding a market. In other words, for
many Arua traders, their activities are limited: their networks are clearly located in the
border region and do not reach the capital Kampala, where they do not know the mar-
ket and are not able to sell theivory.
As a result, many traders could not sell ivory in the capital Kampala, although they
could make more prot there: Kampala is the last nodal point before it exits the con-
tinent through the airport or is traded further towards Indian Ocean Ports—and has
consistently higher ivory prices. For example, between 2010 and 2011, the ivory selling
price was between 100 and 120 USD per kilogram in Arua and around 150 USD per
kilogram in Kampala. More generally, my eld research shows how, between 2010 and
2017, signicantly more prot can be made in Kampala: ivory prices are consistently
between 30 and 70 USD per kilogram more expensive in Kampala.
In sum, many traders limit their activities to their ‘micro-region’: their connections
are mainly embedded in this region. In the next section, we look at the activities of trad-
ers in another key-node in the illegal ivory trade: Uganda’s capital Kampala, which acts
as a major exit-point for ivory, out of Uganda.
Connections with government ofcials: Kampala as a nodal point for illegaltrade
The connections of traders are not uniform, but differ in power: these differences are
principally based on the contacts with the government ofcials. As shown above, most
of the Arua traders base their activities on connections with lower-level government
ofcials based in the region (such as customs ofcials). Other traders have connections
with higher-level government ofcials, and in particular security ofcials. These con-
nections give an increased level of security at various points of the trading chain: when
crossing the border, when transporting throughout the country, on exit points, and so
9Interview ivor y trader, Arua, 11 Januar y 2016.
10Inter view ivory trader, Ar ua, 12 Novemb er 2015.
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on. It also allows for access to information on security operations, and interventions in
case of a problem, such as the potential release of conscatedgoods.
A few of these traders are based in Arua, but they are mainly based in Uganda’s capi-
tal, Kampala. The city is a nodal point for regional illegal trade: it is a key collection
point for illegal commodities such as ivory, from where it transits to the national airport
(in Entebbe) or to Kenya (and more particularly the port of Mombasa). Operating
in these areas is particularly risky, as the airport is a particularly sensitive point and
exporting ivory to Kenya involves longer distances (and more police checkpoints).
Connections with high-level government ofcials allow to navigate these difculties.
Importantly, it also gives access to a wide(r) range of sources (which in turn allows for
bigger stocks of ivory).
Let us look at the example of Adam (a pseudonym), who is an ivory trader based in
Kampala. He has been trading in illegal ivory for about 15years, and throughout the
years, he has been receiving ivory from a range of different sources, with whom he
remains in (ir)regular contact:
• The Tanzanian Wildlife Authority: corruption with Tanzanian government ofcials
is a major problem for wildlife in Tanzania (Brockington 2008) and allows cons-
cated ivory to re-enter the market—among others, in the hands of Adam. In his
words: ‘I know this guy who used to deal with the Tanzania wildlife authority. So they
would steal it from the stock, or from poachers, and they would bring it here. (…)
They come here, because here the law enforcement department is much easier to
manipulate! You always take the route which is the easiest to manipulate’.11 On a num-
ber of occasions, Adam went to buy this ivory on the Tanzanian–Ugandan border.
• Ofcers from the Ugandan Wildlife Authority (UWA) have been engaged in a num-
ber of corruption scandals, equally allowing ivory to enter the market (Teny wa 2 014 ,
2015). Adam frequently collaborates with a trader who used to be a UWA ofcial and
who was a regular source. As this person explained: ‘when Iwas working with UWA,
we were systematically selling ivory. When Iwas working in [national park XY] we
did not declare everything which we conscated. For example, if we conscated 10
pieces, we declared 2.The rest we were selling’.12
• Burundian traders: these traders, bringing over ivory from Bujumbura, largely
bought their ivory in Eastern DRC. Adam himself claimed that this ivory mainly
originated from rebel groups in Eastern DRC.
• Individual Ugandan soldiers, who bring it from theCentral African Republic. As will
be discussed below, Adam has close connections with army ofcials, allowing him to
fairly easily tap into this supply stream.
• The above-mentioned ‘Arua boys’: Adam has been organizing transports from
theUganda-DRC border region to Kampala.
Four traders such as Adam were followed for this research project: two of those (includ-
ing Adam) had a wide variety of sources; two others were mainly relying on the military.
From these various sources, the traders were transporting ivory to Kampala in a num-
ber of ways: either it is smuggled directly to the capital, in which the ivory is hidden in
11Inter view ivory trader, Ka mpala , 17 Januar y 2017.
12Interview for mer UWA ofcial, Kampala, 17 November 2015.
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various ways (in busses, trucks, cars). Another option is for the traders to go and pick
it up at border points, for which they are able to mobilize the necessary contacts. The
traders can either smuggle the goods themselves to Kampala or purely act as a middle-
man, in which they pass on the ivory towards another trader (and pocket the prot).
Traders can also rely on military transport infrastructure to do so. These traders have
a variety of nationalities: there are not only the Ugandan traders, but there is also a
particularly signicant presence of West African traders, from, for example, Nigeria,
Guinee, Sierra Leone or Côte d'Ivoire.
All Kampala traders mentioned personal links with these government actors, par-
ticularly army ofcials: one trader was groomed in the illegal trade business through
an army commander who was a family friend, another trader went to high school with
an army commander, another traders’ best friend is the brother of a high-level army
commander and so on. These connections, in turn, allow operations to be conducted
on a bigger scale. Adam, the illegal ivory trader mentioned earlier, is a good example:
his area of operation was virtually the whole of the country, from border zones with
Tanzania or Congo, to operating in the airport. Key for his operations is his connec-
tions with politico-military elites. Particularly his friendship with one army commander
(a family friend) proved to be crucial in his introduction to the illegal business:
We used to chill at his place when Iwas at university. We have a drink, and in this way, Iknew him;
and he introduced me in the business. He was a shrude guy: he only knew the language of money.
And he had the cover to make things moving. Also the white people, whom we call ‘investors’, they
all knew the big guys. The mainly go to the big guys, they particularly go to the big guys, and they
tell the commander what they are looking for. At the same time, many Congolese came here, and in
this way business was created.13
Hanging out with the commander exposed him to a range of contacts and business
opportunities. This happened at the time of the Congolese wars, when Ugandan army
ofcers were proting from Congo’s natural resources, in particular minerals (Titeca
2011). While his close connection with the above army ofcial introduced him to the
trade, and remained important, this introduction allowed him to build up his own net-
work, involving other traders, buyers and so on. In doing so, he expanded his network
and started dealing in a variety of commodities—not only minerals and drugs, but also
ivory. Similar stories were told by the other Kampala traders.
Importantly, it is through these connections with government ofcials that traders
such as Adam were able to handle this diversity of sources and trade over such a big
territory: different from the localized engagements of the Arua traders,14 high-level
connections allow transport over a bigger territory.
Through these connections, Adam—and other traders with more powerful con-
nections—act as nodes between different scales. First, they have connections with a
number of micro-regions: not only with the Uganda–Congo border region, but also
with other border regions, and with a steady supply from various government agencies.
Second, they are able to connect these various micro-regions to the transnational level,
13Interview ivory trader, Ka mpala, 01 March 2017.
14These trader s have a much more localized engagement with govern ment ofcials: t hey know t he custom authorit ies at
the border, which they pay something from time to ti me, and with whom they have develop ed relations allowing ivory to pass
through the border.
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by selling to transnational traders. The contacts of the traders with the international
traders vary: a few of them are regularly meeting the international recipients and many
of them do not. While the latter were aware of dealing international traders, they were
not aware of the eventual recipient. As one trader summarized ‘I never see the person
for whom the ivory is eventually intended; Ialways see an intermediary. So there’s a
whole chain of people (…). The nal buyer is the Chinese, Thai or Russian. But Inever
see the person on the meeting: they all have national agents’.15
In some cases, more powerful traders are involved in having the ivory pass through
customs and/or airport. For example, one trader primarily dealt with the airport:
I depend on the airport. When there suddenly is a window of opportunity: then it can suddenly leave.
They call and say: it can leave the countr y now. It are the airport agents who make sure this happens.
They tell me: there’s now place on a plane.16
Another trader highlightedhow
It used to be a high-level military ofcer who would help things pass through the airport. (…) So
they’re in charge of that business, and they would make sure the plane is delayed for 5 minutes, and
the ivory would get in board.17
Connections andpower
In sum, connectedness is crucial in this trade, as well as particular nodes providing
these connections. These nodes can be both places and persons: the article highlighted
the Ugandan border town of Arua and the capital Kampala as central localities in the
illegal ivory trade, in which various scales come together. They each constitutes nodes,
bringing together illegal ivory trade from a variety of sources, and acting as a locality
to store the ivory, bring together various traders and so on. Also, the traders act as
nodes, in which their connections bridge various levels and scales: both the traders in
Arua and Kampala connect with transnational traders. While both are linking up the
regional with the transnational level, the power of their connections in doing so dif-
fers, particularly their internal connections: the connections of less powerful traders
(such as the majority of the traders in Arua) are with lower-level, largely street-level gov-
ernment ofcials. While this allows goods to cross borders, and allows them to sell to
international traders, it does not do more than that. It makes their activities largely lim-
ited to the micro-region in which they are based. Other traders (such as the Kampala
traders we discussed)who have connections with higher-level ofcials have a number
of advantages from these connections: they are able to operate on a bigger scale, make
bigger prot and so on. They face less risks, and are better equipped, to operate on a
larger territory, allowing them to collect supplies from various regions. They can also
transport larger quantities (as they, e.g., can be in a position to rely on army trucks)
15Interview ivory tr ader, Kampala, 29 Janua ry 2014.
16Inter view ivory trader, Kampala, 29 January 2014.
17Inter view ivory t rader, Kampala, 26 January 2017. The air port came back i n many of the traders’ account s, as well as in inter-
views with law enforcement of cials, jour nalists and analysts: a ll of these actor s point at t he increa sing importance of Entebb e
airport as a n exit-point for ivor y. I n the words of a trader, when discussing the reg ional interest in t he air port: ‘All these traders
prefer to tr ade ivor y through Entebbe, because things are more exible here’ (interview ivor y trader, Kampa la, 17 November
2015).
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and are able to store larger quantities (as they are better informed about potential con-
scations). Alast quote to illustrate this dynamic, in which one of the Kampala traders
explains how ivory is traded, with the help of a high-ranked military ofcial:
A Congolese contacted me here in Kampala, and told me about the ivory he had. It was stuck at the
border in Congo. Icontacted [high-ranking army ofcial]. The Congolese had 3 pieces of ivor y as a
sample, and they told me they had a ton. The problem was bringing it over; and [high-ranking army
ofcial] was the one able to offer protection. So [high-ranking army ofcial] came with the money;
and he gave me a truck with soldiers. Inegotiated with the traders 20 USD per kg, and Itold [high-
ranking army ofcial] 50 USD per kg. So Imade a lot of money then.18
Conclusions
My ndings, based on the research among illegal ivory traders in Uganda, aimed to
unpack the transnational organization of the illegal ivory trade. Empirical understand-
ing of the trade’s organization is limited: a range of academic literature, policy reports
and media reports suggest that a transnational organization—a ‘criminal syndicate’ or
‘gang’—is responsible for this trade. My ndings suggest that, similar to the research
on human smuggling or drug trade (Zhang and Chin 2003; Natarajan 2006), ivory traf-
ckers form ad hoc alliances and exible networks, in which individual traders are the
thriving force behind this trade: they constitute nodes at particular points of the value
chain (such as the Uganda–DRC borderlands or the capital Kampala). Instead of rely-
ing on a group structure, they form exible coalitions in order to buy, sell or transport
theivory.
A crucial explanation for this are the market conditions of ivory, which are dynamic
and fragmented: supply and demand are unpredictable, and a variety of dangers loom,
such as conscation, lack of market and being cheated by other traders. In these condi-
tions, the traders’personality and connections are central throughout the trade: personal
ties with customs ofcials in order to cross the border, personal ties with army ofcials
for supply, protection and sale, personal connections with other traders in order to avoid
cheating and so on. This does not mean that the level of (dis)organization is uniform in
the ivorytrade.
The article has showed the various degrees of power of the traders’connections: the
better connected with higher-level ofcials, the more advantages for a trader. More par-
ticularly, it gives them a higher degree of security and predictability in their activities: not
only in supply and sale points, but also in transporting goods through important points
such as customs, where they are able to rely on connections with high(er)-level govern-
ment ofcials. This, in turn, allows them to transport and store larger quantities of ivory.
The degree of security and predictability of traders with lower-level connections are more
limited, largely limiting their actions to their ‘micro-regions’.
When the literature on illegal ivory trade emphasises the dominance of interna-
tional syndicates—what Hübschle (2016: 208)calls the idea of a ‘foreign-dominated
parasitic conspiracy’—important realities get overlooked. Concretely, this research has
shown how, rst, ivory trade is to a large extent organized and experienced locally and
18Inter view ivory trader, Ka mpala, 29 January 2014.
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regionally. Transnational ivory trade mainly relies on historically embedded trading
networks, such as the regional trade along the Uganda–DRC border. Second, it is the
traders’ (unequal) connections linking the regional and transnationalscales, which are
central in this trade. In other words, the transnational is not found in global syndicates,
but in the various interactions between these different local and global traders, inside
and between different countries (Co lu mb 2 017).
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