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Ownership Structure and Bank Risk: The Effects of Crisis, Market Discipline and Regulatory Pressure

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... Điều này làm giảm động lực của nhà quản lý, họ thể hiện ít nỗ lực hơn so với các đồng nghiệp ở ngân hàng tư nhân, từ đó dẫn đến việc phân bổ nguồn lực không hiệu quả, sẵn sàng điều chuyển nguồn vốn đến các dự án rủi ro cao nhằm phục vụ các lợi ích cá nhân 15 . Đồng thời nhà quản lý ở các ngân hàng này sẵn sàng gia tăng rủi ro với giả định ngầm về sự bảo đảm an toàn của chính phủ 29,30 . Nhiều nghiên cứu thực nghiệm cho thấy ngân hàng sở hữu nhà nước có chất lượng tín dụng kém và rủi ro cao hơn các ngân hàng tư nhân 23,29,31 . ...
... Việc niêm yết sẽ đặt ngân hàng dưới các tiêu chuẩn thị trường cao hơn, tác lực thị trường (market forces) mạnh hơn, các tác lực này sẽ ảnh hưởng đến các động lực chấp nhận rủi ro của ngân hàng 15 . Cụ thể, việc niêm yết sẽ thúc đẩy cơ chế giám sát chặt hơn và đến từ nhiều phía: một là sự điều tiết từ các cơ quan quản lý sẽ nhanh hơn khi các ngân hàng niêm yết được cập nhật thông tin liên tục trên sàn chứng khoán 30 ; hai là các ngân hàng niêm yết sẽ thu hút sự chú ý của các đơn vị phân tích và đầu tư nhiều hơn (như các công ty môi giới, quỹ đầu tư, tổ chức xếp hạng tín nhiệm), đây được xem là một cơ chế giám sát bổ sung vì các đơn vị này có thể trình bày các vấn đề của ngân hàng thông qua các báo cáo đánh giá, phân tích xếp hạng khách quan 32 . Áp lực từ các cơ chế giám sát tăng thêm này giúp làm giảm các hành vi mạo hiểm của nhà quản lý, từ đó giảm rủi ro cho ngân hàng. ...
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This study examines the impact of ownership structure on bank risk. The former is classified into four types, including concentrated, institutional, foreign, and government, while the latter is proxied by the Z-score (an inverse measure of risk). The Generalized Least Squares (GLS), which controls for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, is employed to analyze an unbalanced panel data set including 21 joint-stock commercial banks in Vietnam from 2010 to 2018. We further investigate the moderating effects of market discipline (proxied by variable listed) on the relationship between ownership structure and bank risk. The results suggest that there is a negative association between three proxies of ownership structure (ownership concentration, institutional ownership, and government ownership) and bank risk and that foreign ownership does not have any significant relationship on the risk of the bank in the direct relationship models. However, the results for the models where interaction variables are included show that foreign shareholders help improve bank stability and reduce risk in listed banks. In addition, the relationship between institutional ownership and bank risk is reinforced for listed banks, while the relationships between the other two (concentration and government) and bank risk are not influenced by the listing status.
... We start with the role of analysts. With their substantial industry knowledge and interaction with management, analysts are able to provide previously private information related to management (Tran, Hassan, and Houston 2018a). They can express their concerns related to covered banks through channels such as research reports, recommendations, and ratings (Yu 2008). ...
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We investigate whether diversification affect bank risk‐taking of US banking industry, and whether this relationship is partially explained by agency theory. Our results show that U.S. banks with a relatively high share of non‐interest income become riskier when moving toward non‐interest‐generating activities, especially activities from investment banking, proprietary trading, etc. Diversification not only affects the conditional average risk, but also influences the dispersion of risk. Moreover, diversified TARP‐recipient banks become riskier than diversified non‐recipients after TARP capital injections. Our main findings are robust with a battery of robustness tests. The results are partially explained under agency frameworks related to poor corporate governance. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
... To understand the effect of the capital regulation, it is necessary to consider the bank's ownership structure, as ownership type and degree both shape risk-taking decision of the banks (Tran et al., 2018;Laeven and Levine, 2009). Same regulation may result differently in different ownership composition of the banks. ...
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The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in firms with large free cash flows--more cash than profitable investment opportunities. The theory developed here explains 1) the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, 2) how debt can substitute for dividends, 3) why diversification programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidation-motivated takeovers, 4) why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil, and 5) why bidders and some targets tend to perform abnormally well prior to takeover.
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Abreu, José Filipe, and Mohamed Azzim Gulamhussen, 2013, Dividend payouts: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies in the context of the financial crisis, Journal of Corporate Finance 22, 54-65.
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Gandhi, Priyank, and Hanno Lustig, 2015, Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns, The Journal of Finance 70, 733-768.