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СХІД № 1 (153) січень-лютий 2018 р.
98 Історичні науки
Філософські науки
UDC 323.2
DODONOV ROMAN,
Doctor of Philosophy, Professor,
Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF THE POLITICS OF MEMORY
This article is devoted to the analysis of the directions and logical stages of the institutionalization
of historical memory in Ukraine. It is proved that the stages of institutionalization and their «closed»
questions of history are attracting intellectuals, independent history researches as well as journalist
investigations. This entails the necessity to restore truth and justice, establish norms and rules
making historical information publically available, including declassification of archives, conducting
expeditions in the places of mass graves, establishing new and reviving old memorial sites, revision
of the national heroes pantheon, introducing various programs aimed at studying spoken history,
inclusion of history memory content into the textbooks of educational institutions; adoption of the
relevant norms at the legislative level and imposition of sanctions on non-compliers; and finally,
the creation of the National Memory Institute.
Key words: historical memory; memory policy; memory wars; institutionalization; Institute of National
Memory.
Formulation of the problem. The post-Maidan con-
dition of the Ukrainian value-spiritual environment revealed
how insecure it is when facing external interventions and,
at the same time, actualized theoretical studies of many
concep ts, contributing to humanitarian security system
developm en t. Tho se are concepts of histo rica l cons-
ciousness, national identity, value consciousness, cultural
heritage, discourse management, conflict design, histo-
rical justice, historical memory, etc. Events, similar to Cri-
mean annexation and Donbass situation demonstrate that
history has always been a significant factor for most of our
fellow citizens that performs mobilization functions in pre-
conflict situations. In the realm of historical science, where,
indeed, the branch of memory study (memoria studies)
was formed, this issue transferred to social philosophy,
social p sychology, c ultural studies, political science, and
sociology. Moreover, the historical memory content beco-
mes subject of state policy, su bstantially affecting inter-
national relations even up to the appearance of so-called
"memory wars." The necessity to take the people's histo-
rical memory under control helped turn it into an object of
manipulation. "Memory policy" became an integral part of
political management, means of influencing mass cons-
ciousness and identity as well as a source of legitimacy of
state and supra-state institutions. Under those conditions
it is necessary to analyze the process of historical memory
institutionalization with isolation of its stable and potential
institution al forms.
Research analysis and research publications on this
issue. French religious scholar Ernest Renan was one of
the first who drew attention to the possibility o f effective
use of the tragic past elements for national interests. In
his Sorbonne report entitled as "What is nation?" (1882),
he proclaimed: "Heroic past, great figures, glory (but true)
are the main force on which the national idea is based ...
nation means great solidarity that based on the already
brought sacrifices and those ones which will be brought
in future" [1]. Therefore, it is not surprising that historical
memory classification has the richest tradition in French
humanities. It is enough to name Maurice Halbwachs, who
was a pioneer in studying social memory [2], and Pierre
Nora, who proposed the "place of memory" concept [3].
Representatives of such school as "Annals" paid their
attention to the study o f such phenomenon as historical
memory. They also drew attention to the ways by which
pe ople of the past end o w ed their act ions with th e
meanings; to the motives which they guided in their actions.
The Annalists actively sough t sources, t hroug h w hich-
historian can "penetrate" into the consc iousness of the
individual, distant from him in time.
Later, historical memory was studied by A. Assmann [4],
F. Graebner, M. Eplle [5], O. Etkind, G. Kasyanov, P. Con-
nerton, A. Miller, A. Novak, T. Ranger, I. Riuzen, K. W ike,
D. Fentress, M. Ferretti [6], D. Schnapper, etc. In Ukraine,
this issue is in the spotlight of such researchers as Y. Hryt-
sak, V. Gorobets, S. Yekelchik, Y. Zernyi, S. Kogut, S. Kul-
chytskyy, L. Nagorny, V. Fadeev, O. Shtokvysh, N. Yakoven-
ko etc.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the directions
and logical stages of the h istorical memory institutiona-
lization in Ukraine.
Presenting main material. In our society, the meaning
of "historical memory" concept is filled with, on the one
hand, theoretical developments of specialists who carefully
examine this issue, primarily by fo reign historians, and,
on the other hand, it happen thanks to own assessments
of historical events, which are called "folk memory "or"
memory of the people". These concepts are commonly
used to refer to the information block that relay to the official
version of history, which is considered to be, in the best
case, as additional, oppositional, semi-marginal pheno-
menon. The generally accepted interpretation of history
may not correspond to the assessment that sp ontane-
ously developed among participants and which was con-
veyed orally to descendants.
In particular, the Holodomor of 1932-33 was not officially
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mentioned in Soviet times. But this information was kept
in people's memory. Unlike official history, which is "written"
by professional scholars, historical memory is based on
testimo nies, personal experien ces and experiences of
particip ants of th ose events. A nd their testimonies are
transmitted from generation to generation, c reating an
altern ative version o f histo ry. So individu al memo rie s
become a collective property.
It is worth admitting that historical memory is a very
un stab le elem en t of historical consciousness. Stat ic
memory does not exist. Any socio-political changes lead
to transformation of histo rical knowledge, assessments,
memory, and representations. The image of the past never
freezes. It is c o nstantly chan ging, some f eatures are
erased, while others emerge. It depends on the actua-
lization of the ongoing problems of our time. Therefore,
historical memory is powered both by the present and the
past. As M. Ferretti no tes, memory, as itself, as well as
past, does not exist. It is always a pattern, a result of
continu ous and invisible activity, sometimes conscious,
and sometimes unconscious interaction of many people
and diverse forces. Memory is plural, and often its various
manifestations are contaversory [6]. Exactly these memory
characteristics turn it into object of state policy, which, for
its part, involves its institutional design.
In sociolo gy, institutio nalization is interpreted as a
process of defining and consolidating social norms, rules,
statuses and roles, bringing them into a system capable
to satisfy certain social need. T he process of institutio-
nalization involves several succ essive stages, such as:
emergence of needs, satisfaction of which requires joint
org anized action s, formation of c ommon g oals, emer-
gen ce of social norms and rules during spontan eous
social interaction, carried out by trial and error; acceptance
of procedures related to these norms and rules, imposing
sanctions system to maintain these no rm s and rules,
differen tiation of their application in individu al cases,
creation of statuses and roles system applicab le to all
institu t e mem b ers with o u t exc eption. The re sult of
institutionalization is the emergence of social institutions.
The first step towards the historical memory institu-
tionalization deman ds the incorporation its content into
literary works of writers, the appearance of feature films,
depic ting events in altern ative way, the disclo su re of
archives, journalistic investigations, etc. W ith the deve-
lopment of information and communication technologies,
off icial history loses its m on opo ly on truth, n umerou s
version s of historical even ts underm ine the dominant
metanarrative on which the legitimacy of the incumbent
power is based.
For example, the Holodomor, the Stalinist repressions,
some episodes of the Second World War in Soviet times
turned into "black holes" and "whites of spots" of history,
and truth about those events began to be widely kno wn
thanks to the writers who, in the 90's, started to include
testimony of participants of those events in their works.
The fact that official Soviet historiography was interpreted
as a manifestation of the "general preference of the social
system" was in fact a series of miscalculations and mis-
takes that were corrected at the cost of human lives.
In general, writers and poets, journalists and publicists
of the Perestroika era "awakened" the sleeping historical
memory. Before them, the Soviet Union did not know the
eth ical discussio ns of intellect uals, as it happened in
Western Europe. Families kept silent about the true cir-
cumstances of the deaths of their relatives, and those who
stayed on the occupied territories or was imprisoned were
suspected in collaboration and betrayal. Instead, the lac-
quered myth about the Great Victory and the victorious na-
tion was created.
After collapse of the USSR, the process of folk memory
institutionalization started to develop in many ways. In the
Russian Federation, publications aimed at reinterpretation
of the Second W orld War had been releasing. Historical
journalism was widely spread thanks to V. Besanov, P. Bo-
bylova, T. Bushevoy, M. Veller, V. Danilov, V. Doroshenko,
V. Karpov, V. Kiselev, J. Latinina, M. Meltukhova, I. Pavlova,
B. Rezun (Suvorov), A. Sakharov, M. Semiyryagi, B. Sokolov,
M. Solonin. It was presented an alternative version of the
beginning of the war. In Russian society, the discussion
beg an with aim to find o u t to what extent St alin was
responsible for plunging Europe into the war.
But after Vladimir Putin came to power, these discus-
sions were artificially slowed down. The Great Victory has
become a sacred symbol of the nation as well as ground
for national identification. Today, according to the Russians
themselves,"the heroization of the war, the monumenta-
lization of its collective image is not considered to be an
evidence of memory, but an evidence of "black holes" in
history, amnesic trace or "scar"... ,We can say it is a kind of
cenotaph, a kind of "black hole" in consciousness, lack of
awareness if we speak about this phenomen on. It is a
monument, but not memory. A nd this means that the
traumatic event of the Second W orld War in Russia, is not
really experienced unlike, for example in Germany" [7].
On the contra ry, in Ukr ain e and other post-S oviet
countries was continuing the process of filling the white
spots of Soviet history. Moreover, it happened with renewed
wig o ur. Next steps of the in stitution alization memoria
studies ins titutionalization included: d ec lassification of
archives, con ducting expeditions in the places of mass
graves, establishing new and reviving old memorial sites,
revision of the natio na l heroes pantheon, int roducing
vario us pro g rams aimed at studying spok en his tor y,
including interviewing veterans who are direct witnesses
and participan ts o f those event as well as bearers of
historical memory.
Last but not least, the mentioned popularity was caused
with the fact that the ruling elites of the post-Soviet countries
separated from the Stalinist regime and did not want to be
associated with it .References to the mistakes and crimes
of the Soviet era did not have an ideological obstacle,
because the moral responsibility for it was completely
shifted to Moscow. This logic was clearly outlined by the
Lithuanian writer Ruta Vanagayte: "we have such history
that turns out the Lithuanians as victims. During the whole
life th ey had been su ppressing by someone, whether it
was Soviets, Poles, or G ermans. And then we, brave
people, threw out this oppression and became heroes,
because we destroyed the Soviet Union. W e rose, victims
became heroes, and remained as victim / hero" [8]. A similar
system is typical for Ukraine, where one can see an ethical
conflict in historical memory. On the one hand, most citizens
are proud of Victory and offended by the statements made
by Russian leader that Russia without Ukraine would still
have defeated in that war. But on the other hand, the
tendency of Ukraine's victimization is becoming more and
more visible. That means the desire of authorities to present
Ukraine not as a winning hero, but solely as a victim of the
Stalinist regime.
This conflict has internal and external dimensions. The
internal component is that in the process o f institu tio-
nalizing the memory of people about historical events,
which, I recall, o riginally arose as opposition to official
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history, and itself turns into such opposition. Th e rapid
and uncomprom ising formation of the "corr ect" official
version of historical memory provoke appearance of a new
alternative in the mass co n sc iousness of Ukrainians,
opening a new cycle of commemorative practices.
In addition, the functioning of several variants of his-
torical memory in society , several "truthful scenarios "
contributed to the creation and rapid growth of schizmo-
genetic tendencies in Ukraine. For example, in 2006 during
the discussion of the Ukrainian Law "On the Holodomor of
1932-33 in Ukraine", Verkhovna Rada experienced rough
confr ontation which deepen ed the split of the country
conditionally into East and West. This violent reaction was
caused by the order of 12.06.2009 on general dismantling
of monume nts and memor ials dedic ated to people in-
volved both in the organization and execution of Holodomor
and political repressions in our country during Soviet times,
by sig ned Vik tor Yush c h enk o . Equ ally no tab le were
dispu tes over the reco gnition of OUN (Оrganization of
Ukrainian Nationalists) and UIA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)
soldiers as fighters for Ukraine's independence which led
to the adoption of the relevant Law only in 2015.
An important stage in the h istorical memory institu-
tionalization was the creation of the Ukrainian Institute of
National Remembrance (UINR) in 2006, wh ich is similar
to such institutio ns in o ther cou ntries of Central and
Eastern Europe. According to its first director, academician
Igor Yukhnovsky, the main task of this institution is "im-
plementation of measu res aimed at c onsolidatio n and
gr ow th of th e Uk r ain ia ns sta te-b u ildin g patrio tism"
However, from the very first days of its existence, with full
support of the President Viktor Yushchenko, UINP promoted
not so much consolidation of society but intercession, with
tendentious approach to the interpretation of the historical
past.
The UINPR activity was imperfect from the normative
point of view, as it provided the ideological indoctrination
of Ukrainian citizens by the state authority. Moreover, the
implementation of such activities could not but contribute
to th e escalat ion of schizog en es is, as t he versio n of
Ukrainian h istory, promulgated by the UINR, wh ich was
not shared by all in Ukraine. Almost all achievements and
official advantages of the Soviet era "fell into oblivion", while
atte ntio n was foc u sed on Stalin is t rep re ssions, the
Holodomor, the rethinking of the role of the OUN and UIA,
etc. In fact, a kind of "memory war" was announced, which
became especially noticeable when Volodymyr Vyatrovych,
a former director of the Ukraunian Security Service Archives
became a director of the UINR.
The best result of the institutionalization memory policy
has been achieved after adoption of several normative
documents on decommissioning. On April 9, 2015, during
Verkhovna Rada session, V. Vyatrovych presented a pac-
kage of drafts of four laws on decomunization: "On the
legal status and honoring the memory of the fighters for
the independence of Ukraine in the 20th c entury" (Law
No.314-VIII); "On the Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism
in the Second World W ar in 1939-1945" (Law No.315-VIII);
"On access to the archives of the repressive bodies of
the c ommu nist totalitarian regime in 1917-1991" (Law
No.316-VIII); "On the Conviction of the Communist and
Nat ional-Soc ialist (Nazi) To talitar ian Regim es and the
Pro h ibition of the Promo tion of Their Symbols" (Law
No.317-VIII). All bills were adopted, but they caused ambi-
guous reactions in Ukraine and abroad.
Thus, the Law "On the Conviction o f the Communist
and Natio nal-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes ..."
actually identified these two ideologies, not even taking
into account the fact that the communist regime had been
dominated in Ukraine for more than 70 years, and the
socialist one lasted less than four years. According to the
norm of this Law, "a public denial, in particular in mass
media, the criminal nature of the communist totalitarian
regime of 1917-1991 in Ukraine", considers as a propa-
gan d a of the c o mmunist totalit arian regim e, which is
prohibited. That is, propaganda is a denial of crime. In
fact, our grandfathers and parents who, under the red flags,
selflessly built Ukrainian cities, created a large industry,
cultivated bread, raised children, protected their native land
from the Nazi invasion, were accomplices of the crimes
together with the Soviet authority. And that one who denies
it, is offender himself.
Too categorical articles o f this law does no t take into
account the fact that for the population of South-Eastern
industrial cities in Ukraine, it was exactly Soviet ind ust-
rialization that became the most important period in their
historical development. If we forget about this period then
we will have only some memories about the colonization
of "W ild Fields", the Cossacks and the imperial-Orthodox
age. This is clearly demon strated by the deccommu-
nization campaign, which swept the wave of renaming
through the geographical map of Ukraine. And instead of
"Lenino", "Kirovo", "Ordzhonikidze" we have "Pokrovski",
"Voznesenivski" and "Bogorodytski". However, this cam-
paign is full of irrational and ambiguous elements, in order
to assess this phenomenon in certain way ...
The external component of the memory policy is con-
nected with the general reorientation of Ukraine to the
European Union, which cause the harmonization of the
basic values. The foundation of modern Russian policy of
memory is the recognition and cultivation of powerful nation
which gained victory. Th e triumphant idea inspires plenty
of people, generates confidence and optimism. Not ac-
cidently, that apart from the Soviet Union, such ideology of
triumph was also typical for other winning countries in the
Second World War (the United States of America and Great
Britain). It would seem that such sentiments are natural
for Ukraine as well.
But we should not forget that if there are winners, then
they must be losers. A nd amo ng them there are most
countries of Central-Eastern Europe such as German y,
Austria, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Finland, France, etc. As Ivan Krastev notes,
"European liberalism of the 50's of the twentieth century is
based on completely different principles than the idea of
triumph". This liberalism ...was based on defeat. It was
universalism, based on empathy, sympathy and under-
standing of humanism but not on the doctrine of power"
[9].
The key point of European liberalism was based on
the feeling of a common blame for killing Jewish people.
This period was called the Holocaust. And while in post-
war Germany there was a serious intellectual and moral
"work on mistakes", the Holocaust was thoroughly avoided
in the Soviet Union. "Following the Second World War, when
the countries of We stern Eur ope was getting c lo ser,
sharing the memory of co mmon suffering, the USSR of
Eastern Europ ean s, and thus quickly turned into their
dictator. Such attitude prevented nation who defeated Nazi
regime, who released p risoners from Auschwitz and who
was one of the main prosecutors during the Nuremberg
process from taking the leadership in general Europ ean
memorial policy" [5].
After the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainian orientation
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Додонов Роман,
доктор философских наук, профессор,
Киевский университет имени Бориса Гринченко
ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛИЗАЦИЯ ПОЛИТИКИ ПАМЯТИ
Статья посвящена анализу направлений и логических этапов институционализации исторической памяти
в Украине. Под институционализацией понимается процесс определения и закрепления социальных норм,
правил, статусов и ролей, приведение их в систему, которая способна действовать в направлении удовлетво-
рения некоторой общественной потребности. Такой необходимостью в Украине стало требование восстанов-
ления исторической справедливости и установления исторической правды. Закрытые темы отечественной
истории, особенно ХХ века, включая Голодомор, сталинские репрессии, отдельные страницы Второй миро-
вой войны требовали своей рефлексии и ценностного переосмысления. Без моральной оценки и своеобраз-
ной "работы над ошибками" общество не может двигаться дальше. В этих условиях возникает необходимость
институционализации исторической памяти с выделением ее постоянных и потенциальных институциональ-
ных форм. Содержание исторической памяти становится предметом государственной политики, существенно
влияя на международные отношения - вплоть до появления так называемых "войн пам яти". Необходимость
взять историческую память народа под контроль способствовала превращению ее в объект манипуляции.
Філософські науки
towards the European Union and the gradual refusal to
follow Russia symbolically excluded this country out of the
winning party and put it to the losin g p arty. Ukrainian
"memory politician s" still managed to balance between
the dignity of the winners and the suffering of victims at the
same time shifting the responsibility for making mistakes
during that period on the external force represented by
supporters of Stalin regime. But such position is unlikely
to have lasting effect. Acc ording to Mykola Eple, such
instructions of the Eastern European countries remind "the
Austrian incident, when the role o f the victim during the
Second W orld War allowed to alleviate its own negative
actions and its own responsibility for Nazi crimes. As a
result, nationalism in Austria is much more common than
in Germany" [5]. And even the mourning demonstration in
Babyn Yar and recognition of Halacaust at the highest level
does not bring Ukraine closer to the general European
consensus, mostly because of the unreso lved issue o f
the crimes, committed by the OUN-UIA.
In 2016 Polan d con tribu ted to adju sting Ukrainian
memory policy ,denying the policy of glorifying Ukrainian
nat io n alist s an d in si st ing on their re spo ns ib ilit y for
genocide of the Polish population located in territory of
Galicia and Volhyn during the Secon d World W ar. The
beginning of broad anti-Uk rainian c ampaign in Polan d
started after the premiere of "Volhyn" film directed by
Wojciech Samzowski. Several avid statements was made
by senior officials. In 2017, a "black list" of Ukrain ian
scholars and historians who were banned to enter the
territory of Poland came into force. Representatives of the
Polish radical parties demon stratively began to destroy
Ukrainian monuments and in response to such ac tions
Ukraine suspended searching activities and exhumation
of the dead Poles. In January 2018, the Sejm of Poland
adopted a Law according to which all those who deny,
support or promote the criminal acts of OUN-UIA will be
prosecuted. Thus, Poland sent a signal to Ukraine that
"with Bandera heritage, Ukraine will not accepted to the
family of European nations" [10].
Conc lusions The institutionalization of historical me-
mory contributes to solving such large-scale socio-political
issues as implementation of national project, the formation
of political nation, national identity, integration into one or
another supra-state institution, etc. The stages of institu-
tionalization are the attraction of attention to the "closed
questions" of history by representatives of creative intel-
lectuals, independent studies o f historians, journalistic
investigations. As a result it became necessary in society
to restore j ustice and truth, the establishment of norms
and rules for the publication of historical memory content,
including declassification of archival documents, the work
of search expeditions in the places of mass graves, finding
new places of memory as well as revival of forgotten ones,
revision of the panth eon of national heroes, vario us
programs aimed to study oral history, the inclusion of the
hist orical memory content in textbo oks o f education al
institutions; adoption at the legislative level of the relevant
norms and imposing sanctions for its no n-compliance.
Finally the creation of a sp ecialized Institute of National
Remembrance. Accurate processing of issues of the past,
despite all the contradictions, is considered a to be a key
for preventing crimes against humanity from recurrence in
the future.
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102 Історичні науки
"Политика памяти" становится неотъемлемой составляющей политического менеджмента, средством воз-
действия на массовое сознание и идентичность, источником легитимности государственных и надгосудар-
ственных институтов.
Этапами институционализации является привлечение внимания к "закрытым вопросам" истории со сто-
роны творческой интеллигенции, независимым исследованиям историков, журналистским расследованиям,
в результате чего в обществе сформировалась потребность в восстановлении справедливости и правды;
установление норм и правил обнародования содержания исторической памяти, включая рассекречивание
архивных документов, работу поисковых экспедиций в местах массовых захоронений, определение новых и
возрождение забытых мест памяти, пересмотр пантеона национальных героев, разнообразные программы
изучения устной истории, включение содержания исторической пам яти в учебники учебных заведений; при-
нятие на законодательном уровне соответствующих норм, предусматривающих санкции за их несоблюдение;
наконец, создание Института национальной памяти.
Ключевые слова: историческая память; политики памяти; войны памяти; институционализация; Ин-
ститут национальной памяти.
Додонов Роман,
доктор філософських наук, професор,
Київський університет імені Бориса Грінченка
ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЯ ПОЛІТИКИ ПАМ'ЯТІ
Стаття присвячена аналізу напрямків і логічних етапів інституціоналізації історичної пам'яті в Україні. Під
інституціоналізацією розуміється процес визначення і закріплення соціальних норм, правил, статусів і ро-
лей, приведення їх у систему, яка здатна діяти в напрямку задоволення деякої суспільної потреби. Так ою
потребою в Україні стала вимога відновлення історичної справедливості і встановлення історичної правди.
Закриті теми вітчизняної історії, особливо ХХ ст., включаючи Голодомори, сталінські репре сії, окремі сто-
рінки Другої світової війни вимагали своєї рефлексії та ціннісного переусвідомлення. Без моральної оцінки
та своєрідної "роботи над помилками" суспільство не може рухатися далі. За цих умов виникає необхідність
інституціоналізації історичної пам'яті з виокремленням її сталих і потенційних інституціональних форм. Зміст
історичної пам'яті стає предметом державної політики, суттєво впливаючи на міжнародні стосунки - аж до
появи так званих "війн пам'яті". Необхідність взяти історичну пам'ять народу під контроль сприяло перетво-
ренню її на об'єкт маніпуляції. "Політики пам'яті" стають невід'ємною складовою політичного менеджменту,
засобом впливу на мас ову свідомість та ідентичність, джерелом легітимності державних і наддержавних
інституцій.
Етапами інституціоналізації є привертання уваги до "закритих питань" історії з боку творчої інтелігенції,
незалеж них досл іджень істориків, журналістських розслідувань, внаслідок чого в суспільстві сформува-
лася потреба у відновленні справедливості і правди; встановлення норм і правил оприлюднення зм істу
історичної пам'яті, включаючи розсекречення архівних документів, роботи пошукових експедицій в місцях
масових поховань, визначення нових та відродження забутих місць пам'яті, перегляд пантеону національ-
них героїв, різноманітні програми вивчення усної історії, включення змісту історичної пам'яті у підручники
навчальних закладів; прийняття на законодавчом у рівні відповідних норм, що передбачають санкції за їх
недотримання; нарешті, створення Інституту національної пам'яті.
Ключові слова: історична пам'ять; політики пам'яті; війни пам'яті; інституціоналізація; Інститут на-
ціональної пам'яті.
© Додонов Роман
Надійшла до редакції 08.12.2017
Філософські науки
