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DAR Y PEDIR RAZONES: FUNDAMENTO DE LA ESTRUCTURA CONCEPTUAL HUMANA SIMÓN RUIZ MARTINEZ UNIVERSIDAD PONTIFICIA BOLIVARIANA
Abstract
La práctica de dar y pedir razones se desglosa en tres aspectos: doy razones como individuo racional, pido razones como practicante del lenguaje y las razones que se dan y se piden para instituir comunidades epistémicas. En este sentido, la racionalidad es un asunto práctico y lingüístico.
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Standard theories of so-called donkey anaphora (Kamp 1981, Heim
1982, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991) predict that sentence (1) is truth conditionally
equivalent to (2).
(1) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
(2) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats every donkey that he owns.
I will refer to the proposition expressed by (2) as the strong reading
of (1). A nonstandard theory, defended by King (1993, 2004), predicts
that (1) is equivalent to (3).
(3) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats a donkey that he owns. The proposition expressed by (3) is the weak reading of (1). Although the authors I have referred to disagree about how best
to interpret (1), they agree that (1) is not ambiguous; it semantically
expresses no more than one reading. Not everyone shares this opinion,
though. Schubert and Pelletier (1989), Kanazawa (1994), and Chierchia
(1995) suggested that sentences relevantly like (1) are ambiguous.
2 Consider, for example, sentences (4)–(6).
(4) Everyone who owns an umbrella leaves it at home on a sunny day.
(5) Everyone who owns an umbrella uses it on a rainy day.
Yes and no. It depends on the meaning of the question. Traditionally, those on the affirmative side — predominantly neo-Fregeans — hold that Ralph's believing about Ortcutt, de re, that he is a spy is identical with, or otherwise reducible to, Ralph's believing some proposition or other of the form The such-and-such is a spy, for some concept the such-and-such that is thoroughly conceptual or qualitative (or perhaps thoroughly qualitative but for the involvement of constituents of Ralph's consciousness or of other mental particulars), and that uniquely determines, or is uniquely a concept of, Ortcutt (in Alonzo Church's sense of ‘determines’ and ‘concept of’). Concerns over Ralph's believing that whoever is shortest among spies is a spy while not suspecting anyone in particular have led some neo-Fregeans (not all) to qualify their affirmative response by requiring that the concept the such-and-such and its object bear some connection that is epistemologically more substantial than that between the shortest spy and the shortest spy.
This paper provides an agonistic interpretation of Robert Brandom's social-pragmatic account of normativity. I argue that social practice, on this approach, should be seen not just as cooperative, but also as contestatory. This aspect, which has so far remained implicit, helps to illuminate Brandom's claim that normative statuses are ‘instituted’ by social practices: normative statuses are brought into play in mutual engagement, and are only in play from an engaged social perspective among others. Moreover, in contrast to a positivist or conventionalist understanding of Brandom's work, it shows that the possibility of a critical stance toward existing practices is not only compatible with, but already implicit in this form of pragmatism. This can be made explicit with the notion of farcical practices: practices that are treated merely as if they institute genuine commitments and entitlements. Interpreting a practice as farcical is taking a critical stance toward it, and this possibility is inherent in Brandom's theoretical framework. This opens the way for a fruitful appropriation of Brandom's pragmatism for social and political philosophy.
Quentin Skinner's appropriation of speech act theory for intellectual history has been extremely influential. Even as the model continues to be important for historians, however, philosophers now regard the original speech act theory paradigm as dated. Are there more recent initiatives that might reignite theoretical work in this area? This article argues that the inferentialism of Robert Brandom is one of the most interesting contemporary philosophical projects with historical implications. It shows how Brandom's work emerged out of the broad shift in the philosophy of language from semantics to pragmatics that also informed speech act theory. The article then goes on to unpack the rich implications of Brandom's inferentialism for the theory and practice of intellectual history. It contends that inferentialism clarifies, legitimizes, and informs intellectual historical practice, and it concludes with a consideration of the challenges faced by inferentialist intellectual history, together with an argument for the broader implications of Brandom's work.