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Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America
... Under presidentialism, party (or coalition) unity has no direct impact on the odds of government survival and, therefore, having the support of a strong parliamentary organization is not a necessary condition for sustaining control over the national executive. Fused power systems create rather distinct incentives because legislators affiliated with the governing party or coalition need to stick with their parties and support the government's agenda to avoid bringing down the government and, in some cases, incurring in electoral losses due to anticipation of elections (Huber, 1996;Linz, 1990;Mainwaring, 1993;Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997;Shugart and Carey, 1992;Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998;Owens, 2003). ...
... Although previous research has argued that incentives for interbranch cooperation should be low when presidents are endowed with substantial legislative authority (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997;Shugart and Carey, 1992), empirical evidence on coalition formation under presidentialism does not support these claims 3 . Figueiredo et al (2012) analyzed over 200 cabinets formed by minority presidents in Latin America and demonstrated that high levels of presidential agenda power reduced the likelihood of a minority government being formed. ...
... Previous theorizing on the matter has assumed that executive strength and party strength are linearly and inversely related and, therefore, presidential systems in which presidents are endowed with substantial legislative authority should almost of necessity develop weaker and less cohesive parties than any other regime type. By the same reasoning, a presidency with limited powers was viewed as the best alternative in terms of constitutional design, and especially so under pure presidentialism (Shugart and Carey, 1992;Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). What we find, however, is that presidential powers vary a lot among popularly elected presidents, and that weak presidents are associated with higher levels of party unity under semi-presidentialism, but not under presidentialism. ...
This article proposes a novel theoretical framework to account for the combined effects of regime type and patterns of executive authority on legislative party unity. We argue that broad presidential legislative powers favor coordination between the president and legislative parties under pure presidentialism, whereas under a semi-presidentialism, strong presidents increase the potential for intra-executive conflict, submitting parties to cross-cutting pressures. We expect higher levels of legislative authority to decrease party unity under semi-presidentialism but increase under presidentialism. When presidents are endowed with limited legislative authority, semi-presidentialism produces higher levels of party unity than presidentialism, but for sufficiently high levels of legislative authority there should be no difference across regime types. Our analyses of 1586 pooled observations for 72 democracies from all regions of the world using the V-Dem measure of party cohesion demonstrate that presidential legislative authority, in combination with regime type, is indeed a key predictor of party unity.
... However, when we observe that countries in Latin America are overwhelmingly presidential, I cannot help but agree with Shugart that the conclusion drawn by Stepan and Skach is subject to selection bias and fails to consider the variety of institutional designs within the countries under consideration. (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997). Another critique of Presidentialism in Latin America is the inherent weakness of state institutions, complicated even more by fragmented and undisciplined parties (Valenzuela, 2004). ...
... As is the case in most Spanish-speaking countries there is a longstanding phenomenon of weak or volatile parties that are centered around a popular figure or ideology. Under a Parliamentarysystem, countries with weak parties will inevitably face more volatile governance and social instability than those under a Presidential system (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997). Finally, there is a concerning retrogressive assumption that since Latin America has only experienced presidential governance, we can attribute the democratic breakdown in the region to this specific institutional structure. ...
... (Hudson, 1992). Lastly, the constitutional framework requires such a high threshold for censures of presidential cabinets that it has consequently maintained credibility between the legislative and executive branches in a way that preserves Uruguays designation as a strong 'Presidential' state (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997). These features of the constitution have solidified a balanced relationship between the president, his allies, and the opposition in a way that has maintained the legitimacy of institutions that form the government. ...
... Desse modo, uma "engenharia constitucional" tornou-se prioritária nos estudos comparados das novas democracias (Sartori, 1997;Lijphart, 1992Lijphart, , 1994Lijphart, , 1996Lijphart, , 2003. Para diversos analistas, era imprescindível a identificação de arranjos institucionais que fossem imunes ou, ao menos, resistentes a possíveis retrocessos autoritários em decorrência de impasses instransponíveis entre o Executivo e o Legislativo (por exemplo: Linz, 1990aLinz, , 1990bLinz, , 1994Linz, , 2002Shugart;Carey, 1992;Skach 1993;Sar-tori, 1997;Lijphart, 1994;Mainwaring, 1993Mainwaring, , 1999Valenzuela, 1994ae 1994b, Jones, 1995Lijphart;Waisman, 1996;Huber, 1996;Diamond, 1997;Mainwaring;Shugart, 1997aShugart, e 1997bTsebelis, 1995Tsebelis, , 2002. Em ambos os casos -governabilidade difícil e ingovernabilidade com crise institucional -os especialistas preconizaram desenhos constitucionais que consideravam menos sujeitos à manifestação de múltiplos atores com poder de veto às políticas propostas pelo Executivo. ...
... Anteriormente, Riggs (1988) já havia alertado para a necessidade de se considerar os impactos de fatores "paraconstitucionais", como a cultura no funcionamento do presidencialismo. Na sequência, autores como Shugart e Carey (1992) e Mainwaring e Shugart (1997aShugart ( ,1997b) chamaram a atenção para um detalhe de suma importância até então não observado, qual seja, o presidencialismo, por si mesmo, não é um obstáculo à consolidação da democracia, ou mesmo à sua qualidade operacional, mas sim a variação do presidencialismo adotada na América Latina. Nessa região, de acordo com os autores, essa forma de governo foi combinada com dispositivos constitucionais que prejudicariam seu funcionamento. ...
... Com base nessa concepção, a literatura temática inferiu que a fórmula de representação proporcional era a indutora do multipartidarismo (Shugart;Carey,1992;Mainwaring;Shugart, 1997aShugart, , 1997b e, portanto, da baixa governabilidade. Claro que, no caso de países nos quais se considerou haver uma larga permissividade à criação de novos partidos, outros aspectos da legislação eleitoral e da legislação partidária foram incluídos no rol de fatores de estímulo à fragmentação excessiva do sistema partidário -quanto ao modelo brasileiro, por exemplo, o voto nominal em listas abertas foi identificado como um incentivador da competição entre os candidatos da mesma legenda, assim como da ligação paroquialista entre políticos e eleitores (Jones, 1995;Ames, 1995aAmes, , 1995bAmes, , 2001Samuels, 2003). ...
Our proposal in this article is to analyze the debate on presidentialism, having as central the theme of governability and its relation with the performance of party oppositions in the legislative arena. We argue that the concern with the consolidation of recent democracies has led analysts to privilege governance over the effectiveness of parliamentary opposition. In this way, the evolution of studies and debates about the most appropriate constitutional designs for democratic consolidation has resulted, on the one hand, in the conception that, if effective, parliamentary oppositions can harm the consolidation of new democracies and, on the other, in a lack of empirical research on their prerogatives and behavior. We defend the need to overcome this normative bias and the development of an investigation agenda on its strategic performance, after all, parliamentary oppositions are indispensable actors in the democratic regime.
... Indeed, most observers conclude the President is the primary initiator of legislation within Brazil's system of government. 5 Presidentialism's track record in Latin America along with its merits and problems is usefully summarized in Linz (1990) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997). 6 These Vice-Presidents included: José Sarney (1985-90), Itamar Franco (1992-95), and Michel Temer (2016. ...
... Scholars have called Brazil's federalism "robust" (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997) and emphasize the generous revenue sharing between the federal, state, and municipal levels. The national government collects most tax income, but it is constitutionally obligated to return 49 percent to state and local governments. ...
... Another institutional aspect that magnifies the political effects of federalism is an extremely malapportioned Congress. According to some observers (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997;Samuels 2003;Rosenn 2004) Roraima, but because of constitutional requirements that ratio is limited to about 9 times as many representatives. While this situation prevents one state from dominating national policy, it does weaken the representativeness of Brazilian institutions. ...
This chapter focuses on the structure of the Brazilian government today. I outline the basic design and key characteristics. The key questions answered in this chapter are: what roles do different political actors play and how is power allocated within the Brazilian government? What are the characteristics of Brazil's major political institutions and where are they headed?
... A literatura trata o presidencialismo de coalizão basicamente sob duas abordagens que estão relacionadas, em alguma medida, com a própria evolução histórica do modelo brasileiro no tempo. Até o governo Itamar Franco, os argumentos descreviam nosso sistema político brasileiro como muito vulnerável, gerador de altos custos de governabilidade e tendente à paralisia decisória, em virtude da combinação explosiva de suas instituições (ABRANCHES, 1988;MAINWARING, 1997;AMNES, 2003). ...
... A paralisia decisória decorreria, assim, de processos de intensificação e dispersão de preferências e de fragmentação dos recursos políticos, o que estimula a formação de coalizões de veto ad hoc e dificulta a formação de maiorias governativas estáveis, levando ao impasse permanente. Mainwaring (1997) também chama a atenção para a difícil combinação das instituições políticas brasileiras, defendendo que essa junção não seria suficientemente compensada pelos poderes presidenciais. Na mesma linha, para Ames (2003) Brasil decorreriam do conjunto de instituições disfuncionais, particularmente a representação proporcional em lista aberta, a existência de grandes distritos a as baixas barreiras à entrada de partidos. ...
Resumo: O Brasil tem observado períodos de alta instabilidade e fragilidade nas relações entre Executivo e Legislativo, impondo um novo desafio para interpretar o presidencialismo. Neste artigo, defende-se que a explicação do sistema brasileiro pode ser melhor concebida por meio de um constructo teórico sistêmico, formado pela junção de diferentes abordagens, com destaque para o delineamento de um conjunto de habilidades e competências observadas ao longo dos mandatos presidenciais. Assim, propõe-se o desenvolvimento de um framework dialógico baseado em recurso heurístico e metáfora comparativa aplicado a eventos de competições automobilísticas, permitindo-se ilustrar e melhor compreender o perfil dinâmico e desafiador de sistemas presidencialistas multipartidários.
... Previous work has analyzed the ideological behavior of political party members of Congress by the modeling of voting data in signed and weighted networks [7,45,8,157,187] These prior efforts tackled topics such as community detection, party cohesion and loyalty analysis, governance of a political party and member of Congress inŕuence in such networks. Yet, the identiőcation and characterization of ideological communities, particularly in fragmented party systems, require observing some issues, such as: (i) presidents may deőne coalitions to strengthen the implementation of desired public policies, which may be ruptured after some time [172,33]; (ii) political members have different levels of partisanship and loyalty, and their political preferences may change over time [14,7]; and (iii) different parties may have the same political ideology, being redundant under a party system [67]. ...
... When these members of Congress are associated with a large number of political parties, the party system in question is regarded as fragmented. In this case, during a term of office, coalitions are often established, leading political parties to organize themselves into ideological communities, defending together common interests during voting sessions [172,262]. ...
Understanding the collective behavior of (groups of) individuals in complex systems, even in scenarios where the individual properties of their components are known, is a challenge. From the point of view of network models, the collective actions of these individuals are often projected on a graph forming a network of co-interactions, which we here refer to as a many-to-many network. However, the volume and diversity with which these co-interactions are observed in the most varied systems, such as, for example, social media platforms, economic transactions and political behavior in voting systems, impose challenges in the extraction of patterns (structural, contextual and temporal) emerging from collective behavior and that are fundamentally related to a phenomenon under study. Specifically, the frequent presence of a large number of weak and sporadic co-interactions, which, therefore, do not necessarily reflect patterns related to the phenomenon of interest, end up introducing noise to the network model. The large amount of noise, in turn, may obfuscate the most fundamental behavior patterns captured by the network model, that is, the patterns that are essentially relevant to the understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Removing such noise becomes then a key challenge. Our goal in this dissertation is to investigate the modeling and analysis of collective behavior patterns that emerge in networks formed by co-interactions in different contexts, aiming to extract relevant and fundamental information about a target phenomenon of interest. Specifically, we tackle the extraction of structural, contextual and temporal properties associated with patterns of collective behavior that are fundamentally represented by communities extracted from the network. To this end, we propose a general strategy that addresses the aforementioned challenges. In particular, this strategy includes, as an initial step, the identification and extraction of the network backbone, that is, the subset of the edges that are indeed relevant to the target study. The next steps consist of the extraction of communities from this backbone as a manifestation of the existing collective behavior patterns and the characterization of the structural (topological), contextual (related to the phenomenon of interest) and temporal (dynamic) properties of these communities. Based on this general strategy, we propose specific artifacts for some of the steps that compose it and advance the state-of-the-art, in particular with a new method for backbone extraction, a new temporal node embedding method capable of representing and extracting different temporal patterns of interest from a sequence of networks, and finally a methodology to support the selection and evaluation of backbones from a structural and contextual point of view, considering the most common scenario where there is no ground truth. Furthermore, we explore these artifacts by studying three different phenomena that require different modeling and analysis strategies. Specifically, we investigate: (i) the formation of ideological groups in the Brazilian and U.S. House of Representatives, (ii) online discussions on Instagram in Brazil and Italy, and (iii) information dissemination on WhatsApp. Overall, our results show that the proposed artifacts offer relevant contributions to the field in which this dissertation is inserted.
... The theoretical framework here advanced is based on an existing general argument about the distribution of portfolios by the president in exchange for agenda-setting power in the legislative process (for instance, see Shugart and Carey, 1992;Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997;Amorim Neto, 2006b;Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010;Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011;Kellam, 2015). Yet, in this study, this argument is tested in a new way, identifying, for the first time in the study of coalition governments in presidential democracies, the direction of the proportionality deviation-i.e., whether to the president's party benefit or not. ...
... Building on existing arguments about the effect of presidential institutional powers on the formation and composition of executive cabinets (Shugart and Carey, 1992;Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997;Amorim Neto, 2006b;Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010;Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011;Kellam, 2015), in the next section I theorize that the extent to which the president controls the legislative 3 Figure 1a was produced using Warwick and Druckman's data (Warwick and Druckman, 2006), comprising 807 observations at the coalition party level as the unit of analysis, from cabinets formed across 14 European countries from 1945 to 2000. Figure 1b was produced using new data at the coalition party level as well from 20 presidential cabinets formed over more than 70 years (1946-2019), comprising 656 observations. The full tests for Gamson's Law in parliamentary and presidential democracies are presented in Appendix A. See Appendix B for a detailed description of the data for presidential systems. ...
Recent studies provide evidence that the absence of a no-confidence procedure in presidential systems is crucial for understanding why the allocation of portfolios does not follow the same pattern in both parliamentary and presidential democracies. In this study, I argue that distinctions within presidential systems must be used to explain the substantial variation in the allocation of portfolios to presidential parties. I theorize that when the president is more dependent upon the legislature to make and enact policies, the balance of power in presidential cabinets is more likely to reflect the balance of power in the legislature. In this case, the presidential cabinet can resemble the proportional cabinets usually formed in parliamentary systems. With new data from 20 presidential democracies worldwide spanning more than 70 years, the results support the expectation of a greater formateur's advantage when presidents have greater institutionally-granted powers to influence the policy agenda in the legislature.
... Sobre la compatibilidad entre el sistema democrático latinoamericano y el régimen presidencialista también se expresó Nogueira (1988), Mainwaring (1990), Mainwaring y Shugart (1997), Lipset (1990), Horowitz (1990), Nohlen (1991), Nohlen y Fernández (1998), Lijphart (1989a, O´Donnell (1992), Stepan (1993), Valenzuela (1989), Meyer (1992), Diamond (1990), Schmitter (1991), Przeworski et al. (1996), Lipset (1996), Thibaut (1993) y Serrafero (1993). ...
... La propuesta y la posición de Linz (1990) originaron un debate en el cual participaron notables investigadores que, al poco tiempo de la aparición del estudio, aportaron distintas perspectivas. Entre otros, pueden citarse la crítica metodológica de Nohlen (1991), la propuesta alternativa de Sartori (1991), las perspectivas complementarias de Lijphart (1989), los trabajos más empíricos de Mainwaring (1990), Shugart y Carey (1992) y de Mainwaring y Shugart (1997). Los estudios se multiplicaron y existieron distintas "olas" (Elgie, 2005) sobre el análisis del presidencialismo en la región que partían del trabajo de Linz (1990). ...
La revocatoria de mandato es un mecanismo institucional que habilita a los ciudadanos a solicitar, por medio de una iniciativa popular, la apertura de un referéndum vinculante en el que puedan decidir sobre la salida anticipada de un representante electo que ha perdido su confianza. De este modo, permite a la población mantener el control sobre los gobernantes elegidos durante el plazo de tiempo que dure su cargo ya que un cierto número de electores insatisfechos con algún mandatario puede reclamar votaciones especiales para destituirlo.
Fue incorporada junto con otros institutos de democracia directa en varias constituciones nacionales latinoamericanas, en mayor medida desde fines de los años ’80. En un escenario de crisis de la representación, la apertura de estos espacios institucionales para la participación y el control popular en los procesos de política pública cobró un interés creciente.
Ciertos países adoptaron la revocatoria para todos los cargos, empezando por los del nivel nacional y llegando a alcanzar (algunos de ellos) al mandato presidencial. Esto último podría implicar una modificación en el diseño y funcionamiento del sistema presidencialista. Otros Estados también incorporaron esta herramienta en sus normativas nacionales pero sólo para revocar puestos electivos provinciales y/o locales. Los ámbitos subnacionales fueron los más alcanzados por este mecanismo, tanto en términos institucionales como de aplicación empírica, debido a que sus cargos, de menor rango y peso político, resultan ser los más simples y menos costosos de revocar.
Esta tesis tiene por tanto tres ejes centrales. Un primer eje teórico, en el cual, a la luz del estudio de la revocatoria de mandato, se revisa y amplía la literatura existente, por un lado, sobre la crisis de la representación y los diseños alternativos de democracia participativa y deliberativa. Por el otro lado, se releva y extiende la teoría concerniente a los regímenes presidenciales, en particular, la referida a la rigidez del sistema por el mandato fijo del Ejecutivo, especialmente el del presidente; el hiperpresidencialismo y los estilos personalistas de liderazgo; y las interrupciones o caídas presidenciales
El segundo eje, normativo, se propone analizar el diseño legal de la revocatoria de mandato a partir del estudio de las constituciones nacionales que la incluyen y de las leyes y resoluciones nacionales que la reglamentan. De este modo, se dilucidarán las facilidades y dificultades que ofrece la normativa para su aplicación en la práctica.
El tercer eje es empírico y se concentrará en el uso que hasta el momento ha sido dado a este mecanismo en los diferentes países que lo poseen en sus constituciones nacionales. Se relevarán y analizarán los casos empíricos de aplicación de la revocatoria en los distintos ámbitos y cargos a fin de conocer las potencialidades y limitaciones de esta herramienta tanto para un ejercicio efectivo de accountability societal sobre los gobernantes, como para habilitar una salida institucional frente a graves crisis enfrentadas por los funcionarios electivos, especialmente, por los presidentes.
En el desarrollo de los tres ejes mencionados, el diseño y la aplicación de la revocatoria presidencial en el subcontinente recibirán una atención especial, debido a la relevancia del cargo en cuestión para los regímenes presidenciales. En dicho contexto institucional, este mecanismo podría tanto flexibilizar su diseño relativizando la rigidez de la duración de los mandatos, contrapesar la excesiva acumulación de poder en el presidente y constituir una nueva modalidad de interrupción institucional del mandato presidencial, todo ello a favor de la resolución de crisis institucionales y de la preservación de la estabilidad democrática.
Todo lo anterior incluye asimismo la consideración de posibles abusos en el empleo de tal mecanismo: acentuar el ejercicio plebiscitario del gobierno a través de la ratificación de un funcionario vía referendo revocatorio, la especulación electoral anticipada de sectores opositores que aspiran a reemplazar al mandatario, un uso demasiado frecuente y fundado en razones diferentes de las que el mecanismo prevé, entro otros. Todos usos desviados que podrían derivar en una indeseada inestabilidad política e institucional.
... Executive-legislative relations are largely shaped by the institutions and organizations that facilitate inter-branch cooperation (Cheibub and Limongi, 2010). For example, some Latin American presidents were able to push forward their policy agenda partly because they had considerable partisan support, in spite of parties' institutional weakness (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001;Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997;Stein and Tommasi, 2008). In this view, partisan powers compensated institutional weaknesses; the support from fellow legislators, usually cultivated by presidents, helped them compensate the limits of their formal prerogatives. ...
It is usually expected that presidents can rely on their own parties to advance their policy agenda. But within-party policy differences can set back presidents' plans. What needs to happen inside a party to make it an effective Presidential Tool? I propose that the internal organization of the ruling party can help overcome preference heterogeneity and support a policy agenda. Focusing on Rafael Correa's presidencies, I use a mixed-method strategy to trace a process of informal organizational changes in the ruling party. This process concentrated decision-making power in Correa's hands, shaped intra-party decision-making, and lawmaking. The changing organization of the party provided rules and procedures that facilitated the management of legislative support, in spite of internal policy differences. These findings help understand the role of party organization on executive-legislative relations and the conditions that make the ruling party an effective presidential tool.
... Un presidente proactivo es aquel que tiene el poder constitucional de alterar el statu quo a través de sus facultades materialmente ejecutivas y legislativas. El mejor ejemplo de un presidente con fuerte respaldo constitucional como promotor legislativo se da a través del de decreto con el cual no necesitan la aprobación del Congreso para que su petición quede establecida en ley (Mainwaring 1997). Los presidentes con decreto tienen el poder suficiente para controlar la agenda y para hacerla realidad. ...
Este estudio analiza el argumento sobre la existencia de parálisis legislativa al existir gobiernos divididos en el caso mexicano. Se utiliza el Pacto por México como ejemplo de instrumento innovador para generar acuerdos con congreso divido gracias a la los liderazgos políticos.
... Widescale bureaucratic fragmentation across vertical agencies and spatial regions undeniably exists due to deep jurisdictional cleavages, and competition and bargaining proliferate between organizations and policy entrepreneurs (Brødsgaard, 2016;Gilli et al., 2018;Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1990;Mertha, 2005Mertha, , 2009). However, the ruling party in a single-party regime is usually well-organized, holds power of both constitutional and non-constitutional origin (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997), and can incentivize bureaucrats to align their attention and efforts with the demands of the central authority. ...
In autocracies facing widespread corruption, the allocation of the scant attention available for fighting corruption strongly affects corruption control. Although research has found that authoritarian regimes tend to fight corruption selectively, it is unknown whether and how autocracies allocate attention across different policy areas to combat corruption. We propose that single-party authoritarian regimes can steer anticorruption attention to the policy domains prioritized by the central authority through the mechanism of cross-organizational policy coordination. Using original datasets compiled from Chinese governmental and procuratorial policy papers from 1998 to 2016, we demonstrate that Chinese prosecutors direct anticorruption attention to the policy domains accentuated in the central government's major reforms. Our field interviews support this finding and reveal possible disruption of anticorruption efforts in policy domains falling off the central government's top list. Thus, we extend the research on political influence over anticorruption agencies and show that single-party regimes can instrumentalize anticorruption to serve the government's policy agenda, driving the allocation of limited anticorruption attention across policy areas.
... As is known, the political systems in this region are characterized by their presidentialism, within a system of political parties, and a general social system of aggregation of interest, which have tended to be weak institutions when compared to political figures (cfr. Linz & Valenzuela, 1994;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). ...
We investigate the evolution of the coverage of political campaigns in Chile, through a content analysis of the issues highlighted in four national newspapers in the 1989 and 2009 campaigns. We seek to determine the increases of two types of personalization and the coverage of the candidates’ strategies. We focus on personalization, understood first as “competences” (the coverage of political-personal characteristics of the candidates) which differ from the “privatization” (highlights the private lives of the candidates). Results show an expected increase in the space allocated to privatization and strategies, but no change in the coverage of the political traits of the candidates.
... Para Mainwaring y Shugart (1997) los poderes partidarios del Presidente se debilitan y la influencia que pueda tener a través de mecanismos de disciplina partidista, decrece ante un sistema de partidos fragmentado, que expresa la pluralidad existente en un país y contexto determinado y si bien esto puede ocasionar un estancamiento, un punto muerto en la relación ejecutivo-legislativo, la posibilidad de formar coaliciones y/o las facultades legislativas del Presidente, establecidas constitucionalmente, pueden influenciar la formulación de políticas y lo más importante obtener la cooperación de los legisladores miembros de los partidos de oposición (Negretto, 2006 p. 66). ...
El artículo discute cuatro visiones distintas sobre los modelos institucionales de representación y decisión en las democracias contemporáneas; considera las ventajas y desventajas que implica cada diseño institucional en particular, en términos de la efectividad en la toma de decisiones y la inclusión del mayor número de preferencias e intereses. El trabajo parte de la premisa que las democracias representativas no son todas iguales en la medida en que cada una, en su diseño, encuentra un límite en la maxi-mización de la dimensión de gobierno o en la dimensión representativa.
... Bu makalenin amacı Latin Amerika'da uygulanan başkanlık sisteminin demokrasi düzeylerine ne tür bir etkide bulunduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu konu Linz (1994) ve Mainwaring (1990) tarafından incelenmiş ve başkanlık sisteminin demokrasi üzerinde olumsuz etkisi olduğu vurgulanmaya başlanmıştır. Latin Amerika ülkeleri sürekli olarak sistemsel krizler yaşamaktadır. ...
Latin Amerika ülkeleri örneği üzerinden başkanlık sistemlerinin demokrasi üzerinde olumsuz etkisi uzun süre tartışma konusu olmuştur. Sistemsel krizlerin çok sık yaşandığı Latin Amerika ülkelerinde, başkanların yasama ve yargının yetkilerinin bir kısmını gasp etmesi ve bu erklerin düzgün çalışmasını engelleyecek şekilde yetkilerini kullanması yaygın olarak gözlenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı Latin Amerika’da uygulanan başkanlık sisteminin demokrasi düzeylerine ne tür bir etkide bulunduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktır. Latin Amerika ve Karayipler bölgesinden dört ülke -El Salvador, Uruguay, Meksika ve Brezilya- seçilerek başkanlık sistemlerinin işleyişi ve demokrasi göstergeleri karşılaştırılmıştır. Siyasal sistemi işlenmez kılan birçok etken olmasına rağmen çalışmada genel olarak siyasal kurumsal nedenlerden çıkan krizler ele alınmış ve başkanlık sisteminin Latin Amerika demokrasisi için başlıca sorunlardan biri olduğu önermesinin yeterince tutarlı olmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır.
... This is understood as the "degree and means by which elected policymakers are electorally responsible to citizens"(Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). ...
This papers aims to contribute to the understanding of
the (causal) relation between decentralization, democratization and the
institutional capacity and performance of local governments. Most of current
literature points out the positive effects of democratic decentralization reforms
in local institutions. However, there is an alternative body of literature around
clientelism and mobilization as non-democratic practices that hinder local
governance. Based on a unique case of a political electoral reform in the state
of Nayarit in México, this paper discusses the political economy of local
governments to disentangle the complex linkages between the change in the
“rules” through political decentralization and the effects in the “results” by
municipal government accountability and performance.
... In those with fixed terms and independent mandates, reshuffles have proven to be a strategic way to improve legislative support for the government and, thus, to overcome the risk of presidential instability through the threat of impeachments, forced resignations or coups (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015;Sedelius and Ekman 2010). In fact, comparative studies on presidentialism have shown that the institutional power presidents hold for legislative and interparty bargaining is crucial to overcoming their lack of partisan power during the course of their presidential mandate (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997;Shugart and Carey 1992). In particular, the literature on coalitional presidentialism has demonstrated how the presidential power to appoint and dismiss ministers unilaterally has shaped those interparty bargains and the make-up of presidential cabinets (Chasquetti 2001;Limongi and Figueiredo 1998;Neto 2006). ...
In this article we propose an innovative comparative analysis of cabinet reshuffles in Latin American presidential systems, focusing on personal incentives as drivers of ministerial turnover. We analyse when and why risks of reputational damage to a president drive cabinet changes. These risks are contingent and dependent upon the interaction between a president's reputational assets, on the one hand, and the high ‘walk-away value’ of the minister, on the other. We argue that ministerial turnover is a function of presidents' political and reputational resources as well as of exogenous factors. However, who is fired from the cabinet depends on the ministers' walk-away values and how threatened the president feels by them. We analyse cabinet changes in single-party and multiparty presidential governments in Latin America. Our results confirm the explanatory power of personal incentives to better understand the mechanisms that drive cabinet reshuffles.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
In recent years there has been a proliferation of concepts to describe intersectoral health policies. Much of this work orients around the promise of Health in All Policies (HiAP), an intersectoral approach that promotes addressing the social determinants of health (SDH) and social inequities in health. However, in practice, questions of health equity are often marginal or unattainable. Based on a conceptual critique of HiAP, we explore some of the problems involved when trying to effectively design and implement policies with the explicit goal of reducing social inequities in health. We find that the intersectoral approaches to policymaking and implementation of health equity policies should be seen as distinct from Health in All Policies. Using the example of intersectoral health policies seeking to reduce smoking, we argue that they have been relatively ineffective at reducing social inequities in smoking. We suggest that the capability approach (CA) could provide the basis of a policy framework for guiding more effective intersectoral policy action to reduce social inequities in health.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
The premise of this book is that public health policy is locked in a stalemate between the evidence-based and the politics-driven policy-making perspectives. This chapter argues that local public health actors on the ground develop strategies to work around this stalemate and circulate their evidence into the policy process. These strategies are indicative of a politically savvy conception of the policy process. The argument builds on data from an empirical study of active transportation policies in Montréal and Toronto (Canada) using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). In several instances, public health actors sidestepped political constraints by circulating their data to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizens or by building “coalitions” with stakeholders sharing similar policy values. We argue that these strategies for circulating evidence show how science and politics are intertwined in local practices. Local public health actors sometimes take the moral high ground but are also keenly attentive and attuned to local politics. The following strategies could help sidestep the stalemate: better connecting public health evidence with practical policy solutions; developing sustained interactions with non-public health actors working with or advocating for these policy solutions and getting the help of boundary actors skilled in connecting problems and solutions across policy sectors.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
There is stalemate of sorts between two views of the place of politics in public health. The public health enterprise is concerned with the ways in which “politics” interferes with the making of public health policy whereas political science sees politics as endemic and something to be better understood. To transcend this stalemate this exploratory essay proposes a typology of the possible interactions between political science and public health: political science without, in, of, and ideally with public health. Each has different implications for what role political science can play in better understanding the role scientific evidence does and does not play in the making of public health policy.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
This chapter explores how to combine insights from public health and political science to explain and adapt to policymaking in preventive public health. First, it describes public health approaches to policy change, focusing on the social determinants of health and the need for high political commitment to health equity. Second, it suggests that, while governments often use the right language to describe public health aims, there is a major gap between commitment, policy, and policy outcomes. We draw on public policy theories to explain this gap, with reference to the ambiguity of preventive policy initiatives, exacerbated by policymaking complexity in which no actor or organisation has strong coordinative capacity. Third, it relates these insights to a qualitative systematic review of ‘Health in All Policies’ (HiAP) research. We compare two different ways to use policy theories for practical lessons: to improve the HiAP playbook and programme logic or to prompt critical reflection on policymaking dilemmas.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
The utility of political science insight and methodology for public health has become increasingly apparent in discussions over policy implementation. However, prior to coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19), public health analyses undertaken within a political science paradigm focused primarily on how to mobilize decision-makers in order to bring about particular kinds of legislation or policy initiatives (policies on tobacco, alcohol, urban design, etc.). This chapter, written before the onset of COVID-19, suggested that it would be useful to use the lens of political science to understand pandemic planning, as the evidence-policy-politics nexus in public health differs substantially between the fields of health promotion and disease surveillance and response. Using the case of H1N1 in Nova Scotia, the chapter notes some of the political tensions that arose when decisions had to be made in the face of limited information, public pressure, and rapidly-changing circumstances.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic promised to teach us many things. One of the things it can help to teach us is about ways to do political science with public health. A political science with public health can work best if informed by a broad social-scientific understanding of both fields. This chapter, therefore, takes its inspiration from not just political science but also sociology and Science and Technology Studies, a field which focuses on the social construction of facts and their flow through society. The chapter focuses on three issues that seem to be particular causes of disciplinary misunderstanding and potentially fruitful research. The first is the professional authority of public health as a profession, including the extent to which it has a clear domain of expertise that others in government and academia respect. The second is the politics of data. Data are endogenous to the political process because the collection and coding of data of any kind are political decisions. The experience showed the potential value of viewing statistics as a dependent variable. The third is of the most contested concepts that can be found at the border of public health and political science: political will.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought into never-before-seen sharp focus the challenges at the interface between health and public policy. To address these challenges, epistemic trespassing is required and, more precisely, engagement between public health and political science. This book highlights the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of public health political science, explores the empirical contributions, and calls for deeper engagement between public health and political science. Not surprisingly, challenges remain: the need to unite, both spatially and conceptually, the global network of colleagues at this interface and expand it to include perspectives from the Global South and from places where democratic institutions are truncated if not completely absent; the need to promote more cross-disciplinary teaching, training, and research in public health and political science; and engagement with the full range of political science sub-disciplines beyond those highlighted in this volume. Finally, there is a need to leave the ivory towers of academe (whether political science or public health) and more proactively engage with policymaking efforts if we are to not simply make a point but make a difference.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
Good arguments can be made why the deployment of theories and concepts from political science disciplines to public health and health promotion fields yields novel and actionable insights. But this chapter purports to show that there may be a qualitative difference for the effectiveness of this deployment across jurisdictions. It shows how the application of a comprehensive and hybrid array of political science theories to public health issues at the ‘local’ level generates relevant and actionable insights for policy advocacy, agenda setting, prioritisation, implementation and learning. It draws on work in a range of Healthy Cities and local government settings around the world and shows that, although local is better, health policymaking always has glocal dimensions.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that the choices governments make to address infectious disease threats are necessarily and inherently informed by both scientific evidence and a host of other social, ethical, and economic considerations. Managing what are often competing goals is the stuff of politics. Because public health is political, it only makes sense to draw on the insights of political science, a discipline that seeks to systematically understand how politics and government work. However, what some have called public health political science is a relatively underdeveloped area, in part because of structural barriers that keep these two disciplines from engaging meaningfully. Thus, the major goals of this book are to provide examples of how political science perspectives can be used to better inform public health; to call on political scientists to learn from and engage in public health; and to advance the interconnection of public health and political science as scholarly disciplines. This chapter briefly explores the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this emergent field and provides a summary sketch of the individual chapters.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
This chapter explores the gradient of public health engagement and relationships with politics and political science. On one hand, public health values evidence-based decision-making grounded in orthodox hierarchies of evidence, while on the other, by nature of the issues, there are challenges to obtaining this data and to omitting values and contextual considerations. Additionally, public health competes with other health sectors for time and funding which makes political spheres difficult to break into as public health researchers. Apart from some critical public health scholars, many public health researchers have limited knowledge of policy-related concepts. This chapter describes a gradual shift from evidence-based to evidence-informed decision-making in policy, and what this means for conceptualizing policymaking and politics from a public health lens. Most importantly, the chapter describes the importance of the community as the space from which issues are identified, evidence is generated, and solutions are contextually bound.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
Despite long-standing critiques, the rationalist model—which describes a simple, linear process by which evidence should inform policy decision-making—remains dominant in the minds of many researchers and policymakers. Why is this the case, and does it matter? I argue that in addition to its intuitive, simple appeal, the rationalist model has been bolstered by repeated appeals from the public health research community for policymakers to rely (often solely) on the ‘best’ evidence. The insistence on an evidence hierarchy creates the idea that some forms of evidence are of more value than others, and that research design can be used as a way to quickly identify ‘best’ evidence. I argue this enables misuse of evidence and reduces the scope for effective dialogue between those who make and those who use evidence. A more useful approach would be to explore how knowledge and policy interact at a more systemic level, to help us understand who is involved in evidence production, valuing, codification, and use. Conceptualising the political economy of knowledge in this way offers a new way to begin thinking about how to creatively shape a more helpful environment for both policy and evidence.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
Recent efforts to counter the shortcomings of ‘evidence-based policy’ include strategies for democratising the utilisation of evidence. Deliberative forums involving a small number of lay citizens (‘mini publics’) are one of the most popular innovations. This chapter explores a specific type of mini-public known as ‘citizens’ juries’, using health inequalities in the UK as a case study. After introducing citizens’ juries, this chapter reflects on earlier research by the lead author, which identified a presumption among policy actors and researchers that the British public were unsupportive of the kind of macro-level policy proposals research suggests are required to reduce health inequalities. This chapter challenges this presumption via a review of existing qualitative studies, a national representative survey and three citizens’ juries. This analysis is used to reflect on the potential for citizens’ juries to help overcome the apparent tensions that exist between evidence, policy and publics. This chapter concludes that deliberative spaces offer constructive discursive spaces in which it appears possible to overcome tensions between evidence, policy and publics for at least some long-standing societal challenges. However, it also acknowledges reasons to be cautious, given limited political engagement, the high resources required, and challenges around ethically representing minority groups.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
This chapter examines the process of evidence use within the Westminster select committee system and the potential this offers for health-harming industries to influence the evidentiary content of policy debates. It introduces these issues through the example of the regulatory debate on electronic cigarettes and the 2018 Science and Technology enquiry into their regulations. Through this we identify a more general set of issues around the governance of select committees, and their generation and promotion of policy-relevant evidence, which is under-explored in the current research literature. The currently opaque accountability mechanisms create a significant opportunity for well-resourced policy actors, including trans-national corporations, to shape the evidentiary content of policy debates, via committee evidence gathering and synthesis processes and the potentially influential reports generated from this. Studies of the tobacco and other health-harming industries identify a long-standing strategy of seeking to ‘capture’ apparently independent bodies to generate research amenable to their underlying policy objectives. Such outputs are particularly valuable to corporate political actors, as they have the appearance of separation from the industry and enjoy the kudos associated with entities at the heart of the body politic. As such, it raises important questions about the oversight of evidence production by government bodies.
... Linz's interest was in democratic stability, and of all the thousands of publications his insight inspired, most are likewise about regime stability and transitions rather than public policy (though public policy and domestic politics researchers are quite aware of the impact of presidents on public policy, e.g., [Skowronek, 1982]). Subsequent scholarship has qualified Linz's point by emphasizing the extent to which party systems and electoral rules change presidential powers, accountability, and incentives (Elgie, 2005;Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). But Linz's point has power for understanding who mattered in COVID-19 response. ...
Despite long-standing efforts to enhance evidence-informed decision-making in public health policy, tensions remain between the goal of basing decisions on the best available scientific evidence and the need to balance competing aims, interests, and evidentiary sources in representative democracies. In response, several strategies have been proposed both to democratize evidence production and evaluation, and to effectively integrate evidence into the decision-making processes of institutions of representative democracy. Drawing on a synthesis of the conceptual and empirical literature, this chapter describes and categorizes mechanisms that aim to reconcile political and scientific considerations in evidence-informed policymaking and develops an analytical typology that identifies salient dimensions of variation in their selection and design.
... But the impetus for democratic progress has lost momentum, and numerous scholars and pundits have been quick to blame the increasing level of polarization for it. These claims are in line with extant research in political science and economics, linking polarization with a series of problems for democracy including breakdown (Huntington 1968;Linz 1978), the inability of governments to implement redistributive economic policies (Alberto et al. 1999;Rodrik 1999) or policy reforms (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997;Shugart and Carey 1992), and regime stability (Levitsky and Roberts 2011;Weyland et al. 2010). While the aforementioned studies provide important insights about the consequences of polarization, they offer no systematic explanation of its origins. ...
What explains political polarization across developing democracies? In contrast to extant studies, this article develops a novel argument that links electoral (in)stability at the party system level with varying levels of polarization. Specifically, we claim that increasing levels of electoral volatility generate high levels of uncertainty among partisan elites, which respond by setting clear policy positions that are frequently far away from the center in the ideological spectrum. As such, higher levels of volatility engender higher levels of polarization. Further, because the majority of party system change in developing democracies comes mainly from the emergence of new parties, we decompose the effects of stable party system volatility (for established parties) and replacement party system volatility (for newly competing parties) and hypothesize that higher levels of replacement volatility-as opposed to stable volatility-generate higher levels of polarization. Our main theoretical claims find strong qualitative and quantitative support.
... Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b: 449), for example, show that presidential systems are likely to function better "where presidencies have weak legislative powers, parties are at least moderately disciplined, and party systems are not highly fragmented" (see also . However, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997c) and Power and Gasiorowski (1997) do not find any support for this thesis. Beliaev (2006: 394) shows that "[s]trong executive powers of presidents corresponded with lesser advances in terms of democratic consolidation" (see also Van Cranenburgh 2008). ...
... But the impetus for democratic progress has lost momentum, and numerous scholars and pundits have been quick to blame the increasing level of polarization for it. These claims are in line with extant research in political science and economics, linking polarization with a series of problems for democracy including breakdown (Huntington 1968;Linz 1978), the inability of governments to implement redistributive economic policies (Alberto et al. 1999;Rodrik 1999) or policy reforms (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997;Shugart and Carey 1992), and regime stability (Levitsky and Roberts 2011;Weyland et al. 2010). While the aforementioned studies provide important insights about the consequences of polarization, they offer no systematic explanation of its origins. ...
What explains political polarization across developing democracies? In contrast to extant studies, this article develops a novel argument that links electoral (in)stability at the party system level with varying levels of polarization. Specifically, we claim that increasing levels of electoral volatility generate high levels of uncertainty among partisan elites, which respond by setting clear policy positions that are frequently far away from the center in the ideological spectrum. As such, higher levels of volatility engender higher levels of polarization. Further, because the majority of party system change in developing democracies comes mainly from the emergence of new parties, we decompose the effects of stable party system volatility (for established parties) and replacement party system volatility (for newly competing parties) and hypothesize that higher levels of replacement volatility—as opposed to stable volatility—generate higher levels of polarization. Our main theoretical claims find strong qualitative and quantitative support.
... Durante varios años y en los albores de las transiciones democráticas en América Latina, gran parte del debate sobre cómo asegurar las condiciones de estabilidad política que las nuevas democracias requerían estuvo centrado en el ya clásico debate sobre si era necesario virar hacia sistemas parlamentarios (Linz y Valenzuela, 1994) o si el presidencialismo también podía ser garantía de estabilidad (Shugart y Carey, 1992y Mainwaring y Shugart, 1997. En tal contexto se aportaron interesantes conclusiones sobre cómo los gobiernos de coaliciones pueden apuntalar la estabilidad en gobiernos democráticos (Chasquetti, 2008: 98). ...
Argentine history has had long periods of institutional instability. In this article we try to evaluate some of the causes of this instability. The purpose of this article is to identify the factors that explain the variation in government survival in Argentina. This analyzes the set of presidents who governed the Argentine Republic from 1862 until the present, emphasizing the effect that the ways of access to power have on the longevity of governments. The results show different patterns
that explain differences between the survival of presidents who came to office by popular vote and those rulers who acceded throughout other mechanisms. The latter register greater risks of bankruptcy
when they assume the government, a situation that diminishes as the presidency goes on. On the other hand, the rulers who acceded by popular vote face the opposite situation: the risk increases
along their mandates. Therefore, we can argue that the probabilities of replacement in governments with a different origin than electoral result from conflicts of interest that expressed their lack of legitimacy of origin and undermine their capacity to govern. On the contrary way, governments that results of electoral processes suffer from political erosion that occurs in the medium or long term.
Key words: Argentine – Government Survival – Political Regime – Parties – Democracy
... Some presidents have no formal power to introduce legislation and only have an ex post veto, while other presidents can introduce legislation. These studies also find that it is easier for a president to influence the policymaking process when the president's party controls the legislative branch (Cox and Morgenstern, 2001;Samuels and Shugart, 2010;Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997). ...
In this analysis, we examine the effect of party-voter linkages on executive and legislative influence over policymaking in democracies throughout the world. We expect committees in legislatures with programmatic parties to have more power over the public policymaking process than committees in legislatures with clientelistic parties do. We also expect executives in countries with programmatic parties to have less power over the public policymaking process than executives in countries with clientelistic parties do. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset and controlling for relevant factors, we find support for our expectations. The results of this paper shed light on how party linkages to constituents can affect executive and legislative influence over policymaking.
... In contrast to explanations focusing on fragmentation, which are actor-blind, this approach understands delegation in terms of the level of support commanded by the nominal party of the head of government. Famously described by Walter Bagehot (1867) as the 'efficient secret' of English parliamentary politics, legislators delegate their legislative and oversight powers to their partisan leaders (Cox 1987;Mainwaring and Shugart 1997;Rasch and Tsebelis 2011). Thus, delegation to the executive is likely to accelerate as the number of legislators belonging to the executive party increases. ...
Is legislative power flowing to the executive branch over time? Beginning in the 1990s, comparativists began to investigate delegation to the executive under different executive formats. Hypothesized causes include collective action problems due to legislative fractionalization, the presence of a dominant pro-executive faction, preference congruence vis-à-vis the head of government, and challenges posed by economic crises. We test these four hypotheses on a data set containing 2,020 country-year observations of democracies and semi-democracies between 1976 and 2014. Using V-Dem data, we derive annualized measures of shifts in executive–legislative relationships. Contrary to stereotypes of executive dominance, relative gains by legislatures are no less frequent than gains by executives, and economic crises do not advantage political executives in consistent ways. Surprisingly, some of the factors expected to benefit executives seem to enhance assembly authority as well. Robust democracy maintains interbranch power relations in equilibrium, while lower levels of polyarchy are associated with greater ‘noise’ in the relationship.
... 9 McCubbins (2000) discusses gridlock as an extreme case of state indecisiveness. In Latin America, Linz (1990) and Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) argue that political gridlocks caused by non-majority governments contributed to the breakdown of democracies. ...
Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a political agency model with ideological parties where citizens and politicians care about rents (a valence issue) and policy (a positional issue). Then, we analyze the impact of SP on the effectiveness of elections to discipline and select politicians. We demonstrate that SP unambiguously raises a majority of voters’ welfare in highly polarized non-competitive political environments, because it strengthens both discipline and selection without causing political gridlock. SP also raises voters’ welfare if elections are very effective at disciplining first period incumbents. Nevertheless, SP may reduce voters’ welfare if most rents go undetected and reform is not a first-order issue.
... Los aportes de este artículo son dos, uno a nivel teórico y otro a nivel metodológico. El primero consiste en vincular dos campos comunes en la ciencia política usualmente tratados por separado: uno enfocado en los jugadores de veto 1 en democracias parlamentarias (Tsebelis et al., 1997;Goplerud & Schleiter, 2016;Becher, 2018) y el otro en la relación entre Ejecutivo y Legislativo en democracias presidenciales (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). El segundo consiste en introducir un índice de rendimiento parlamentario que tiene como fin clasificar a las bancadas congresales en función de las similitudes en su comportamiento legislativo. ...
En los sistemas presidenciales latinoamericanos, la división y el balance de poderes entre el Legislativo y el Ejecutivo son de vital importancia para la gobernabilidad del estado. Sin embargo, la teoría y los casos evidencian que las constantes crisis políticas y un parlamento con oposición mayoritaria pueden generar la ruptura total entre estos dos poderes del estado. Evidencia de esto es el caso estudiado, en setiembre del 2019, el presidente peruano, Martín Vizcarra, disolvía de manera constitucional el Congreso convocando a Elecciones Congresales Extraordinarias en enero del 2020 debido al constante desencuentro y crisis políticas generadas a partir del desequilibrio de poderes del Ejecutivo y Legislativo.
De esta manera, el presente estudio pretende comprender la disolución del foro legislativo como resultado de un desequilibrio de poderes y, a su vez, definir el comportamiento del aparato legislativo peruano. Para ello, la investigación se basa en métodos de estadística multivariada con el objetivo de analizar el comportamiento del aparato legislativo. De la misma manera, se realiza una revisión teórica y se examina el marco jurídico sobre la disolución del Congreso en el Perú. Asimismo, este artículo espera también aportar al conocimiento teórico sobre crisis políticas, el balance de poder y la disolución parlamentaria a través del estudio del caso seleccionado.
In response to the growing salience of re-centralization in several Latin American countries that decentralized in the 1980s and 1990s, this paper examines presidential efforts to re-centralize fiscal power in the 1990s. In our study of re-centralization in Argentina and Brazil, we assess the utility of four common political economy explanations: the presence of economic crisis; the partisan powers of the president; the division of formal powers between the branches; and the extent of intra-bureaucratic conflict. We find that the success of economic stabilization measures facilitated re-centralization in both countries, though the pathways connecting the two phenomena were partially distinct. In Argentina, key re-centralization measures were rapidly achieved after stabilization as the result of the president's strong partisan powers and in the form of political deals within the Peronist party. Subsequently, the dissipation of President Carlos Menem's powers over the course of his second term facilitated the “return of the governors.” In Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso re-centralized despite weak partisan powers, largely by using his reputation as a successful stabilizer to build a broad reform coalition. In Cardoso's Brazil, strong partisan cohesion in important cabinet posts also served as a partial substitute for the lack of partisan power in the legislature. These findings suggest the need for a closer examination of re-centralization efforts, particularly in the wake of macroeconomic stabilization and economic reform.
El presente trabajo tiene como propósito analizar la revocatoria de mandato considerando características normativas, políticas e institucionales que afectan su aplicación. Para lograrlo se identifican las autoridades de elección popular a quienes se han dirigido las iniciativas populares, circunscripciones electorales a las que pertenecen y cargo político. Se toma como evidencia empírica el caso ecuatoriano, desde el año 1998 hasta el 2018. Es un estudio descriptivo con una metodología de tipo cuantitativa aplicada a una base de datos que identifica los procesos de revocatoria realizados en Ecuador. Entre los principales resultados destaca la relación entre el tamaño de la circunscripción y las iniciativas que se presentan, reconociendo a los gobiernos locales como las instituciones donde se han aplicado con mayor frecuencia este tipo de mecanismo de participación ciudadana. En los veinte años de estudio, se revela que los cargos legislativos de cantones, esto es concejalías, son los principales cargos revocados por iniciativas ciudadanas. El 25% de los referéndums han obtenido mayoría para revocar la autoridad. Existe un fuerte impacto del diseño institucional que explica la evolución histórica de este mecanismo en el país, las continuas modificaciones en requisitos y causales para su aprobación ha limitado la aplicación del mismo.
This article assesses the effect of changes in the lawmaking process on the success of the president’s legislative agenda, distinguishing between within‐term success (bills that passed during the term) and overall success (including bills that passed after the president left office). With the 2064 presidential bills introduced in seven terms (1990–2018) in Chile’s presidential system, we assess the impact of changes in lawmaking rules on within‐term (59.9%) and overall success (70.6%). Changes that decrease attributions of the president and create more opportunities for executive‐legislative bargaining—including concurrent elections—increase the chances of success of presidential bills. The use of presidential urgency motions, an agenda‐setting tool, makes bills more likely to pass, but the issuance of many urgency motions undermines the bill’s chances to succeed. Presidential bills introduced early in the term and those on issues where there is more policy convergence are more likely to pass.
La presente investigación analiza las relaciones entre el ejecutivo y el legislativo en el Perú en el período 2006-2020, caracterizado por un marcado presidencialismo parlamentarizado y un elevado multipartidismo. En este ciclo, se sucedieron tres mandatos presidenciales pero ocupados por seis jefes del Estado, dada la creciente inestabilidad y choque entre el ejecutivo y el congreso (unicameral). Se destaca la ausencia de coaliciones de gobierno y de mayorías oficialistas, así como la preeminencia de gabinetes apartidarios, lo que podría haber afectado la falta de compromiso por parte de los actores políticos. A ello, ha de añadirse la capacidad que mostró la oposición para condicionar la estabilidad de los gobiernos, incluyéndose al jefe del Estado y a los presidentes del consejo de ministros, pero a su vez el rol secundario que la cámara fue cobrando en materia legislativa. Asimismo, se identifican tres fases en cuanto a las relaciones entre la oposición y el oficialismo, evidenciándose una creciente hostilidad que finalizó con la situación de choque y bloqueo que caracterizó el bienio 2018-2020 y una grave crisis política.
en Political economists have argued that the design of political institutions bears important consequences for the quality of public policy, especially in areas like the privatization and regulation of utilities. Our study looks at how variations in key institutional traits of executive and legislative branches (specifically presidents' legislative powers, presidents' prerogatives to designate the director of the regulatory agency, and legislative fragmentation) affect investment in Latin American telecommunications, a critical sector for economic development. Institutional factors influence how easily executives and important political (legislative) parties can alter policies related to the telecommunications sector. We find that resolute institutional designs foster investment in the sector, but only under private ownership. For state-owned firms, decisive institutional designs have better effects on investment.
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Inversión en el sector de telecomunicaciones de América Latina: evaluación del papel de las instituciones políticas
Los economistas políticos han sostenido que el diseño de las instituciones políticas acarrea importantes consecuencias para la calidad de la política pública, especialmente en áreas tales como la privatización y regulación de servicios públicos. Nuestro estudio investiga cómo las variaciones en ciertos diseños institucionales estratégicos del ejecutivo y del congreso (específicamente los poderes legislativos del presidente, sus prerrogativas para designar al director de la agencia regulatoria, y la fragmentación legislativa) afectan la inversión en un sector crítico para el desarrollo económico: las telecomunicaciones en América Latina. Estas instituciones influyen en la facilidad con la que los ejecutivos e importantes partidos políticos (en la legislatura) pueden alterar las políticas públicas relacionadas con el sector de las telecomunicaciones. Nuestra investigación muestra que los diseños institucionales decididos fomentan la inversión en el sector, pero solo los de propiedad privada. Para las empresas públicas, los diseños institucionales decisivos tienen efectos más fuertes.
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拉美电信业投资：评估政治制度的作用
政治经济学家主张，政治制度的设计为公共政策质量揭开了重要结果，尤其是在私有化和公用事业规制等领域中。我们的研究分析了行政和立法机构的重要制度特征（具体地，总统的立法权、总统就任命监管机构负责人的特权、以及立法分化）的差异如何影响拉美电信业这一经济发展关键部门的投资。制度因素会影响行政领导和重要政治（立法）党派在改变电信业政策一事上的难易程度。我们发现，坚定的制度设计（resolute institutional designs）能培养电信业投资，但这仅在私人所有权下成立。对国有企业而言，决定性制度设计（decisive institutional designs）对投资产生更好的效果。
Este artículo analiza la formación y supervivencia de los gabinetes presidenciales en Colombia entre 1958 y 2018. Se comparan dos períodos de la historia política del país. Durante el primer período, de 1958 a 1990, Colombia funcionó con un sistema bipartidista. El segundo período, de 1991 a la actualidad, se caracteriza por la apertura del régimen político a nuevos partidos y la formación de gobiernos de coalición. Para esto, utilizamos modelos semiparamétricos y regresiones de Cox que nos permiten estimar la supervivencia de 581 nombramientos ministeriales e identificar los predictores de supervivencia en sus cargos a partir tanto de las características individuales de los ministros como de las características institucionales del sistema. El estudio muestra que la estabilidad en los cargos de los ministros durante el periodo bipartidista es menor que la duración de los ministros durante la etapa de presidencialismos de coalición.
We study how parties balance the benefits of disciplined programmatic campaigning with the electoral appeal of charismatic but potentially unfaithful candidates. We incorporate the well-known collective action problem arising from candidates' inability to fully internalize the fruits of programmatic brand building. Although parties may strategically use promotions to induce brand building efforts, we show that the party may be unable to commit to such a promotion scheme when the electoral returns to candidate charisma are high. We further demonstrate how electoral volatility and parties' ingroup loyalties shape their commitment to reward brand building. Volatility increases the focus on candidate charisma and decreases programmatic campaigning, but only among parties with weak group attachments. Parties with loyal partisans place emphasis on both candidate charisma and programmatic messaging. Empirical analyses of cross-national data and quantitative and qualitative case studies in Brazil, Austria, and Spain are consistent with our predictions.
Los diferentes volúmenes de las Guías Introductorias para la Elaboración Constitucional pretenden contribuir a los procesos nacionales de elaboración o reforma constitucional ayudando a los ciudadanos, partidos políticos, organizaciones de la sociedad civil, funcionarios públicos y miembros de asambleas constituyentes a tomar decisiones constitucionales informadas. Además proporcionan orientación al personal de las organizaciones intergubernamentales y a otros agentes externos en su intento de apoyar de manera informada y relevante al contexto a los decisores políticos locales. Las Guías se han concebido como introducción para lectores no especializados y como recordatorio útil para lectores con conocimientos previos o experiencia en elaboración constitucional. Las Guías, organizadas temáticamente en torno a las decisiones prácticas que deben tomar los contribuyentes a la elaboración constitucional, tienen como objetivo explicar cuestiones constitucionales complejas de manera rápida y sencilla.
Este libro busca dejar documentado el proceso de reforma política y electoral, así como sus principales etapas y logros, descrito por Pamela Figueroa y Tomás Jordán. Por otra parte, presentar el análisis de evaluación externa que sobre dicho proceso de reforma fue encargado por IDEA Internacional al politólogo uruguayo Profesor Daniel Chasquetti.
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