Entertaining Without Endorsing: The Case for the Scientific Investigation of Anomalous Cognition

Abstract

Empirical reports in mainstream journals that human cognition extends in ways that challenge the current boundaries of science (anomalous cognition) has been viewed with dismay by many who see it as evidence that science is broken. Here the authors make the case for the value of conducting and publishing well-designed studies investigating anomalous cognition. They distinguish between the criteria that justify entertaining the possibility of anomalous cognition from those required to endorse it as a bona fide phenomenon. In evaluating these 2 distinct thresholds, the authors draw on Bayes’s theorem to argue that scientists may reasonably differ in their appraisals of the likelihood that anomalous cognition is possible. Although individual scientists may usefully vary in the criteria that they hold both for entertaining and endorsing anomalous cognition, we provide arguments for why researchers should consider adopting a liberal criterion for entertaining anomalous cognition while maintaining a very strict criterion for the outright endorsement of its existence. Grounded in an understanding of the justifiability of disparate views on the topic, the authors encourage humility on both the part of those who present evidence in support of anomalous cognition and those who dispute the merit of its investigation.

Full text

Entertaining Without Endorsing: The Case for the Scientific
Investigation of Anomalous Cognition
Jonathan W. Schooler, Stephen Baumgart, and Michael Franklin
University of California Santa Barbara
Empirical reports in mainstream journals that human cognition extends in ways that
challenge the current boundaries of science (anomalous cognition) has been viewed
with dismay by many who see it as evidence that science is broken. Here the authors
make the case for the value of conducting and publishing well-designed studies
investigating anomalous cognition. They distinguish between the criteria that justify
entertaining the possibility of anomalous cognition from those required to endorse it as
a bona fide phenomenon. In evaluating these 2 distinct thresholds, the authors draw on
Bayes’s theorem to argue that scientists may reasonably differ in their appraisals of the
likelihood that anomalous cognition is possible. Although individual scientists may
usefully vary in the criteria that they hold both for entertaining and endorsing anom-
alous cognition, we provide arguments for why researchers should consider adopting a
liberal criterion for entertaining anomalous cognition while maintaining a very strict
criterion for the outright endorsement of its existence. Grounded in an understanding of
the justifiability of disparate views on the topic, the authors encourage humility on both
the part of those who present evidence in support of anomalous cognition and those
who dispute the merit of its investigation.
Keywords: psi, precognition, consciousness, anomalous cognition, Bayes’s theorem
If there is anything which human history demonstrates, it
is the extreme slowness with which the ordinary aca-
demic and critical mind acknowledges facts to exist
which present themselves as wild facts, with no stall or
pigeon-hole, or as facts which threaten to break up the
accepted system.
(William James, 1890, pp. 301–302)
Reasonable men may be allowed to differ where no
one can reasonably be positive.
(David Hume, 1779,p.3)
For over a century, scientists have reported
empirical findings suggesting the existence of
anomalous cognition
1
in which human thought
is claimed to extend in ways that are seemingly
at odds with conventional conceptions of sci-
ence. Hundreds of studies have described posi-
tive evidence that, independent of standard
channels, thought may be sensitive to future
events (precognition), the contents of other
minds (telepathy), distant locations (clairvoy-
ance), and may influence physical actions at a
distance (psychokinesis). Furthermore, al-
though the effect sizes for these studies are
generally quite small and replications variable,
as will be discussed, many meta-analyses report
positive findings. Not surprisingly the bulk of
anomalous cognition studies have been rele-
gated to “parapsychology” journals, however, a
number have appeared in top tier mainstream
1
A variety of names have been offered to categorize the
entirety of this class of controversial phenomena, including
“psi,” “parapsychology,” and “extra-sensory perception.”
We favor the term anomalous cognition because it clearly
demarcates the defining properties of all the cases under
consideration, namely that they reflect cognitive capacities
that are not straightforwardly accommodated within our
current scientific understanding.
Jonathan W. Schooler, Stephen Baumgart, and Michael
Franklin, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences,
University of California Santa Barbara.
The writing of this paper was assisted by a grant from the
Bial Foundation 251/14 and support from the Fetzer Frank-
lin Fund.
We thank Madeleine Gross, John Protzko, Michael Mrazek,
Robert Bernstein, Nina Schooler, Carmi Schooler, Daniel Gil-
bert, Timothy Wilson, and Michael Duggan for comments on
a draft. Because of serious medical issues, Michael Franklin
was not able to contribute to the actual writing of this article.
However, many of the ideas and perspectives represented here
were developed prior to his disability and his contribution to
these ideas warrant his inclusion as an author.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Jonathan W. Schooler, Department of Psycho-
logical and Brain Sciences, University of California Santa
Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA. E-mail: jonathan
.schooler@psych.ucsb.edu
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2018, Vol. 5, No. 1, 63–77 2326-5523/18/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000151
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